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On July 17, 2021, the CDU's chancellor candidate Armin Laschet was photographed laughing during a speech by the German Federal President in the flood-stricken city of Erftstadt. The photographic images caused an uproar and contributed to the CDU's defeat in the September 23 election. The paper analyzes why these images resonated with such damaging effects. Theoretically, it sets the analysis on the background of the moralization and personalization of politics and argues that photography, with its ability to capture behavior at a distance, plays a prominent role in these processes. While this condition explains why an image of a laughing politician can generate such indignation in the first place, the paper discusses how this effect was amplified in the case of Laschet by a range of contextual features: (a) the timing of the images in the middle of an election period where politicians come under intense scrutiny; (b) their appearance in a crisis situation (the German flooding disaster) where politicians are surrounded by other role expectations than in routine periods; (3) Laschet's new, insecure position as leader of the CDU; (d) his history of scandals and poor political judgment; and (e) the frivolous and boisterous manner of his laughter. At a general theoretical level, the paper's insights caution us to avoid prima facie conclusions about the autonomous power of photographs. Instead, they encourage analytical sensitivity to the importance of timing and context as explanatory elements in our understanding of photographic exposés. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political actors in negotiations often face the challenge of contradictory logics of discreet compromise-building on the one hand and generating media publicity to enhance transparency and gain public support on the other. This paper examines how members of parliament (MPs) handle this dilemma within intra-coalition parliamentary negotiations that are essential for legislative decision-making. By referring to the mediatization approach, the concept of self-mediatization of political negotiation systems is introduced to theoretically capture politicians' self-initiated media publications regarding negotiations and associated changes in their negotiation behavior. It is hypothesized that the self-mediatization of negotiations is influenced by negotiators' general tendency to seek media attention as well as situational pressures and incentives. The hypotheses were tested with a factorial survey among German state-level MPs (n = 258) using experimental vignettes. Results show that both individual and situational factors affect parliamentarians' tendency to publicly communicate about negotiations and consequently negotiate in a more news-media-logic-compatible, that is, more conflictual, manner. However, since the surveyed MPs on average show a high willingness to agree with their coalition partner on the explicit secrecy of negotiations, independent of the influencing parameters examined, self-mediatization does not seem to be an existential threat to the intra-coalition compromise-building capacity of parliamentary negotiation systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government censorship—internet shutdowns, blockages, firewalls—impose significant barriers to the transnational flow of information despite the connective power of digital technologies. In this paper, we examine whether and how information flows across borders despite government censorship. We develop a semi-automated system that combines deep learning and human annotation to find co-occurring content across different social media platforms and languages. We use this system to detect co-occurring content between Twitter and Sina Weibo as Covid-19 spread globally, and we conduct in-depth investigations of co-occurring content to identify those that constitute an inflow of information from the global information ecosystem into China. We find that approximately one-fourth of content with relevance for China that gains widespread public attention on Twitter makes its way to Weibo. Unsurprisingly, Chinese state-controlled media and commercialized domestic media play a dominant role in facilitating these inflows of information. However, we find that Weibo users without traditional media or government affiliations are also an important mechanism for transmitting information into China. These results imply that while censorship combined with media control provide substantial leeway for the government to set the agenda, social media provides opportunities for non-institutional actors to influence the information environment. Methodologically, the system we develop offers a new approach for the quantitative analysis of cross-platform and cross-lingual communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pre-election opinion polls are an increasingly prominent aspect of political campaigns, yet they often vary in terms of their results, sources, and where they are published. Citizens are therefore increasingly confronted with the proposition of which polls to give more credence to than others in shaping their voting behaviour. This study investigates the relationship between subjective determinations of poll credibility and voting behaviour in the polarised context of Turkish mayoral elections. The theoretical perspective of motivated reasoning is employed to consider how individuals determine and act upon credible opinion polls in mixed information environments. Using an original two-step experimental approach conducted in 2020, this paper establishes that while the effects of opinion poll credibility on party choice are limited to the strategic considerations of the supporters of smaller parties, opinion polls can have considerable demobilising effects when polling environments are conflicting or deemed not credible. The findings produced in this study are more suggestive of accuracy-seeking than directional motivations, and they have considerable implications for how we think about the relationship between polls, politicians, and voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN climate summits represent decisive moments for climate change policy. Under significant media coverage, world leaders gather for intense negotiations over policies to address global warming. Given the enormous political, economic, and environmental issues at stake, news media typically frame these summits in terms of success or failure. Still, we know surprisingly little about how these mediated mega events influence public perceptions both during and beyond the specific summit. Focusing on the 2021 Glasgow summit (COP26), this study combines a media content analysis and a two-wave panel survey with a rolling cross-section component, to determine how news framing influenced both summit-specific and more generic climate change beliefs among citizens in Sweden. Findings show (1) that beliefs about the success/failure of the summit took shape immediately following the summit, (2) that news framing effects were particularly pronounced when the final agreement was settled, and (3) that these instantaneous framing effects on summit-specific beliefs left small but lasting imprints on citizens' generic climate change beliefs several weeks after the summit. These findings have implications for both climate opinion and theories of dynamic news framing effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social media platforms offer people a variety of options to engage with politics, from directly following elected officials to discussing politics with social peers. Despite major advances in recent research on online political exposure through the lens of selective exposure, filter bubbles, and ideological echo chambers, little is known about the fundamental questions of what types of political actors people are exposed to on social media, and how these distinctive types vary across sociodemographic groups. We address this gap in the literature by analyzing unique panel data on more than 600,000 registered U.S. voters on Twitter during the 2020 U.S. Presidential campaign. We analyze this dataset to identify distinct types of political consumers and how they vary in terms of sociodemographics. Our findings suggest that the bulk of the population has a meaningful share of political content available from social peers, that the majority of this content originates from traditional sources of political information (media organizations, journalists, and politicians), and that media organizations are the dominant and direct source of political information on Twitter for nearly 20% of the sample population. These results advance our understanding of the way citizens learn about politics in new media and pave the way for next-step research to identify the causal effect of exposure to distinct curators of political content on individuals' political attitudes and political behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radio B92 was an iconic independent media institution in Serbia. Founded in 1989, B92 provided Belgrade listeners with subversive rock music, high-quality journalism, and independent perspectives on politics in the former Yugoslavia. An early adapter to the internet, B92 has been credited with sparking the many demonstrations that took place in Belgrade during the 1990s. While the role of Radio B92 during the turbulent days of the Yugoslav Wars is well known, less known is the role of its first CEO and news director in the creation of what would become the Media Development Investment Fund (MDIF). Drawing on semi-structured interviews with journalists, scholars, funders, diplomats, and media observers conducted in Belgrade in 2022, this study argues that much can be learned from the case of Radio B92 and the short history of independent media in Serbia. Although B92 ultimately met a tragic death at the hands of privatization and "market censorship," the "impact investment" model of media development it sparked lives on. Combining affordable loan and equity financing with technical assistance and advisory services, MDIF's model helps struggling news organizations avoid dependency on grants. Although the 2022 reelection of President Aleksandar Vučić demonstrates his party's successful state capture of Serbian news media, a look back at the case of Radio B92 has implications for the broader question of what works in international media assistance and why. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic unleashed a torrent of conspiracy theories across different social media platforms. Parallel to this conspiracy wave was a heightened sense of nationalism, which manifested through both in-group solidarity and perceived out-group threats. In this study, we examine how individuals' use of government social media to gather political information correlated with nation-related conspiracy beliefs during the pandemic. Data were collected from 745 subjects in China and analyzed through path analyses, which allowed us to examine the direct association with political information consumption from government social media and the indirect association with nationalism on conspiracy beliefs. The results indicated that the use of government social media to gather political information was associated with greater beliefs in nation-variant COVID-19 conspiracies, both directly and through different mediations of nationalism. Our findings highlight the importance of examining government social media use and how nationalism can have differentiated mediation effects on beliefs in conspiracy theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New political cleavages are reshaping the political landscape in established democracies. The classic left-right ideological dimension that has structured politics for decades is increasingly challenged by a sociocultural value dimension. At the same time, growing opportunities for media choice open for new forms of selective news exposure along political lines. We argue that previous research has too narrowly focused on traditional ideological cleavages, neglecting the increasingly important sociocultural value dimension of politics. Using four waves of panel survey data collected in Sweden during 2020 and 2021, this study analyses ideological selective exposure, audience composition, and reinforcing spirals across a range of mainstream and alternative news outlets. Findings show (1) that the sociocultural value dimension is more important than the socioeconomic dimension for explaining news choices, (2) that it structures news audiences in uniquely distinct ways, and (3) that these relationships are highly stable over time—reflecting patterns of de facto selective exposure and ideological maintenance, rather than reinforcement. These findings bring new insights to research on selective news exposure, political polarization, and changing ideological cleavages in Western democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have long argued that incidental news exposure (INE) is a potentially valuable way citizens gain political information and learn about current affairs. Yet growing scholarship on news avoidance suggests many people still manage to consume little news, and algorithmic curation may decrease the likelihood that they will be exposed to it incidentally. In this article, we put the literatures on INE, news avoidance, and political talk into dialogue with one another. Then, by inductively analyzing over a hundred in-depth interviews conducted from 2016 to 2020 with news avoiders in the UK, Spain, and the United States, we explore how they encounter news incidentally and to what extent they feel the news is accessible and available to them. Our audience-centric approach highlights that interviewees often did not make a clear distinction between direct encounters with professional news ("firsthand news") and discussions of news ("secondhand news"), especially online. When they did make a distinction, the latter was often more salient for them. We also find that just as news consumers have repertoires of news sources on which they habitually rely, news avoiders have repertoires of sources for incidental exposure to news to stay informed about major events and anything that might affect them directly. And yet, those repertoires catch only the biggest and most sensational stories of the day and do little to help them contextualize or understand the news they encounter, contributing to their sense that news is neither entirely absent nor ambient in the way scholars have theorized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to popular narratives, it is not clear whether using social media for news increases belief in political misinformation. Several of the most methodologically sound studies find small to nonexistent effects. However, extant research is limited by focusing on few platforms (usually Facebook, Twitter or YouTube) and is heavily U.S. centered. This leaves open the possibility that other platforms, such as those that rely on visual communication (e.g., Instagram) or are tailored to strong-tie network communication (e.g., WhatsApp), are more influential. Furthermore, the few studies conducted in other countries suggest that social media use increases political misperceptions. Still, these works use cross-sectional designs, which are ill suited to dealing with omitted variable bias and temporal ordering of processes. Using a two-wave survey fielded in Mexico during the 2021 midterm elections (N = 596), we estimate the relationship between frequency of news exposure on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and WhatsApp, and belief in political misinformation, while controlling for both time-invariant and time-dependent individual differences. In contrast to political discussion, information literacy and digital skills, none of the social platforms analyzed exhibits a significant association with misinformed beliefs. We also tested for possible indirect, moderated, and reciprocal relationships, but none of these analyses yielded a statistically significant result. We conclude that the study is consistent with the "minimal media effects" paradigm, which suggests that efforts to address misinformation need to go beyond social platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether and how public media systems contribute to the health of democracies in 33 countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, North America, the Middle East, Latin America, and South America. We gather national economic data and public media funding levels, audience shares, and regulatory data, primarily for 2018 and 2019 but in some cases earlier, due to lack of available data. We then assess correlations with strength of democracy indices and extend Hallin and Mancini's typology of North American and European media systems through hierarchical cluster analysis of these 33 countries. We find five models of public media systems around the world, ranging from "state-administered" systems with low levels of independence (Botswana and Tunisia) to systems aligning with Hallin and Mancini's "Democratic Corporatist" model, with strong and secure (multiyear) funding, large audience shares, and strong regulatory protection for their independence. In between, we identify three mixed models: a "Liberal-Pluralist" model, a "Direct Funding" model, and a "Commercial–Public" model. Correlations and cluster analyses show that high levels of secure funding for public media systems and strong structural protections for the political and economic independence of those systems are consistently and positively correlated with healthy democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In transitional democracies, the boundary work of defining journalism and through this, ousting certain media actors as illegitimate and threatful to national security and/or democratic stability can hold a particular urgency. This article considers the sanctions against three Russia-affiliated TV channels by the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council adopted in February 2021 – and the ensuing public debate on this decision – as a particularly informative case of such boundary work. Using thematic analysis of materials from Ukrainian news sites and TV talk shows, the article maps out how media regulators and representatives of the sanctioned and non-sanctioned media outlets competed over the authority to define the boundaries of legitimate journalism in Ukraine amid growing security threats. The findings show that the regulator labeled the sanctioned TV channels as "parasites of journalism," situated within the Ukrainian media system, yet functioning in the interest of a foreign state. In turn, the sanctioned media actors styled themselves as repressed opposition media, attacking both regulators and non-sanctioned media for undemocratic intervention and a lack of professional solidarity, respectively. Lastly, non-sanctioned media actors have largely supported the sanction decision and detached from the sanctioned actors' self-legitimation discourse. The study contributes to the literature on boundary work in journalism and showcases how a novel theory of parasites of journalism can enhance the analysis of complex discourses surrounding antagonistic media actors, including in non-Western contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fact-checks and corrections of falsehoods have emerged as effective ways to counter misinformation online. But in contexts with encrypted messaging applications (EMAs), corrections must necessarily emanate from peers. Are such social corrections effective? If so, how substantiated do corrective messages need to be? To answer these questions, we evaluate the effect of different types of social corrections on the persistence of misinformation in India (N ≈ 5,100). Using an online experiment, we show that social corrections substantially reduce beliefs in misinformation, including in beliefs deeply anchored in salient group identities. Importantly, these positive effects are not systematically attenuated by partisan motivated reasoning, highlighting a striking difference from Western contexts. We also find that the presence of a correction matters more relative to how sophisticated this correction is: substantiating a correction with a source only improves its effect in a minority of cases; besides, when social corrections are effective, citing a source does not drastically improve the size of their effect. These results have implications for both users and platforms and speak to countering misinformation in developing countries that rely on private messaging apps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the news media exacerbate or reduce misinformation problems? Although some news media deliberately try to counter misinformation, it has been suggested that they might also inadvertently, and sometimes purposefully, amplify it. We conducted a two-wave panel survey in Brazil, India, and the UK (N = 4732) to investigate the effect of news and digital platform use on awareness of and belief in COVID-19 misinformation over time (January to February 2022). We find little support for the idea that the news exacerbates misinformation problems. News use broadened people's awareness of false claims but did not increase belief in false claims—in some cases, news use actually weakened false belief acquisition, depending on access mode (online or offline) and outlet type. In line with previous research, we also find that news use strengthens political knowledge gain over time, again depending on outlets used. The effect of digital platforms was inconsistent across countries, and in most cases not significant—though some, like Twitter, were associated with positive outcomes while others were associated with negative outcomes. Overall, our findings challenge the notion that news media, by reporting on false and misleading claims, ultimately leave the public more misinformed, and support the idea that news helps people become more informed and, in some cases, more resilient to misinformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research indicates that people with populist attitudes express lower trust in media, especially in Public Service Media. It is assumed that these people are alienated because of their values: populist ideology stems from anti-pluralism whereas Public Service Media promotes pluralism. This study tests this assumption by comparing the predictors of trust in Public Service Media between the populist party sympathizers and the sympathizers of other political parties in the Czech Republic. Two main expectations were included as predictors for trust in Public Service Media, specifically that media should conform to one's worldview (i.e., the cohesive dimension of trust in media) and that media should adhere to the normative standards of journalism (i.e., the normative dimension of trust in media). Using multigroup structural equation modeling, the study analyzes data from a 2019–2020 representative survey of the adult Czech population (N = 3,251). The results suggest that, for the populist party sympathizers, trust in Public Service Media links only to their expectation that media should conform to their worldview, while the sympathizers of other political parties expect normative standards to be maintained. This is interpreted and discussed as support for the assumption that this value-based mismatch links to the populist audience members' lower trust in Public Service Media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on the "protest paradigm" have long explored how a society's mass media system frames the social movements occurring within that society. This study adopts a social movement diffusion perspective to sharpen the transborder dimension of the protest paradigm. Specifically, we introduce the concept of the "diffusion-proofing" protest paradigm, given that an understudied and undertheorized function of the protest paradigm is the prevention of the import of exogenous social movements. Taking the Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement as an example, we investigate how mainland China's mass media acted to prevent movement diffusion. Four transborder components of the diffusion-proofing protest paradigm are proposed: reactions, attributions, consequences, and solutions. Through content analysis, we argue that by highlighting these transborder components, China's newspapers attributed the movement's rise to foreign intervention, emphasized the movement's negative effects on both Hong Kong and mainland China, and revealed the uncompromising nature of China's reaction and the urgency of cross-border cooperation for containing the movement and its diffusion. Further, we identify two modes of reporting: a mainly descriptive mode that relied on a local framework to depict the movement and its local context and an evaluative mode that emphasized the level of deviance and foreign intervention, thus amplifying the movement's transborder effects and the need to prevent its diffusion. Notably, the level of deviance acts as a mediating channel between the two modes, transforming the local framework into a transborder one. The diffusion-proofing protest paradigm is also found to vary across media types and periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Media scholars have long recognized the potential for falsely balanced reporting to distort public opinion, but existing empirical evidence is inconclusive. In this study, we examine the effect of falsely balanced reporting and explicit journalistic intervention on perceptions of voter fraud in U.S. elections through original internet survey experiments conducted in the United States shortly before and after the 2020 U.S. presidential election held on November 3, 2020. The results show that exposure to falsely balanced reporting largely has a null effect on perceptions of voter fraud, though we also find evidence of partisan-based heterogeneity in its effect. The results of the study also show that explicit journalistic intervention equally decreases belief in voter fraud among both Democrats and Republicans before the election, but among Republicans the corrective effect of intervention disappears in the post-election period, suggesting that there are sharp contextual limits on the effect of explicit journalistic intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study develops a new normative and analytical framework of “democracy-framed electoral coverage” grounded in literatures that stress the role of governmental and communicative institutions in protecting democracies from threats. We define “democracy-framed electoral coverage” as journalism that embraces fairly contested elections as an established norm and political ideal, and clearly alerts the public to threats to the peaceful transfer of power. Using the U.S. as a case study of a consolidated democracy facing autocratization threats, the study applies the framework to analyze a comprehensive dataset of 708 articles encompassing twenty one races during the 2022 U.S. midterm elections when candidates who denied the results of the 2020 presidential election were on the ballot. Additionally, we conducted interviews with twelve journalists to evaluate their perspectives and practices regarding election denying candidates. We find that journalists routinely failed to alert the public to the threat posed by candidates unwilling to embrace the legitimacy of U.S. elections. This paper demonstrates the necessity of a normative framework for pro-democracy election coverage, and the findings underscore the electoral fragility of the U.S.—a case of a democracy undergoing autocratization processes and facing threats to the legitimacy of its elections and the peaceful transfer of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies indicate that politicians’ negativity usage fails to enhance their approval ratings among the general public, yet politicians regularly use it. This begs the following question: why are politicians so negative if this strategy does not bolster their prospects for re-election? In this paper, I argue that the media, driven by audience engagement, plays a pivotal role in shaping politicians’ propensity for negativity. Specifically, politicians resort to negativity because it aligns with the media’s negativity bias, thereby increasing their chances of securing media access and public attention. I test this expectation on the less-likely case of Belgium, using data on politicians’ negativity usage in parliament and their presence in prime-time TV news (2010–2020). The results show that using negativity significantly increases politicians’ chances of gaining media access, particularly when using uncivil negativity. The more media access politicians start to attract due to negativity, the more they resort to negativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political actors play an increasingly important role in the dissemination of political information on social media. However, relatively little is known about the mechanisms why specific news items are shared with the support base instead of others. For a timespan between December 2017 and the end of 2018, we combine the analysis of Facebook content from 1,022 politicians associated with 20 political parties from Germany, Spain, and the UK, with an automated content analysis of media coverage from 22 major online news outlets, and survey data in a multilevel binomial regression approach. By comparing news items that have been shared by one or several political parties with news items that have not been shared by any of them, we overcome the selection biases of previous studies in the field of news dissemination. Findings show that a news item's likelihood to be shared by a politician increases (1) if that politician's party is mentioned in the news item, (2) the more salient their party's owned issues are in the news item, and (3) the more party supporters tend to read the news outlet in which the news item is published. We contextualize these findings in light of political actors' multi-faceted motivations for news sharing on social media and discuss how this process potentially reinforces an information bias that may contribute to the polarization and fragmentation of audiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do leaders communicate during domestic crises? We provide the first global analysis of world leader communication on social media during social unrest. We develop a theory of leaders' digital communication strategies, building on the diversionary theory of foreign policy, as well as research on the role of democratic institutions in explaining elite responsiveness. To test our theory, we construct a new dataset that characterizes leader communication through social media posts published by any head of state or government on Twitter or Facebook, employing a combination of automated translation and supervised machine learning methods. Our findings show that leaders increase their social media activity and shift the topic from domestic to foreign policy issues during moments of social unrest, which is consistent with a conscious strategy to divert public attention when their position could be at risk. These effects are larger in democracies and in particular in the run-up to elections, which we attribute to incentives created by democratic institutions. Our results demonstrate how social media provide meaningful comparative insight into leaders' political behavior in the digital age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conflict framing is key in political communication. Politicians use conflict framing in their online messages (e.g., criticizing other politicians) and journalists in their political coverage (e.g., reporting on political tensions). Conflicts can take a variety of forms and can provoke different reactions. However, the literature still lacks a systematic and theoretically-grounded conceptual framework that accounts for the multi-dimensionality of political conflict frames. Based on literature from political epistemology, political communication, and related fields such as psychology, we present four conceptual dimensions of political conflicts: (1) the style (civil/uncivil); (2) the subject (personal/substantive); (3) whether it is about underlying moral/epistemic principles or not (deep/superficial conflict); and (4) whether it concerns a normative or factual issue. Results of a content analysis of newspaper articles and politicians' tweets confirm the usage of these conflict dimensions in the Netherlands during a non-election period. Interestingly, most of the conflicts are civil, substantive, and do not highlight deep fundamental clashes. In light of the current societal concerns about the lack of respect in political debates and the deepening of our political divides, these findings can be considered encouraging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies determinants of political actors' visibility in the news, and their stability over time, observing the press coverage received by Chilean politicians in the elite press since the beginning of the democratic transition in 1991 and until 2019. In dialogue with theories of news values, we test how political positions in a markedly presidential system, the belonging to a government coalition, gender, and the association to conflict frames behave as determinants of the presence and prominence of politicians in the news in the three decades following the recovery of democracy in Chile. We have three key findings. Firstly, the visibility of political actors in the news follows a clear institutional hierarchy led by the president and cabinet members. Secondly, female politicians are less likely to be mentioned or have speaking space in newspapers than male politicians. Lastly, although an association with conflict-framed news boosts politicians' visibility, such association is unable to disturb structural power hierarchies, and the value of conflict does not increase over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we investigate the socio-technical ecology of Twitter, including the technological affordances of the platform and the user-generated discursive strategies used to create and circulate anti-Muslim disinformation online. During the first wave of Covid-19, right-wing followers claimed that Muslims were spreading the virus to perform Jihad. We analyzed a sample of 7000 tweets using Critical Discourse Analysis to examine how the online disinformation accusing Muslims in India was initiated and sustained. We identify three critical discourse strategies used on Twitter to spread and sustain the anti-Muslim (dis)information: (1) creating mediatized hate solidarities, (2) appropriating instruments of legitimacy, and (3) practicing Internet Hindu vigilantism. Each strategy consists of a subset of discursive toolkits, highlighting the central routes of discursive engagement to produce disinformation online. We argue that understanding how the technical affordances of Social Networking Sites are leveraged in quotidian online practices to produce and sustain the phenomenon of online disinformation will prove to be a novel contribution to the field of disinformation studies and Internet research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The degree to which civility norms are upheld or violated is an important criterion in evaluating the democratic quality of public debates. We investigate civility across media types, political systems, and levels of socio-cultural division, offering a comparative perspective on how these factors shape levels of civility in public debates around a key question for societies around the world: What is the proper role of religion in public life? Capturing both positive and negative forms of civility (i.e., recognition and outrage) on multiple levels of analysis, we compile and analyze an original large-scale dataset of news items published during August 2015 until July 2016 in six democracies (Australia, Germany, Lebanon, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA) across three types of media (printed newspapers, news websites, and political blogs). We find that mediated discourse was heavier on outrage in mixed political systems (Germany and Turkey) than in 'purely' majoritarian and consensus systems. Public debate in deeply divided countries contained more outrage but also more recognition compared to less divided countries, with newspapers and news websites mitigating outrage discourse compared to political blogs. Blogs also emerged as less nurturing of recognition than newspapers and news websites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies about media self-censorship typically focus on its mechanism in traditional newsroom settings. But how media self-censorship may evolve in online journalism has remained largely unexplored. Using Hong Kong as a case, I examine the digital evolution of media self-censorship in a unique non-democratic context. Drawing on interviews with online journalists, my findings reveal that digital transformation has provided new valences for media self-censorship. With the financial hardship of legacy media in the digital age, Hong Kong online journalists are more directly exposed to external threats such as advertisement boycotts orchestrated by the state, and hence increasingly reluctant to offend external powerholders out of the fear of political and financial retaliation. Moreover, as online journalists adopt business-driven norms that favor the generation of clicks, political or policy news are further marginalized. These stories are often deemed boring, non-engaging to online audiences, and are not "sensationalizable" due to political risks, especially when compared to soft news types like crimes and lifestyles stories. Adapting to these changes, news managers are increasingly used to avoiding professional editorial debates that results are unpredictable but using "objective" web metrics as persuasive devices to discourage the production of sensitive news. Lastly, the dissemination of sensitive news is curbed in the social media gatekeeping process. These findings suggest that an authoritarian state can effectively influence online news production by controlling the capital that drives digital transformation, thereby limiting the liberating potential of the media in the digital age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study assessed the effects of different message framing strategies on average Americans' attitude towards interventions in humanitarian crises abroad. Two survey experiments were conducted via Qualtrics between late 2019 and early 2020, where participants were randomly assigned to read a mock news story about a foreign humanitarian crisis written using one of the three framing techniques. Results of both studies indicated that the framing effect on respondents' support for intervention interacted with ones' political ideology and prompted distinctive reactions among different populations. Most intriguingly, the results of Study 2, which employed a non-student sample and a secondary frame, suggested that the specific order of message framings also influences public opinion towards humanitarian intervention. These findings contribute to the growing body of literature on the persuasiveness of message design and framing in the context of military humanitarian interventions (MHI). Accordingly, news organizations and policymakers are encouraged to consider these findings in specific contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]