Search

The concept of the "strategic triangle" has been conventionally applied to the relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In actuality, there has also existed a mini-triangle among Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. The first part of this paper explores the various positions in a strategic triangle, ranks these roles in terms of desirability, differentiates between endogenous and exogenous factors, and identifies three sets of derivative relations based on exogenous factors. The paper then reviews the historical patterns of interactions within the great strategic triangle and the mini-triangle, as well as explores the impact of the former on the latter. The third part concentrates on the post-Tiananmen permutations of the dual triangles, evaluates the PRC's position after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and explains U.S. behavior during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait mini-crisis in view of the structure of the mini-triangle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how the Republic of China (ROC) uses economic-related techniques to achieve its foreign policy goals as well as factors that affect the ROC's efforts. The paper's central contention is that the effectiveness of economic diplomacy depends not only on wealth but also on the global environment and the capacity of the Taipei government to negotiate and compromise. In the future, as the ROC's economic leverage decreases and the PRC's sensitivity increases, the Taipei government will need all the statesmanship and leadership at its disposal if it is to employ its economic diplomacy effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assumes that in Taipei's foreign aid policymaking, political and economic motivations are intermingled. As an instrument of foreign policy, the ROC's foreign aid program has been utilized to accomplish its Southward policy. This paper discusses the economic assistance that Taiwan has provided to the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, which are also the main focus of the ROC's Southward policy. The mixture of political and economic motivations in the aid given by the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF) to these three Southeast Asian countries has also exemplified the ROC's recent internal and external dilemmas. From a regional perspective, the ROC's Southward policy and its economic assistance to these Southeast Asian countries present the first concrete step in its involvement in the process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the development of cross-Strait trade relations since 1978. Before the mid-1980s, relations were mainly initiated by Beijing; afterwards, changes in both domestic and international economic conditions forced Taipei to take a more active role in the two-way trade. Nevertheless, both the Taipei government and scholars have urged local enterprises to cooperate with those of other countries for investment in mainland China to avoid political risks during the current uncertainties in cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As South Africa enters a new era in foreign relations, some crucial issues in foreign policy must still be resolved. One such issue is the question of formal ties with the two Chinas, the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Both are important countries: the PRC is earmarked to become an economic superpower in the next century, but Taiwan is more sophisticated economically and politically. Unlike the PRC, the ROC is one of the biggest foreign investors in South Africa, creating many jobs. This is the kind of foreign partner that South Africa needs for the Reconstruction and Development Program. In this sense, South Africa cannot afford to choose between them. But dual recognition has not been possible so far, mainly because of the "one China" principle. Outside powers have been forced to choose between them. However, in a white paper on cross-Strait relations released in July 1994, Taipei called on Beijing to face up to the fact that China is a divided country under two separate governments. This creates positive opportunities for outside governments to approach this dilemma in a "face-saving" way, i.e., to avoid ignoring the PRC while not sacrificing the ROC. In terms of this policy document, the ROC would no longer compete with the PRC for the right to represent China. Taiwan declared categorically that Taipei will not sever ties with South Africa if Pretoria establishes diplomatic relations with Beijing. The ROC government will accept dual recognition and coexist with Communist China. Beijing may disapprove, but a post-apartheid South Africa under Nelson Mandela may do the world a favor if it pursues this line. Others may follow, but Mandela also needs international reassurance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]