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Based on three case studies (Finland, France and The Netherlands), this article describes the performance-based budgeting models in place in the judiciaries of the three countries, and their effects (positive and negative) on the courts’ functioning. This article represent a first attempt to analyse the impact of funding mechanisms on judicial independence, accountability, efficiency and quality.

This paper is divided into two parts plus some concluding remarks. The first one deals with some problems in comparing the number of judges, court personnel, and caseflow in European judiciaries. Data come from the Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) of the Council of Europe. The second part deals with some pitfalls in the data gathering carried out by the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) in the attempt to measure judicial independence and accountability. Each case study brings some hints, summed up in the concluding remarks, that may be useful to improve both exercises.

As with other jurisdictions, China has introduced a range of newer technologies into its justice sector to promote greater access to justice, improve judicial transparency and to promote just outcomes for disputing parties with legal issues. Chinese courts’ practice of embracing technology is unique as an overarching approach has been adopted by the central government to build the ‘smart court’ system across the entirety of its courts. Arguably, the smart court system, which relies on computer technologies that enable big data use, blockchain formation and advisory and determinative forms of artificial legal intelligence, has, to a certain degree, promoted easier access to justice, enabled faster dispute resolution, saved costs by moving judicial process online and ensured that judgments can be enforced. On the other hand, however, there are concerns relating to the use of some technologies that include the use of automated judgments, digital divide issues, judicial independence, as well as issues linked to privacy and data protection. This article concludes that some caution should be exercised in developing the ‘smart court’ system, primarily in relation to the oversight and introduction of more disruptive technologies to ensure that cheap and quick dispute resolution can be achieved without detrimental impacts on justice.

Recently, the federal Courts Administration Service of Canada (the CAS) announced its plans to implement an automated case and registry management system (CRMS) in Canada’s Federal Courts: the Federal Court of Appeal, the Federal Court, the Tax Court and the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada. The CRMS embraces many functions that contribute to the courts’ daily operations: case management, access to case records and documents, transmission and service of court records, transfer of cases and documents among courts, scheduling of cases and courtrooms, etc. Traditionally, these services have been provided by courts’ registries. However, integrated systems offer an opportunity to automate most processes, thereby improving operating efficiencies and reducing procedural delays. Despite the significant benefits of digitization and automation of courts’ operations, the implementation of a CRMS solution poses significant risks to judicial independence. Particularly, this article scrutinizes how CRMS may undermine the security of judicial information and how automation of procedures may adversely affect the procedural independence of the judiciary. To minimize these risks, this article suggests that the CAS create a specialized standard-setting committee that will monitor the CRMS implementation process.

For more than a decade, we have witnessed an erosion of political freedoms and civil liberties across the world amidst a democratic backsliding toward autocracy, a system of government in which a single person (the autocrat) possesses absolute power to weaken institutions such as an independent judiciary that sustain the democratic system At the same time, a surveillance-based economy and anti-democratic threats this poses have thrived The coronavirus pandemic has enabled these trends, giving authoritarian leaders and surveillance capitalists the opportunity to make massive shifts and reprogramming of our sensibilities about privacy and civil liberties that may not be reversible The author argues that judicial leaders and court administrators around the globe will need to readjust and adapt to the realities of governance in this new era of illiberalism He recommends three key changes that courts and justice systems around the world may need to make to deliver justice in the face of the challenges: first, creating a new narrative, one that is less combative, one that aggressively eschews the past's sharply polarized relationships between the judicial branch and the other two branches of government, and one that makes people partners instead of opponents;second, a new approach that puts major emphasis on good governance of the judicial branch, with a focus on competence and performance, an approach that mutes the more strident demands by judicial leaders for absolute judicial independence, coequal status of the judiciary with the executive and the legislative branches of government, and a perfect balance of power between them;finally, "going global" and linking up with international partners for global solidarity and collective action, thereby gaining influence and strength from international support back home © 2020 The Author(s)

The purpose of this article is to explain the debate on the financial independence of the judiciary in France, and why this independence seems particularly necessary for the ordinary courts. The objective of this article is also to contribute to the definition of the financial independence of the judiciary and, starting with the French case, to show how it can be distinguished from two other concepts: financial autonomy and budgetary autonomy.

This article focuses on conceptual issues regarding the new methodology of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) for measuring judicial independence and accountability. First, we argue that the proposal mixes up several concepts – judicial independence, judicial accountability, transparency of the judiciary, and public trust in the judiciary – which should be treated separately. Second, the proposal relies too much on conceptions of independence developed by the judicial community. As a result, it treats judicial administration with higher levels of involvement of judges as inherently better without empirical evidence, and does not sufficiently distinguish between de iure and de facto judicial independence. Moreover, the ENCJ’s indicators of judicial accountability are underinclusive as well as overinclusive and do not correspond to the traditional understanding of the concept. Finally, we argue that the ENCJ has to accept the possibility that (at least some types of) judicial councils (at least in some jurisdictions) might negatively affect (at least some facets of) judicial independence and judicial accountability. As a result, the ENCJ must adjust the relevant indicators accordingly.

On May 11, 2018, Maria Lourdes Sereno was removed from office as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. She had been a vocal critic of controversial President Rodrigo Duterte, and he had labeled her as an “enemy.” While she was under legislative impeachment investigation, Duterte’s solicitor general filed a quo warranto petition in the Supreme Court to challenge her right to hold office. The Supreme Court responded to that petition by ordering her removal, which her supporters claimed was politically-motivated and possibly unconstitutional. The story of Chief Justice Sereno should give urgency to the need for us to consider the proposition that maintaining the rule of law can be difficult, and that attacks on judicial independence can pose a grave threat to democracy. The article presented here considers the impeachment of Chief Justice David Brock in the American state of New Hampshire in 2000, identifying the most significant institutional causes and consequences of an event that presented a crisis for the judiciary and the state. It offers a case study for the readers of this journal to reflect not only on the removal of Chief Justice Sereno, but also on the kinds of constitutional issues, such as judicial independence, judicial accountability, and separation of powers in any democracy, as arising from in conflicts between the judiciary and another branch of government.

This paper examines changes that occurred in the Polish lawmaking process associated with primary legislation (laws and amendments) affecting the court system. It uses the database of 126 laws adopted in the 1991–2019 timeframe (Ist to VIIIth term), that modified either (i) the law on common courts system or (ii) the law on the National Council of Judiciary – two legal acts constituting the backbone of the general jurisdiction courts system. A significant extension of our research is the coverage of RIAs and assessment of their quality. Analysis documents the transition from a rather consensual and deliberative law-making process to the partisan voting machine. That, in turn, enabled so-called ‘reforms’ of the Polish judiciary, implemented after 2015.

This article examines several topics relating to the administration and governance of courts in democratic societies. It includes a summary of the development of court administration as a profession, highlighting Australia and the United States. The summary includes a discussion of how judges and court administrators must work together and coordinate their efforts in key areas of court administration and management. The article also reviews separation of powers issues, highlighting the problems that emerge in systems in which oversight and administration of the courts is vested in the executive branch or power of government, most commonly in a justice ministry. It reviews the practical advantages of having courts governed and managed through institutional mechanisms within the judicial power rather than the executive power.

This article reviews The Impeachment of Chief Justice David Brock – Judicial Independence and Civic Populism, published in 2018 by Lexington Books, co-authored by John Cerullo and David C. Steelman. The book is an historic chronicle and analysis of events in the increasingly fractious relationship between the legislative and judicial powers of state government in the last four decades in the U.S. state of New Hampshire that culminated in an effort by the Senate Judiciary Committee to impeach Chief Justice David A. Brock. The narrative identifies, traces and documents the meandering sources of that effort against a national movement emphasizing enhanced institutional independence within state judicial systems by shedding the traditional constraints and controls over state courts exercised by elected bodies. Simultaneously, it scrutinizes growing resistance within populist pockets of the New Hampshire State Legislature in particular and the state’s population in general against the presumptive hubris of the state judiciary to arrogate unto itself far-reaching decision-making authority and to demonstrate in its internal affairs a clear disregard of and even contempt for basic canons of judicial ethics. These tendencies are viewed as particularly egregious in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as it migrates from adjudicating narrowly defined issues of law and fact on appeal to drafting judgments mandating, for example, broad public education funding initiatives grounded in its own views of what constitute fundamental human rights and the social policies that flow from them. Other misbehavior touching on judicial conduct prohibitions culminated in a variety of disciplinary proposals, including impeaching Chief Justice David Brock, and other initiatives seeking to rein in the excesses of the state judiciary.

After a critical evaluation of the proposal by van Dijk and Vos to make judicial independence and accountability measurable, this paper discusses a number of basic methodological decisions that need to be made before meaningful indicators can be constructed. The paper then moves on to deplore the lack of knowledge regarding the effects of judicial councils and proposes that more research be carried out to reduce our knowledge deficit. It further describes the rising importance of prosecutors and the complete lack of indicators regarding prosecutorial accountability. It argues that producing indicators with regard to prosecutors could add a lot more value than yet another indicator on judicial independence.

This article is a review of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary’s (ENCJ) framework and vision of the independence, accountability, and transparency of the judiciaries in member states of the European Union. Its purpose is to aid ENCJ in the further development of its indicators of judicial independence and accountability. The focus of the article is on performance measurement and management (PMM) as seen, depending on one’s views, either as an instrument for strengthening judicial independence or, alternatively, an instrument for reigning in the power of the judiciary and threatening its independence. The article begins with a general discussion of judicial independence, accountability, and transparency as seen through the “lens” of PMM. It continues with a critical review and assessment of the conceptual framework of the ENCJ’s 22 indicators and 64 sub-indicators of judicial independence and accountability and identifies several shortcomings that decrease the utility of the framework. It urges a rethinking of the conceptual framework and proposes an alternative model – an input/output/outcome “logic model” --more amenable to understanding and improving indicators of judicial independence and accountability. It makes four recommendations aimed at a better alignment of ENCJ’s framework of indicators with principles and practices of modern PMM. The article concludes with a warning about troubling developments at a higher level of governance and politics that some see as a retreat from democracy and the rule of law in Europe and in many other parts of the world, one that poses an existential threat to the judiciary as a coequal partner in government.

Slovenia in 1995 embarked on a road of reforming its judiciary using a model that harked back to history but proved outlived. We learned the hard way that in terms of court management diffusion of responsibility breeds complacency, defeatism and indifference especially if it is combined with courts of inadequate size and capacity for effective delivery of justice. The most prominent feature of the reform was the reorganization of the courts of the first instance where the jurisdiction of the former monolithic Basic Courts was divided between new Local and District Courts. This resulted in that inter alia the most senior and experienced judges were delegated to District Courts. The reorganization also divided the caseload unevenly between the Local and District Courts. As a consequence the Local Courts were left with mostly inexperienced judges that had to deal with the bulk of the overall caseload of the courts of the first instance. The consequences were thus obvious. The motivation of the judges fell significantly which led to the overall performance especially in Local Courts to decrease substantially. This in turn led to a steady increase of unresolved cases which in time proved the main cause for considerable court backlogs that in the end culminated in the Lukenda v. Slovenia decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

In this paper judicial independence is viewed from the angle of economics. Economic historians have identified judicial independence as a key element in explaining why some nations have had a more successful economic development than others. Empirically it is shown that perceived judicial independence correlates with economic growth. I argue that the crucial importance of judicial independence and how it is perceived poses a challenge with regard to judicial budgeting, and that this true with regard to both basic models of judicial budgeting presently found in Europe: the traditional model which grants the authority to manage and allocate the judicial budget to the Ministry of Justice, and the more “modern” approach which grants this authority to an independent judicial council. However as illustrated with practical examples, in both cases the use of carefully designed and transparent statistical performance indicators may help authorities to deal more properly with the challenge posed by judicial independence.

As a public institution, the courts must be accountable for their use of a nation’s resources. The institutional independence of the judiciary from political influences and the decisional independence of individual judges in specific cases are intended not for the personal benefit of judges, but for the benefit of the society as a whole and of all those who come before the courts. Indeed, the very legitimacy of government as a whole can be powerfully reinforced by the effective operation of an independent judiciary.

The management and administration of the courts in Ireland had remained essentially unchanged since the Courts of Justice Act of 1924, which provided for the courts system of the new State shortly after independence. The 1924 regime left a vacuum, failing to address the need for an independent administrative structure for the Courts. There was, for example, no Department such as the Lord Chancellor’s Department. Under the Act, the Department of Justice managed the Courts and their funding apart from judicial salaries. Those arrangements followed what is often loosely referred to as the “Ministry of Justice” model. Responsibility for the provision of budgetary, staffing and other resources, and the management of those resources, rested with the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, as it is now known, through its Courts Division. As distinct from the allocation of business before the courts, the Judiciary – although it might be consulted and make representations – had little input into the allocation of resources or the way in which they were deployed.

The Soviet legacy included courts that were dependent and weak, whose reform had only just begun. The Yeltsin era witnessed considerable progress in making judges more independent and powerful, but the efforts were seriously constrained by budgetary shortcomings and paralysis in the legislative approval of needed procedural changes. The Putin administration overcame both of these obstacles and at the same time began addressing the thorny question of how to make courts and judges accountable without undue harm to their independence. The administration also started to address the skepticism about the courts among a significant part of the public through efforts to improve media coverage, make information about courts more available, and make courts user-friendly. Although praiseworthy and bound to improve the reality and the perception of the administration of justice overall, these initiatives did not end attempts to exert influence on judges and case outcomes by powerful people (in the public and private sectors) or the mechanisms that facilitated their efforts.I begin by identifying criteria for assessing the quality of the administration of justice in any country, including in the post-Soviet world, and suggesting specific markers (usually qualitative) connected to each of the criteria developed above. Then, I provide an account of relevant policy initiatives in judicial reform undertaken first under Yeltsin and then in the Putin years. After that I provide an assessment of the state of the courts in the Russian Federation in 2007 in light of the criteria and markers supplied in the first section. I conclude with a look to the future and the identification of crucial markers of change for the post-Putin era.Criteria of Assessment and MarkersThe purpose of courts is to provide to members of the public the opportunity to obtain the impartial resolution of disputes (mainly through adjudication, but sometimes through mediation) in a timely manner. Courts must act fairly and expeditiously, and the design of judicial systems should contribute to these ends.I propose seven criteria for assessing a court system, some of which break down into a number of components, each of which can serve as markers.1 They are the independence of judges and courts; procedural law aimed at ensuring equality among the parties; the power of the courts; the system of judicial accountability; accessibility of the courts; efficiency of performance (and the factors that encourage it); and public attitudes toward the courts.By judicial independence I mean structural arrangements that improve the chances of impartial outcomes by reducing or eliminating potential lines of dependence of judges, both on external sources and on others within the judicial system. Three basic markers of an independent judiciary (necessary, but not necessarily sufficient to produce impartiality) are (1) a system of tenure that reduces a judge's potential fear of reprisal for decisions (such as tenure to the age of retirement with dismissal only for serious cause at the hands of one's peers) and minimizes the impact of any disciplinary proceedings; (2) sufficient financing of the courts so that judges receive good salaries, have good staff support, and hold sway in buildings that enhance rather than detract from their authority; and (3) a reasonable degree of control by the judiciary over the provision of administrative support to the courts. In judicial systems of the civil law type, where judges pursue careers in the courts, biases are commonly introduced through systems of evaluation of their performance (often involving higher courts) and through the exercise of power by the chairs (presidents) of courts. In the post-Soviet world, chairs of courts are especially powerful, often controlling discretionary perks and benefits for their judges, and are in a position to help their judges get promotions or hurt them through disciplinary initiatives, including recommending dismissal. …

A proper function of courts is to positively influence the economic development of societies. Companies or enterprises are best served when courts function in a fast, fair and affordable manner. However, courts exist not only for the sake of companies, but to bring justice to citizens in accordance with the rule of law. I will focus little attention on the difficulties associated with defining the concept of rule of law. However, it is important to emphasize that developed societies must respect the rule of law. They do so by ensuring an independent judiciary, an impartial court system, a degree of separation of powers between the executive, legislative and the judicial powers of government, and the right to a fair trial. In the greater European community, these essential conditions are set forth in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states that: “(…) everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law

In Switzerland, law clerks hold an important position, which is a particularity of the Swiss judicial system. Law clerks have a wide range of tasks. For instance, they are involved in the instruction of the cases, as well as in the decision-making process. The number of law clerks is continuously increasing, which is namely due to the growing caseload. Nowadays, at many courts in Switzerland there are more law clerks than judges. The result of this development is that judges have a different role than in the past. Despite the crucial role of law clerks, science has paid little attention to their function.This article aims to describe the important role of law clerks from a legal point of view. It also enumerates concerns connected to the position of law clerks. Methodologically, the paper is based on a document analysis and on the results of a quantitative survey. Specifically, the article will discuss the following question: Is the Swiss legal system – where law clerks are key-players – a reasonable solution in order to cope with the increasing caseload in an efficient way?The paper is divided into six parts:1. Introduction2. The Swiss judicial system3. Definition and function of law clerks4. Development and legal issues5. Performance targets for law clerks6. Conclusion and research needs

Performance assessments have become commonplace in management, even in the public sector. With the increasing pressure on courts to perform while making efficient use of resources, performance assessments in the justice system are also gaining in importance. However, the need for judicial independence poses special challenges for performance assessments in courts. Against this background, this article conducts a constitutional appraisal, and contrasts the need for judicial independence with the principles governing effectiveness and efficiency, self-government and supervision, and appointment and re-appointment. A duty to guarantee justice can be derived from this that does not in principle exclude the performance assessment of judges, but even renders it essential, subject to compliance with certain requirements. In these circumstances, it seems hardly surprising that numerous countries conduct performance assessments of judges and also that various international institutions have developed principles for this purpose, a summary of which is presented – in Switzerland’s case based on a recently conducted survey. In the field of conflict between the guaranteeing justice and protecting the judiciary, the following key questions arise in particular: What is the purpose of performance assessments and what are the consequences?What is subjected to a performance assessment and what are the assessment criteria?How is performance recorded as the basis for the performance assessment?Who is subjected to a performance assessment, and must a distinction be made between judges in higher and lower courts?Who carries out the performance assessment and what methods of protecting one’s rights are available?Who should receive the results of the performance assessment?The contribution sketches out possible answers to these key questions and aims to encourage academics and practitioners to give further consideration to this subject.

This article reviews Fair Trial and Judicial Independence – Hungarian Perspectives, edited by Attila Badó, Springer International Publishing, Cham 2014. ISBN 978-3-19-01215-5

This Overview has two primary purposes. First, it provides judicial system officials with the arguments in favor of and in opposition to the creation of specialized courts. Second, it offers recommendations for consideration by judicial system officials when they are deliberating whether to establish specialized courts. This Overview also provides a review of types of specialized courts that have been established in court systems in some countries in Europe and the United States. This review should inform discussions by judicial leaders as to what specialized courts might be appropriate for their system.

This article is written from the perspective of a court president in The Netherlands, a so called civil law country. In theory, in a civil law country, judges and lawyers in civil and commercial cases base their actions on the application of the law and its interpretation. Moreover, in criminal matters, the courts use inquisitorial procedures which differ from the adversarial procedures used in common law countries. The field of court management is not highly developed because of the tension between the need for judicial independence and judicial organization. There are many examples of this tension, including the fact that courts may be subject to budgetary limits which themselves may intrude upon judicial independence. For instance, suppose that a judge believes it necessary to appoint an expert to answer a certain scientific question, but the expert is expensive and budgetary considerations preclude the appointment. When I was involved in the process of the budgets of prosecutors’ offices and courts, this question frequently arose. In an effort to deal with this problem, part of the courts’ budgets were treated as open-ended even though courts rarely spent these open-ended budgets lavishly.