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Some recent papers have concluded that authoritarian regimes have faster economic growth than democracies. These supposed growth benefits of autocracies are estimated using data sets in which growth rates rely heavily on data reported by each government. Governments have incentives to exaggerate their economic growth figures, however, and authoritarian regimes may have fewer limitations than democracies on their ability to do so. This paper argues that growth data submitted to international agencies are overstated by authoritarian regimes compared to democracies. If true, it calls into question the estimated relationship between government type and economic growth found in the literature. To measure the degree to which each government's official growth statistics are overstated, the economic growth rates reported in the World Bank's World Development Indicators are compared to a new measure of economic growth based on satellite imaging of nighttime lights. This comparison reveals whether or not dictators exaggerate their true growth rates and by how much. Annual GDP growth rates are estimated to be overstated by 0.5-1.5 percentage points in the statistics that dictatorships report to the World Bank. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines whether economic sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers. We argue that the effect of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Because personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) to fund patronage, rulers in these regimes are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than leaders in other types of regimes. In contrast, when dominant single-party and military regimes are subject to sanctions, they increase their tax revenues and reallocate their expenditures to increase their levels of cooptation and repression. Using data on sanction episodes and authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1997 and selection-corrected survival models, we test whether sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers in different types of regimes. We find that personalist dictators are more vulnerable to foreign pressure than other types of dictators. We also analyze the modes of authoritarian leader exit and find that sanctions increase the likelihood of a regular and an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup, in personalist regimes. In single-party and military regimes, however, sanctions have little effect on leadership stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the diversionary use of force has burgeoned in recent years, but the literature remains divided. This paper attempts to reconcile extant findings by advancing a new theoretical framework for diversionary force centered on the agenda-setting literature. It expands the conventional conception of diversionary behavior and distinguishes the benevolent use of force over low politics issues (which we term socioeconomic interventions, SEI) from belligerent force used over high politics issues (which we term politico-strategic interventions, PSI). This expansion also refines our understanding of strategic conflict avoidance (SCA). Using Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression on 140 countries from 1950 to 1996, we find that democracies and mixed regimes tend to use SEI for diversion even though strategic conflict avoidance does not prevent them from using PSI. We further find that autocracies do not externalize their internal problems with either type of armed force and that, surprisingly, strategic conflict avoidance may constrain autocracies suffering economic decline. These outcomes suggest that our theory has utility and that research on both diversion and SCA would benefit from further theoretical refinement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we provide one of the first systematic analyses of gender's effect on trade attitudes. We draw on a unique representative national survey of American workers that allows us to evaluate a variety of potential explanations for gender differences in attitudes toward free trade and open markets more generally. We find that existing explanations for the gender gap, most notably differences between men and women in economic knowledge and differing material self-interests, do not explain the gap. Rather, the gender difference in trade preferences and attitudes about open markets is due to less favorable attitudes toward competition among women, less willingness to relocate for jobs among women, and more isolationist non-economic foreign policy attitudes among women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars argue that leaders' expectations about future shifts in the distribution of power can result in preventive war. If a leader expects her adversary to be significantly stronger in the future, the leader may choose to go to war with that adversary rather than bargain with a stronger adversary in the future. However, quantitative evaluations of this argument prove difficult, as they require a measure of leaders' expectations about future shifts in power rather than simply a measure of observed power. In this paper, we develop an empirical model of future power to create this measure. We then use that measure to evaluate the preventive war hypothesis. Our results support the preventive war hypothesis. Increases in a state's expected future probability of winning in war increase its probability of another state in a dyadic relationship initiating war against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proponents often recommend high labor standards as a means of reducing inequality between and within countries. Opponents suggest that labor standards exacerbate international and domestic inequalities. In this paper, we forward a simple argument whereby the impact of higher labor standards on domestic inequality depends on a country's labor endowment. We hypothesize that where labor is abundant, higher standards will exacerbate inequality. Where labor is scarce, higher labor standards might lower inequality. In both cases, the impact of labor standards on inequality work through an employment and wage effect. Using newly available data on labor standards around the world from 1981 to 2000, we provide evidence largely consistent with our hypotheses. Higher labor standards do, indeed, exacerbate inequality in labor-abundant economies. On the other hand, higher labor standards lower inequality in labor-scarce economies. We discuss the implications of these findings for work on labor market insiders and outsiders as well as the political economy of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that a fundamental failing in the debate on the decline of American economic power is not taking globalization seriously. With the rise of transnational corporations ( TNCs), transnational modular production networks, and the globalization of corporate ownership, we can no longer give the same relevance to national accounts such as balance of trade and GDP in the twenty-first century as we did in the mid-twentieth. Rather, we must summon data on the TNCs themselves to encompass their transnational operations. This will reveal, for example, that despite the declining global share of United States GDP from 40% in 1960 to below a quarter from 2008 onward, American corporations continue to dominate sector after sector. In fact, in certain advanced sectors such as aerospace and software-even in financial services-American dominance has increased since 2008. There are no serious contenders, including China. By looking at the wrong data, many have failed to see that American economic power has not declined-it has globalized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations scholars have previously argued that states facing budget constraints will join alliances to free resources for domestic spending. In this paper, we focus on the primary mechanism by which leaders have relaxed this constraint: sovereign borrowing. Sovereign debt enables states to maintain stable tax rates while increasing expenditures to confront budgetary emergencies. Affordable access to credit, then, serves as both a source of power and an important buffer between security and the political consequences of fiscal policy. States that lack the confidence of investors must make tough choices between continued security and their electoral fortunes. We suggest that as governments lack access to affordable credit, they will substitute military capacity with alliance formation. Alliances provide a means for leaders to offset the loss of flexibility from diminished access to credit without disturbing the domestic political economy. Using previous models of alliance formation as a guide, our empirical evidence indicates that states that have a hard time borrowing are more likely to form an alliance than those states with affordable access to credit markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies often assume that empty sanction threats inflict reputation costs on senders. However, target response to senders' previous decisions whether to back down or impose sanctions remains unexamined. In this paper, I argue that the target of sanction threats looks to the sender's actions against prior resistant targets. When the sender has backed down recently, the target, inferring that the sender is prone to making empty threats, is less likely to acquiesce. Conversely, when the sender has recently imposed sanctions against a resistant target, the current target infers that sanction imposition is likely to follow resistance, and therefore, it is more likely to acquiesce, all else equal. In statistical tests of US sanction threats spanning 1971-2000, I find strong evidence that the target is less likely to acquiesce when the United States recently backed down from a sanction threat. I find somewhat weaker evidence that the target is more likely to acquiesce when the United States recently imposed sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Barry, Colin M., K. Chad Clay, and Michael E. Flynn. (2012) Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12039 Nonstate actors, such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs), have attained an increasingly prominent role in modern world affairs. While previous research has focused on these actors' respective interactions with states, little attention has been paid to their interactions with each other. In this paper, we examine the extent to which the decisions of private actors seeking to invest abroad are affected by the reputational costs of doing business in countries publicly targeted by human rights activists. We find that ''naming and shaming'' by human rights INGOs tends to reduce the amount of foreign direct investment received by developing states, providing evidence that INGO activities affect the behavior of MNCs. An additional implication of our findings is that shaming by INGOs can impose real costs on targeted states in the form of lost investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains the varying degrees to which commercial interests or recipients' development needs shape donor governments' foreign aid allocation decisions. I argue that domestic interest group politics is a major driver of the heterogeneity in donors' aid allocation policies. As proxy measures of donor governments' dependence on the political support of industrial producer lobbies and their susceptibility to the demands of development interest groups, I exploit variation in the level of tertiarization and in the intensity of industrial restructuring processes across donor countries and over time. While higher levels of tertiarization increase donor governments' relative responsiveness to the aid allocation demands of development interest groups, intense periods of industrial adjustment provide incentives for governments to allocate aid in line with the preferences of their industrial producer constituencies. Statistical analyses of a dyadic panel data set of 21 OECD donor and 124 developing recipient countries for the period from 1980 to 2001 support the theoretical predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a decade of Aid for Trade (AfT) allocations, we can now begin to assess whether this new development strategy has been effective. Focusing on the short-term goal of export growth, we examine whether AfT from the US government promoted exports within recipient national economies over the period 1999-2008. Our results suggest that a $1 dollar increase in total US AfT has been associated with about a $69 increase in recipient exports 2 years later. We also show that the export effect of US AfT has not been confined to the US market and is driven primarily by exports to the rest of the world. In addition, we show that US AfT has been effective in reaching more needy countries as the substantive effect of US aid for trade has been larger in lesser-developed, landlocked, and more distant recipient countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do domestic institutions affect how dictators respond to their political opposition? In this paper, I argue that institutionalization is key to understanding whether dictators respond to domestic opposition groups with concessions. I present a nominal typology of dictatorial opposition movements, arguing that the manner in which the opposition is incorporated into the regime reveals important information about the types of concessions dictators will likely provide. Using a system of endogenous equations, I show that dictators buy off some types of domestic opposition with material concessions and liberalize when they face other types of opposition. Because dictators often make decisions facing environmental constraints, however, I also argue that financial conditions can limit a dictator's ability to respond beneficently to the opposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As ordinarily used by political scientists, the charge of ‘economism’ refers to a violation of the political sphere's privileged presumption of autonomy. More specifically, it refers to an exaggeration of the economic sphere's importance in the determination of social and political relations and a corresponding underestimation of the autonomy and integrity of the political sphere. With the aim of further clarifying the concept and its applications to the study of war and peace, this paper examines three distinguishable modes of economism: variable economism, where political outcomes are said to be attributable wholly or predominantly to economic causes, logical economism, where international political life is interpretable only insofar as it can be comprehended within the framework of economic logic, and historical economism, involving a double limiting of state practice and international political theory in the joint reproduction of an economistic social order. Statist economism, the paper contends, is a dangerous form of historical economism characteristic of advanced capitalist society. As the successor to the institution and doctrine of laissez-faire, statist economism entails both the transparent reduction of state practices and legitimations to economic interests and a diminishment of the creative and adaptive capacities of the modern states system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the determinants of international child adoption. We argue that prospective parents' desire to reduce transaction costs and ensure a successfully completed adoption influences adoption flows. Drawing on dyadic panel data over the period 1991-2010, we fit hurdle models to identify sending-country and dyad characteristics that correlate with adoption flows. We show that an international agreement designed to ensure the integrity of adoption depresses foreign adoptions by raising transaction costs. By contrast, adoption is more likely when sending countries have a high-quality regulatory environment and when colonial or migration ties exist within the dyad. Our findings highlight the impact of transaction costs on transnational, non-market exchange, expand political economy models of migration, and emphasize the importance of private international law in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What accounts for the spread of Sovereign Wealth Funds ( SWFs)? Despite the increasing importance of SWFs in the global economy, we lack persuasive systematic answers to that question. Most analysts take for granted that economic imperatives drive the creation of SWFs; governments create them as effective solutions to the challenges generated by reserve accumulation and commodity-export specialization. In this article, I argue that the evidence fails to support this theory. Instead, the spread of SWFs best resembles the diffusion of a fashion or fad. SWFs became fashionable as an appropriate approach for reserve- and resource-rich countries seeking to manage policy uncertainty related to these economic characteristics. As other countries developed the same characteristics, they followed the lead of their peers and also created SWFs. I provide, with the use of a new data set, the first cross-national political-economy statistical analysis of SWF creation. The results suggest peer group emulation has, indeed, been crucial in shaping the decision of many countries to create SWFs-especially in fuel-exporting countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether the impact of International Monetary Fund ( IMF) programs on the perceived creditworthiness of a country is conditional on government partisanship. Left-of-center governments tend to suffer from greater credibility problems in financial markets than right-wing governments, because they are typically believed to pursue expansionary policies and have less respect for debt obligations. Applying the conventional wisdom held as ' Only Nixon can go to China,' I argue that adopting IMF programs can benefit leftist governments more than other types of governments. The logic of the Nixon paradox implies that market-oriented reforms have greater credibility when implemented by a left-of-center party, whose ideologies do not accord well with the IMF's neoliberal policies, than when implemented by a right-wing party. This is because market participants interpret the action by a leftist government as driven more by a willingness to commit to market-oriented reform than by ideological affinity. Using sovereign credit rating data for almost 90 emerging market countries from 1980 to 2004, I find robust evidence consistent with the ' Nixon- Goes-to- China' hypothesis. The findings suggest that adopting IMF programs improves the perceived creditworthiness of leftist governments, whereas no such benefit is found among non-leftist governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As governments lower traditional tariffs, they may use non-tariff barriers, such as antidumping ( AD) and countervailing duty ( CVD) laws, to protect domestic industries. Research on the US International Trade Commission ( ITC), an independent agency responsible for adjudicating AD/ CVD claims, finds mixed evidence of political influence in these cases. However, this research focuses predominately on the political influence of the petitioning industry. Applying theories of bureaucratic oversight, I posit that the ITC must be receptive both to petitioners and to firms that oppose trade barriers. Using an original data set compiled from ITC records of witness testimony in these cases, I demonstrate that domestic opposition to an AD/ CVD petition has a significant effect on ITC decisions. Moreover, members of Congress actively intervene on both sides of AD/ CVD petitions and have some influence on ITC decisions. These results suggest that AD/ CVD politics in the United States is better understood as a contest between competing domestic interests than a captured bureaucracy providing rents to protectionist interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have argued that oil resources lead to poor quality institutions and governance, which causes slower economic growth, an increased propensity for civil war, and other maladies. Such conclusions, however, rest on strong modernization assumptions that oil resources are unrelated or detrimental to the level of economic development. Utilizing a unique multilevel version of extreme bounds analysis ( EBA), we find that oil's deleterious effects on governance are not well established. Instead, when we relax strong assumptions about the exogeneity of economic development and utilize more objective indicators of institutional quality, oil has a net positive impact on governance. Moreover, when accounting for endogeneity, there is little to suggest either an intervening or independent effect of poor governance on civil conflict in petro-states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Barry, Colin M., K. Chad Clay, and Michael E. Flynn. (2012) Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12039 Nonstate actors, such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs), have attained an increasingly prominent role in modern world affairs. While previous research has focused on these actors' respective interactions with states, little attention has been paid to their interactions with each other. In this paper, we examine the extent to which the decisions of private actors seeking to invest abroad are affected by the reputational costs of doing business in countries publicly targeted by human rights activists. We find that ''naming and shaming'' by human rights INGOs tends to reduce the amount of foreign direct investment received by developing states, providing evidence that INGO activities affect the behavior of MNCs. An additional implication of our findings is that shaming by INGOs can impose real costs on targeted states in the form of lost investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does government social spending affect inequality in this era of globalization? This article investigates the relationship between openness, government social expenditures (i.e., education, health, and social security and welfare), and income distribution through a time-series cross-sectional panel data set for 35 less developed countries (LDCs) from 1972 to 1996. I compare these findings to the redistributive effects of social spending in 11 advanced industrialized economies. The results show that while all categories of social spending help improve income distribution in richer countries, the effects of social spending are much less favorable in LDCs. Only spending on education in LDCs encourages a more favorable distribution of income in the face of globalization. I argue that the pressures of a more competitive global economy increase incentives for more redistributive education spending, whereas publicly sponsored health programs and, particularly, social security and welfare programs confront greater political lobbying and clientelism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm has long been a part of ordinary parlance in political science. Aside from its role in metatheoretical debate, scholars have enlisted the paradigm concept to explain policy change, particularly in the international political economy (IPE) literature. In this context, policy paradigms are defined primarily in ideational terms and with respect to a specific domain of policymaking. We argue that this stance overstates the ideational coherence of policymaking and runs a risk of reification. We re-evaluate the paradigm concept by drawing a link to the recent literature on norm change that emphasizes the importance of practice and process. This analysis highlights theoretical difficulties in using the paradigm concept, as the relation of ideas to practical logics elides the distinctness of paradigmatic frameworks. Without clear boundaries, paradigms lose much of their analytical purchase. While the paradigm concept initially proved useful in highlighting the role of ideas, it is time to recognize its limits in explaining stability and change in policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The realities of interdependence dictate that the ability of governments to pursue domestic policies effectively is influenced and constrained by developments in the international system. It is equally evident that the realization of international objectives depends meaningfully on domestic politics and economics. Our purpose in this paper is to lay the foundation for a Realist theory of state action which bridges domestic and international politics. We proceed by positing assumptions about state objectives and deducing strategies relevant to their pursuit. First, we examine conceptions of the state found in classical and structural Realism. Second, we present two models or "faces" of state action which relate the goals of state officials in one arena to the strategies available in the pursuit of such goals in the other. Third, building upon these two models, we put forth several hypotheses which explore the types of challenges to the state that arise in one arena that may trigger responses in the second. Fourth, we introduce variations in domestic and international structures and predict the choice of strategy made by the states across venues. Finally, a concluding section examines the implications of this effort for future Realist inquiry and the study of domestic and international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the linkages among the ideological, political, and economic dimensions of the world-system by looking at changes in the publication of two types of utopian novels in the United States. We argue that positive and negative visions of the future (eutopian and dystopian literature, respectively) can be treated as aspects of the ideological dimension of the world-system. As part of such an interrelated system, the volume of utopias should change in response to periods of crisis and stability in the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of the system. A time-series analysis indicates that both types of utopian literature are affected by changing conditions of the world-system. On the basis of these findings, we conclude that the world-system perspective represents a promising approach for the study of ideological change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review article summarizes and Criticizes two recent books by Peter J. Katzenstein and one by John Zysman on politics, industrial policy, and political economic performance in postwar industrialized capitalist democracies. Drawing some elements from these books and forging others from their criticism, the paper proposes a preliminary framework for the study of political economic policy and performance that stresses structures of interests, of state organization, and of interrelations among these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing upon the theory of hegemonic stability, this paper advances a theory of international economic structures. It places particular emphasis on analyzing the whole structure of the international economy, and not simply the absence or presence of hegemony. It finds that there is no axiomatic relationship between hegemony and free trade or declining hegemony and protection. By differentiating between non-hegemonic structures, moreover, the theory of international economic structures also calls into question the appropriateness of the ‘British’ or ‘1930’ analogy for the future of the present international economy. Finally, the theory is briefly examined through the cases of American trade policy in the inter-war period and the 1970s and early 1980s. The conclusion argues against simplistic analogies between the two periods and maintains that a considerable potential does exist for collective leadership of the international economy in the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues for conceiving international relations, including studies of world political order and disorder, as the intersection and union of behavioral-scientific, dialectical/Marxist and traditional approaches. Each is a tradition of scholarship, with dominant and inferior tendencies, visible in all parts of the scholarly world. A content analysis of Kornberg's collection of recent American international course lists shows a parochial behavioralism to dominate the instruction offered at our ‘leading’ universities. An intensive analysis of Waltz's influential treatment of radical/dialectical theorists shows many signs of the same myopia, as well as its consequences. Both epistemological and political differences in context are important for better, more ‘worldly’ and sophisticated research and teaching. Debates and convergences cutting across approaches or more specialized research programs are particularly important in this regard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conceptualizes the political economy of the Soviet bloc in terms of concepts used to describe ‘classic dependence’ and ‘dependent development’ in the capitalist periphery. In particular, the rapid economic growth that occurred in Eastern Europe between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s can be termed ‘dependent development’ because the primary stimulus for it came from an external dominator (the Soviet Union) and because the process of economic growth and structural transformation made Eastern Europe more dependent economically upon the USSR and created ‘class linkages’ of common interest between the Soviet and East European elites. Dependent development of the Soviet bloc was also analogous to the Western case in that, despite initial successes, it ultimately created major economic, political, and social ‘contradictions’-which seemingly can only be resolved by a radical structural transformation. In addition to such similarities between ‘capitalist’ and ‘socialist’ dependency, there are several important differences as well that evidently derive from the fact that dependency relationships are more ‘political’ in the Soviet bloc and more `economic' in the capitalist world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The quantitative evidence on whether extractive industries generate economic wealth at the local level is far from conclusive. In line with recent studies highlighting the moderating role of institutions and governance structures in the resource–development nexus, we argue that the effect of mining on local economic well-being is largely driven by different control rights regimes. We claim that domestic mineral production stimulates local income more than internationally controlled extraction, since national mining companies promote more backward economic linkages and have higher incentives to engage in local capacity building. To test our micro-level arguments, we combine information on districts' economic well-being as well as individual's assessments of their personal economic situation with our own dataset on the control rights of copper, gold, and diamond mines. Relying on these data, we perform district- and individual-level analyses of sub-Saharan Africa covering the period from 1997 to 2015. Our instrumental variable estimations and fixed effects models show that the presence of domestic mining companies is associated with increased local wealth. Multinational firms, by contrast, are linked to increased regional unemployment. They largely fail to promote subnational economic well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary United Nations (UN) peacekeeping deployments commonly pursue both security and economic objectives, but the existing scholarly literature contains hardly any systematic assessments of peacekeeping missions' economic effects. We address this issue in two ways. First, we use cross-country data to show that UN peacekeeping missions are large-scale economic interventions. They stimulate demand in depressed economic environments; we find significantly higher economic growth in the presence of peacekeeping deployments than in comparable cases without them. However, we estimate that economic growth rapidly declines when missions end, which suggests that they do not necessarily promote stable economic development. Second, we provide evidence in this vein by turning to microlevel survey data that we collected in Monrovia, where the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) had a large presence from 2003 onward. Our data suggests that UNMIL's spending created demand for low-skill employment in the service sector, largely without facilitating skill transfers or loosening credit constraints for business owners. This illustrates the problem of "peacekeeping economies" suggested by our cross-country analysis: peacekeeping missions help create an economic boom fueled by demand in nontraded products, particularly low-skill services, which may not be robust to the mission's withdrawal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does economic interdependence shape political relations? We show a new pathway to support a commercial peace in which economic interdependence changes strategies for conflict management. The uncertainty arising from political disputes between countries can depress trade flows. As states seek to protect trade from such negative effects, they are more likely to bring their disputes to legal venues. We assess this argument by analyzing why countries bring cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Using data on 190 countries from 1960 to 2013, we find that countries are more likely to file ICJ cases against important trading partners than against states with low levels of shared trade. We conclude that economic interdependence changes the incentives for how states resolve their disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent study commissioned by the United States Agency for International Development to assess the effectiveness of its spending on democracy in its programs worldwide found that such aid works—with the sole exception of programs in the Middle East. What explains this exception? I argue that previous studies on democracy aid pay insufficient attention to the fact that such programs often develop as negotiated deals. Because authoritarian regimes may choose how to accept assistance, democracy aid may reward economic interests tied to incumbent regimes. I explore these dynamics through case studies of US democracy programming in Egypt and Morocco. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern investor-state arbitration regime was explicitly designed to replace commercial diplomacy as a mechanism for protecting foreign investment. I argue, however, that diplomacy continues to play an important role in managing political risk, particularly in countries with weak rule of law. Yet, since commercial diplomacy occurs primarily behind closed doors, it is difficult to observe, let alone test for its effects. To overcome this obstacle, I exploit variation in vacancies among US ambassadors to foreign countries--conditions overwhelmingly driven by US domestic political factors--which provides for a quasi-natural experiment for testing the effects of commercial diplomacy. I show that American firms operating abroad are significantly more likely to initiate investor-state arbitration disputes during temporary vacancies in US ambassadorships. The effects of these vacancies prove particularly strong in countries with weak rule of law. The results suggest American investors frequently seek assistance from the US government in informally resolving incipient investment disputes; if diplomatic channels are unsuccessful or unavailable, investors then file formal arbitration cases. These findings underline that, even in highly legalized issue areas in world politics, such as investment protection, informal diplomacy continues to influence important political economy outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do governments distribute their foreign aid resources across international development organizations (IDO)? We argue that governments' distributional choices across IDOs derive from their attempt to minimize the costs of delegation and to pursue their own interests in foreign aid policy. Governments make decisions about the allocation of resources across a large number of IDOs, and they delegate their scarce aid resources to IDOs that pursue development policies in line with their own foreign development interests. We use data on the financial contributions of 22 OECD governments to 12 IDOs from 1970 to 2008 to test our argument. We find strong support for our claims. Governments regularly contribute to a large number of IDOs, and they tend to delegate more resources to IDOs that provide higher levels of portfolio similarity. The findings suggest that governments can benefit from the increasing complexity of the system of international organizations. It allows them to minimize the loss of control they experience when delegating sovereignty to international organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The more that states depend on oil exports, the less cooperative they become: they grow less likely to join intergovernmental organizations, to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and to agree to binding arbitration for investment disputes. This pattern is robust to the use of country and year fixed effects, to alternative measures of the key variables, and to the exclusion of all countries in the Middle East. To explain this pattern, we consider the economic incentives that foster participation in international institutions: the desire to attract foreign investment and to gain access to foreign markets. Oil-exporting states, we argue, find it relatively easy to achieve these aims without making costly commitments to international institutions. In other words, natural resource wealth liberates states from the economic pressures that would otherwise drive them toward cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many argue that government partisanship influences the size of investment flows into stocks and bonds. But existing literature tells us little about how international capital flows influence election outcomes. I argue that passive investment into stocks, bonds, and other debt instruments--in other words, portfolio investments--increases political contributions to right-wing parties. This investment generates resources for domestic capitalists. These owners of capital then channel these resources into political contributions to right-wing parties and enhance those parties' electoral position. Thus, passive investment bolsters the electoral chances of right-wing governments. I illustrate this process with a formal model of special interest politics in which lobbies operate under budget constraint. Using a new data set on political contributions and statistical analyses for a sample of states from 1980-2009, I find support for my general argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the institutional design of a state's bureaucracy affect foreign policy? We argue that institutions can moderate bureaucrats' incentives to act in accordance with an Executive's diplomatic preferences. Where the Executive can influence budgets or career paths, bureaucrats face incentives to adopt her diplomatic goals as their own. Where agencies are shielded from Executive influence, bureaucrats are free to act independently in a bid to enhance their autonomy and their reputation for competence. To test these expectations, we develop a new measure of bureaucratic independence for the 15 aid-giving agencies in the US government. We analyze how independence affects foreign aid allocation patterns over the 1999-2010 period. We find that in 'dependent' agencies, foreign aid flows track the diplomatic objectives of the president. In 'independent' agencies, aid flows appear less responsive to presidential priorities and more responsive to indicators of need in the recipient country. Our results highlight limits on the diplomatic use of foreign aid and emphasize the importance of domestic institutional design. Our findings yield insight into a broad range of policy domains-including international finance, immigration, and the application of economic sanctions-where multiple government agencies are in charge of implementing foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do remittances stabilize autocracies? Remittances-money sent by foreign workers to individuals in their home country-differ from other sources of external non-tax revenue, such as foreign aid, because they accrue directly to individuals and thus raise the incomes of households. We argue that remittances increase the likelihood of democratic transition by undermining electoral support for autocratic incumbents in party-based regimes. Remittances therefore make voters less dependent on state transfers. As a result, autocracies that rely heavily on the broad-based distribution of spoils for their survival, namely party-based regimes, should prove especially vulnerable to increases in remittances. Evidence consistent with this argument suggests that remittances promote democratization in some dictatorships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]