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Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work (Halpern and Rêgo , arxiv.org/abs/0704.2014), we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware players, and suggested a generalization of Nash equilibrium appropriate for games with unaware players that we called generalized Nash equilibrium. Here, we use this framework to analyze other solution concepts that have been considered in the game-theory literature, with a focus on sequential equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze the relationship between efforts and centrality on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of ordinal centrality. We first show that in both dominant and dominated equilibria central agents exert more effort. Second, we explore the issue of social coordination induced by our game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the existence of Nash equilibria in games with an infinite number of players. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in all normal form games such that pure strategy sets are compact metric spaces and utility functions are continuous. The player set can be any nonempty set. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we examine whether the possible manipulations can have a serious impact on the outcome. Specifically, we examine which allocations are realized in the direct revelation game of any rule satisfying certain normative properties. For this class of rules we show that decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free allocations are the only ones realized through an ɛ-Nash equilibrium for any sufficiently small ɛ > 0. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reinterprets the γ-core (Chander and Tulkens in Int Tax Pub Financ 2:279–293, 1995; in Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition formation is formulated as an infinitely repeated game in which the players must choose whether to cooperate or not. It is shown that a certain equilibrium of this game corresponds to the γ-core assumption that when a coalition forms the remaining players form singletons, and that the grand coalition is an equilibrium coalition structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]