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Research in international relations has many goals. One of the most important is the attempt to establish propositions which can serve to explain and perhaps predict the international behavior of the basic units of the international system, the nation-states. Ideally, such propositions will eventually be brought together to form a coherent theory of foreign policy. In this paper I have adopted the position that the most direct approach to this goal is the comparative study of the foreign policies of a number of state-actors. This method has the great advantage of increasing the number of units of study from one international system to a maximum of over one hundred and thirty states. This increase in units of analysis permits the use of statistics which, in turn, permits the use and manipulation of large quantities of data. By means of various statistical techniques one may draw from the data measures of foreign policy behavior, examine the relationships between theoretically interesting variables, test hypotheses, and develop causal models or theories of foreign policy. This paper illustrates only one aspect of this approach by means of an analysis of the foreign policies of thirty-two African states with

The effects of both absolute and relative size and strength have long, if sporadically, been subjects of investigation in international politics.' However, they have rarely been tied to the literature on diplomacy or bargaining. Recently Zartman (1971: 206) called for an investigation of "power in the context of negotiations." A beginning has been made in the small but growing literature on asymmetric international relationships (for example Suhrke, 1973a, 1973b; Axline et al., 1974). This paper contributes to this literature by dealing with relations between disparate parties in negotiations. The pervasive effect of a general and enduring disparity in capabilities will tend to be revealed in negotiations. Such a disparity results in a typical and recognizable "strategy of the weak" and "strategy of the strong." We are not concerned here with relating what have been termed the "bases" or elements of power-for states, usually thought to be population, natural resources, economic, technological, or military capability, and so on-with degree of bargaining success. (On bases, see Dahl, 1957. Generally on state power, see Holsti, 1964; Morgenthau, 1967; Knorr, 1970; Wolfers, 1962. On pervasive effects of power, see Bachrach and Baratz, 1963. On correlation

This paper will focus on two sets of questions. First, are domestic and external determinants of foreign policy decisions equally relevant and influential; if not, what is the rank order of these two clusters of environmental components and the individual input-components within them-for a specific decision, an issue, and the war-peace issue area as a whole? Second, is there feedback from foreign policy decisional outputs to subsequent inputs and, through them, to future decisions; if so, can those effects be specified and ranked in terms of influence? The concept of feedback is an integral part of a more basic construct-a foreign policy system with definable boundaries, environments, actors, structures, and processes. It also contains two dynamic flow relationships, or linkages.' One is from inputs (I), through process (P), to decisions and actions, that is, to outputs (0). It may be portrayed as

The purpose of this paper is to examine developments in t-he agricultural and transport sectors of the European Economic Community (EEC) against the backdrop of Functionalist theory.' Specifically, I will address myself to the concept of spill-over as a mechanism for bringing about integration. It will be convenient to proceed in the following manner: First, I will speak in general terms of the treatment of spillover in the Functionalist literature; second, I will pay some attention to the development of integration in the transport and agricultural sectors of the EEC with an eye toward discerning how events here can aid us in generating testable propositions; third, I will evaluate my notion of spillover in light of the case material; and fourth, I hope to test several propositions derived from my understanding of the case material.

This paper hypothesizes the existence of a subordinate state system in Southern Africa.l Evidence will be produced to show that this system can be described as an entity, that it operates quite independently of the dominant world power blocs, and most importantly, that it can best be analyzed and understood in terms of its own interrelations. Having postulated this system, I will then analyze the forces and pressures, both on and within the system, in an effort to assess the system's prospects for stability. The idea of joining the notion of an integrated system with that of a discussion about the possibility of future stability in the area