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In 2019, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted General Comment No 5 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence (Article 12(1)). In this general comment, the commission elaborated on the right to freedom of movement and residence within state borders. This issue, while explicit in international human rights law, is a challenge within various jurisdictions, including in Africa. This article provides a background to and commentary on General Comment No 5, leveraging on the insight of the authors, who participated in its drafting. Unlike the UN Human Rights Committee's earlier general comment, General Comment No 5 provides detailed guidance on the internal dimension of the right to free movement and residence. As “soft law”, its persuasive force depends on a number of factors, including its use at the domestic level, its visibility and its integration into regional human rights jurisprudence.

Federalism presents a dilemma for the implementation of international human rights law in those African states that operate federal constitutions. Central governments in these states enjoy international legal personality, make treaties and represent their states as parties to those treaties, yet internal legislative competence over some issues regulated by treaty is commonly shared between central and regional governments. Consequently, while central governments bear responsibility for transforming international standards into national law, challenges arise in areas such as the protection of children from child marriage, where they lack exclusive national legislative competence. How have these states managed to implement international law without violating their own constitutions? Applying a comparative approach, this article argues that African federal states have employed two main models to overcome the dilemma, neither of which has been totally effective. Drawing lessons from federal states outside Africa, the article suggests other mechanisms to perfect Africa's two main models.

Modern peacekeeping is increasingly expansive, and much of it occurs in Africa. The African Union's attitude to the challenges of regulating this modern peacekeeping is therefore an important source for the associated legal debates, but one that is often neglected (in part because the sources are limited and often in draft form). This article seeks to articulate and then critique the AU's emerging view on the application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law to peacekeeping activity and the relationship between the two bodies of law in this context. It argues that the AU's emerging position treats international humanitarian law as a narrowed lex specialis, only displacing international human rights law in relation to peacekeepers while they are actively engaged in armed conflict. Even this position, however, underestimates the extent to which the pervasive rights-based concerns in AU sources imply a still more pervasive application of international human rights law to its peacekeeping activities.

Property rights discourse, particularly the scope, nature, distribution, redistribution, recognition and protection of property rights, has dominated debate in African post-colonial property rights systems. In Zimbabwe, property rights law has been a contested space since the colonial era. That the property rights system is a contested arena is particularly so in view of the fact that colonial subjugation in Zimbabwe was characterized, in a very important way, by politically motivated land dispossession and, consequently, inequitable property rights distribution patterns. As a result, Zimbabwe's property rights law has always responded to mainstream, albeit fluid, political and economic undercurrents. This has meant that mainstream historical and contemporary debates have provided the context for understanding the constitutional regulation of property and land rights in Zimbabwe. This article assesses the constitutional regulation of constitutional property and land rights in Zimbabwe, and the conflicts and tension that are accommodated in the constitutional property rights framework.

This article is constructed around the premise that women's rights to safe abortion give rise to obligations that the state has a positive duty to implement. Using Uganda as a case study, it frames failure by a state to implement its abortion laws in ways that render the rights tangible and accessible to women as a violation of human rights. The article develops a normative human rights framework for imposing on a state the obligation to take positive steps to implement abortion laws that the state, itself, has adopted. The framework does not depend on requiring the state first to reform its substantive laws or broaden the grounds for abortion. Rather, it focuses on the implementation of existing domestic laws. The article draws its remedial juridical responses partly from conceptions of women-centred rights to procedural justice, equality and health, and partly from jurisprudence developed in recent years by United Nations treaty-monitoring bodies and the European Court of Human Rights.

This article describes the politics related to the criminalization of torture in South Africa. It studies the differences between torture as an international crime and as a crime under international human rights law. The South African anti-torture law is analysed and critiqued against the standards and provisions set out in the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The article recommends amendments to the South African law, aimed at making the combating of torture more effective.

If applied in isolation from the fundamental rights of women seeking abortion services, the right to conscientious objection can render any given rights to abortion illusory, including the rights to health, life, equality and dignity that are attendant to abortion. A transformative understanding of human rights requires that the right to conscientious objection to abortion be construed in a manner that is subject to the correlative duties which are imposed on the conscientious objector, as well as the state, in order to accommodate women's reproductive health rights. In recent years, the Colombian Constitutional Court has been giving a judicial lead on the development of a right to conscientious objection that accommodates women's fundamental rights. This article reflects on one of the court's decisions and draws lessons for the African region.

A solid stream of cases have been submitted to the quasi-judicial and judicial treaty monitoring bodies making up the African regional human rights system, namely the African Commission, the African Children's Rights Committee and the African Human Rights Court, and also to sub-regional courts in Africa. Allowingamicus curiaebriefs to supplement the parties' pleadings can enhance the soundness of the factual and legal findings of these bodies, especially given their institutional and practical constraints. Thus far, the use ofamicus curiaeinterventions before the African regional human rights bodies has been negligible. In order to ensure greater participation byamici, this article suggests that the possibility ofamicusintervention should be unequivocally provided for under each of the applicable legal regimes, that the grounds for accepting or rejecting interventions should be clearly articulated, and that access to information about pending cases should be provided routinely.

This is the first judgment from the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to address the rights of indigenous peoples and their claims to land and natural resources. It is also the first ruling by an international tribunal which finds a violation of the right to development. The Commission examined the Kenyan government's eviction of the indigenous Endorois community from their ancestral land around Lake Bogoria to establish a game reserve. Finding violations of the rights of the Endorois to religion, culture, property, natural resources and development, the Commission called for the recognition of Endorois ownership of their ancestral land and its restitution to the community. This case note describes the Commission's legal analysis of the Endorois case and explains how the decision establishes an important precedent for ensuring equity and participation in natural resource management and development on indigenous lands.

The right to non-discrimination for all children is established in international human rights law. International children's rights law further provides for the common responsibility of parents for the maintenance of their children. African customary law and common law have always made a distinction between children born in and out of wedlock so far as the duty to maintain them is concerned. The resilience of this customary and common law approach is evident in statutory provisions of the countries discussed in this article. This is despite international obligations under children's rights treaties ratified by these countries. On the face of it, the distinction of responsibility based on marital status seems harmless. However, in view of gender inequities and resource distribution between men and women in society, such a distinction has serious implications for the rights of affected children.

A practice of frequent constitutional amendments started shortly after Kenya attained her independence in 1963. Consequently, the country has witnessed a confusion of systems of governance, ranging from single-party autocracy to virtual multi-party democracy, which have served to endorse the chronic condition of human rights violations in the country. In the process of such experimentation, Kenyans have unabatedly been denied the enjoyment of many of their fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to participate in their government. This article analyses Kenya's constitutional order with the intention of highlighting the extent to which the country's citizens have been denied the right to participate in their government. Drawing inspiration from the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the article recommends ways in which this right could be entrenched in the country's constitutional order.

This article analyses the challenges facing those living in poverty in Nigeria in accessing justice for the enforcement of their rights, despite those rights being constitutionally protected and despite the existence of a specific procedure for their enforcement. People living in poverty are generally most likely to see their human rights violated, and least likely to enforce their rights. The article posits that the judiciary in developing countries has a crucial role to play in fighting human rights violations specifically affecting people living in poverty, and notes the great challenge for the Nigerian legislator and judiciary towards making justice accessible in practical terms to the needy in Nigeria. The example of public interest litigation in India can serve as a source of inspiration in this respect.

This article re-assesses the means available for the effective enforcement of human rights in Tanzania based on the valid assumption that the proclamation of human rights in legal instruments, be they at the domestic or international level, is meaningless without the entrenchment of effective enforcement procedures. Particular attention is directed towards the re-examination of the capacity and ability of the courts to meet the challenges posed by human rights and political discourses in their ongoing transformation. The issue is whether they can be said to be adequately providing effective avenues for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights.

Each right has a corresponding duty. The African Children's Charter, under article 31, imposes a range of duties on children. Understandably, it could become contentious when an instrument on the rights and welfare of children expressly imposes duties on them. After setting the platform for discussion by highlighting international experiences and outlining the African concept of human rights, this article critically examines and attempts to clarify the precise meaning, content, conditions of compliance and application of those duties for children. By way of conclusion, it suggests that article 31 represents a valuable addition to the international human rights agenda, and that a purposeful interpretation of its constituent parts reveals that children should be required to play a role at family, community, national and continental levels, in accordance with their age and maturity as they grow up, as part and parcel of their heritage, empowerment and developing citizenship.

This article considers the importance of preventing mother to child transmission of HIV in Africa. It argues, however, that any approach to achieving this aim must be consistent with respect for human rights. In particular, it argues that mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women violates their rights to autonomy, health and reproductive care, and non-discrimination, all guaranteed in the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women and other international and regional human rights instruments. It concludes by arguing that respect for women's human rights should form the fulcrum for any call for mandatory or routine HIV testing of pregnant women in Africa.

Despite the ratification by African states of several human rights instruments protecting the human rights of women in Africa, and the solemn commitment of the African states to eliminate all forms of discrimination and harmful practices against women, women in Africa still continue to experience human rights violations. Most African women are denied the equal enjoyment of their human rights, in particular by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by tradition and custom, or as a result of overt or covert discrimination. Many women in Africa experience distinct forms of discrimination due to the intersection of sex with such factors as race, language, religion, political and other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other factors, such as age, disability, marital, refugee or migrant status, resulting in compounded disadvantage. Therefore, much remains to be done to realize the human rights of women in Africa. This article examines the relationship between culture and women's human rights, and makes some recommendations for the effective realization of these rights.

This article examines the extent to which the decision to establish the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights was motivated by the desire of African states to safeguard their own interests at the expense of effectively protecting human rights in Africa. Using an examination of the drafting history of the Banjul Charter and the establishment of the African Commission as a background, this article explores the potential implications for the future of human rights protection on the continent as a result of the creation of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and its proposed merger with the African Court of Justice.

Caught between pressure from dominant global economic actors (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and certain states) to implement painful socio-economic reform measures, and pressure from significant numbers of their own peoples to reject these IMF/WB-style prescriptions, formally democratic “third world” governments often yield to the demands of the former to push through such reforms, sometimes at great social cost. This article utilizes a contemporary Nigerian case study to illustrate this point and to show how the curtailment of labour rights and the weakening of labour movements have formed an important part of the economic strategy of many such governments. This anti-labour rights/movements strategy is an attempt by governments to deal with the human rights contradictions that are often generated when third world countries attempt dual political and economic transitions. The article argues that the deployment of an anti-labour strategy is grounded in a new kind of “full belly thesis” that prioritizes a particular IMF/WB-friendly vision of economic development over certain kinds of political (especially labour) rights. The powerful global economic actors, who would otherwise advocate the observance of all human rights, have nevertheless found this thesis more acceptable than its earlier iteration, which was grounded in a far less IMF/WB-friendly economic vision.

The entry into force of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 2003 on 25 November, 2005, marked the culmination of years of lobbying for a document which would promote and protect the human rights of the continent's women by African women's rights advocates. This commentary provides a brief historical overview of the process leading up to the adoption of the Protocol by the African Union in Maputo in July 2003 before moving on to consider its substantive provisions.

In the joined cases of Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v. Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another (2005(1) B.C.L.R. 1 (CC)), the South African Constitutional Court held unanimously that the male primogeniture rule according men rights to inheritance not enjoyed by women enshrined in the South African Customary Law of Succession violated the right to equality guaranteed under section 9 of the South African Constitution. On one level, the decision can be seen as a triumph for the universality of human rights norms. On another level, however, the case raises difficult questions about the relationship between human rights and culture. The aim of this paper is to assess the judgment critically in the context of the ongoing debate about the application of international human rights standards in different cultural settings.

CHIRWA, DANWOOD MZIKENGE, A full loaf is better than half: the constitutional protection of economic, social and cultural rights in Malawi, Journal of African Law, 49, 2 (2005): 207–241The last two decades have seen a new wave of constitution-making in Africa as many countries changed from autocracy to democracy. Malawi followed the trend by adopting a new Constitution in 1994 to mark the end of a 30-year, dictatorial one-party regime. This Constitution breaks with traditional constitutions by recognizing economic, social and cultural rights. However, few of these rights are entrenched in the Bill of Rights as justiciable rights. The rest are enshrined as unenforceable principles of national policy. These provisions and the jurisprudence they have generated thus far are discussed critically. It is argued that while the Malawian Constitution deserves acclaim for recognizing these rights, the model adopted for protecting them fails to give full effect to the notion of the indivisibility of all rights and is not good enough for a poor country, which is also in transition to democracy. Not only was Malawi's choice of this model not preceded by a careful and reasoned examination of the existing models and the local circumstances, it was also made without wide public consultations. The ways, based on the existing constitutional provisions, in which the protection of these rights can be improved are explored.

The transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) has been the subject of some, albeit limited, debate. The role that the promotion and protection of human rights will play in the AU appears, on the face of the various documents, to be an important consideration, yet which organs will have responsibility in ensuring their implementation is still not clear. This article aims to discuss the framework of and relationship between the institutions established under the auspices of the OAU and how these have changed since the transformation to the AU. It argues that insufficient attention has been paid to ensuring a coherent and integrated approach to human rights across the Union. Organs such as the African Commission and the new African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, however, have huge potential to influence the way forward.

Within the African regional human rights system, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights is mandated to promote and protect human and peoples' rights. As part of its protective mandate, the Commission, in terms of an individual complaints procedure, can find that state parties are in violation of the provisions of the African Charter and has recommended remedies in cases where violations have been found. However, concerns have been raised about the non-compliance of state parties with the findings and recommendations issued by the African Commission. Although many possible reasons for this phenomenon could be explored, this contribution investigates one of the factors that may play a role, namely the argument that the findings of the Commission are not legally binding, and that states are consequently not obliged to abide by them. Arguments pertaining to the Commission's lack of competence to decide individual communications and its lack of competence to issue remedies, usually forwarded by those holding the view that the Commission's findings are not legally binding, are addressed here in a bid to clarify the status of the Commission's findings. A conclusion is reached that the findings of the Commission may be viewed as legally binding, firstly on a textual basis (the provisions of the African Charter) and secondly on account of the subsequent “ratification” (or “adoption”) of the findings by the AU Assembly.

The problems of the absence or infrequency of states parties reports to the African Commission and the inadequacy of many that are submitted needs to be addressed. At the 25th session of the African Commission, South Africa presented its initial report. This process before, during and after the examination of the report is discussed and provides both encouragement for states to comply with their reporting obligations under the African Charter and useful lessons for states wishing to improve the quality of their reports.

For Africa, the launch of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education represents an invaluable opportunity to help transform human rights ideals into reality. The article assesses the key characteristics of this strategy and its viability in the African context. It highlights current constraints on implementing the Plan of Action and suggests some solutions.

In the Internet ruling the Authority did not come to the assistance of the monopoly. It is submitted that the vested interests of the ISPs outweighed any protection that Telkom could claim and it suited the Authority then to have reference to constitutional rights and universal sendee policies to justify its ruling. The Authority's perception of the market-place may have influenced the decision. In the call back ruling, however, the Authority came to the assistance of the monopoly. This ruling was based in part on a desire to protect Telkom's revenue. But it seems because the call back operators were not afforded an opportunity to present a case to protect their interests, the Authority assumed Telkom's interests to be more important. This notwithstanding, in both rulings the Authority opted for a value-laden rather than a technologically informed decision. While this may be commendable in terms of achieving the overall goals of the sector, it does lead to inconsistency. As I have alluded to above, this can perhaps be overcome if the Authority develops a coherent policy framework for decision making, i.e. the White Paper and the Telecommunications Act afford the Authority a number of policy beacons by which they may be guided and it is inappropriate to follow one (the Telkom monopoly) at the expense of others.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights1 (hereinafter the “African Charter” or “Charter”) was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1981. It entered into force on 21 October, 1986, after a majority of OAU member states had ratified the Charter. At present, 52 of the 53 member states have become parties: the only non-ratifying state is Eritrea.

In terms of article 6(1) of the Protocol Establishing the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, the Court may entitle both relevant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission), and individuals to institute directly before it, urgent cases or cases of serious, systematic or massive violations of human rights. In deciding the admissibility of cases brought under article 6(1), the Court may request the opinion of the Commission which must give its opinion as soon as possible. Additionally, article 25(2) of the Protocol provides that the Court may receive written and oral evidence and other representations including expert testimony and it shall make a decision based on such evidence and representations.

In the leading South African case of The State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, Ishmail Mohamed, J., (as he then was) with his characteristic eloquence observed that“all Constitutions seek to articulate, with differing degrees of intensity and detail, the shared aspirations of a nation; the values which bind its people, and which discipline its government and its national institutions, the basic premises upon which judicial, legislative and executive power is to be wielded; the Constitutional limits and the conditions upon which that power is to be exercised, the national ethos which defines and regulates that exercise, and the moral and ethical direction which the nation has identified for its future” (at para. 262).

One of the important characteristics of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992, is the prominence it gives to the constitutional protection of the rights of men, women and children who live for a larger part of their lives as families. Although there are passing references to the family, that word is not defined by the Constitution, but the absence of a definition need not be regarded as evidence of non-recognition of the concept of family in Ghana society. Few will disagree widi the proposition that the basis of every society from the most primitive to the most complicated is the family. As an institution it is of great antiquity.

On 4 July, 1989 in Maina Mbacha v. Attorney General the High Court of Kenya appeared to remove itself from its role of enforcing the Bill of Rights of Kenya. The court ruled “inoperative” section 84 of the Constitution of Kenya which grants original jurisdiction to the High Court to enforce Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, section 70–83 (inclusive) (Chapter V). The provision was deemed “inoperative” in Kamau Kuria v. Attorney General, and this was upheld shortly thereafter in Maina Mbacha when the High Court found that no rules of procedure had been enacted to enforce the Bill of Rights and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, in the latter case the court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction even though the case was before the court by virtue of the constitutional grant of “original unlimited jurisdiction”. As a matter of established law, the court can be approached by any available procedure when ruling to enforce established constitutional rights. Ordinary rights can be defeated for failure to follow procedure, but historically, procedural requirements often defer to constitutionally granted rights. Once the Bill of Rights was enacted in the Constitution, its enforcement became supreme to all other law, including procedural rules, for the supremacy clause of the Kenya Constitution states: “… if any other law became inconsistent with this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void”

In an address to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights on 31 January, 1994, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Human Rights stressed that the ratification of human rights instruments and die effective implementation of their provisions is fundamental in a world that aspires to the rule of law and the safeguard of fundamental freedoms. This followed the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations which reaffirmed that the effective implementation of the international human rights instruments is of major importance to the organization and urged all states that have not yet done so to become parties to the two International Covenants and to consider acceding to the Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) allows any state party that has good reason to believe that another state party has violated the provisions of the Charter to make a complaint (communication) to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission). But, in spite of persistent reports of widespread human rights violations in Africa, there is no evidence that state parties make use of this procedure to report each other to the African Commission for violations of the provisions of the Charter. State parties are generally not keen to complain about human right violations by another state of its own nationals within its territory. The reason for this reluctance may lie in the well-known adage that people who live in glass houses should not throw stones. However, if the decision in the recent Nigerian case of Gunme & Ors v. Attorney General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is good law and is followed in other countries, then an important way by which to overcome this reluctance on the part of state parties may have been established. In that case the Federal High Court of Nigeria in Abuja allowed 12 Cameroonians, who alleged that their right to self-determination under the African Charter had been violated by the Republic of Cameroon, to maintain an action in Nigeria for an order requiring Nigeria, as a state party to the African Charter, to present the case of the peoples of Southern Cameroons for self-determination and independence before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

In the history of modern Africa the issue of self-determination has always been of special significance. For a better part of a century and in some cases more, almost the entire continent was subject to colonisation by various European powers. The end of the Second World War and the subsequent adoption of the United Nations Charter, incorporating the principle of self-determination, heralded a new phase for the African colonies in international relations. Defined in its simplest terms, self-determination is the principle by virtue of which a people freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Selfdetermination is in essence the right of self-government. A territory exercises the right by either opting to establish itself as an independent state, associating with an existing state or by accepting to be integrated into an existing state. Self-determination so defined was thus used as the basis for decolonisation in Africa and provided the foundations for equal statehood for the former colonies of Africa in international relations.After decolonisation, the issue of self-determination still persists in Africa attracting sentiments and implications well exemplified by the conflicts Over Biafra and Katanga in the 1960s and currently in Eritrea, the Tigray province of Ethiopia and the Southern Sudan. The very successful propagation of self-determination as the right of every people to self-government by African nationalists during the colonial days seems to have left behind a legacy of a question for post-independence Africa—is the ideal of self-determination

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted unanimously in June, 1981, by the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.). Although it is not yet in force its adoption represents an important landmark in the protection and promotion of human rights on the African continent. The O.A.U. has in the past been sharply criticized for its apparent indifference to the suppression of human rights in a number of independent African States. Although the founding Charter of the O.A.U. of 1961 makes reference to the issue of human rights in Article II l (e) and also mentions in general terms the need to promote the welfare and well-being of the African people, its primary concern has been with the eradication of colonialism andapartheidon the African continent. In this context it is clearly committed to the achievement of human rights and self-determination of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia. However, other breaches of human rights on a widespread scale, such as the massacre of thousands of the Bahutu tribe of Burundi in 1973, was neither discussed nor condemned by the O.A.U. Similarly, the mass murders and other atrocities during the former regime of Idi Amin (Uganda 1971–79) and subsequently and also those which took place during the regime of Jean-Bedel Bokassa, (Central African Republic 1966–79) and Marcias

In 1981, after nearly three years of drafting and deliberations, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) at its 18th Session adopted a regional human rights instrument— The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Recent documentation indicate that an adequate number of ratifications have been received to bring the Charter into force. There has so far however not been any test of its provisions. Nevertheless this article will be devoted to a legal examination and in other ways to a speculative analysis of an aspect of one of the human and/or peoples' rights sought to be guaranteed in the Charter—the right to political self determination. This of course means that the very narrow scope of this paper will hardly touch on the economic aspects of self determination, which is also provided for in the Charter.

In many states, more developed or less developed, the general populace does not seek redress through the court system, does not have access to legal interpretation of constitutional provisions, and is little affected by juridical decisions concerning human rights, To the majority in the Third World, dispute resolution through customary law may be of more relevance, and what matters most to the average person is how she or he is affected by the planning and daily practice of government and other bureaucratic institutions. This paper will review some aspects of political and economic development in Tanzania and Kenya since their attainment of independence from Britain, and will attempt to relate their experience to international agreements for the promotion of human rights.

The rights of the individual in the society have been conceived as natural rights—which in the modern state have no more than a moral force. In the context of a modern state which asserts absolute powers within its borders, it appears idle to suggest as in the traditional natural law theories that there is anything like a law of nature existing independently of and overriding positive law.