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This paper examines the service mode selection strategy of a ride‐hailing platform and analyzes the impact of the strategy on consumers and drivers. The platform has three service modes to select from, including Mode L (only low‐quality services), Mode H (only high‐quality services), and Mode HL (high‐ and low‐quality services). We find that each service mode does not affect the price and the wage of the low‐quality service but affects those of the high‐quality service. Additionally, the platform cannot optimally select Mode L. The platform is better off if the car quality difference between high‐ and low‐quality services (CQD) is small and is worse off otherwise, under Mode HL. Counter‐intuitively, it is conditional for Mode HL to bring the highest surpluses to both consumers and drivers, and the conditions are related to CQD, social status utility of consumers and cost ratio between the drivers providing the two types of services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The e‐commerce platform has been adopting the agency mode to sell the products of the national brand manufacturer (NBM) while introducing its own store brand and obtaining the consumer's preference information (CPI) to reinforce the competitiveness of the store‐brand products. This paper investigates the platform's decisions on whether to share the CPI with the NBM and its impact on the production timing decisions of the platform and the NBM. The results show that the platform may benefit from CPI sharing which may also change the equilibrium production timing of the platform and the NBM from sequential decision to simultaneous decision. In addition, the equilibria of the joint decision between the CPI sharing and the production timing are obtained, which is related to the market acceptance uncertainties of the products and the competitiveness of the national brands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines an electric vehicle manufacturer's (EVM) battery outsourcing decision and product choice strategy in a two‐stage supply chain consisting of a battery supplier and an EVM that have different power structures. We analyze two game scenarios: the EVM outsources battery production versus the EVM produces batteries in‐house. In each scenario, the EVM has three product choices: producing an electric vehicle (EV) with a low driving range only, with a high driving range only, and with both driving ranges. We show that the conditions of the EVM's product choice strategy depend on two thresholds related to the production cost of batteries, the manufacturing and assembly cost of EVs, the government subsidy and the range anxiety, while the conditions are independent of the EVM's market position and battery outsourcing decision. Furthermore, the EVM inclines to produce batteries in‐house as its market position and operation cost decrease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a one‐service operator, one‐handset manufacturer mobile phone supply chain (MPSC), and examines how the nature and level of both the handset manufacturer's fairness concerns and the operator's fairness concerns affect the decision of pricing, subsidizing, and channel choice between an unlocked channel and a bundled channel. Our analysis shows that in most circumstances, the MPSC will choose the bundled channel as long as the price elasticity is higher; however, this property is invalid under certain conditions. Our analysis further shows that the introduction of fairness may have significant effects on channel choice decisions. First, the manufacturer's fairness may hinder the MPSC from choosing the bundled channel when the channel power between the operator and the manufacturer is sufficiently asymmetric. Second, when the manufacturer is almost neck‐and‐neck with the operator, the manufacturer's fairness concerns may be conducive to the deployment of the bundled channel. Third, the bundled channel would never be a reasonable choice for both the operator and the MPSC when the manufacturer has a relatively powerful status, in particular under the situation when the manufacturer has strong fairness concerns. Fourth, the operator's fairness concerns are always detrimental to the bundled cooperation which is different from the effect of the manufacturer's fairness concerns, and the bundled channel would never be a reasonable choice for the MPSC when the operator is extremely powerful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the supply chain coordination and contracting issue for competitive dual sales channels of the mobile phone industry in which a telecom service operator (operator) cooperates and competes with a handset manufacturer (manufacturer) to deliver the complementary telecom service and handset to end consumers. After deriving the equilibrium strategy based on the game theoretical paradigm, we present the sensitivity and comparative analysis as well as the coordination analysis. Among others, our result shows that the widely used subsidy‐only contract fails to coordinate this dual sales system. To solve the coordination failure, we propose a two‐way revenue sharing contract that can be well utilized to realize the first best outcome, and even guarantee the win–win situation, in particular under the situation when the telecom service price is sufficiently high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the pricing and environmental governance efficiency decisions and channel coordination of a dyadic tourism supply chain with corporate social responsibility. We consider two cases: only the theme park exhibits (environmental) social responsibility; and both theme park and tour operator exhibit social responsibility. For each case, we design a coordination mechanism. In the first case, we find that (a) if the environmental governance investment is relatively inexpensive, then the retail price, environmental governance efficiency, and sale quantity may simultaneously increase with the theme park's environmental responsibility (extra investment on the treatment of ungoverned environmental damage) under the centralized system; (b) it is more likely to achieve a win‐win outcome if the theme park cares more about the environment when the channel is coordinated; (c) the theme park's environmental responsibility enables itself to gain more coordination benefit when its negotiation power is relatively high. In the second case, we find that (a) the environmental governance efficiency or sale quantity increases with the tour operator's social responsibility; (b) both members' profits may increase with the tour operator's social responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]