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This study traces the way the evolving nature of the Korean national identity has shaped the construction of the Chineseness of immigrants as others. Two immigrant groups, Chinese immigrants called Hwagyo and Korean-Chinese referred to as Joseonjok, have constituted the majority of foreigners in Korea during different historical eras. Although Koreans assumed both represented 'Chinese' people, I argue that the core of their Chineseness was defined differently according to the evolving sense of the Korean subjectivity. The growth of the national economy and the culturally advanced and orderly society constituted the sources of the national character and provided legitimate grounds to discriminate against Chinese immigrants who were assumed to pose economic and cultural threats. This study suggests that the different logic of 'othering' is derived from the evolution of the Korean national identity in response to the nation's changing economic and political circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the early history of the British Chinese community in the light of transnational studies. It questions the belief that homeland and intradiasporic economic ties are predominantly new, save on the rare occasions that elites maintained them, and that early political transnationalism was less common still and even more sure to be elite based. In so doing, it draws attention to the role played by political elites in galvanising migrant communities. It also analyses the role played by class-based organisations in constructing transnational ties, a form of Chinese transnationalism that other studies fail to note. It finds that transnational practices and institutions pervaded the early community in its immigrant phases, both from below and from above. This immigration was overwhelmingly proletarian, but nonetheless transnational. Though basically economic, the transnational community was also political. Capturing a mass base among Chinese overseas was a central strategy of late-Qing dissidents. Crucially, China's early radicals shared a Cantonese origin with their compatriots in Britain, North America, Australia, and elsewhere. The article's findings challenge transnational theories, which stress contemporaneity, economics, and elites. The political cultivation of Chinese in Southeast Asia by Republicans and Communists has been the subject of numerous studies. Far less is known about analogous activities in Europe. By exploring early Republican and Communist influences on the Chinese in Britain, this article traces further paths along which diasporic nationalism spread. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]