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Adopting this stance is challenging because it requires the candidate or analyst to give up the idealization of psychoanalysis and often of the training analyst that can lie behind claims to exceptionalism and replace it with a realistic assessment. In this brief contribution, I revisit ideas that I have expressed over the past twenty years (e.g. Tuckett [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]; Tuckett et al. [19]) and collect them together to outline six significant and inter-related barriers currently in place which prevent psychoanalysts, on the whole, from having a productive debate with each other and also with those in other disciplines, or society more generally. As Denis puts it, "If the are not to limit themselves to indoctrinating their patients with ready-made formulas, psychoanalysts must allow themselves to be taken over by their patient's psychic functioning" ([3], 43). Denis suggests that due to their everyday clinical experience analysts find it very hard to loosen their attachment to their own model of doing psychoanalysis, in part due to what he calls the traumatic quality of their work and its emotional uncertainties, which tempts them to a fetishistic solution. [Extracted from the article]

Psychoanalytic training has been an object of controversy for many years. Arguments have been intense about the details, sometimes called "requirements", and particularly over whether or not training institutes should have routine external validation. We describe these arguments and present preliminary conclusions about the core challenges psychoanalytic trainings face using a unique set of detailed observations collected during structured "conversations" inside nine European institutes. We conclude that whether a psychoanalytic training is "working" is not a matter of compliance with requirements. Rather, it is an issue of how candidates, training analysts, supervisors and committee members, confront within and between each other the consequences of the unconscious dynamics that psychoanalytic training must inevitably create. Institutional psychoanalytic capacity is to take itself as the object. Consequentially, we propose that training committees that seek to claim that their psychoanalytic training is genuinely and safely producing psychoanalysts would be ones that institute routine procedures to show to themselves, transparently, how they attend to the dynamics just mentioned and how they take a neutral inquisitive stance towards them. Fear of oversight, we suggest, is a symptom of deeper anxieties. They can be faced by creating an appropriate setting. Properly conducted visits from outsiders are welcomed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution is a personal reflection on the papers presented at the New York and London anniversary conferences, in which the author takes stock to consider what they might tell us about where the discipline is now, where it has come from and where it might go. Taking the clinical contributions as evidence of the way many leading analysts in the field now proceed, it is suggested that there is an increasing and more and more subtle use of the analyst's behaviour, thoughts, fantasies, feelings and experiences, inside and outside the session, as core sources for constructing the patient's unconscious. Placing this observation in the context of issues of evidence raised in the 50th and 75th anniversary volumes, the author argues that a possible future agenda for the field may be to think more plainly about the basis of an analyst's knowledge claims, whether made implicitly or explicitly to patients in sessions. The author wonders if more disciplined understanding of transference consistent with neuroscientific findings of the last few years may be one factor that could prove useful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution to honour the Journal's centenary elaborates the classical view that what is primarily at stake in a psychoanalysis are ideas patients and analysts have that are prevented from becoming conscious. It is argued, drawing on a "bare bones" or parsimonious model of psychoanalytic treatment, that the ideas concerned are mainly the worrying unconscious beliefs patients have about their experience with their analysts. These are ideas saturated with feeling and derived from the internal templates that patients use to respond to current experience, based on ways they have registered experience from the beginning of their lives. Because such ideas are unconscious, they cannot be taken as hypotheses until revised. Rather, they are assumed to be facts, knowledge of which, because they generate feelings like anxiety, guilt or shame, is to be avoided and hidden. After introducing the model and discussing two short vignettes from psychoanalytic treatment, the author elaborates the view that recognising which ideas are being prevented from becoming conscious in sessions is the kernel of psychoanalytic therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What psychoanalysts consider psychoanalytic interpretation, in what setting it emerges and specifically why, when and how transference should be interpreted, have become increasingly unclear and controversial. In this paper I set out, elaborate, illustrate and argue the value for post-session reflection, certainly within the object relations traditions, of adopting a parsimonious model of practice. The model rests on the foundations of a specific understanding of free association, evenly suspended attention, resistance and transference and separating two epistemologically distinct intentions in transference interpretation. One, transference construction, aims to make a patient aware of the unconscious ways a patient is behaving in sessions (and then outside them) and how and why that is happening. A second, transference designation, focuses on the more limited aim of making patients aware of how they unconsciously experience the psychoanalyst at specific moments of resistance in sessions. Both types of interpretation may help but, I argue, it is the latter that must form the bedrock for fundamental change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an obituary for Betty Joseph, an acclaimed teacher and supervisor.

The underlying concern of this paper is that psychoanalysis as practised today is in danger of losing its specificity and so losing its way. The author suggests this is possible for three reasons: the problem analysts face in responding to the strong emotional demands the great majority of patients necessarily place on them, the unintended consequences of the apparent success of 'here and now technique' and the absence of good clinical theory. The paper mainly discusses the author's ideas about some core elements of the clinical theory that all psychoanalysts must use when they are working and proposes (at the risk of being facile) some relatively simple heuristics related to them which are meant to be helpful. Recalling Kurt Lewin's maxim that 'there is nothing so practical as a good theory', he will suggest that continuous reflection on how one is using theory in daily practice is highly practical, if the theory is good enough. Theory in fact is a necessary 'third' in psychoanalytic practice which, if kept in sufficient working order close enough to clinical experience, provides an ongoing and very necessary check on our sense of reality. But, of course, as a third it can, like reality itself, be the focus of both love and hate with equally problematic consequences. The paper starts with a clinical example of a difficult but apparently successful analysis reaching its end, which will be used throughout the paper to illustrate and elaborate the theoretical ideas set out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out to explore if standard psychoanalytic thinking based on clinical experience can illuminate instability in financial markets and its widespread human consequences. Buying, holding or selling financial assets in conditions of inherent uncertainty and ambiguity, it is argued, necessarily implies an ambivalent emotional and phantasy relationship to them. Based on the evidence of historical accounts, supplemented by some interviewing, the authors suggest a psychoanalytic approach focusing on unconscious phantasy relationships, states of mind, and unconscious group functioning can explain some outstanding questions about financial bubbles which cannot be explained with mainstream economic theories. The authors also suggest some institutional features of financial markets which may ordinarily increase or decrease the likelihood that financial decisions result from splitting off those thoughts which give rise to painful emotions. Splitting would increase the future risk of financial instability and in this respect the theory with which economic agents in such markets approach their work is important. An interdisciplinary theory recognizing and making possible the integration of emotional experience may be more useful to economic agents than the present mainstream theories which contrast rational and irrational decision-making and model them as making consistent decisions on the basis of reasoning alone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An obituary for editor, professor and psychoanalyst Arnold M. Cooper is presented.