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Delipalla and O'Donnell (2001) contains a formula for the incidence of specific and ad valorem taxes in a conjectural variation oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms. The formula is incorrect. We derive the correct formula and provide a discussion of the error and its implications for empirical studies of pass-through.

Recent theoretical work has shown that the incidence of ad valorem and specific taxes may differ and each may be over or under-shifted onto consumers in the presence of imperfect competition. These results are used to derive a method of estimating market power and conduct. An application is made to the European cigarette industry. Previous empirical comparison of the incidence of ad valorem and specific taxes is limited. For a group of countries with broadly similar cigarette industries, there is evidence of undershifting of both taxes, with the specific tax having a significantly greater impact on price. The extremes of both perfect competition and monopoly can be rejected. Behaviour is no less competitive than the equivalent of Cournot.

Legislators often attach specific names to individual taxes to help explain their purpose, increase transparency, and ease public backlash over tax increases. It may be politically beneficial, but does the simple act of naming a tax and attaching it to a specific set of benefits have an actual effect in the marketplace? Do consumers respond differently to tax-induced price increases depending on what that tax is? In this article, a natural experiment is used to evaluate tax incidence after the introduction of two gasoline taxes in Alberta - 1) an increase in the generic excise tax and 2) an environmentally-targeted “carbon levy”. While similar on the cost side, the taxes were very different in name and transparency on the benefit side. Results show that benefit-side transparency can matter – responses were lower and incidence higher for the more transparent carbon levy than with the less transparent excise tax.