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This article examines the trends in archaeological research and the state of conservation of archaeological sites in Judea and Samaria between 1993 and 2022. The absence of Palestinian-Israeli cooperation resulted in the establishment of two parallel bodies that have been responsible for the issue, with no connection between them. In the Israeli-controlled territory, academic involvement declined with only a handful of new excavations. In the Palestinian-controlled territory, many new studies were conducted with foreign assistance, primarily to strengthen Palestinian national identity. An assessment of the state of conservation indicates significant damage as a result of development and antiquities theft. In this region, where the future remains uncertain, relics of the past and the research of these relics appear to have sustained irreversible damage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the factors that influenced the trends in archaeological excavations in Judea and Samaria during the decade attending the 1967 Six-Day War. Examination reveals a close connection between the political trends in Israel as they pertained to Judea and Samaria and the archaeological excavations undertaken in this region. When a prime minister appeared to consider Judea and Samaria an inseparable part of the state of Israel archaeologists followed (Meir). But when prime ministers regarded Judea and Samaria as territory that would be returned to the Jordanians (Eshkol and Rabin), the archaeologists stopped excavating in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examined the differences between the political attitudes of two generations of religious Zionists settlers in the West Bank. Theoretical approaches on intergenerational socialization were reviewed, predicting trends of continuity vis-à-vis change in intergenerational attitudes. Also, previous studies of the religious Zionist sector subgroups, the settlements, and their residents were reviewed. The study was conducted with a quantitative method, while the research tool was an online research questionnaire. The study findings verify the research hypothesis regarding the intergenerational differences in political attitudes, as most issues that were examined found that the younger generation holds more hawkish attitudes in comparison to their parents. Finally, the young Torani were emphasized in the research as the secondary group of settlers who, in most cases, hold the most extreme political attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many members of minority groups clash violently with state agents. The case of West Bank rightwing activists is particularly paradoxical. Unlike disempowered groups whose ability to bring about change is limited, these activists constitute a powerful sociopolitical force, and the security forces with which they clash also protect them in the territories to which they claim sovereignty. Based on 20 interviews with rightwing protest activists, this article explores what interpretation activists give to their part in violent clashes. The article offers two main contributions. First, it proposes the concept of perceived state legitimacy as a theoretical construct for evaluating the degree to which citizens view their state as legitimate. Unlike previous studies that define legitimacy as a unidimensional construct, perceived state legitimacy is defined here as made up of five different components: identification, trust, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legality. Second, the article shows empirically that violent clashes can indicate undermining distinct components of state legitimacy. Thus, West Bank rightwing activists who took part in violent clashes with state agents undermine the state's legitimacy components of trust, distributive justice, procedural justice, and legality – but not identification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines a double discourse by the Palestinian leadership, one in English and one in Arabic, which plays a central role in their negotiating strategy with Israel since the onset of the Oslo 'peace process' (1993). Using language very close to Western terminology, Palestinians in English speak of 'Occupation' and 'Settlements' with the 1967 borders as the defining issue; while in Arabic, they speak of 'Occupation' and 'Settlements' in terms of the 1948 borders (i.e., all of Israel is an 'Occupation' and Tel Aviv is an illegal 'settlement'). As a zero-sum negotiating strategy this makes perfect sense: convince Israel to concede 'land for peace' (1967 borders), when in reality this means 'land for war' (1967 borders as launching pad for war to 1948 borders). The western news media, allegedly committed to accurate reporting, shows no knowledge of the Arabic discourse and presents what Palestinians say in English as reliable reflections of their actions and intentions. As a result of this failure to identify the double-discourse, the Western legacy media presents Palestinian war propaganda as news to their Western audiences, unwittingly helping the Palestinians in their deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the establishment of the Elon Moreh locality in the second half of the 1970s constitutes an important milestone in the evolution of post-1967 Jewish settlement in the biblical lands of Judea and Samaria (or the West Bank as they have been known since their 1950 Jordanian annexation), the episode has been surprisingly neglected by the professional literature. This article seeks to fill that lacuna by exploring the factors and circumstances underlying this momentous event, as well as the political and legal struggles attending its occurrence. As such, it not only offers the first comprehensive historical account of this episode but also shed important fresh light on one of the more intractable aspects of the Israeli?Palestinian conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The settlers constitute a minority group whose goals are becoming increasingly unpopular among Israelis. As a result, the degree of legitimacy granted to them by the government gradually eroded over the years. However, their project still thrives. Their impressive success can be attributed to their focus on the bureaucracy. As early as the 1960s, the settlers engaged in a constant effort to identify actors in state and semi-state agencies that had common interests with them. At first they mobilized supporters from within those agencies. Later they made any effort to fill available positions with their own people. Today, the settlers' movement in Israel has fused itself with the relevant elements within the bureaucracy to a degree that many state agencies serve as extensions of the settler movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study describes the establishment and subsequent growth of settlements in Judea and Samaria, areas captured from Jordan during the Six Day War in 1967. In particular, the motivations and processes of these undertakings are examined from three different perspectives: time, place and society. A distinction is made between settlements that were initiated or tacitly approved by the government and those that were undertaken by private organizations or individuals, often flaunting a government freeze on building. The relative impact of ideology versus pragmatic considerations in shaping colonization in this region is also assessed. Quantitative data on demographic developments are integrated into the presentations of various communal morphologies that constitute the physical configurations and social fabric of the settlement enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant societal discourse of actors comprising Israel's security networks influences their choices for solutions to the perceived existential threat to the state from the demands and actions of the Palestinian authorities. Israeli elites, who are identified with the liberal discourse, propose to solve this problem by withdrawing, either unilaterally or via a peace process, from the Judea and Samaria region conquered in the 1967 war. This discourse requires the ‘securitization’ of the political process and the framing of Israeli control of Judea, Samaria and Gaza as an existential burden. By framing the security narrative in this way, the liberal elite seeks to draw support from most Israelis, who subscribe to an alternative ethno-national discourse, for abandoning the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes the establishment of the pre-military academies in Judea and Samaria as cultural agents preceding the militaristic habitus of these areas. It follows the development of the security epistemic community in these areas which formed a new identity of the settlers. The increase of religious-Zionist youth in combat units and officer courses in the IDF due to these academies altered the positioning of the settlers and all religious Zionists in Israeli society vis-à-vis non-religious elites, the ultra-orthodox, and religious-Zionist groups who did not join the pre-military academy revolution. Judea and Samaria became a ‘security zone’ identified with sacrifice, heroism, giving, a pedagogical partnership with the army, reflected in higher percentages of activities in educational, religious, and cultural institutions encouraging meaningful army service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been highly identified with the dispute over the core issues: Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem, the establishment of settlements in the disputed territories, the final borders between the two parties and the Palestinian refugee problem. The first three issues were a result of the 1967 war, while the refugee problem was a corollary of the 1948 war. However, it was the Israeli administration from 1967 to 1976 that exposed refugee camps to the Israeli public and made some initial efforts to resolve the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the past two decades the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been identified with the dispute over four core issues: the future of East Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements in the disputed territories, the final borders between the two sides, and the fate of the Palestinian refugees. The first three issues were born during the first 10 years of Israel's control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, while the refugee problem dates back to the 1948 war. Yet it was the Israeli administration from 1967 to 1976 that exposed the refugee camps to the Israeli public and led to initial efforts to resolve this problem. This first half of the two-part article outlines the establishment of the Israeli administration in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and lays the ground for the creation of the core issues which will be described in the second part. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assault by Transjordan's Arab Legion on the Etzion Bloc (Gush Etzion), a cluster of Jewish villages north of the Biblical town of Hebron, from 4-14 May 1948, before the termination of the British Mandate, constituted an important milestone in the overall Arab strategy to prevent the emergence of the independent state of Israel in accordance with the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947. The timing and manner of the attack were not coincidental but indicative of King Abdullah's political and military ambitions. They also tell of the reality of mandatory policy, as it was Britain that armed, trained, and led the Legion, and was obliged to protect the Jewish villages. In theory, the Etzion Bloc, like other Jewish neighbourhoods in the prospective Arab state, should have been able to live and prosper in peace. As it were, all were destroyed and their inhabitants expelled, in this case - after a large scale massacre of surrendered fighters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article accounts for Israel's failure to take the historical opportunity to invade the West Bank during the 1948 war. It also considers the nature of British support for Jordan between 1948 until the death of King Abdullah in 1951. British interests in Transjordan were determined by strategic factors that were outlined in the 1948 Anglo-Transjordan Treaty. Although the British were bound by the treaty to come to Jordan's assistance in the case of an invasion, in practice this would have been very difficult to achieve short of invading Israel from Egypt. This paper argues that the Israelis failed to invade the West Bank in 1948 because they were deterred by the possibility of British intervention and because of divisions within the Israeli political establishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A careful analysis of the decision-making process during the 1967 Arab- Israeli Six-Day War reveals that Israel's brilliant military victory did not stem from a systematic master plan, nor was it the product of professional staff work that led the government to order the IDF to seize the West Bank. Rather it was the result of tactical achievements that led the nation's leaders to widen the scope of territorial conquests regardless of the problematic rule of the Palestinians and the strategic dangers involved in it. Retrospectively the dialectical meaning of this unplanned victory demonstrates the need for professional staff work at the cabinet level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compares the commemoration of the Nakba event among Israeli Arabs and Jewish Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza. Origins and nature of the debate on the participation of Arabs in Israeli politics; Organizational aspects of the Nakba commemoration; Analysis of the Nakba narratives and their implications for the relations between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews.