Search

This article introduces a dataset on disaggregated national military capabilities from 1970 to 2014, drawn from the International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance. While practitioners have long recognized the importance of what weapons states own, scholars have largely examined surrounding questions in piecemeal fashion due to data limitations. The Distribution of Military Capabilities dataset identifies the weapons portfolios of states over the past half century at various levels of aggregation suitable to a wide variety of research questions. This paper begins by explaining the value of data on disaggregated national military capabilities, the data's scope, and the data collection process, including the creation of a new modular typology of weapons categories consistent across time and space. I then identify some initial trends about changes in the distribution of military capabilities and their implications for China's military rise. These data allow scholars to better investigate important questions concerning power projection, military innovation, conflict outcomes, the use of force decisions, and interest group lobbying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses a largely overlooked actor in China's foreign relations, the International Department of the Communist Party of China (ID-CPC). Using publicly available documentation, we systematically analyze the patterns of the CPC's external relations since the early 2000s. Building on an intense travel diplomacy, the ID-CPC maintains a widely stretched network to political elites across the globe. The ID-CPC's engagement is not new; but since Xi Jinping took office, the CPC has bolstered its efforts to reach out to other parties. We find that party relations not only serve as an additional channel to advance China's foreign policy interests. Since President Xi has come to power, party relations also emerged as a key instrument to promote China's vision for reforming the global order. Moreover, China increasingly uses the party channel as a vehicle of authoritarian learning by sharing experiences of its economic modernization and authoritarian one-party regime. The cross-regional analysis of the CPC's engagement with other parties helps us to better understand the role of the CPC in Chinese foreign policy-making, pointing to a new research agenda at the intersection of China's foreign relations, authoritarian diffusion, and transnational relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests propositions advanced in previous theoretical literature about the impact of international economic integration via trade and investment on environmental protection with a case study of China. We hypothesize that instead of leading to additional environmental degradation, increased openness to trade and foreign investment results in an overall improvement in environmental quality by acting as a transmission belt for superior regulatory standards and environmental technology from China’s key export markets. Additionally, pressure for enhanced environmental regulation and product standards from principal developed-world importers of Chinese goods may induce Chinese firms to self-regulate rather than attempting to reduce the cost of their exports by lowering environmental standards. Statistical analysis of the variation in environmental performance across China’s regions from 1996 to 2004 lends support to this hypothesis, indicating that rather than leading regions to engage in a “race to the bottom” with the lowering of environmental standards, increased trade and investment encourages more stringent policy enforcement and compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the earliest years of the Internet’s creation, cyberspace has been distinguished from other types of political space because of three unique qualities: (i) its ability to mobilize users, particularly “outsiders” including those who have not been easily included in political systems using conventional means; (ii) its ability to quickly provide large quantities of information of uncertain or unregulated quality; and (iii) its ability to shrink distances between users, in some sense rendering conventional physical geography irrelevant. This paper presents three lenses for interpreting the significance of these developments: utopian, liberal, and realist. Evolving doctrines of cyberwarfare as put forth by China, Russia, and the United States in particular stress the ways in which cyberspace presents a unique security threat which may present greater advantages to nonstate actors engaged in unconventional warfare. Differing economic, political, and security policies derive from each lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do authoritarian states sometimes play up dangerous international crises and embarrassing diplomatic incidents in domestic propaganda? Is it to mobilize, threaten, divert, or pacify? Recent studies in comparative politics have focused on regime legitimacy and stability as key drivers of authoritarian propaganda practices, leaving aside other possible motivations such as mobilization of the regime's domestic allies or strategic signaling aimed at foreign audiences. Foreign policy analysts, meanwhile, have emphasized international dimensions of the propaganda behavior of China—the contemporary world's most powerful and technologically sophisticated authoritarian state—but have often mistakenly framed complementary theories as competing alternative explanations. This article argues that once the multiple domestic and international audiences for authoritarian propaganda are brought into view, many supposedly competing explanations turn out to be logically compatible and, in many cases, mutually reinforcing. We identify four sets of explanations—mobilization, signaling, diversion, and pacification—first showing how they fit together logically, before illustrating their convergence in the PRC's otherwise puzzling high-intensity propaganda campaign in 2016 over the Philippines vs. China arbitration on the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese "aid" is a lightning rod for criticism. Policy-makers, journalists, and public intellectuals claim that Beijing uses its largesse to cement alliances with political leaders, secure access to natural resources, and create exclusive commercial opportunities for Chinese firms--all at the expense of citizens living in developing countries. We argue that much of the controversy about Chinese "aid" stems from a failure to distinguish between China's Official Development Assistance (ODA) and more commercially oriented sources and types of state financing. Using a new database on China's official financing commitments to Africa from 2000 to 2013, we find that the allocation of Chinese ODA is driven primarily by foreign policy considerations, while economic interests better explain the distribution of less concessional flows. These results highlight the need for better measures of an increasingly diverse set of non-Western financial activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We demonstrate material origin of strategic preference expression in authoritarian systems, where firms express dissent against or conform to the government's position based on what they seek to obtain from the government: politically powerful firms are more likely to dissent to negotiate policy concessions while politically weak firms are more likely to conform to the government's position to obtain side payments or to avoid punishment. We test this argument using survey experiments with firm executives in China. A treatment that signals the government's commitment to liberalize inward foreign direct investment increases the percentage of firms that report to "benefit" from the policy between 14 and 36 percentage points. Powerful firms (state- and foreign-owned) conform the least to the government and politically vulnerable firms and the recipients of government contracts conform the most. Our results suggest that political standing is a key driver of business position-taking in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does international attention to political prisoners make them more likely to be released? The political science literature provides theoretical reasons to believe that widely publicizing a case may make regimes both more and less likely to free their prisoners, but to date there has been no systematic examination of this issue. An analysis of political prisoners in China from 1994 to 2017 shows that international publicity of a political prisoner's case will make regimes 70 percent more likely to release them early before sentencing, but has no effect once the prisoner has been sentenced—and may even be counterproductive. This "resistance" to international efforts appears to be more closely related with demonstrating the regime's strength to an international audience rather than to a domestic one. The study shows how fine-grained data on individuals can illuminate the domestic mechanisms behind why states comply with or resist transnational activism and human rights diplomacy. ¿La atención internacional a los presos políticos hace que su liberación sea más probable? En ciencias políticas, la literatura ofrece razones teóricas para creer que la amplia difusión de un caso puede hacer que los regímenes tengan más y menos probabilidades de liberar a sus presos, pero hasta la fecha, esa cuestión no se ha evaluado sistemáticamente. Un análisis del caso de los presos políticos en China entre 1994 y 2017 demuestra que la publicidad internacional hace que los regímenes sean un 70 percent más propensos a liberarlos antes de la sentencia, pero no tiene ningún efecto una vez que el preso ha sido condenado, e incluso puede ser contraproducente. Esta "resistencia" a los esfuerzos internacionales parece tener mayor relación con la demostración de la fuerza del régimen ante un público internacional que ante uno nacional. El estudio muestra de qué manera los datos detallados sobre las personas pueden echar luz sobre los mecanismos internos que explican las razones por las que los Estados cumplen con el activismo transnacional y la diplomacia de los derechos humanos o se resisten a hacerlo. L'attention internationale accordée aux prisonniers politiques les rend-t-elle davantage susceptibles d'être libérés? La littérature consacrée aux sciences politiques offre des raisons théoriques de croire qu'une grande sensibilisation du public à un cas spécifique peut rendre les régimes à la fois plus et moins susceptibles de libérer leurs prisonniers, mais jusqu'ici, ce sujet n'a pas encore fait l'objet d'un examen systématique. Une analyse portant sur les prisonniers politiques de Chine entre 1994 et 2017 montre que la sensibilisation internationale du public au cas des prisonniers politiques rend les régimes 70 percent plus susceptibles de les libérer rapidement avant leur condamnation, mais que cela n'a aucun effet une fois que le prisonnier a été condamné et que cela peut même être contreproductif. Cette « résistance » aux efforts internationaux semble davantage étroitement liée à la volonté du régime de montrer sa force au public international plutôt qu'au public national. Cette étude illustre la manière dont des données détaillées sur les individus peuvent apporter un éclairage sur les mécanismes nationaux qui expliquent pourquoi les États se conforment ou résistent à l'activisme transnational et à la diplomatie des droits de l'Homme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do government rhetoric and propaganda affect mass reactions in international crises? Using two scenario-based survey experiments in China, one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events, we assess how government statements and propaganda impact Chinese citizens' approval of their government's performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, suggesting that leaders can face public opinion costs akin to audience costs in an authoritarian setting. However, we also find evidence that citizens approve of bluster—vague and ultimately empty threats—suggesting that talking tough can provide benefits, even in the absence of tough action. In addition, narratives that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval, along with frames that emphasize a shared history of injustice at the hands of foreign powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we depart from the classic model of foreign direct investment (FDI) determinants and examine the effect of sociohistorical factors on FDI. We argue that past foreign aid projects confer social capital that constitutes specific resources available to investors in the present, increasing their preferences for host countries in which their home country has accumulated more social capital. We use new data on China's historical aid in Africa to test these contentions, uncovering a positive, significant connection between China's historical aid program in Africa (1956–1999) and contemporary (2000–2015) investments by Chinese companies. While China's historical aid may have been politically driven, it has had important long-term consequences for its commercial investors. More broadly, these findings suggest a sociohistorical explanation of the puzzle of why Chinese foreign investments deviate from conventional FDI patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the rise of large emerging economies influenced the foreign economic policies of smaller nations? Many of the BRICS' (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) dominance in export markets for low-skilled goods pose a particular challenge for "surplus-labor" countries characterized by large populations of unskilled and underemployed labor. We theorize the incentives of firms and governments in surplus-labor countries to form South-South preferential trade agreements (SSPTAs) as a means of diversifying and expanding trade relationships in the face of this challenge. Of all the BRICS, our findings show that China poses the greatest challenge; the countries forming the most South-South agreements are those whose exports have been most displaced by China. We verify this pattern using both systemic and country-specific measures of the China "shock." Imports from China, in contrast, have no significant effect on SSPTA formation. Our account, which helps resolve the dual puzzle of declining trade with rich countries and the proliferation of SSPTAs in recent decades, underlines the implications of China's rise on the developing world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies how local religious institutions mediate the effect of interethnic inequality on local violence. Focusing on the case of Xinjiang, China, we argue that local religious institutions decrease violence caused by local grievances. They do so in two ways: first, they provide local public goods; second, they provide an "information bridge" between the local population and the government, allowing for nonviolent management of potential discontent. We evaluate our claims with a county-level database of incidents of ethnic violence in Xinjiang, China. We measure local interethnic inequalities using education indicators from census data and the strength of religious institutions using local mosque density. We find a conflict-dampening effect of religious institutions: a higher level of interethnic inequality is associated with increased ethnic violence only in areas with low and medium levels of mosque density. This article contributes to the literature of civil conflict, ethnic violence, and political and social unrest by revealing how local institutions mediate the effect of grievances on violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many observers see mutual distrust as a major reason for increasing tensions in East Asia, but few studies systematically explore exactly how trust, or the lack of it, influences international cooperation in the region. We examine the microfoundations of international trust in East Asia by analyzing an original survey of Chinese urban residents' attitudes toward Japan and South Korea. We find that generalized trust, or the belief that other nations have benign intentions, provides the most important driving force of trust toward Japan and South Korea. This, in turn, has a positive effect on preferences for interstate cooperation. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, nationalism and historical memory have little or no effect on international trust. Our analysis enhances our broader understanding of international trust by clarifying its sources and consequences. It also suggests some important policy implications for Sino-Japanese relations and Chinese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How much war was there in early modern East Asia? This article empirically corroborates characterizations of relations between Sinic East Asian polities as being unusually peaceful and stable, which we attribute to the participants' shared subscription to a common and accepted hierarchy framed by a Confucian worldview. More broadly, we provide direct empirical evidence that international hierarchies derive their stability from cultural consensus rather than simply asymmetries in material power. We make these claims by addressing the extent, range, and patterns of war in early modern East Asia by introducing and describing an extensive dataset of over 1,100 entries that measures war and other violence in early modern East Asia from 1368 to 1841 and relies principally on both Chinese and Korean language sources. The combination of these two Asian language sources forms the basis of a unique dataset that will substantially widen and complement the largely Chinese or English language sources that are generally used in debating war in early modern East Asia. Asia was composed of much more than simply China, and bringing in scholarship from other areas of early modern East Asia reflects a trend of moving past national studies to research the region more holistically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study identifies 37 central banks that added China's renminbi (RMB) to their reserve portfolio since 2010. Why do some states diversify into new reserve currencies at an early stage while most continue to take a wait-and-see approach? We argue that state preferences regarding international order influence decisions to invest in RMB. While some states support the liberal, US-led status quo, others prefer an emerging Chinese alternative order. We contend that as state preferences for international order move away from the US model (and toward China), the likelihood of diversifying reserves into RMB should increase. Thus, the decision to invest in RMB is not simply an economic choice. It is also a political act that signals and symbolizes a state's preferences for a diminution of American global influence and support for a revised order. Employing new United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) ideal points data, we find that states with larger (smaller) ideal point distance with the United States (China) are more likely to adopt RMB as a reserve currency. Furthermore, political consideration--rather than economic concerns about transaction needs, optimal portfolio considerations, or instrumental calculations--best explains emergent demand for the RMB as a reserve currency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For several years now, China has implemented policies to promote the international use of its national currency, the Renminbi ( RMB). As part of these efforts, the People's Bank of China ( PBC) has negotiated 25 bilateral currency swap agreements ( BSAs) with foreign central banks. These make it easier for firms in both China and its partner countries to settle cross-border trade and direct investment in RMB. We seek to explain why China and these countries cooperate via BSAs. We theorize that trade and direct investment interdependence relate to dyadic BSA cooperation via two mechanisms: financing insulation from international liquidity shocks and reduced transaction costs of cross-border exchange for local firms. Additionally, we expect the presence of preferential trade agreements ( PTAs) and bilateral investment treaties ( BITs) will increase the probability of dyadic BSA cooperation. BSAs are natural extensions of these existing agreements. They represent an additional layer of state-level formal cooperation that further reduces barriers to cross-border trade and direct investment. Our empirical analysis finds that both de facto trade interdependence and de jure economic integration via PTAs and BITs increase the probability of BSA cooperation between China and partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China has led to a spate of scholarly and journalistic speculation about the future of a liberal world order. Apparently, the rise of a nondemocratic, Asian rival to US hegemony potentially undermines the growth of democracy throughout the system. Many see a resource-hungry China engaging itself globally out of purely self-interested motives, and Chinese business and aid offer a viable alternative to Western influence. Using the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research's (SIPRI) data on arms transfers since the end of the Cold War, we test the proposition empirically by assessing the nature and strength of Chinese politico-military support, measured as conventional arms transfers, globally and to African regimes. In short, we find that China relative to the United States transfers greater amounts of arms to democracies rather than autocracies, whereas the United States seems to prefer more autocratic regimes, despite rhetoric that claims an ethical foreign policy. The same result holds when we assess this relationship using human fights data. Moreover, Chinese arms transfers to countries suffering civil wars are much lower than the United States'. The findings are robust to the inclusion of several control variables and alternative estimation techniques. The findings show that popular perceptions about China's role in Africa do not match reality, particularly when assessed against the current hegemon's behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rising power and increased global activism have attracted increasing attention, with particular focus on whether a stronger China is likely to be a revisionist or status quo state. Power transition theory highlights the potential for a dissatisfied rising power to challenge the existing international order, but it is difficult to evaluate whether a rising power is dissatisfied. Where Chinese leaders choose to travel can offer insights into whether China's behavior is more consistent with that of a revisionist or status quo state and into China's broader diplomatic priorities. We present a series of expectations concerning how the travel patterns of a challenger state are likely to differ from the travel patterns of a status quo state. Using a newly compiled data set, we then analyze the correlates of travel abroad by top Chinese leaders from 1998 to 2008. Our results are more consistent with a status quo conceptualization of China, though there are some important exceptions such as willingness to travel to rogue states. We also use travel data to test other hypotheses about Chinese foreign policy behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the abolition of extraterritoriality in world politics? Which factors account for the variation in the timing of the abolition process? I develop a state-building explanation for the abolition of extraterritoriality. I find that traditional explanations of the abolition of extraterritoriality that rely on power and culture do not account for Western states’ decisions to keep or abolish extraterritoriality. I suggest that the state-building practices of non-Western countries, specifically the institutionalization of a state-based legal system, are key to explaining why Western states decided to keep or abolish extraterritoriality. I test my argument against alternative explanations using a comparative case study of the abolition process in Japan and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research suggests that cultural differences in Chinese and Western modes of conceptual reasoning play a significant role in political discourse and relations between the United States and China. In contrast, our analysis of the discourse surrounding the 2001 collision of an American surveillance plane with a Chinese fighter jet over international waters reveals a surprisingly high degree of similarity in conceptual metaphors used across the two cultures. Using tools from cognitive linguistics and cognitive science, we compare U.S. and Chinese conceptual metaphors used to frame the incident over a 13-day period, ultimately distinguishing between shared metaphorical conceptualizations (War, Journey, and Economic) and competing metaphorical conceptualizations (Game, Technical Fix, Victim, and Civil Relations). Our analysis allows us to make empirically grounded claims about Chinese–American relations that avoid cultural stereotypes and suggest possibilities for further integration of interpretive and scientific approaches for understanding intercultural discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why would a declining power help arm a neighboring and once-hostile rising power? Current international relations literature cannot explain relationships in which one powerful country contributes directly to its long-term relative decline in order to make smaller, short-term gains. This study focuses on one example, the Treaty on Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, signed in Moscow on July 16, 2001. Presenting evidence that this alliance embodies a relationship that is based primarily on sales of arms from Russia to China, the authors argue that this association cannot be explained by current theory. Three variables appear most important to understanding the arms sales element of this case: declining relative position discloses the structural factors behind Russia's actions; domestic policy explains its willingness to make what had appeared as rash sacrifices; and identity issues explain the core motivations and interests of each actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]