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In The Agrarian Vision, Thompson argues that a better appreciation of agrarian ideals could lead to a more virtuous, more sustainable way of life. While I agree with Thompson in many respects, there are some aspects of the book that I question and others that I would like to hear Thompson explicate in greater detail. In this paper, I question Thompson’s claim that agrarian farmers and farming communities serve as ideal models of virtuous habits and good character. I challenge Thompson’s use of virtue theory, particularly the notion that farming virtues can be acquired without participating in farming practices. In the end, I make the point that Thompson seems to vacillate between being realistic and being idealistic, which may seriously complicate our notions of responsibility and obligation in practice.

The evaluation of whether an animal has a life worth living (LWL) has been suggested as a useful concept for farm animal policymaking. But there are a number of different ways in which the concept could be applied. This paper attempts to identify and evaluate candidate ethical principles based on the concept. It suggests that an appropriate principle by which to apply the concept is one that (1) is framed in terms of preventing an animal having a life worth avoiding (LWA), rather than ensuring they have LWL, (2) is based on a prospective, rather than retrospective, concept of a life’s worth, and (3) relates to both the perpetuation and creation of an animal at all times during its life. The paper concludes by endorsing an overarching principle that no animal should be unreasonably caused to be, or allowed to remain, in a position of having a prospective LWA.

The choice between organic and conventional agriculture for farmers is modeled as an ethical decision. Farmers are either loyal to one of the systems or they optimize between systems. This model is empirically validated through a survey among Swiss farmers. A cluster analysis separates farmers into loyal organic, loyal conventional, and optimizing farmers. However, the three resulting clusters bore some, but not all the necessary characteristics of “optimizers” and “loyals.” A probit analysis shows that loyal farmers have larger farms than optimizers. Loyal organic farmers receive less direct payments than optimizers, which confirms the utility-maximizing pattern of the latter group.

Overall, the deregulation of genetically engineered (GE) crops for commercial cultivation in North America has been a success story. In several cases, however, GE crops have sparked concerns and disagreements among the stakeholders and there are incidences of court lawsuits, including a recent one on glyphosate resistant (GR) alfalfa (Medicago sativa, L.). While GE crops can provide operational benefits to farmers, challenges are looming from commercialization of perennial GE crops. The unique ecology and biology of these crops and GE alfalfa in particular can facilitate adventitious presence (AP) of GE traits and it makes more visible that economic risks for conventional growers and food/feed producers have not been adequately addressed by the GE regulatory system in the United States (US). Asynchronous market approvals and the existence of a number of GE sensitive export markets create uncertainties among the exporters. Policy development in these fields may be helpful for ensuring a broader acceptance and market success of GE agriculture in general. The analysis is focusing on the US, although many diagnosed problems are also relevant to other jurisdictions—in particular if no co-existence policy is in place.

A common tactic in public debates over science and technology is to dismissively label innovations as mere technological fixes. This tactic can be readily observed in the long debate over agricultural biotechnology. While these criticisms are often superficial rhetorical tactics, they point to deeper philosophical disagreements about the role of technology in society. Examining the technological fix criticism can clarify these underlying philosophical disagreements and the debate over biotechnology. The first part of this essay discusses the origins of the notion of a technological fix and distinguishes two types of technological fix criticisms, philosophical and practical. These distinctions are then applied to clarify and evaluate arguments for and against agricultural biotechnology. This analysis should clarify the debates over agricultural biotechnology and bring to light fundamental philosophical differences over the role of technology in agriculture.

It is commonly asserted that “death is not a welfare issue” and this has been reflected in welfare legislation and policy in many countries. However, this creates a conflict for many who consider animal welfare to be an appropriate basis for decision-making in animal ethics but also consider that an animal’s death is ethically significant. To reconcile these viewpoints, this paper attempts to formulate an account of death as a welfare issue. Welfare issues are issues that refer to evaluations concerning an animal’s interests. This includes evaluations that refer only to comparisons between the presence and absence of states, including positive states. This means that an animal’s death may be a welfare issue insofar as it leads to the exclusion of relevant positive states. This allows us to deny that death is necessarily not a welfare issue.

Evans et al. (Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2008) have attempted to enmesh me in their dispute with the Florida Bureau of Invasive Plant Management about a specific system, Kings Bay/Crystal River. In so doing, they repeatedly mischaracterize my positions in order to depict, incorrectly, invasion biology as monolithic and me as a representative of one extreme of a false dichotomy about management of introduced species. In addition, they introduce an issue irrelevant in this case (extinctions) and cite incorrect data. Proposing to manage people, manatees, introduced plants, and cyanobacteria in Kings Bay by participative adaptive management, they ignore the fact that living organisms can both disperse autonomously and hitchhike. Finally, they present few details on any aspect of their management proposal and do not address the myriad problems that have beset previous attempts at scientific adaptive management, especially at large scales. Until such a management approach is fleshed out and implemented, it is impossible to assess its validity for Kings Bay, and it is very premature to suggest it as a general model for dealing with invasive species disputes.

This paper discusses the ethical and regulatory issues raised by "intragenics" - organisms that have been genetically modified using gene technologies, but that do not contain DNA from another species. Considering the rapid development of knowledge about gene regulation and genomics, we anticipate rapid advances in intragenic methods. Of regulatory systems developed to govern genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, the Australian system stands out in explicitly excluding intragenics from regulation. European systems are also under pressure to exclude intragenics from regulation. We evaluate recent arguments that intragenics are safer and more morally acceptable than transgenic organisms, and more acceptable to the public, which might be thought to justify a lower standard of regulation. We argue that the exemption of intragenics from regulation is not justified, and that there may be significant environmental risks associated with them. We conclude that intragenics should be subject to the same standard of regulation as other GMOs.

The four papers in this issue are all concerned, in one way or another, with the relationship between food ethics and the health of the public. The papers cover: trust in relation to food issues; functional foods; the ethics of patenting GM crops; and the challenges facing regulators interested in reducing diet-related health problems.

When it comes to conflict over risk management priorities in food production, a number of observers, including myself, have called for some sort of public deliberation as a means of resolving the moral disagreements underlying such conflicts. This paper asks how, precisely, such deliberation might be facilitated. It is shown that representative democracy and the liberal regulation that most Western democracies adhere to place important constraints on public deliberation. The challenge is to find forums for public deliberation that can operate within these constraints while still making a constructive contribution.

The continuing existence of zoos and their good purposes such as conservation, science, education, and recreation, can be ethically justified only if zoos guarantee the welfare of their animals. The usual criteria for measuring animal welfare in zoos are physical health, long life, and reproduction. This paper looks at these criteria and finds them insufficient. Additional criteria are submitted to expand the range of welfare considerations: natural and abnormal behavior; freedom and choice; and dignity. All these criteria should play a role in analyzing zoo animal welfare and interests but dignity has the overriding part because it impacts on both animal and human interests.

One common method of criticizing genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is to label them as “magic bullets.” However, this criticism, like many in the debate over GMOs, is not very clear. What exactly is the “magic bullet criticism”? What are its origins? What flaw is it pointing out in GM crops and agricultural biotechnology? What is the scope of the criticism? Does it apply to all GMOs, or just some? Does it point to a fatal flaw, or something that can be fixed? The goal of this paper is to answer these questions and clarify the magic bullet criticism of agricultural biotechnology. It is hoped that the results of this exercise will be helpful in advancing deliberationover the role GMOs and agricultural biotechnology should play in twenty-first-century agriculture.

The industrialization of agriculture not only alters the ways in which agricultural production occurs, but it also impacts the decisions farmers make in important ways. First, constraints created by the economic environment of farming limit what options a farmer has available to him. Second, because of the industrialization of agriculture and the resulting economic pressures it creates for farmers, the fact that decisions are constrained creates new ethical challenges for farmers. Having fewer options when faced with severe economic pressures is a very different situation for farmers than having many options available. We discuss the implications of constrained choice and show that it increases the likelihood that farmers will consider unethical behavior.

In her recent article, “Does autonomy count in favor of labeling genetically modified food?,” Kirsten Hansen argues that in Europe, voluntary negative labeling of non-GM foods respects consumer autonomy just as well as mandatory positive labeling of foods with GM content. She also argues that because negative labeling places labeling costs upon those consumers that want to know whether food is GM, negative labeling is better policy than positive labeling. In this paper, we argue that Hansen’s arguments are mistaken in several respects. Most importantly, she underestimates the demands of respecting autonomy and overestimates the cost of positive labeling. Moreover, she mistakenly implies that only a small minority of people desire information about GM content. We also explore the extent to which her arguments would apply to the US context, and argue that any discussion of the relationship between autonomy and labeling should include not just considerations of consumer autonomy but also considerations of what we call citizen autonomy.

In this paper I argue that consumerautonomy does not count in favor of thelabeling of genetically modified foods (GMfoods) more than for the labeling of non-GMfoods. Further, reasonable considerationssupport the view that it is non-GM foods ratherthan GM foods that should be labeled.

This article explores what an ethicfor organic animal husbandry might look like,departing from the assumption that organicfarming is substantially based in ecocentricethics. We argue that farm animals arenecessary functional partners in sustainableagroecosystems. This opens up additional waysto argue for their moral standing. We suggestan ethical contract to be used as acomplementary to the ecocentric framework. Weexpound the content of the contract and end bysuggesting how to apply this contract inpractice. The contract enjoins us to share thewealth created in the agroecosystem (by ourjoint contributions) by enjoining us to carefor the welfare and needs of the individualanimal, and to protect them from exploitation(just as human co-workers should not beexploited). The contract makes promoting goodanimal welfare a necessary condition forbenefiting farm animals. Animals for their partare guaranteed coverage under the contract solong as they continue to contribute to thesystem with products and services.

In 2001, it was announced thattransgenic DNA had introgressed intotraditional strains of maize in Mexico. Acontroversy erupted and raged throughout 2001and 2002. This episode represents an acutebreakdown in scientific discourse. Given thestakes in the genetically modified organismdebate, a breakdown in scientific discourse isalarming. The following inquiry looks into thecauses of this breakdown. Ultimately, it willbe argued that the underlying problem is thecurrent institutional structure of science,particularly in the United States. If thediagnosis is correct, then the proper course oftreatment is to pursue a program ofinstitutional reconstruction.

Pest control operations andexperimentation on sentient animals such as thebrushtail possum can cause unnecessary andavoidable suffering in the animal subjects.Minimizing animal suffering is an animalwelfare goal and can be used as a guide in thedesign and execution of animal experimentationand pest control operations.

In spite of stricter provisions in the new EU directive on deliberate release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), critics still advocate a moratorium on permits for cultivation of GMOs. Howev ...

There is an ongoing debate in animalethics on the meaning and scope of animalwelfare. In certain broader views, leading anatural life through the development of naturalcapabilities is also headed under the conceptof animal welfare. I argue that a concern forthe development of natural capabilities of ananimal such as expressed when living freelyshould be distinguished from the preservationof the naturalness of its behavior andappearance. However, it is not always clearwhere a plea for natural living changes overinto a plea for the preservation of theirnaturalness or wildness. In the first part ofthis article, I examine to what extent theconcerns for natural living meet ``theexperience requirement.'' I conclude that someof these concerns go beyond welfare. In thesecond part of the article. I ask whether wehave moral reasons to respect concernsfor the naturalness of an animal's living thattranscend its welfare. I argue that the moralrelevance of such considerations can be graspedwhen we see animals as entities bearingnon-moral intrinsic values. In my view the``natural'' appearance and behavior of an animalmay embody intrinsic values. Caring for ananimal's naturalness should then be understoodas caring for such intrinsic values. Intrinsicvalues provide moral reasons for action iffthey are seen as constitutive of the good lifefor humans. I conclude by reinterpreting,within the framework of a perfectionist ethicaltheory, the notion of indirect dutiesregarding animals, which go beyond andsupplement the direct duties towardsanimals.

An experimental survey was undertakento explore the links between thecharacteristics of a moral issue, the degree ofmoral intensity/moral imperative associatedwith the issue (Jones, 1991), and people'sstated willingness to pay (wtp) for policy toaddress the issue. Two farm animal welfareissues were chosen for comparison and thecontingent valuation method was used to elicitpeople's wtp. The findings of the surveysuggest that increases in moral characteristicsdo appear to result in an increase in moralintensity and the degree of moral imperativeassociated with an issue. Moreover, there was apositive link between moral intensity/moralimperative associated with an issue andpeople's stated wtp for policy to address theissue. The paper discusses the relevance of thefindings of the survey in the context of thedebate concerning the relationship betweenmoral and economic values and the use of thecontingent valuation method to estimatepeople's wtp of policy options with moraldimensions.

The UN Cartagena Protocol onBiosafety adopted in Montreal, 29 January, 2000and opened for signature in Nairobi, 15–26 May,2000 will exert a profound effect oninternational trade in genetically modifiedorganisms (GMOs) and their products. In thispaper, the potential effects of variousarticles of the Protocol on international tradein GMOs are analyzed. Based on the presentstatus of imports of GMOs and domestic researchand development of biotechnology in China,likely trends in imports of foreign GM food andrelated products after China accedes to WTO isexplored. Also, China's potentialcountermeasures to control and regulate importsof GMOs in line with implementation of theProtocol are discussed. China, in recent times,has increased its food and agricultural importssubstantially from USA and Canada. Chinaimported soybean 10.42 mill. tons in 2000 andabout 15 mill tons in 2001, of which majorityare from USA where GM soybean accounts for60%. The plantation of US Monsanto'stransgenic Bt cotton was increased to more than1 million ha in China in 2001. Though China haspaid great attention to develop biotechnology,it appears to have little scope to export GMOsand GM products. So China may consider a rangeof administrative measures to implement theCartagena Protocol and to regulate its importof GMOs and GM agricultural products.Consequently, the Regulation on Safety ofAgri-GMOs was issued on June, 2001 and followedthree detailed rules issued in Jan. of 2002,with a priority to limit foreign GMOs importingby safety certification and labeling system.These were outlined taking into accountpolicies adopted in Western countries such asgreen barriers to international trade.

Three types of concern for animal welfare are widelyheld: Animals should feel well, they should function well, andthey should lead natural lives. The paper deals with a well-knownanswer to the question of why such concerns are morallyappropriate: Human beings have direct duties towards animals,because animals are beings that can flourish, the flourishing ofanimals is intrinsically or inherently valuable, and that whichis conducive to their flourishing is a legitimate object of moralconcern. Looking for a tenable conception of direct dutiestowards animals, the following questions are discussed: Whatshould we take it to mean that ``animal flourishing isintrinsically or inherently valuable?'' Under what conditions doesa living being's ability to flourish create direct duties towardsthis being? Is awareness or sentience required for there to bedirect duties towards a living being? Does such a requirementimply that moral concerns for animals would be limited to theirfeeling well, or does it also give way to having moral concernsfor their functioning well and leading natural lives? Can onetake into account considered judgements that claim that towardsdifferent animals we have moral duties that differ in kind and/orstrength? If environmental ethics cannot be based on theconception of direct duties here discussed, should one draw adistinction between duties towards ourselves, our fellow humanbeings, or animals, and duties regarding plants, or collectiveentities such as populations, species, and ecosystems?

The aim of this paper is to clarify the ethical issuessurrounding GM crops by examining the various stages or levels intheir development, production, and consumption. Previous workabout the acceptability or non-acceptability of GM crops hastended to conflate these various levels, partly as a result ofwhich GM crops are all-too-often simply said to be ``good'' or``bad.'' There are, though, various problems with such a binarycategorization. I look in particular at the duties of scientists,companies, regulatory systems, farmers, retailers, and consumers.

Animal husbandry has been accused ofmaltreating animals, polluting the environment, and soon. These accusations were thought to be answered whenthe Dutch research program ``Sustainable TechnologicalDevelopment'' (STD) suggested a government-initiatedconversion from meat to novel protein foods (NPFs).STD reasoned that if consumers converted from meat toNPFs, non-sustainable animal husbandry would no longerbe needed. Whereas STD only worried about how toconstruct NPFs with a meat bite, this paper drawsattention to the presumed, but problematic, role forthe government in the execution of the STDsuggestions. Although vegetarians take the credo ``YouAre What You Eat'' literally and accuse non-vegetariansof being beasts, a different interpretation is morepromising: eating meat has become a leading thread inmany lifestyles and narratives of self-identity. Sincethe freedom to follow your own lifestyle orconsumptive preferences is a core value incontemporary affluent societies, governmentintervention in the formation and satisfaction ofconsumer preferences for meat dishes is a precariousissue. Hence, NPFs might be interesting for a smallfraction of society, but we had better not expect toomuch from a government-initiated conversion from meatto NPFs as the answer to animal husbandry'sproblems.

The influence of religious beliefs on people's attitudes andactions in the area of animal welfare was examined by interviewing dairyworkers on kibbutzim (communal agricultural settlements) in Israel.Workers on religiously observant kibbutzim were no more consistent intheir attitudes toward and treatment of dairy cows than workers onnon-observant and selectively observant kibbutzim.

The paper addresses the issue of how indemocratic societies a procedure might be formulatedto facilitate ethical judgements on modernbiotechnologies used in food production. A frameworkfor rational ethical analysis, the Ethical Matrix, isproposed. The Matrix adapts the principles describedby Beauchamp and Childress for application to medicalissues, to interest groups (e.g., producers,consumers, and the biotic environment) affected bythese technologies. The use of the Matrix isillustrated by applying it to an example of a ``novelfood,'' viz., a form of genetically modified maize.

Ben Mepham has proposed that a ``matrix'' beused in the analysis of ethical problems in foodproduction and elsewhere. In particular cases, thismatrix would ideally cross the most important moralprinciples involved, and the individuals and groupsaffected by the decisions. In the following, Mepham'smodel is assessed in the case of geneticallyengineered bovine growth hormone. My argument is thata more straightforwardly ``consequentialist'' analysiscan draw attention to the problems of using thehormone better than Mepham's original proposal. It ispossible, however, that some nuances will be lost inthe process. I do not, therefore, argue for theoverall superiority of my suggestion – it is merelya slightly different, and perhaps sometimes a morepromising, way to analyze the ethical dimensions offood production and marketing.

The creation of a cloned sheep from mammary tissue has raisedmajor social concern, and much talk about major ethical issuesoccasioned by this technology. It is necessary to separategenuine from spurious ethical issues here, a task made failureto initiate ethical discussion and explanation of new technologyas well as by fear reactions in society. As in geneticengineering of animals, issues about cloning fall into threecategories – suggestions that the technology is inherently wrong,risk emerging from the technology and harm to the creatureengendered. The issues regarding the cloning of humans can beanalyzed using the same categories.

This paper examines the relationship between North American beef consumption and deforestation in South and Central America. Some writers have argued that consumption of hamburgers in North America, particularly hamburgers consumed in fast food restaurants, contributes to the depletion of the rainforest in South and Central America. We survey the published policy literature on the causes of rainforest depletion in the region. We also review the published estimates of the rate and extent of clearing of rainforest that has occurred in South and Central America since 1970. Finally, we review the data on beef imports and consumption in Canada and the United States in a effort to assess the importance of South and Central America as suppliers of beef to the North American market. We conclude that the relationship between beef consumption in North America should not be considered an important cause of forest depletion in South and Central America. Domestic policies and market forces in the countries where rainforests are located are the leading causes of rainforest depletion in this region. This lesson seems to have been lost on some popular and even some textbook writers on this subject.

Through the process of domestication the genetic make-up of farm animals can be changed by means of either selective breeding or genetic engineering. This paper is about the ethical limits to such genetic changes. It is suggested that the ethical significance of domestication has become clear recently in the light of genetic engineering, but that the problem has been there all along. Two ethical approaches to domestication are presented, genetic integrity and animal welfare. It is argued that the welfare approach is superior. Finally, five ethical hypotheses based on the welfare approach are presented.

Is the use of electrical stunners adequately discharging our moral obligations with respect to the humane slaughter of poultry? Below, three separate lines of investigation show that we cannot give an unequivocal answer to this question. First, five potentially humane methods of poultry slaughter are examined. Electrical stunning is found to be an acceptable method of rendering birds unconscious before slaughter. However, we lack sufficient evidence to claim that it is the most humane method currently available. Second, surveys of poultry processing plants show that, with alarming frequency, a proper stun is not achieved. An investigation of the complexity of the electrical stun process shows the difficulties involved and suggests that under many on-the-floor slaughterhouse conditions, consistently proper stunning is likely to remain unachievable. Finally, the call to overcome inconsistent stun results by increasing current flow to levels that electrocute birds is investigated. Controversy surrounding the impact of electrocution on carcass quality and operator safety will continue to cause resistance to the adoption of this method of poultry slaughter.

Without looking beyond the conditions under which laying hens typically live in the contemporary U.S. egg industry, we can understand why the production and consumption of “factory farmed” eggs could be judged immoral. However, the question, “What (if anything) is wrong with animal by-products?” cannot always be adequately answered by looking at the conditions under which animals live out their productive lives. For the dairy industry looks benign in those terms, but if we look beyond the conditions under which milk cows live, we can better understand some animal rights activists' reasons for objecting to dairy products. The contemporary U.S. dairy industry requires a slaughter industry between one-seventh and one-third the size of the contemporary beef industry. Today, beef slaughter is vastly more humane than poultry slaughter, but if today's beef slaughter industry is judged emmoral, the contemporary dairy industry should be judged similarly immoral, because the two are wedded. This is the deep reason for moral suspicion of the dairy industry.

Infants, children, adolescents, and pregnant and lactating women have been described as groups with special needs. Regardless of diet chosen, these groups are at higher risk for nutritional deficiencies than adult males. Vegan diets can be safely used by these groups if foods, and in some instances supplements, are selected which provide a healthful and nutritionally adequate diet. Guidelines have been developed for those choosing to follow vegan diets. In many instances vegan diets offer health benefits. Studies of vegans are limited by factors such as heterogeneity of diets, the size and extent of this type of study, and difficulty in subject identification. There is a scarcity of studies of “newer” vegetarians who are often more mainstream than the vegetarians of the 1960s and 1970s. In some instances this has led to assumptions about today's vegans which are based on out-dated information. Thorough scientific studies of today's vegetarians, especially of those in groups with special needs, are needed.

A number of distinct definitions ofsustainable agriculture have been proposed. In this paper we criticize two such definitions, primarily for conflating sustainability with other objectives such as economic viability and ecological integrity. Finally, we propose and defend a definition which avoids our objections to the other definitions.

Farmers in a southwestern Ontario watershed were surveyed to determine factors influencing their attitudes towards adoption of soil conservation practices. The majority of farmers in the watershed were internally motivated which indicates they believe that their own actions determine their successes and failures. Most respondents were also environmentally oriented. However, although many farmers in the study area have adopted crop rotations and cross-slope tillage, the adoption rate of conservation tillage is low. The survey suggests that the low adoption rate may be more a function of perceived economic risk associated with the tillage practice than lack of farmer motivation.

Salmon farming is a rapidly expanding industry. In order for it to develop in an ethical manner, many ethical issues must be confronted. Among these are questions regarding the quality of life of salmon on farms. To develop reasonable answers to these questions considerable thought must be devoted to developing appropriate standards of care for salmon. If these questions are not addressed the results could be bad both for salmon and for salmon farmers.