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Previous work has shown that nonlinear taxation can affect the willingness to undertake risky investments. We show that similar results can arise if agents are uncertain regarding future tax rates. Uncertain taxes distort investment decisions when tax rates are correlated with marginal productivity. We demonstrate this result in a simple theoretical framework, which can also explain some well-known results on the effects of tax progressivity and tax asymmetry on investment. Time-series estimates for the post-WW2 era suggest a negative correlation between effective tax rates and total factor productivity in the USA, yielding an effect on firm investment equivalent to an investment subsidy of around 1 percent. Our results have wide-ranging implications for a variety of tax-related work, including effective tax rates, optimal audit policy, and principal-agent problems between investors and managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compute participation tax rates across the EU and find that work disincentives inherent in tax–benefit systems largely depend on household composition and the individual's earner role within the household. We then estimate participation elasticities using an IV group estimator that enables us to investigate the responsiveness of individuals to work incentives. We contribute to the literature on heterogeneous elasticities by providing estimates for breadwinners and secondary earners separately, according to their potential earnings. Our results show an average participation elasticity of 0.0–0.1 among breadwinners and 0.1–0.4 among secondary earners in the EU as well as a high degree of heterogeneity across countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how taxes affect relative mobility in the income distribution in the USA. Panel data for continuously married households drawn from the PSID between 1967 and 1996 are employed to analyse the relationship between marginal tax rates and the probability of staying in the same income decile. Exogenous variation in marginal tax rates is identified by using counterfactual rates based on legislated changes in the tax schedule. I find that higher marginal tax rates reduce income mobility. An increase in 1% point in marginal tax rates causes a decline of around 0.5% points in the probability of changing to a different income quintile. Tax reforms that reduce marginal rates by 7% points are estimated to account for around a tenth of the average movements in the income distribution in a year. Additional results suggest that the effect of taxes on income mobility differs according to the level of human capital and that it is particularly significant when considering mobility at the bottom of the distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that the sufficient statistic approach to the welfare properties of income (and other) taxes does not easily extend to tax systems with notches, because with notches, changes in bunching induced by changes in tax rates have a first-order effect on tax revenues. In an income tax setting, we show that the marginal excess burden (MEB) of a change in the top rate of tax is given by the Feldstein (Rev Econ Stat 81(4):674–680, 1999) formula for the MEB of a proportional tax, plus a correction term. This formula applies even if there is tax evasion. These correction terms cannot be calculated just from knowledge of the elasticity of taxable income, and quantitatively, they can be large. An application to VAT is discussed; with a calibration to UK data, the MEB of the VAT is roughly three times what it would be if VAT was simply a proportional tax. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effect on the elasticity of taxable income for individuals in couples, where there is no income splitting for tax purposes but joint decisions are taken regarding taxable incomes. Two approaches are considered. First, the effects of minimising the total tax increase arising from a marginal rate increase are examined. Second, the paper considers the effects of joint utility maximisation. In both cases, analytical results suggest the possibility that empirical taxable income elasticity estimates obtained while ignoring the distinction between individuals and couples can be biased, sometimes substantially. Thus, in the presence of individual income taxation, both taxable income elasticity and revenue response estimates could be expected to be quite different when those estimates are obtained while erroneously treating the behaviour of members of couple households as if they were separate individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) holds the promise of representing a summary measure of tax efficiency costs, which means that further information about the behavioral components of the ETI is not required for its use in tax policy design. However, since there are response margins that can cause biases in the estimation of the elasticity, this paper warns against neglecting information about the composition of the behavior summarized by the ETI. When using responses of the Norwegian self-employed to the tax reform of 2006 for illustration, we discuss how three different response margins relate to the overall ETI: working hours, tax evasion and shifts in organizational form. We provide empirical illustrations of effects of each of these margins and argue that the standard procedure for estimating the ETI produces a biased estimate due to the organizational shift margin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the direction of welfare-improving income tax reforms in the context of New Zealand, which recently reduced its top marginal income tax rate to one of the lowest in the OECD. A behavioural microsimulation model is used, in which social welfare functions are defined in terms of either money metric utility or net income. The model allows for labour supply responses to tax changes, in which a high degree of population heterogeneity is represented along with the details of the highly complex income tax and transfer system. The implications of the results for specific combinations of tax rate or threshold changes that are both revenue neutral and welfare improving are explored in detail, recognising the role of distributional value judgements. Results suggest, under a wide range of parameter values and assumptions, that raising the highest income tax rate and/or threshold would be part of a welfare-improving reform package. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of household income on interest credits from early tax payments. The hypothesis that the richest households pay their income taxes early is tested in a demand specification for interest credit on early tax payments. The empirical analysis uses regional data from 170 municipalities in the canton of Zurich from 2007 to 2013. A one standard deviation increase in the ratio for household income between the mean and the 75th percentile increases the ratio of interest tax credit to total taxes by 5%. The finding that high-income households pay their taxes early supports the view that institutional arrangements supporting early tax payments make the (effective) tax system more regressive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2005, over 8% of Norwegian shareholders transferred their shares to new (legal) tax shelters intended to defer taxation of capital gains and dividends that would otherwise be taxable in the aftermath of a reform implemented in 2006. Using detailed administrative data, we identify family networks and describe how take-up of tax avoidance progresses within a network. A feature of the reform was that the eligibility to set up a tax shelter changed discontinuously with individual shareholding of a firm and we use this fact to estimate the causal effect of availability of tax avoidance for a taxpayer on tax avoidance by others in the network. We find that eligibility in a social network increases the likelihood that others will take-up. This suggests that taxpayers affect each other's decisions about tax avoidance, highlighting the importance of accounting for social interactions in understanding enforcement and tax avoidance behavior, and providing a concrete example of optimization frictions in the context of behavioral responses to taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the behavioural responses to kinks and notches in the Dutch system of cash transfers, using data on the universe of Dutch households for the period 2007–2014. We typically do not find statistically significant evidence of bunching around kinks or notches, neither in income nor in wealth. This finding is robust across different household types and modes of employment. We consider potential mechanisms that can explain this apparent lack of bunching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the extent to which a fiscal stimulus involving durable goods induces financial distress and causes debt burden. Using account-level loan data to study the impact of Thailand's first-car-buyer tax rebate scheme at both individual and postcode levels, we find that the program led to higher loan delinquency and crowded out other loan originations, which are symptoms implied by excessive debt burden. The adverse impacts were more pronounced for passenger car buyers than for truck buyers and there were local negative spillovers to non-participants. Our findings raise questions about the merit of promoting economic growth by inducing debt-fueled spending and suggest that the design of durable goods stimulus policy should focus more on productive business durables than on consumer durables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We find that corporate income tax (CIT) rates are significantly positively associated with corporate debt and negatively associated with household debt, using panel data of 28 OECD countries between 1995 and 2015. The found association between CIT and debt comes from small countries where CIT is more exogenous due to tax competition. The tax deductibility of interest payments encourages firms to use more debt when CIT is high. If the total supply of loanable funds is not affected by a lower CIT, a lower CIT leads to a larger fraction of the total private debt incurred by the household sector. The estimated association becomes stronger in regressions with difference-stationary variables. A decrease in the CIT rate can explain around one-fourth of the increase in the average household debt incurred during the last two decades. The paper is the first study to investigate and yield supportive, though weak, evidence of distortion in household indebtedness caused by a CIT cut. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the direct effect of federal and subnational fiscal policy on aggregate demand in the USA by introducing the Fiscal Effect (FE) measure. FE can be decomposed into three components. Discretionary FE quantifies the effect of discretionary or legislated policy changes on aggregate demand. Cyclical FE captures the effect of the automatic stabilizers—changes in government taxes and spending arising from the business cycle. Residual FE measures the effect of all changes in government revenues and outlays which cannot be categorized as either discretionary or cyclical; for example, it captures the effect of the secular increase in entitlement program spending due to the aging of the population. Unlike other approaches, FE is a bottom-up approach that allows for differential effects on aggregate demand depending on the type and length of the policy change. Thus, FE is arguably the most detailed and comprehensive measure available of the stance of US fiscal policy in relation to aggregate demand. We use our new metric to examine the contribution of fiscal policy to growth in real GDP over the course of the Great Recession and current expansion. We compare this contribution to the contributions to growth in aggregate demand made by fiscal policy over past business cycles. In doing so, we highlight that the relatively strong support of government policy to GDP growth during the Great Recession was followed by a historically weak contribution over the course of the current expansion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the properties of optimal piecewise linear income tax systems for families, based on joint and individual incomes. It models the interaction between the wage rates of mothers as “second earners” and variation in child care prices and productivities as determinants of heterogeneity in second earner labour supply. We find that individual taxation welfare dominates joint taxation on grounds of both efficiency and equity. Heterogeneous labour supplies, the positive relationship between household wages and child care quality, and the sharp rise in wage rates in the top percentiles of the primary wage distribution account for this result. In addition to reducing the intra-household net-of-tax wage gap, individual taxation removes the opportunity for tax avoidance that income-splitting makes available to high-wage primary earners, leading to a much fairer distribution of the tax burden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the causal relationship between child benefits and household spending on child and adult goods. In particular, we examine whether it matters if it is the husband or wife who controls this income transfer. We exploit the introduction of child benefits to families with at least four children. The law assigned the mother as the beneficiary but, when asked who collected the amount, one-third of beneficiary families reported the father as the recipient. We use the propensity score matching approach to assess the issue of possible self-selection of beneficiary families into answering who was the recipient parent and the results favour common support. We apply the difference-in-difference approach and find evidence in favour of a gender bias in the spending of child benefits. On average, after the reform, recipient families’ spending on child clothing, food and tobacco was significantly different from that of non-recipient families. Further analysis suggests that recipient families with the mother (father) in control of the amount spent more on child clothing and food (tobacco) relative to non-recipient families. The evidence has implications on the design of welfare programmes to benefit the children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the welfare effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA86). We rely on different welfare metrics, which fully retain preference heterogeneity and are based on different ethical priors. We estimate utility functions with preference heterogeneity on the basis of structural models of family labor supply. Then, using these estimated preferences, we compute and compare different well-being rankings corresponding to different ways of measuring well-being. Finally, we identify the losers and the winners of TRA86, in absolute and relative terms, for each of the welfare metrics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a theory of social planning with a concern for economic coercion, which we define as the difference between consumers' actual utility and the 'counterfactual' utility they expect to obtain if they were able to set policy themselves. Reasons to limit economic coercion include protecting minorities and preventing disenfranchised groups from engaging in socially costly behavior, or political economy considerations. If consumers are fully rational, we show that limiting coercion is equivalent to placing more welfare weight on coerced consumers at the expense of others. If, however, consumers' rationality is bounded, counterfactual utility becomes endogenous to current policy, and the welfare loss associated with limiting coercion increases. We set up a numerical version of our model and find that the bias-related welfare loss can be substantial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generous income support programs as provided by European welfare states have often been blamed to hamper employment. This paper investigates the importance of incentives inherent in the tax-benefit system for the individual decision to take up work. Using German microdata over the period 1993-2010, we find that recent reforms in Germany increased work incentives at the extensive margin measured by the participation tax rate (PTR), particularly for low-income individuals. Work incentives are even higher if the time horizon is extended to more than one year, pointing at an overestimation of the disincentives by standard measures. Regression analysis reveals that a decrease in the PTR increases the probability of taking up work significantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether 'kiddie tax' legislation in Canada, effective as of 2000, deters income splitting between parents and minor children by taxing at the top marginal rate certain types of non-labor income received by children. OLS estimates based on cross-province and time-series data reveal that the share of dividend income reported by children aged 19 and under declines by 86 % after the introduction of this anti-avoidance rule. The estimates also reveal that the share of capital gains (income not covered by the legislation) reported by minor children increases by 70 % in the post-legislation period, suggesting that parents are switching to an alternative income splitting technique. However, the latter percentage effect is on a small base, and thus, the decrease in dividend income is much larger than the increase in capital gains income. Hence, our analysis suggests that the 'kiddie tax' is an effective method to deter income splitting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We apply recently proposed individual welfare measures in the context of preference heterogeneity, derived from structural labour supply models. Contrary to the standard practice of using reference preferences and wages, these measures preserve preference heterogeneity in the normative step of the analysis. They also make the ethical priors, implicit in any interpersonal comparison, more explicit. Information on preference heterogeneity is obtained from a structural discrete choice labour supply model for married women estimated on microdata from the Socio Economic Panel in Germany. We construct welfare orderings of households according to the different metrics, each embodying different ethical choices concerning the treatment of preference heterogeneity in the consumption-leisure space and provide empirical evidence about the sensitivity of the welfare orderings to different normative principles. We also discuss how sensitive the assessment of a tax reform is to the choice of different metrics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study proposes a method to obtain the social marginal costs of public funds (SMCF) that allows for heterogeneity on a household basis as well as labor supply responses along both the extensive and the intensive margins. To demonstrate our methodology, we take the example of the 1999 national income tax reform in Japan and evaluate it by estimating the SMCFs for changing marginal tax rates in different income brackets. We estimate the discrete choice model (DCM) of labor supply using a 1997 data set of Japanese households, and we use the estimates to generate the SMCFs with a DCM micro-simulation. We evaluate the simulated SMCFs with various distributional weights and find that the value of the SMCF for a 1 % increase in the marginal tax rate in any given income bracket decreases as we move across brackets from the bottom to the top. This finding suggests that the national government should have made the Japanese income tax system more progressive rather than less progressive as carried out in the 1999 reform. Our method is readily transferrable to tax reforms in other countries as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of charitable lotteries on charitable donations depends on the motives of charitable donations, and is thus more an empirical question. Utilizing the propensity score matching method to overcome sample selection bias, this study estimates the effect of lotto outlays on direct charitable donations based on Taiwan's experience of introducing a lottery in 2002. We find that people's lottery spending neither crowds out nor crowds in charitable donations after the control group for lottery players is matched by propensity scores. The evidence thus suggests that people are more concerned about how they make their donations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norway imposes some of the highest tax rates on alcoholic beverages and tobacco in the world, making, e.g., cross-border shopping an attractive activity for Norwegians. In light of this fact, we pose the question: Could we increase the total tax revenue from indirect taxes by decreasing tax rates on, e.g., spirits in Norway? When using an empirically based consumer model including cross-border shopping, tax-free shopping, and smuggling, we do find revenue curves implying total tax revenue maximizing tax rates. But we also find that these tax rates are always higher than the observed tax rates, i.e., suggesting that the answer to our question is no. In addition, we compare our results to a closed economy setting without cross-border shopping, etc. We find that the existence of cross-border shopping, etc. affects the shape of the revenue curves somewhat, although not dramatically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows how income changes in response to changes in marginal income tax rates (MTRs) translate into tax revenue changes for the familiar multi-step income tax function used in many countries. Previous literature has focused on the relatively straightforward case of a proportional income tax or the top MTR only. The paper examines revenue responses at both the individual and aggregate levels, and it is shown that for individual MTRs within a multi-rate regime, simple expressions for tax revenue responsiveness can be derived that nevertheless capture the various behavioural and structural responses to income tax reforms involving changes to multiple rates and thresholds. Illustrations are provided using changes to the New Zealand income tax structure in the 2010 budget. This reduced all marginal tax rates while leaving income thresholds unchanged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main rationales for taxing consumption rather than income is that it is believed that consumption taxes discourage consumption, encourage savings, and thus generate higher economic growth. However, empirical evidence on the actual effectiveness of consumption taxes in stimulating savings is very limited. In this paper, we estimate the impact of a broad-based consumption tax, the value-added tax (VAT), on the aggregate consumption of fifteen European Union countries over the period 1961-2005. Our empirical results indicate, across a variety of estimation methods and specifications, that a one percentage point increase in the VAT rate leads to roughly a one percent reduction in the level of aggregate consumption in the short run and to a somewhat larger reduction in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax systems with separate taxation of wage and capital income, also called dual income tax systems, have gained relevance through the Mirrlees Review. Obviously, such tax systems are exposed to horizontal equity (HE) failures, or horizontal inequity (HI). HE and HI have a firm grip on assessment of fair tax policies, both from an academic point of view and in general public debate. The dual income tax system of Norway was modified by the tax reform of 2006 precisely because the previous schedule failed to deliver equal tax treatment of equals. This paper discusses the meaning and measurement of HI effects of dual income tax systems, and evaluates the development of HI for Norway over the time period 2000-2008 using microdata. A copula-based identification strategy efficiently establishes a framework for evaluations of HI over time. The dual income tax system and the early announcement of its impending revision during the period under examination created measurement problems which we had to account for by defining a new income concept for the empirical strategy. As expected, we find less HI in Norway after the reform of 2006. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how a government should intervene when agents make choices having long-term detrimental effects on their life expectancy. For that purpose, we consider an economy where some agents consume a sin good (reducing their survival chances) out of myopia, and regret their choices later on, whereas other agents make, because of their impatience, the same risky choices, which they never regret. We argue that, in the first-best, a government should only interfere with behaviors that agents will regret, but not with other behaviors. In the second-best, asymmetric information and redistributive concerns imply interferences not only with myopic behaviors, but also with impatience-based (rational) behaviors. Finally, we introduce heterogeneity in individual earnings, and show that the optimal tax on the sin good depends on the size of the myopic group, on the reactivity of sin good consumption to tax changes, and on the extent to which sin good consumption is correlated with labor earnings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we investigate how the possibility of (legal) tax avoidance affects the extent of (illegal) tax evasion and hence the shadow economy. We formulate a theoretical microeconomic model of household behavior in which households can participate in the official and in the shadow economy. Using comparative statics, we show that the complexity of the tax system affects participation in the shadow economy negatively, i.e. a more complex tax system with more possibilities of legal tax avoidance implies, ceteris paribus, a smaller labor supply in the shadow economy. In addition, we show that a reduction in the maximum admissible number of working hours in the official economy increases the labor supply in the shadow economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Substantial evidence suggests that savings behavior may depart from neoclassical optimization. This article examines the implications of raising the savings rate-whether through social security, retirement plans, or otherwise-for labor supply, where labor supply is determined by behavioral utility functions that reflect the non-neoclassical character of savings behavior. Under one formulation, raising the targeted savings rate increases labor supply regardless of the slope of the labor supply curve; under a second, raising the targeted savings rate has the same effect on labor supply as that of raising the labor income tax rate; and under a third, raising the targeted savings rate has no effect on labor supply. Effects on labor supply are particularly consequential because of the significant preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

number of countries have begun implementing tax incentives designed to reverse the decline in fertility. Whether such incentives are effective or equitable remains an open question. During the early twentieth century, France initiated an unusual tax policy to promote fertility and marriage: Household income was divided by family size to obtain a final tax bracket. The policy was regressive in that fertility incentives were so large and greatest among the rich. Similar policies whose fertility benefit increases with income are being implemented today. Using hand-collected archival data from aggregate tax returns and three natural experiments, I find mixed evidence that these kinds of tax incentives affect fertility and marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the effect of observed food price changes on household consumption (welfare) in Tanzania and from this simulates the welfare effect attributable to tax (tariffs and VAT) reforms. The three rounds of the Tanzania Household Budget Survey (1991/92, 2000/01 and 2007) are used to apply Deaton’s method based on median unit values (prices) and household budget shares. The results indicate that real price increases over 1991–2007 have reduced welfare of the average household by 20 per cent of 1991 income, and the loss was fairly evenly distributed between the 1990s and 2000s. The welfare loss was much greater for the poor, especially the rural poor (a 27 per cent reduction), compared to the non-poor (in particular the urban non-poor, who suffered a five per cent loss). Although we cannot establish explicit links between tax reforms and domestic commodity price changes, to assess the extent to which welfare changes can be explained by tax reforms we simulate the effects of tax changes on domestic price changes. The simulation shows that tax reforms (tariff reductions) offset the welfare losses for all household groups, especially in the 1990s; although the differences were small, the urban poor benefit more in relative terms from tax reforms whereas the rural poor benefit least (the effect on the non-poor was similar irrespective of location). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Altruistic parents may transfer resources to their offspring by providing education, and by leaving bequests. We show that in the presence of wage taxation, a small bequest tax may improve efficiency in an overlapping-generations framework with only intended bequests, by enhancing incentives of parents to invest in their children’s education. We also calculate an optimal mix of wage and bequest taxes with alternative parameter combinations. In all cases, the optimal wage tax rate is clearly higher than the optimal bequest tax rate, but the latter is generally positive when the required government revenue in the economy is sufficiently high. If educational investment is partly unobservable for the government, these results qualitatively hold also when allowing for education subsidies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the potential impact of welfare benefits on the partnership status of women in the UK. Using recent policy reforms to identify the response rate, it was found that a £100/week welfare benefit “partnership penalty” reduces the probability of a woman having a partner by seven percentage points. The model is also used to explore the potential effects of the recent tax credit reforms on partnership rates; it was found that while the 1999 WFTC reform improved partnership incentives, this effect was effectively undone by the 2003 WTC/CTC reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of a recent Swedish child-care fee reform are compared with those of an alternative reform, increased child benefits. The fee reform implied considerably decreased fees and was intended to increase both labor supply among parents and their economic well-being. We estimate labor supply effects using a discrete choice labor supply model, and simulate behavioral responses to the changes. We find positive, but small, effects on labor supply from reduced fees, while increased child benefits would make single mothers decrease their labor supply. On the other hand, increased child benefits would make income distribution more equal. We make a social welfare comparison and conclude that for plausible values of inequality aversion, the alternative reform would have been preferred to the implemented fee reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]