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Economic relations between Taiwan and China have developed very rapidly due to strong business motivations in both societies. Taiwan's government worries that Beijing might exploit China's economic leverage by using economic sanctions to achieve political goals if asymmetric interdependence in China's favor emerges across the Strait. This paper seeks to answer two categories of questions: first, how large is China's actual and potential economic leverage over Taiwan in terms of imposing economic sanctions, and what conditions or factors would contribute to China's decision to exploit this economic leverage? Second, how vulnerable is Taiwan to any such imposition of economic sanctions, and what conditions or factors would contribute to the success or failure of these sanctions? This paper concludes that China has no economic leverage over Taiwan in terms of imposing economic sanctions and that Taiwan's vulnerability to such a scenario is almost nonexistent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assumes that in Taipei's foreign aid policymaking, political and economic motivations are intermingled. As an instrument of foreign policy, the ROC's foreign aid program has been utilized to accomplish its Southward policy. This paper discusses the economic assistance that Taiwan has provided to the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, which are also the main focus of the ROC's Southward policy. The mixture of political and economic motivations in the aid given by the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF) to these three Southeast Asian countries has also exemplified the ROC's recent internal and external dilemmas. From a regional perspective, the ROC's Southward policy and its economic assistance to these Southeast Asian countries present the first concrete step in its involvement in the process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade and investment relations between Taiwan and China have been more noticeable for their impacts on Taiwan than on China in both economic and security terms. Instead of discussing the political and military consequences of this asymmetrical economic interdependence, this paper suggests an analytical framework for exploring the effects of the externalities of cross-Strait market forces on Taiwan's security from a nontraditional security perspective. Economic factors, independent from traditional security notions, are vital to Taiwan's international survival and domestic stability. Vulnerabilities and concerns arising from cross-Strait de facto economic networks are the externalities to the basic source of Taiwan's international expansion, leverage over the geoeconomic order, and the state's capacity to manage internal cohesion. In conclusion, the transnational nature of nontraditional security issues and the relevance of cross-Strait economic ties to China's economic security suggest the possibility of more interest-based responses to the identified concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan has had to conduct a foreign economic policy (FEP) within a constricted international space given the island's "contested statehood" predicament. While the dynamic nature of Taiwan's newly industrialized economic development and the government's "resourceful" economic diplomacy strategies have provided Taipei with increasing room for FEP maneuvers, the "mainland China" factor continues to loom large. This paper contends that the People's Republic of China (PRC) exerts orientating gravitational forces upon Taiwan's FEP that are growing in strength. These forces comprise two main aspects. The first concerns the gravitational pull of the PRC economy upon Taiwan's economy that centers on the burgeoning growth of cross-Strait commerce and the ever more palpable transnational economic space this interaction is creating. Here, Taipei must primarily weigh the risks and benefits of further economic integration with mainland China. The second aspect relates to the domain of economic diplomacy, where Taiwan must navigate in a wider international economic system in which the PRC is exerting increasingly powerful economic and political gravitational forces. Discussion on this broad issue is examined in the context of Taiwan's pursuit of economic security in the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's success in achieving economic growth has created speculation that China will become a great power in the twenty-first century. The rise of China is particularly alarming given the resurgence of Chinese nationalism that is occurring, in the People's Republic of China (PRC) today. How should we interpret the rise of China? What are the implications of nationalist appeals on Beijing's policy of national reunification with Taiwan? Moreover, has the rise of nationalism made Beijing's international behavior more aggressive? These are important questions. Using a case study of the recent changes in Beijing's Taiwan policy, this paper argues that the rise of nationalism does not necessarily make China a threat to the international community because nationalism has not driven China into taking irrational action against Taiwan. Despite nationalist rhetoric, Beijing's policy of national reunification has not been particularly inflexible Although Beijing has intermittently used the strategy of military coercion and peaceful offense, nationalism has not prevented Beijing's pragmatic leadership from adopting peaceful offense as the most desirable approach for national reunification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the rapid development of trade between Taiwan and mainland China has made it essential that a reliable method be worked out for calculating trade values. This paper consists of a theoretical analysis of the different statistical methods so far devised and the contrasting and somewhat confusing data they have produced. An attempt has been made to integrate these methods to produce a more accurate estimate of the level of Taiwan-mainland trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]