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This article examines talks that took place between British government officials and loyalist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland at a critical moment in the most recent Troubles. In particular, this article describes talks that took place secretly at the Northern Ireland Office's ‘Laneside’ building, a secluded suburban house used by British diplomats and MI6 officers on the shores of Belfast Lough between 1971 and 1976. Drawing on both recently released archive material as well as interviews with those who worked at and visited Laneside, this article explores what went on at these talks and analyses their outcomes from three different perspectives. This article demonstrates that the most accurate perspective from which to view what occurred in these meetings is neither top-down (government led) nor bottom-up (paramilitary led), but one that looks at what went on there as part of a conversation which both sets of participants for a time found useful. For the loyalists, Laneside had a role as a venue to think about strategy (rather than negotiate ends). For the British these were conversations that were useful in furnishing their understanding of loyalism, and as a place where policies could be explained and problems better understood. Looking at what occurred at Laneside as a semi-autonomous governmental body in Northern Ireland reveals key insights into both the loyalist paramilitaries' political ideas as well as the aims of British policy in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, this middle perspective holds a mirror up to the more familiar talks then occurring between the very same British officials and the Provisional IRA. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The availability under the Thirty Years Rule of the Northern Irish and UK state papers for the start of the Troubles has made it possible to reassess what happened on 5 October 1968 in Derry. This article uses these files, other primary sources such as newspapers, and the ‘Flashpoints Model of Public Disorder’ to examine how the civil rights march and the police reaction transformed the contexts within which people in Derry and Northern Ireland as a whole thought and acted. It goes on to explore the three days of rioting that followed the violent scenes on Duke Street and the ‘collective remembrance’ of the event, which reached its climax during the Stormont general election campaign of February 1969. The article argues that the existing literature has overlooked not only the complexity of what happened on 5 October 1968 in Derry, but also the conflicting readings that were subsequently developed by contemporaries. The struggle to control the narrative helped drive the fragmentation and polarization in the second city that was encouraging certain individuals and groups to adopt violent strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The availability under the Thirty Year Rule of British and Stormont government papers for the early stages of the Troubles has made it possible for existing analyses of the role of key actors to be reassessed. This article uses the reports of successive UK Representatives to cast new light on the nature of British policy in the 1969-71 period. It argues that a view of the dynamics of the conflict as between an entrenched and discriminatory majority and an oppressed minority led to an underestimation of the depth of Protestant fears and the deepening of the regime's legitimacy crisis with its own supporters. The result was persistence with a policy that achieved the worst of both worlds: a regime incapable of stabilising itself and an increasingly militant and radicalised Catholic population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]