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Washington's Taiwan policy has been a controversial issue for U.S. policymakers and politicians for decades. At the core of the Taiwan issue is the question of establishing sovereignty. However, there is no "silver bullet" for resolving cross-Strait issues, especially the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. This paper first presents a chronological review of the components of the U.S. government's "one-China policy" and then examines a definitional problem found in the debate on sovereignty and its implications for Taiwan's sovereignty. A preliminary assessment will be made of the US. perception of Taiwan's sovereignty by analyzing key documents and interviews which have been conducted in Washington. This paper will then conclude with a discussion of some of the implications for the future of cross-Strait relations. Iris argued that for the United States, Taiwan's sovereignty is defined as "one policy, three sovereignties, and five perceptions." The United States is reluctant to define Taiwan's sovereignty, and as interviews conducted in Washington indicate, Taiwan's status is clearly unsettled. The United States challenges neither the Republic of China's (ROC) governance of Taiwan, nor Beijing's position on Taiwan's sovereignty. In brief the United States does not take sides on this issue, but is still bound to a certain degree by its domestic law, the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States' foremost concern is to strike a delicate balance between helping Taiwan to practice its consent, while at same time not violating its own national interests (which implies avoiding a military confrontation with China). This clearly takes precedence over getting involved in defining Taiwan's sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the development of Taiwan's security policy by exploring the decision-making of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government under the leadership of President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2004. The first part of the paper reviews the development of Taiwan-China relations and theoretical developments related to this subject, as well as the major theoretical approaches adopted by scholars and strategic analysts, to explain the influence of Taiwan-China relations on Taiwan's security. Next the paper attempts to define the structure and process of the security policymaking mechanism during Chen's government to identify the major "players" in the decision-making process and their roles. The last part of the paper examines the development of the referendum issue before the 2004 presidential election in order to show how President Chen's decision-making style affected the decision to how the controversial referendum in March 2004, and how such a decision-making mechanism makes a foreign policy crisis inevitable. This paper finds that President Chen and his DPP government have a top-down decision-making style in which the president is supreme in deciding foreign policy objectives. Limited numbers of high-ranking officials are consulted or involved in the formulation of key policy objectives. This decision-making style often leads to poor communication between different decision-making levels and sometimes misunderstandings among government agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is motivated by three ideas. First, analyses of interstate relations have over-emphasized the role of hard power (especially military capabilities) to the relative neglect of soft power (including the important role played by economic statecraft). Second, these analyses have privileged the role of the state while not giving civil society (in the case of this paper business interests) sufficient attention. Evolving relations between the state and civil society influence the feasibility and success of economic statecraft. And third, economic carrots and sticks are two sides of the same coin, and their effects are in part contingent on the alignment of domestic interests and influence. I pursue these ideas in the context of Taiwan-China-U.S. economic relations, offering general heuristics and selective reference to the pertinent literature. After a short introduction, the discussion proceeds to treat (1) the double-edged nature of economic intercourse, (2) relative bargaining power, (3) vulnerability to economic holdup, (4) cross-border signaling, and (5) evolving domestic interests and influence. The paper's conclusion returns to the thesis that carrots and sticks are two sides of the same coin when states engage in economic exchanges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies the "strategic triangle" approach to the relations among Washington. Beijing, and Taipei in the post-Cold War period. The main argument is that the strategic triangle among the three has been gradually shifting from a "romantic triangle" with the United States playing the role of an "unwilling pivot," to a "marriage" between the United States and Taiwan--although whether that status can be sustained remains to be seen. The cause of this shift is mainly structural: an unwilling pivot tends to tilt toward the weaker of the two wings, particularly when the stronger wing is emerging as a threat. In making this argument, the paper draws a historical analogy with the Berlin-St. Petersburg-Vienna triangle between 1870 and 1914. In that triangle, the unwilling pivot, Germany, first adopted an impartial attitude toward Russia and dustria-Hungary. As the duel between St. Petersburg and Vienna intensified over the Balkans, however, Germany was forced to take sides and bind its fate with the Hapsburg Empire. A comparison of the two triangles--including their modes of entry., operation, and exit--reveals a strong tendency in the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle to evolve following the historical pattern of the pre-WWI Berlin-St. Petersburg-Henna triangle. Based on this comparison, we can conclude an unwilling pivot should find that the costs associated with pivot playing are likely too high, and entry into a partnership with one of the wings is deemed more favorable. It remains to be seen whether a formal marriage will come about between the United States and Taiwan, as it did between Germany and Austria-Hungary prior to WWI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic relations between Taiwan and China have developed very rapidly due to strong business motivations in both societies. Taiwan's government worries that Beijing might exploit China's economic leverage by using economic sanctions to achieve political goals if asymmetric interdependence in China's favor emerges across the Strait. This paper seeks to answer two categories of questions: first, how large is China's actual and potential economic leverage over Taiwan in terms of imposing economic sanctions, and what conditions or factors would contribute to China's decision to exploit this economic leverage? Second, how vulnerable is Taiwan to any such imposition of economic sanctions, and what conditions or factors would contribute to the success or failure of these sanctions? This paper concludes that China has no economic leverage over Taiwan in terms of imposing economic sanctions and that Taiwan's vulnerability to such a scenario is almost nonexistent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the emerging discourse on, and capability of the PRC in, information warfare (IW)--as well as the implications of such developments for cross-Strait and U.S.-PRC relations. Chinese discourse shows that informed PLA officers realize that IW constitutes the war of the future and plays a critical role in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) ---a key step necessary for China's military modernization. One allure of this type of warfare is the potential for China to wage an "asymmetric war" --i.e., the use of surprise force by a weaker party against a stronger but vulnerable adversary--by applying traditional stratagems. The Chinese argue that using such traditional maxims as Sun Tzu's "overcoming the superior with the inferior" and Mao Zedong's "people's war" in modern warfare would both counter overall American strengths by focusing on certain "pockets of excellence" and present China with a credible military option for achieving its political objective of unification with Taiwan (on Beijing's terms). These strategic considerations could, however, introduce instability into the Taiwan Strait; they also challenge conventional wisdom in international relations. This paper critically evaluates the doctrinal-capability gap in China's 1W development--the double-edged nature of technology, the low connectivity of Chinese society, and Taiwan's responses--and concludes with a cautionary note on an emergent digital "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) dynamic across the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2001 marked the tenth anniversary of Taiwan's multiparty elections. The 1990 presidential election was the last contest under the old system. The National Assembly elections of 1991 and the forced retirement of the senior parliamentarians elected in mainland China marked the beginning of democratic elections that/or the first time had the potential to bring about a change in ruling party. Ten years time passed, offering us a timely opportunity to take stock of the developments in Taiwan's party politics. This paper endeavors to tackle the following five questions: (1) What theoretical framework can be employed to test the developments of Taiwan's political parties? (2) Do Taiwan's parties emphasize issues in electoral campaigns' (3) If hey do, which issues dominate the political agenda! (4) Do Taiwan's parties differ in the issues that they stress or "own"? (5) How has party issue emphasis changed over the 1990s? The paper analyzes party change via a content analysis of newspaper advertisements for one month prior to each major election between 1991 and 2000. The coding scheme employed is a revised version of that developed by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG). The results show that, generally speaking, although candidates are heavily stressed in elections, Taiwan's parties also pay considerable attention to issues. The data is supportive of issue ownership theory, as parties stress favorable issues and ignore or treat perfunctorily unfavorable issues. There has been a degree of movement and convergence on certain issues such as Taiwan independence. On care issues, however, movement has only taken place within ideologically delimited areas, and leapfrogging on core dimensions has either not taken place or been a rare occurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how PRC domestic politics constrains and influences China's Taiwan policy, and thus indirectly affects cross-Strait relations. Specifically, this paper examines six factors: (1) collective leadership and factionalism, (2) succession politics, (3) bureaucratic competition, (4) nationalism, (5) legitimacy crisis and political reform, and (6) central-local and central-minority relations. The impact of these six factors is multiple. In genera4 they constitute tremendous constraints for any PRC leadership seeking to change the existing policy line. From the perspective of the policymaking process, a lack of a transparent, stable, and predictable political structure and policymaking process does not allow the regime in general, and individual leaders in particular much room to take political risks or enjoy flexibility in dealing with Taiwan. From the perspective of the structural characteristic of the whole nation, internally the PRC holds a strong feeling of insecurity in regard to national integrity-i.e., has a vulnerable legitimacy base. Externally speaking, China also suffers from deep frustration in her pursuit of international status, which in turn fuels a strong nationalism. There is thus a strong hawkish bias in the PRC's Taiwan policy that derives from domestic political factors. In determining whether or not a "Taiwan threat" exists, this paper thus argues that more attention should be paid to the opportunities and challenges presented or imposed by the structural constraints and dynamics of FRC domestic politics. The Impact of the PRC's Domestic Politics on Cross-Strait Relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes Taiwan's stability from an economic perspective. It first discusses challenges to Taiwan r economy, with particular focus on the influence of China's economic rise. In recent years, the PRC's policy toward Taiwan has been to contain and isolate Taiwan politically in the international community while at the same time striving to attract Taiwan s capital and technology by means of the mainland's economic strength. Almost all East Asian countries, including Taiwan, have felt enormous pressure from China. The paper also examines whether Taiwan s economy has the wherewithal to weather this economic storm and avoid any political or social instability that could be caused by economic depression. The argument is that although Taiwan's economic performance has not been outstanding in recent years, long-term depression in Taiwan is unlikely. As the global economy recovers, so should Taiwan's fortunes. However to ensure Taiwan's economic security and maintain strong international competitiveness in the long term, Taiwan should follow the overall principle of "consolidating the island's original equipment manufacturer (OEM) base, creating indigenous brands, and expanding niches." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PRC-Taiwan diplomatic rivalry has not spared the South Pacific islands, a region only rarely mentioned within a Western strategy for Asia. This paper argues that the PRC and Taiwan have, since the 1970s, become players in their own right in Oceania, raising new variables in an uneventful area. Beijing and Taipei have made energetic efforts out of all proportion to draw such tiny islands to either camp. The elusive reasons are dissected herein. Wary of Western hegemony, the region's leaders have turned to Asia for offers of trade and aid, and have played the PRC and Taiwan against each other. This paper seeks to: explain Beijing's and Taipei's goals in lands that yield seemingly negligible gains; show how such activism has impacted Oceania; determine the region's perceptions and reactions; portray the relative position of all players; and point out future problems. The study is divided into contentious points crystallized over time: Cold War decolonization and the Chinese/Taiwanese arrival; aid, trade, and investment; fishing disputes; the role of China's navy; the region's nuclear-free zone; UN and South Pacific Forum dialogues; and the region's social economic, environmental ethnic, and security concerns. The study concludes that the supremacy of Chinese and Taiwanese global commercial considerations aims to demand a specific institutional-geopolitical alignment in Oceania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the making of both the ROC's mainland policy and the PRC's Taiwan policy over the past two decades. It shows that the making of the PRC's Taiwan policy can be accounted for by a pure Rational Actor Model. In contrast, although the policymaking process in the ROC under the reign of President Chiang Ching-kuo was also close to the Rational Actor Alodel, at present it resembles the Bureaucratic Politics Model. This paper argues that the solution of the game is quite clear-cut in the case of the PRC; less so in Chiang's ROC: and in the case of Taiwan after Lee Teng-hui came to power, there was originally an equilibrium (i.e., the median voter in all directions), but such an equilibrium has become disrupted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews some of the key issues in recent U.S.-China trade relations and outlines the macro environment for trade between the two, including their economic ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan. It first provides an overview of U. S. - China trade, including a description of historical trends, industry distribution, and the involvement of Hong Kong and Taiwan. The major sources of foreign direct investment in China are also discussed. The paper then goes on to discuss current key issues in U.S. - China trade, including China's application to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status, intellectual property rights protection, and the mounting U.S. trade deficit with China. The impact of these issues on Taiwan and Hong Kong is highlighted where appropriate. The paper also discusses briefly the future prospects of U.S. - China trade and related opportunities for Taiwanese firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of the "strategic triangle" has been conventionally applied to the relationship among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In actuality, there has also existed a mini-triangle among Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. The first part of this paper explores the various positions in a strategic triangle, ranks these roles in terms of desirability, differentiates between endogenous and exogenous factors, and identifies three sets of derivative relations based on exogenous factors. The paper then reviews the historical patterns of interactions within the great strategic triangle and the mini-triangle, as well as explores the impact of the former on the latter. The third part concentrates on the post-Tiananmen permutations of the dual triangles, evaluates the PRC's position after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and explains U.S. behavior during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait mini-crisis in view of the structure of the mini-triangle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first analyzes Taiwan-mainland China relations in the context of PRC President Jiang Zemin's eight-point proposal on the unification issue and ROC President Lee Teng-hui's six-point response in early 1995. Next, the paper discusses Lee's visit to the United States in June 1995 and the PRC's violent reaction to the visit, which resulted in the PRC's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, its public denunciation of Lee, and the suspension of the talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF-ROC) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS-PRC). Since Lee's landslide presidential election victory in Taiwan, he has repeatedly called on the PRC to resume talks, but the PRC has refused to respond positively to the calls, and Taiwan-mainland China relations remain uncertain and volatile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I have introduced two simple extensive-form games and conducted the Poisson regression analysis to investigate the important factors that might influence Sino-South Korean relations. One of the most interesting questions examined in the paper is the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) behavior toward South Korea in case of any change in South Korea-Taiwan relations. The findings of the analysis have indicated that any incremental change in South Korea-Taiwan relations will not influence the PRC's behavior toward South Korea as long as South Korea maintains friendly relations with the PRC. This study suggests that South Korea should maintain the highest possible unofficial relations with Taiwan as long as it does not violate the "one China" principle. Strategically speaking, South Korean policies toward China or Taiwan should not be based on Beijing's verbal expressions or threats but on how Beijing has actually responded to similar situations. That is, it is most important for South Korea to investigate where the PRC actually stands or how the PRC has responded to other nations which have attempted to improve relations with Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A general theory of strategy allows scholars to explain or predict national strategies based on certain stable social characteristics. The interactions between national values and national strategy is tested here on a case study of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The first part of the paper concerns itself with the identification of the ROC's national values. Taiwanese society is deemed to have materialism and individualism as national values. Accordingly, the theory predicts that Taiwan will adopt a direct strategy of action. An examination of the historical record of the ROC on Taiwan under the process of de-Chiangization takes up the first part of the paper. The second half of the paper concerns itself with empirical investigation of the hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how the Republic of China (ROC) uses economic-related techniques to achieve its foreign policy goals as well as factors that affect the ROC's efforts. The paper's central contention is that the effectiveness of economic diplomacy depends not only on wealth but also on the global environment and the capacity of the Taipei government to negotiate and compromise. In the future, as the ROC's economic leverage decreases and the PRC's sensitivity increases, the Taipei government will need all the statesmanship and leadership at its disposal if it is to employ its economic diplomacy effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assumes that in Taipei's foreign aid policymaking, political and economic motivations are intermingled. As an instrument of foreign policy, the ROC's foreign aid program has been utilized to accomplish its Southward policy. This paper discusses the economic assistance that Taiwan has provided to the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, which are also the main focus of the ROC's Southward policy. The mixture of political and economic motivations in the aid given by the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF) to these three Southeast Asian countries has also exemplified the ROC's recent internal and external dilemmas. From a regional perspective, the ROC's Southward policy and its economic assistance to these Southeast Asian countries present the first concrete step in its involvement in the process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role the United States has played in the maintenance of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait from a constructivist/institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way has the United States helped preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how has the United States reproduced the status quo arrangement to shape the interests of Beijing and Taipei? It is maintained that a status quo arrangement has developed across the Strait which the United States has helped to construct and which is supported to varying degrees by Beijing and Taipei. This status quo institution has been created and reinforced through direct codification as well through an indirect process of structuration. The three Washington-Beijing joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) form the first stage of institutional development through formal codification which emphasizes the use of peaceful means on both sides for the final resolution of the situation. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the status quo arrangement, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. These policy statements normally uphold such supreme values as "prosperity," "stability," or "peace." They also help sustain the regulative, normative, or cognitive pillars of the status quo institution through the strategies of stigmatization, role conferment, or internalization. The main purpose of the status quo institution, instantiated by repeated policy statements or actions, is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, and interests of Beijing and Taipei. Although Beijing and Taipei are not merely passive and sometimes seek to test the rules or promote alternative norms, this behavior has not been sustained. If they have taken action, it has often been rationalized to ensure that the core values were not directly challenged. As such, it is concluded that the construction and reproduction of the status quo institution has been considerably effective so far, if not completely successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an institutional account of how President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan has sent important messages across the Taiwan Strait. Under Taiwan's constitutional system, the parliament can neither hold the president accountable for what he says nor sack the premier appointed by the president, while a president who lacks legislative support also finds it hard to put his policy goals into practice. These problems give President Chen the excuse to set up extra-constitutional channels to deliver pro-independence messages, some of which go against his official pledges. Here, a collection of Chen's important remarks directed across the Taiwan Strait are analyzed, and a consistent pattern is revealed of when and where he is likely to say what. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade and investment relations between Taiwan and China have been more noticeable for their impacts on Taiwan than on China in both economic and security terms. Instead of discussing the political and military consequences of this asymmetrical economic interdependence, this paper suggests an analytical framework for exploring the effects of the externalities of cross-Strait market forces on Taiwan's security from a nontraditional security perspective. Economic factors, independent from traditional security notions, are vital to Taiwan's international survival and domestic stability. Vulnerabilities and concerns arising from cross-Strait de facto economic networks are the externalities to the basic source of Taiwan's international expansion, leverage over the geoeconomic order, and the state's capacity to manage internal cohesion. In conclusion, the transnational nature of nontraditional security issues and the relevance of cross-Strait economic ties to China's economic security suggest the possibility of more interest-based responses to the identified concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a conceptualization of cross-Strait relations during the first decade of the twenty-first century. In particular, it traces the path by which the Bush administration came to play a balancing role in cross-Strait relations. As will be seen, there is more than a little irony about the current state of cross-Strait relations. First, the Bush administration's policy toward the conflict between China and Taiwan has been measured and primarily reactive, in contrast to its aggressive initiatives elsewhere, suggesting a policy of "muddling through." Second, President George W. Bush has evidently become upset with President Chen Shui-bian on several occasions for acting like, well, President Bush: appealing to his base constituency and being "bold" in foreign affairs. Finally and more analytically, a policy of muddling through (which can be discerned in Beijing and Taipei as well as in Washington) does not imply very good policymaking, especially in such a vital area as the relations between Taiwan and China. Yet, at least so far, muddling through seems to have worked tolerably well in the sense that crises in cross-Strait relations have been defused and that they now appear fairly stable, despite the fundamental disagreement between Beijing and Taipei over Taiwan's sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Direct flights across the Taiwan Strait have been the hottest issue in cross-Strait relations since the 1980s. Although Taiwan's policy toward direct flights is not yet clear, many believe that the entry of both sides into the World Trade Organization (WTO) will speed up the flight schedule process. There are, however, some technical problems to be solved before the airlines at either side can operate nonstop flights across the Strait. One critical issue regards the striking of a bilateral agreement between China and Taiwan. If both sides agree to negotiate such an official document, serious political and economic conflicts would likely occur as soon as negotiations are begun. This paper discusses the history of air transportation services among Macau, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China. Past and new agreements are examined, their impacts and possible influences on the regional markets are analyzed, and both the business and political considerations related to these agreements are explored. Given the experiences of both past and existing agreements, the format as well as the content of any cross-Strait bilateral agreement would need to be carefully constructed in order to be acceptable to both sides. The possibility of a multilateral agreement within these states and zones, and the resulting impacts on this area will also be examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a historical overview and theoretical interpretation of the issue of national identity in Taiwan. The author demonstrates how the idea of "orthodoxy" in the dynastic tradition has shaped various projects of Chinese nationalism in the twentieth century. Taiwan has surpassed this dynastic mind-set by transforming cultural nationalism into civic nationalism. Taiwan's new political order, which is centered on popular elections of the president, is interpreted as the institutionalization of plebiscites which has forged a new national identity. Theoretical reflection on the relationship between the civic nationalism of Taiwan and tile cultural nationalism of China is also provided. The author contends that a mode of heterocentric self-understanding is needed to resolve the ideological conflict between China and Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common assumption is that regional disparities affect voting behavior in Taiwan, given the fact that voters in the south show steady support for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The common sense premise is that the south provides a stable support base for the DPP. Although a pattern of political clustering appears to be taking shape, empirical data are required to test this hypothesis. The findings of this paper suggest that, first, regional factors are contingent on the influences of election type and the personal attributes of individual candidates. Second, above and beyond what appears commonsensical, the Kuomintang (KMT) shows greater regional disparities with respect to its support base than does the DPP. This article proposes that party realignment has significantly affected the KMT's support base and has particularly influenced it in the non-southern area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan has had to conduct a foreign economic policy (FEP) within a constricted international space given the island's "contested statehood" predicament. While the dynamic nature of Taiwan's newly industrialized economic development and the government's "resourceful" economic diplomacy strategies have provided Taipei with increasing room for FEP maneuvers, the "mainland China" factor continues to loom large. This paper contends that the People's Republic of China (PRC) exerts orientating gravitational forces upon Taiwan's FEP that are growing in strength. These forces comprise two main aspects. The first concerns the gravitational pull of the PRC economy upon Taiwan's economy that centers on the burgeoning growth of cross-Strait commerce and the ever more palpable transnational economic space this interaction is creating. Here, Taipei must primarily weigh the risks and benefits of further economic integration with mainland China. The second aspect relates to the domain of economic diplomacy, where Taiwan must navigate in a wider international economic system in which the PRC is exerting increasingly powerful economic and political gravitational forces. Discussion on this broad issue is examined in the context of Taiwan's pursuit of economic security in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's success in achieving economic growth has created speculation that China will become a great power in the twenty-first century. The rise of China is particularly alarming given the resurgence of Chinese nationalism that is occurring, in the People's Republic of China (PRC) today. How should we interpret the rise of China? What are the implications of nationalist appeals on Beijing's policy of national reunification with Taiwan? Moreover, has the rise of nationalism made Beijing's international behavior more aggressive? These are important questions. Using a case study of the recent changes in Beijing's Taiwan policy, this paper argues that the rise of nationalism does not necessarily make China a threat to the international community because nationalism has not driven China into taking irrational action against Taiwan. Despite nationalist rhetoric, Beijing's policy of national reunification has not been particularly inflexible Although Beijing has intermittently used the strategy of military coercion and peaceful offense, nationalism has not prevented Beijing's pragmatic leadership from adopting peaceful offense as the most desirable approach for national reunification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China's economic reform deepens and the Chinese market becomes more liberalized, trade between the United Slates and main/and China, particularly in the area of U.S. exports to China, will continue to expand. This paper argues that the prospects of growing trade between the United Stales and China represent enormous opportunities for Taiwanese firms, given the unique strengths that Taiwanese firms possess. This argument is made first by reviewing U.S. government programs and company practices in the area of trade with China. Then, specific opportunities and strategies for Taiwanese firms to form alliances with U.S. firms in exploring the market in mainland China are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PRC's recent missile tests in the seas near Taiwan have raised serious concerns over the ROC's security, and various proposals have been suggested for Taipei to deal with Beijing's looming threat. Among them, six policy options are worthy of discussion. They include arms buildup, missile defense, regional collective security, closer relations with the United States, a peace accord with the PRC, and the nuclear option. After a systematic analysis, the paper concludes that Taipei's options are still limited, and it will not be easy to make a major shift from current security strategies. One possible way to improve cross-Strait relations is to open talks for a peace accord wherein the two sides agree to the "one China "principle but are allowed to have their own interpretations of "one China." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Taiwan, the public's attitude on the unification/independence issue is very diversified, ranging between supporting immediate unification and supporting immediate independence. The majority of the Taiwan public stands between these two extremes. On an aggregate level, the distribution of these positions has been quite stable in the past three years. However, there have been variations on the individual level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the individual differences among the Taiwan public regarding this issue. The concept of "political generation" will be applied to distinguish attitudinal discrepancies among different groups. Survey data will be used to analyze the different distributions of unification/independence attitudes among various generations of the three major ethnic groups in Taiwan: the Fulao, Hakka, and mainlanders. Discrepancies have been found among these generation groups; especially noticeable is the fact that the youngest generations of Fulao and Hakka tend to be more supportive of a unified Taiwan and China than their elders. This could be a life-cycle phenomenon and subject to change in the future. These discrepancies also have been found to have an impact on presidential preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, there have been many studies of cross-Strait trade and investment relations based on the theories of comparative advantage. However, none have provided a satisfactory explanation of the cross-Strait trade-investment complementarity. In (his paper, the author attempts to use a footloose specific factors model to analyze the moving forces which shape the patterns of cross-Strait trade and in vestment. The model shows that Taiwan's investment in the Chinese mainland has been determined by the comparative advantages of the two sides, as well as the absolute advantages that Taiwan enjoys relative to the mainland and other institutional factors. The model also helps clarify come commonly-confusing issues linked to cross-Strait trade and direct investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the rapid development of trade between Taiwan and mainland China has made it essential that a reliable method be worked out for calculating trade values. This paper consists of a theoretical analysis of the different statistical methods so far devised and the contrasting and somewhat confusing data they have produced. An attempt has been made to integrate these methods to produce a more accurate estimate of the level of Taiwan-mainland trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the development of cross-Strait trade relations since 1978. Before the mid-1980s, relations were mainly initiated by Beijing; afterwards, changes in both domestic and international economic conditions forced Taipei to take a more active role in the two-way trade. Nevertheless, both the Taipei government and scholars have urged local enterprises to cooperate with those of other countries for investment in mainland China to avoid political risks during the current uncertainties in cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As South Africa enters a new era in foreign relations, some crucial issues in foreign policy must still be resolved. One such issue is the question of formal ties with the two Chinas, the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Both are important countries: the PRC is earmarked to become an economic superpower in the next century, but Taiwan is more sophisticated economically and politically. Unlike the PRC, the ROC is one of the biggest foreign investors in South Africa, creating many jobs. This is the kind of foreign partner that South Africa needs for the Reconstruction and Development Program. In this sense, South Africa cannot afford to choose between them. But dual recognition has not been possible so far, mainly because of the "one China" principle. Outside powers have been forced to choose between them. However, in a white paper on cross-Strait relations released in July 1994, Taipei called on Beijing to face up to the fact that China is a divided country under two separate governments. This creates positive opportunities for outside governments to approach this dilemma in a "face-saving" way, i.e., to avoid ignoring the PRC while not sacrificing the ROC. In terms of this policy document, the ROC would no longer compete with the PRC for the right to represent China. Taiwan declared categorically that Taipei will not sever ties with South Africa if Pretoria establishes diplomatic relations with Beijing. The ROC government will accept dual recognition and coexist with Communist China. Beijing may disapprove, but a post-apartheid South Africa under Nelson Mandela may do the world a favor if it pursues this line. Others may follow, but Mandela also needs international reassurance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts with a literature review of cross-Strait relations studies. It then evolves into a proposal for an analogical model and a new research agenda. After pointing out the shortcomings of the dominant approaches in the field for not grasping the defining features of Taiwan-mainland relations (power asymmetry and sovereignty claims based on ethnic ties), it then argues that the cross-Strait relations are structurally similar to the relations between the Russian Federation and the "near abroad" countries. Taiwan, like Ukraine or the Baltics, can choose between balancing and bandwagoning under power asymmetry and sovereignty claims by a potential aggressor. Democratization and the resultant rise of Taiwanese nationalism have prompted the government to pursue balancing, while the increasing costs associated with such a strategy have given rise to political forces advocating reconciliation and bandwagoning. The learning curve derived from the Russian case is heuristic in pointing out the possible development of Taiwan's mainland policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]