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Between 1880 and 1950, Swiss psychiatrists established themselves as experts in criminal courts. In this period, the judicial authorities required psychiatric testimonies in a rising number of cases. As a result, more offenders than ever before were declared mentally deficient and, eventually, sent to psychiatric asylums. Psychiatrists also enhanced their authority as experts at the political level. From the very beginning, they got involved in the preparatory works for a nationwide criminal code. In this article, I argue that these trends toward medicalization of crime were due to incremental processes, rather than spectacular institutional changes. In fact, Swiss psychiatrists gained recognition as experts due to their daily interactions with judges, public prosecutors, and legal counsels. At the same time, the spread of medical expertise had serious repercussions on psychiatric institutions. From 1942 onwards, asylums had to deal with a growing number of "criminal psychopaths," which affected ward discipline and put psychiatry's therapeutic efficiency into question. The defensive way in which Swiss psychiatrists reacted to this predicament was crucial to the further development of forensic psychiatry. For the most part, it accounts for the subdiscipline's remarkable lack of specialization until the 1990s.

The aim of the study is to explore the relationships between results of forensic psychiatric evaluation on "mental status at the time of the offense (MSO)" and the final decision of the courts after the amendment of the Criminal Code in 2005. All criminal cases referred to Taipei City Psychiatric Center for MSO evaluation from July 1, 2006, to December 31, 2015, were reviewed, and only the completed trials were included. Concordance rates in each category of MSO conclusion and the court decision were analyzed and compared. The sample consisted of 366 MSO evaluations. Overall concordance was 95.6% (350/366). The concordance rate in conclusions of "full responsibility", "diminished responsibility", and "insanity" were 98.3% (177/180), 97.7% (126/129) and 91.9% (34/37) separately, and these three groups showed no statistical significance after compared with the other. Conclusions of "intentionally or negligently induced insanity or diminished responsibility" reached the lowest concordance at 65.0% (13/20) and compared with the other three groups all showed statistical significance. We found, after the amendment of Criminal Code, the lowest concordance rate in those conclusions of "insanity" before change seemed diminished. But the conclusions of "intentionally or negligently induced insanity or diminished responsibility" became the major origin leading to discordance. Comparing to the previous finding in the same hospital which revealed separate conclusions resulted in statistically significant concordance rates, the effect of the amendment seems likely to improve the consensus among psychiatric experts and trial judges except substance and alcohol related mental condition.

Imagine the following scenario. John has been charged with the murder of his estranged wife. Dr. Jeckyl, a forensic psychiatrist, has written a report to the effect that John was suffering from chronic "reactive" depression, which substantially impaired his thought processes at the time of the killing. Mr. Hyde, a forensic psychologist, has reported that because John can remember little about the actual killing and because of his ongoing depression, he was most probably in a dissociative state at the time of the killing. Another forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Frankenstein, reports that John is suffering from endogenous depression such that he lacked the capacity to control his actions at the time of the killing. What defence counsel will make of this evidence in Australia will largely depend upon where John is to be tried. If John is to be tried in New South Wales, Queensland, or the Northern Territory, defence counsel will probably raise the defence of diminished responsibility, which allows for a conviction of manslaughter rather than murder. The defence would have to show that John's depression led to an "abnormality of mind" that substantially impaired his "mental responsibility" for the killing (Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s. 304A; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s. 23A; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s. 37). A number of cases have held that "reactive" depression which has its source within the accused's psychological makeup amounts to an abnormality of mind for the purposes of the defence of diminished responsibility (see, e.g., R v. Schaf fer ius [1977] Qd R 213; R v. Seers" (1984) 79 Cr App R 261; R v. H icks (1988) Cr App R 502) and there is therefore a good chance of this defence succeeding. Alternatively, in the jurisdictions that have criminal codes, namely Queensland, Western Australia, the Northern Territory, and Tasmania, defence counsel could raise the insanity defence on the basis that John's depression was a "mental disease" (or in the Northern Territory, an "abnormality of mind") that affected John's capacity to control his actions as those jurisdictions in

This article examines the relationship between mental disorder and criminality in Canada from the colonial period to the landmark 1992 Mental Disorder Amendments that followed the passing of Bill C-30. The history of this relationship has been shaped by longstanding formal and informal systems of social regulation, by the contests of federal-provincial jurisdiction, by changing trends in the legal and psychiatric professions, and by amendments to the federal Criminal Code. A study of these longer-term features demonstrates that there has been no linear path of progress in Canada's response to mentally unwell offenders. Those caught in the web of crime and mental disorder have been cast and recast over the past 150 years by the changing dynamics of criminal law, psychiatry, and politics. A long historical perspective suggests how earlier and more contemporary struggles over mental disorder and criminality are connected, how these struggles are bound by historical circumstance, and how a few relatively progressive historical moments emerging from these struggles might be recovered, and theorized to advantage.

A substantial majority of Canadians favours a change to the Criminal Code which would make it legally permissible, subject to careful regulation, for patients suffering from incurable physical illness to opt for either physician assisted suicide (PAS) or voluntary active euthanasia (VAE). This discussion will focus primarily on the arguments for and against decriminalizing physician assisted suicide, with special reference to the British Columbia case of Lee Carter vs. Attorney General of Canada. The aim is to critique the arguments and at the same time to describe the contours of the current Canadian debate. Both ethical and legal issues raised by PAS are clarified. Empirical evidence available from jurisdictions which have followed the regulatory route is presented and its relevance to the slippery slope argument is considered. The arguments presented by both sides are critically assessed. The conclusion suggested is that evidence of harms to vulnerable individuals or to society, consequent upon legalization, is insufficient to support continued denial of freedom to those competent adults who seek physician assistance in hastening their death.

This article describes the organization and funding of mental health services in Canada for persons accused or convicted of criminal offenses. Initially, the context in which these services are provided is briefly presented. Next, the organizational structures which exist to provide pre-trial and pre-sentence evaluations are described. In subsequent sections, mental health services for persons found incompetent to stand trial (IST) and not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and for inmates of penal institutions are presented. In conclusion, some distinctive features of these structures are identified along with the principal advantages and weaknesses of each. The Canadian Context Several characteristics of the Canadian health and judicial systems are important to note at the outset, as they have major implications for the organization and funding of forensic services. Each Canadian province administers its own health and social welfare system. While each provincial system is slightly different from another, all Canadians are provided with extensive health care and social services. Taxation formula for supporting these services vary from one province to another. Adults with no children, who do not work and who are not receiving unemployment insurance, receive approximately $480 a month in welfare payments. While health is exclusively a provincial matter, the Criminal Code is a national or federal law. The administration of the justice system is a provincial responsibility, and thus differs to some extent from one province to another. This division of responsibilities and powers between the federal and provincial governments further complicates the difficult interfacing of the health and judicial systems, but it allows regional variants of the same system to emerge. The Canadian Criminal Code does not define incompetency to stand trial but generally, it is considered to be an inability to understand the court proceedings