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The strategy of deterrence by denial is widely used by different actors. Despite its prominence, however, the scholarship on deterrence by denial stands to be developed further. It lags behind scholarship on deterrence by punishment on two points: in identifying the conditions under which the strategy works and in examining elements affecting its adoption. Deterrence by denial also carries some conceptual ambiguity since its employment takes many significantly different forms and also because it overlaps with deterrence by punishment. Despite the emphasis in current scholarship on "inflicting costs" as a defining element of deterrence by punishment, costs arguably also play a significant role in deterrence by denial. To address these challenges, I distinguish between deterrence strategies by focusing on two main elements: the means the deterrer actor threatens to use (offensive or non-offensive) and the timing of the threatened use of these means (before or after the unwanted activity). This offers a more nuanced distinction between deterrence strategies and better encompasses the role of inflicting costs in deterrence by denial. I suggest that this research offers a useful point of departure to further theorize about deterrence by denial, and it sets a promising research agenda that is pertinent given the growing interest in deterrence by denial, especially in its application to cyber deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of deterrence presents a number of challenges, mainly to do with identifying deterrence success and defining how deterrence works. Studying cyber deterrence presents even greater challenges, as traditional deterrence challenges are exacerbated and interactions in the cyber domain create further difficulties. When studying cyber deterrence, scholars face uncertainty not only in identifying situations of deterrence success, but also—due to the secrecy surrounding cyber practices—in identifying situations of deterrence failure. Despite the many studies on cyber deterrence, methodological solutions to address these challenges still need to be developed. To this end, I suggest focusing on the adoption and employment of the strategy rather than on its success. I argue that since communicating threats is a core element of deterrence, it is easier to observe how the strategy is adopted and employed than whether it succeeds or fails. This focus provides a promising direction to study cyber deterrence and address these challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]