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• Proposed cooperative game model of hierarchical trans -regional electricity trading. • Analyzed the impact of carbon quota systems on trans -regional electricity trading. • Proposed a reasonable profit distribution scheme based on the Owen graph value. • Demonstrated that the formation of priori union can improve the profits of trans-regional electricity trading. • Under loose low-carbon demand policy, carbon quota sharing responsibility are more effective than producer responsibility. Trans-regional electricity trading is a meaningful way to optimize resource allocation and achieve carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals. In this paper, we construct the trans -regional electricity trading cooperative game models considering the impact of local microgrid integration. Based on the cooperative game theory with coalition and graph structures, the optimal mode of trans -regional electricity cooperation and the impact of different carbon quota systems on cooperation profits are studied. The profits obtained through the trans -regional electricity trading are reasonably distributed by the profit distribution scheme based on the Owen graph value. The theoretical and numerical simulation results demonstrate that the local microgrid and the bulk power grid form a priori union, and then participate in the trans -regional electricity trading can obtain more profits. In addition, when the low-carbon policy on the demand side of electricity becomes more relaxed, the implementation of a carbon quota shared responsibility between producers and consumers will be more effective than producer responsibility. Compared with the Myerson value, the profit distribution scheme based on the Owen graph value is more suitable for distributing the profits obtained through trans -regional electricity trading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]