Search

This paper proposes a service-oriented manufacturing strategy in a two-echelon supply chain with random demand. When there is no inventory for the retailer to meet demand, customers can choose to order products through the retailer and products will be delivered to them by the manufacturer directly in the promised time, and we call this delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing. We employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to analyse the procurement quantity and delivery time decisions by the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. Using the performance of the pure-manufacturing strategy as a benchmark, our main results follow. First, the equilibrium strategies of the two players are obtained. Clear decision rules are also given. Second, delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing can be an effective way to reduce the holding cost of the retailer. Third, we describe the customer loss caused by waiting and find how the manufacturer influences procurement quantity of the retailer through the decision of delivery time. Finally, delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing cannot always improve the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer. We give guidance for managers to provide it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, gray markets have become a significant phenomenon in the business practice. This paper investigates the gray markets issues in differentiated duopoly case by considering quantity competition among firms. We develop a game-theoretic model and provide equilibrium results for three scenarios, i.e. the benchmark scenario ‘no gray market’, the scenario ‘parallel imports act as a buffer against a follower’s product’ and the scenario ‘gray markets stimulate the competition’. By the analysis of the equilibrium results, some important managerial insights are obtained. Finally, by comparison of the equilibrium results among different scenarios, we study the impact of gray markets on manufacturers’ optimal strategies and profits in differentiated duopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we combine two aspects of remanufacturing, namely product acquisition management and marketing (pricing) of the remanufactured products. We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who decides on the acquisition prices offered for returns from different quality types and on selling prices of new and remanufactured products, in a single period setting. We develop a procedure for determining the optimal prices and corresponding profit of the OEM, and conduct a sensitivity analysis to understand the effect of different model parameters on the optimal strategies and profit. An important managerial insight is that the optimal solution is not to have the same profit per remanufactured item for all return types, but to if the minimum cost for acquisition and remanufacturing of some core type is lower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]