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Because freedom of choice and economic gain are at the heart of productivity, human trafficking impedes national and international economic growth. Within the next 10 years, crime experts expect human trafficking to surpass drug and arms trafficking in its incidence, cost to human well-being, and profitability to criminals ( Schauer and Wheaton, 2006: 164–165 ). The loss of agency from human trafficking as well as from modern slavery is the result of human vulnerability ( Bales, 2000: 15 ). As people become vulnerable to exploitation and businesses continually seek the lowest-cost labour sources, trafficking human beings generates profit and a market for human trafficking is created. This paper presents an economic model of human trafficking that encompasses all known economic factors that affect human trafficking both across and within national borders. We envision human trafficking as a monopolistically competitive industry in which traffickers act as intermediaries between vulnerable individuals and employers by supplying differentiated products to employers. In the human trafficking market, the consumers are employers of trafficked labour and the products are human beings. Using a rational-choice framework of human trafficking we explain the social situations that shape relocation and working decisions of vulnerable populations leading to human trafficking, the impetus for being a trafficker, and the decisions by employers of trafficked individuals. The goal of this paper is to provide a common ground upon which policymakers and researchers can collaborate to decrease the incidence of trafficking in humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between migration and development in Sri Lanka, a country that has been the source of large numbers of migrants and the recipient of much development assistance. Commissioned as part of a wider study conducted by the Centre for Development Research, Denmark, this case study seeks to answer a set of specific questions about the nature and extent of links between development assistance and migration flows. The paper surveys the socio-economic context in which both migration and development have taken place in Sri Lanka, describing the causes, scale, and features of migration flows from Sri Lanka in recent decades. Two main streams of migration flows are identified: labour migration and political migration. The flows are distinguished by ethnic characteristics (the former is mostly Sinhalese and the latter pre-dominantly Tamil) and destination (the former to the Middle East and the latter to the West). Both flows have intensified during a time of protracted conflict and in the context of waraffected economic development since the early 1980s. The importance of remittances from migrants to the Sri Lankan economy and the extent to which diaspora activities impact Sri Lanka are also discussed. Despite the lack of statistics, especially on informal remittances from the Tamil diaspora, it is suggested that the remittances have been and will continue to be a sizeable component of foreign exchange receipts in Sri Lanka. The paper concludes that the complex interactions between migration, development assistance, remittances, and conflict are important for the prospects for peace and reconstruction in Sri Lanka. The challenge in Sri Lanka will be to move from a vicious cycle of conflict, underdevelopment and migration to a more virtuous one. In this process, it is suggested that the diaspora will be a key player in the shift towards peace and remittances will be an integral part of reconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the relationship between migration and development in the context of Afghanistan. It begins with a brief outline of the historical and political background to the refugee crisis of the past two decades, and looks briefly at the society and economy of Afghanistan. The history and pattern of aid flows are described and analysed in the next section, followed by consideration of migration and refugee flows over the past two decades, and of remittances and diaspora activities. Repatriation and reconstruction are covered in the following two sections. The penultimate section looks at lessons to be learned for policy making in Afghanistan in the future, and is followed by concluding observations. A cautionary note on data on Afghanistan: although the recent months have seen a surge of interest and writing on Afghanistan, there has always been a shortage of data on the country. Much writing on Afghanistan, both by journalists and a few academics during the 1980s and 1990s, relates to politics, given the Cold War context of the conflict at the time. Most other data available on Afghanistan tend to come from aid agencies involved in the country. While this provides the bulk of information and data on aid and refugee issues — as reflected in the sources used in this paper — it has little to offer on other aspects of life in Afghanistan, especially on recent history and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International labour migration is a multidimensional process and primarily a family mechanism intended to reduce vulnerabilities associated with underlying inequalities. However, for immigrants, the break-up of physical contact with family members is an enduring feature of vulnerability in their communication with origins (often in developing countries). On the whole, family relationships are transformed: the absence of physical contact is traded-off with remittances sent home to family members. Remittances create potential for resilience by increasing human development of children, while reducing extreme poverty at the local level. Remittance flows are also an important source of foreign exchange for countries of origin. However, labour markets' polarization, backlash, and economic downturns at destinations (often in developed countries), and governments' moral hazard, currency revaluation, and production inertia at origins recreate vulnerabilities and disrupt the potential build-up of resilience. In fact, the re-creation of vulnerabilities largely outweighs the generation of resilience threads. The paper develops a typology that highlights the dynamic interaction between vulnerabilities and resilience, revealing the multiple aspects of people and remittances flows, the potential for mainstreaming migration policies into economic development, and the scale of the policy task to reduce vulnerabilities associated to international labour migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Worker remittances constitute an increasingly important channel for the transfer of resources to developing countries. Behind foreign direct investment, remittances are the second-largest source of external funding for developing countries. Yet, literature on worker remittances has traditionally focused on the impact of remittances on income distribution within countries, on the determinants of remittances at a micro-level, or on the effects of migration and remittances for specific countries or regions. Macroeconomic determinants and effects of remittances have received more attention only recently. Hence, the focus of this paper is on the macroeconomic determinants of remittances and on differences in these determinants between remittances and other capital flows. We find that remittances respond more to demographic variables while private capital flows respond more to macroeconomic conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the determinants and consequences of temporary and permanent migration from the perspective of migrant source countries. Based on a large and detailed household dataset on migration in the Republic of Moldova, the most important factors that influence a respective migrant's decision whether to return to the home country or to stay abroad for good are presented first. Second, the remittance behaviour of temporary and permanent migrants is analysed to investigate how developing countries benefit from either type of migration. The results indicate that the most important determinants of permanent migration relate to the economic conditions at home and abroad, as well as to the legal status of a migrant in the host country. Furthermore, economic and political frustration plays an important role in the decision of permanent migrants not to come back. On the contrary, family ties as measured by the number of close family members at home act as a pull factor for migrant return. Interestingly, permanent migrants use source country networks that differ from those of temporary migrants, indicating that the return decision of individuals is influenced by the decision of their migrant peers. Concerning remittances, the results reveal that, in absolute terms, temporary migrants remit around 30 per cent more than their permanent counterparts. This outcome is surprising, because temporary migrants often reside in countries where wages are much lower. Overall, the findings indicate that when compared to permanent migration, temporary migration is favourable for developing countries, as it fosters not only repatriation of skills, but also higher remittances, and home savings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objectives of this paper are: first, to briefly review the different theoretical aspects of brain drain and its potential positive or negative, direct or indirect effects on the economy of the home country; second, to highlight the limited empirical research on some of these issues; and third, to discuss on this grounding the empirical evidence on the nature and size of brain drain, as well as its impact on the economies of Albania and Bulgaria. As it appears, the evidence for these two countries and its evaluation as to whether brain drain has been or can be a threat to their development is contradictory and confusing, as it comes out from different casual observations without a convincing analysis. The relevant discussion has not escaped the stereotype way of thinking that the economy and society of these two countries would have been better had emigration of educated persons not taken place, or had those who migrated just returned. The conclusion on policy for brain drain and brain return is that merely hindering the emigration of educated people or trying to motivate their return cannot by itself elevate education and research to higher quality levels and promote development and growth. Without simultaneously developing a friendly and comprehensive institutional and pragmatic framework, such measures are often ineffective or even counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is revived interest and debate on the relation between international migration and development, with Asia emerging as one important locus for such deliberations. A number of institutions, journals, people and organizations have emerged as key players in these discussions but so far there have been few attempts to investigate the information gathered from the perspective of “knowledge production”. This paper’s objective, therefore, is to outline some of the ways in which knowledge about migration and development is being produced in Asia. We focus on selected aspects of knowledge production to identify the lenses through which much of the work is currently generated and the research imagination resulting from existing approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objectives of this paper are: first, to briefly review the different theoretical aspects of brain drain and its potential positive or negative, direct or indirect effects on the economy of the home country; second, to highlight the limited empirical research on some of these issues; and third, to discuss on this grounding the empirical evidence on the nature and size of brain drain, as well as its impact on the economies of Albania and Bulgaria. As it appears, the evidence for these two countries and its evaluation as to whether brain drain has been or can be a threat to their development is contradictory and confusing, as it comes out from different casual observations without a convincing analysis. The relevant discussion has not escaped the stereotype way of thinking that the economy and society of these two countries would have been better had emigration of educated persons not taken place, or had those who migrated just returned. The conclusion on policy for brain drain and brain return is that merely hindering the emigration of educated people or trying to motivate their return cannot by itself elevate education and research to higher quality levels and promote development and growth. Without simultaneously developing a friendly and comprehensive institutional and pragmatic framework, such measures are often ineffective or even counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic models typically study the long-term effects of migration, and hence emphasise their impact on a country’s endowment of skills using net migration rates. This approach however does not take into account the contribution of short-term movements of skilled labour on a country’s stock of knowledge and ability to innovate. This paper develops a theoretical approach to extend the analysis to gross migration flows, which captures the volume of interactions and the potential for knowledge exchanges between a country’s skilled labour and workers living elsewhere. One implication of the approach developed is that higher growth can be achieved through higher international labour mobility, even if there is no net migration. Countries that find it difficult or impossible to attract skilled labour on a permanent basis may therefore enjoy the growth effect brought by skilled temporary migrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Migration and development are linked in many ways — through the livelihood and survival strategies of individuals, households, and communities; through large and often well-targeted remittances; through investments and advocacy by migrants, refugees, diasporas and their transnational communities; and through international mobility associated with global integration, inequality, and insecurity. Until now, migration and development have constituted separate policy fields. Differing policy approaches that hinder national coordination and international cooperation mark these fields. For migration authorities, the control of migration flows to the European Union and other OECD countries are a high priority issue, as is the integration of migrants into the labour market and wider society. On the other hand, development agencies may fear that the development policy objectives are jeopardized if migration is taken into consideration. Can long-term goals of global poverty reduction be achieved if short-term migration policy interests are to be met? Can partnership with developing countries be real if preventing further migration is the principal European migration policy goal? While there may be good reasons to keep some policies separate, conflicting policies are costly and counter-productive. More importantly, there is unused potential in mutually supportive policies, that is, the constructive use of activities and interventions that are common to both fields and which may have positive effects on poverty reduction, development, prevention of violent conflicts, and international mobility. This paper focuses on positive dimensions and possibilities in the migrationdevelopment nexus. It highlights the links between migration, development, and conflict from the premise that to align policies on migration and development, migrant and refugee diasporas must be acknowledged as a development resource. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the nexus between migration, development and security in South-North migration through an analysis of certain discursive constructions in current migration policy debates; in particular, the migration-development nexus that attempts to make migration work for development in the global South, and the migration-security nexus that legitimizes stricter border controls and migration management in the global North. Shifting geopolitical concerns have changed the balance between the two nexuses over time, but by and large policy debates have been driven by the interests of Northern governments, whereby 'development' has been reduced to an instrument of migration policy and 'security' to an issue of keeping unwanted and potentially dangerous migratory flows out. The security situation of journeying migrants may make it to the policy debating tables of international organizations and forums, but has thus far not radically changed migration policy. I suggest analysing the nexus constructions through an analytical lens capable of encompassing both migrants and their border-spanning social networks, on the one hand, and migration policies and state responses aimed at controlling human mobility, on the other. The starting point for this analytical endeavour is the intersection between the migration industry, understood as the broad array of both legal and clandestine actors linked to the facilitation of international migration, and the growing markets for migration management both at the inter-state level and in the increased use of private and commercial agents for control purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]