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This paper investigates two pricing policies against supply disruption for a supply chain with vertical product differentiation as well as an external competitor who sells similar products. Market‐chasing pricing policy aims at minimizing the market share loss, while profit‐chasing pricing policy aims to minimize the profit loss under supply disruption. Stackelberg games are established to analyze the equilibrium pricing behaviors with both pricing policies under supply disruption. It is shown that the effectiveness of market‐chasing pricing policy depends on the competitive power of the manufacturer and competitor, while profit‐chasing pricing policy is always helpful for the manufacturer to reduce her profit loss under supply disruption. Furthermore, to minimize market share loss, firms need to lower both the price of the disrupted product and the undisrupted product. But firms can lower the price of the disrupted product only and increase the price of other undisrupted products to minimize the profit loss. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a financing problem in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one supplier and one buyer under supply disruption. The supplier could face a disruption at its end which could effectively reduce its yield in case of disruption, thereby resulting in supply yield uncertainty. The retailer can finance the supplier using advance selling that can help mitigate the impact of disruption. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, where the supplier as the leader announces the wholesale price and the retailer responds by deciding its optimal order quantity given stochastic demand and an exogenous fixed retail price. The supplier then commences production and a disruption can happen with a known probability. We assume that under disruption the quantity delivered is a fraction of the initial quantity ordered by the retailer. The retailer loses any unmet demand. We analyze three different scenarios of the Stackelberg game, namely no advance selling with disruption, advance selling without disruption, and advance selling with disruption. Our results indicate that advance selling can be used to mitigate the impact of supply disruption and at the same time could lead to an increase in the overall SC profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Market disruptions are unplanned and unanticipated events, which may further influence the flow of goods and materials within a supply chain. In view of the increasing significance of market disruptions in industries, in this paper, we review a selection of related papers that focus on market disruptions in the supply chain. We classify the literature into three aspects, namely, demand disruption, supply disruption, and supply chain disruption risk. We review the representative operational models in each aspect. We derive insights into the current state of knowledge in each area. We suggest three future research directions: (a) Can supply chain structure help reduce disruption risk? (b) How does information asymmetry influence the supply chain in the presence of disruption? (c) How does social welfare vary in the presence of disruption? In conclusion, this paper provides up-to-date information to both researchers and practitioners to better identify, manage, and control market disruptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates an assembly system comprising one manufacturer and two suppliers who provide two complementary components independently. One unreliable supplier may encounter disruption during production, whereas both the manufacturer and the other reliable supplier can assist the disrupted supplier in capacity restoration. We specifically consider two different scenarios. In each scenario, the manufacturer or the reliable supplier ex ante decides whether to handle the disrupted supplier's capacity restoration cost alone and to what extent. We demonstrate that the cost-sharing incentives of the manufacturer and reliable supplier vary significantly under different conditions. When the retail price is high, paying for the disrupted supplier's restoration cost can be favorable for the manufacturer. Otherwise, the manufacturer can benefit considerably when the reliable supplier shares the restoration cost. When the wholesale price is high, handling the restoration cost alone is more favorable for the reliable supplier than sharing this responsibility with the manufacturer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines contingent rerouting strategy for enhancing supply chain resilience taking a supplier's point of view. We consider a supply chain with multiple suppliers at each stage and establish a mathematical model for product allocation behavior among different suppliers. The allocation model is based on each supplier's production capacity, product quality, production cost, as well as possible decision maker's preferences. As a performance measure for rerouting strategy, we use the total outflow of the supply chain. We propose an optimization model and its solution determines the rerouting strategy for product flow through the supply chain under disruptions. Numerical examples demonstrate the effect of the rerouting strategy and show the resilience of the supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]