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In an age of 'permanent austerity', growing economic insecurity may increase the demand for protection against labour market risks. At the same time, economic pressures may push governments to scale down on the provision of social protection. In this article, this contradiction is examined by focusing on reforms of two labour market institutions: unemployment benefits and employment protection legislation. It is argued that the incidence of reforms of both institutions follows a different set of logics, depending on the type of economic pressures as well as the political and institutional settings. The article makes use of a new data set on labour market reforms in 14 European countries over the period of 1980-2007. Results from discrete-time logit-regression analysis support the main hypotheses that (1) reforming unemployment benefits (UBs) does not follow the same logic as reforming employment protection legislation (EPL), and (2) factors that contribute to expansion/regulation are not the reverse of those that lead to retrenchment/deregulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]