Search

AbstractThis paper will set out the concept of a ‘gap’ between the social rented and market rented housing sector. This will be examined with respect to one aspect of competition between the two sectors in England, France, the Netherlands and Germany: substitutability. The analysis will involve an examination of the extent to which tenants can choose between the two sectors. The price-quality bundles of housing services as expressed by the characteristics of the accommodation, the property rights of the tenants, the allocation system and the housing allowances in the different countries will be compared. Competition measured in this way seems to be rather larger than smaller in the Netherlands and Germany and rather small in England. France's intermediate sector partly closes the gap between both rental tenures.

AbstractIn an attempt to promote efficiency and consumer choice, many governments in Europe have in recent years required social housing organisations to be more market-orientated and competitive. Competition, however, is being discussed and implemented without any detailed examination of what is meant by the term ‘competition’ outside a conventional ‘market’, as is the case in social housing. It is not clear what exactly is meant by competition and this paper therefore focuses on the question of how competition can be operationalised and how it can be measured in practice.This paper concentrates on social housing in England and the Netherlands: two countries where competition in social housing is an issue. These two countries also have different social housing models. For both countries, we build on an evaluative framework based on the economic concepts of rivalry, risk and choice and then analyse the data to establish whether competition can be measured in a convincing way.

AbstractThe private rental sector has been declining in many European countries. In describing the decline of the private rental sector, it is often suggested that a causal relationship exists between the decrease in private renting and rent control. The assumption is that the stricter the form of rent control, the greater the decrease in private renting levels. Or, conversely, that with fewer rent controls there are more opportunities for the private rental sector. At the same time, however, an unregulated rental market may result in insecurity for tenants.This text focuses on conflicts of interest between private landlords and tenants in the regulation of rents, from a welfare economics viewpoint. We present the results of a comparative study that involves France, England, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands. We describe the system of rent regulation in each country. We conclude that the balance achieved between landlords and tenants as a result of rent regulation may not be as clear-cut as it is often presented to be.

AbstractSocial rental housing has once again captured a strong position on the Dutch political agenda. This has happened especially since the European Commission sent a letter to the Dutch government indicating that the Dutch social rental sector was not considered EU-proof from the viewpoint of the European Union's competition policy. The letter coincided with criticisms from Dutch politicians that housing associations had not been performing well enough for some time, given their abundant resources. However, in an international context, the Dutch social rental sector is often regarded as a good system for providing affordable housing to those who need it, without the sector being marginalized and stigmatized. Jim Kemeny has classified this market as one in which the social rental sector in due course competes with the private rental sector on equal or almost equal terms as a unitary rental market.The starting point of this paper is whether the achievement of a unitary rental sector is threatened by the EU's competition policy. It will also discuss two other possible threats to the future of the Dutch unitary rental market: the threat to take surplus capital away from housing associations and have government decide on what to invest; and the attractiveness of home-ownership to households. We conclude that the character of the Dutch unitary rental sector is indeed under threat, although mostly by stealth.