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The United Kingdom was not under a duty to provide a civil remedy to the applicant in respect of alleged torture which did not take place within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or with which the United Kingdom authorities did not have any causal connection. The Court accepted that the prohibition of torture has achieved the status of a peremptory norm in international law. Notwithstanding the special character of the prohibition of torture in international law, it was not established that there was yet acceptance in international law of the proposition that States were not entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged torture committed outside the forum State. The application by the English courts of the provisions of the State Immunity Act 1978 to uphold Kuwait's claim to immunity could not, therefore, be said to have amounted to an unjustified restriction on the applicant's access to court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there appeared to be a trend in international and comparative law towards limiting State immunity in respect of employment-related disputes, where the proceedings related to employment in a foreign mission or embassy, international practice was divided on the question whether State immunity continued to apply and, if it did, whether it covered disputes relating to the contracts of all staff or only more senior members of the mission. Moreover, the Court was not aware of any trend in international law towards a relaxation of the rule of State immunity regarding issues of recruitment to foreign missions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In taking the view that the applicant church was not a new denomination and in making its recognition depend on the will of a recognised ecclesiastical authority, the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, the Government had failed to discharge their duty of neutrality and impartiality. Not being recognised by the State, the church did not have the right of access to a court to defend its rights and protect its property, given that only denominations recognised by the State enjoyed legal protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right of an accused to free legal assistance is one of the elements inherent in the notion of fair trial. That provision attaches two conditions to this right. The first is lack of “sufficient means to pay for legal assistance”, the second is that “the interests of justice” must require that such assistance be given free. The nature of the charges against the applicant, the need to develop appropriate arguments on complicated legal issues or the complexity of the cassation procedure might, from the point of view of the “interests of justice”, necessitate that he be granted free legal assistance. There was a primary, indispensable requirement of the “interests of justice” that must be satisfied in each case. That was the requirement of a fair procedure before courts, which, among other things, imposed on the State authorities an obligation to offer an accused a realistic chance to defend himself throughout the entire trial. In the context of cassation proceedings, that meant that the authorities must give an accused the opportunity of putting his case in the cassation court in a concrete and effective way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The procedure followed by the judicial authorities where the evidence of a child, reported in court by third persons, one of them a close relative, was the only direct evidence of the sexual offence in question and the domestic courts based their finding of the applicant's guilt to a decisive extent on the child's statements could not be considered as having enabled the defence to challenge the evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The applicant was not able to bring his justified complaint about a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for over sixteen years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering the particular circumstances of the case and notably the importance of the decisions to be taken, the applicant had not been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide her with the requisite protection of her interests. The failure of the Regional Court to inform the applicant of the additional evidence obtained during the appeal proceedings which deprived her of the possibility to react thereto revealed an insufficient involvement of her in the decision-making process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once an acquittal has become final the voicing of any suspicions of guilt, including those expressed in the reasons for the acquittal, is incompatible with the presumption of innocence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The applicants could easily have dispelled the doubts voiced by the authorities, in particular by slightly changing the name of their association and by sacrificing, or amending, a single provision of the memorandum of association. Those alterations would not, in the Court's view, have had harmful consequences for the Union's existence as an association and would not have prevented its members from achieving the objectives they set for themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil claim barred on public policy grounds without any examination of merits of claim [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Award of damages against a newspaper for defamation of cosmetic surgeon [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extradition to the United States of a person allegedly risking being subjected to “death row syndrome” and liable to be sentenced to life imprisonment without remission Extradition of applicant to the United States, where he had been convicted in absentia, following adoption of a US law allowing for the possibility of retrial [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dismissal of cassation appeal due to appellant's failure to surrender into custody Refusal to examine cassation appeal against a criminal conviction Inapplicability of prescription to crimes against humanity Effects of a media campaign on the fairness of the jury trial of a former Minister Absence of reasons for jury's verdict in criminal trial [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

NATO bombing of Belgrade [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dismissal of teacher for exerting political influence on pupil in the GDR Proceedings concerning the dismissal of a secondary school teacher [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Delays in the criminal trial of a person who first had been subject to an extradition proceeding and whose case was then transferred for trial could not be imputed to the action or omission of the authorities, and resulted from a system of judicial assistance which functioned in many countries and where each government depended on the cooperation of the other. The intervening delays must be considered as part of a classical system which took time and as such should be considered inevitable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents various cases from the European Court of Human Rights concerning the legal issue of admissibility. Case of "H.D v. Poland," in which the plaintiff complained of ill-treatment during arrest and during detention at a sobering-up center; Decision of the court on the case of "Riela and Others v. Italy"; Applicability of Article 6, Section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights to the proceedings in the case "Mort v. the United Kingdom"; Judgments rendered on the cases of "Hammern v. Norway" and "Ringvold v. Norway."

Presents summaries of judgments on court cases from the European Court of Human Rights. Case of "McElhinney v. Ireland," in which the court held that there had not been a violation of right to a fair trial; Judgment of the court in the case of "Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom," in which the Court held that there had not been a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Principal facts of the case "Fogarty v. the United Kingdom"; Decision of the court in the case of "Tsironis v. Greece."

There was a violation of the subjective test of judicial impartiality when a motion came for decision to a court at the request of a judge sitting on that court. Moreover, the fact that the judge who submitted to the court a motion for the applicant to be dismissed could be regarded as giving objective grounds for believing that the court deciding on this motion lacked impartiality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Refusal by domestic courts to release the applicant relying in particular on “the significant danger to society” caused by a criminal offence with which he was charged, and “a heavy load of social harmfulness” carried by the offence in question was very general and did not seem to reflect a diligent examination of all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a genuine requirement of public interest justifying in the applicant's case a departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on various cases concerning the civil rights of complainants. Issue on the right to private life; Elaboration on Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Emphasis on the right to a fair trial; Applicability of the provision on freedom of expression.

Presents the summaries of judgments on various court cases from the European Court of Human Rights. Judgment rendered by the Court in the case of "Sahiner v. Turkey"; Provisions of the law invoked by the complainant in the case "P.G. and J.H. v. the United Kingdom"; Principal facts of the case "I.J.L., G.M.R. and A.K.P. v. the United Kingdom"; Contention of the complainant in the case "Hirvisaari v. Finland"; Decision of the Court in the case "G.B. v. France."

Discusses the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on cases concerning the civil rights of complainants. Decision of the Court on the case of "Allan v. the United Kingdom"; Provisions of the law invoked by the complainant in the case "Van der Ven v. the Netherlands"; Contention of the complainant in the case "Victor Emmanuel de Savoie v. Italy."

When proceedings were undertaken concerning granting an authority to enforce a decree which emanated from the courts of a country which did not apply the Convention, a review examining whether Article 6 guarantees had been secured was necessary, especially where a matter of capital importance to the parties was at stake in the application for the authority. Inherent in the right to adversarial process was the opportunity which each party to the proceedings, whether criminal or civil, had in principle to be given to examine and contest any evidence or observation submitted to the court with a view to influencing its decision. That opportunity could not be denied on the ground that the applicant had no defence to the petition for a decree of nullity as it was based on an undisputed objectively verifiable fact, the reason being that it was solely for the parties to a dispute to decide whether a response to evidence adduced by the other party or witnesses was called for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Death after being taken into custody by the security forces and without putting forward any ground justifying recourse to lethal force by its agents engaged the responsibility of the State. The fact that the public prosecutor had not been given a list of the police officers on duty at the material time and had been unable to take evidence from them or to arrange a meeting with the alleged eyewitnesses, despite the fact that he was an independent civil servant in charge of the inquiry and did not accept the information that had been provided by the police and that the public prosecutor“had been unable to visit the cells at Ankara Security Headquarters because, at the material time, the police enjoyed a form of impunity” meant that the Turkish authorities had failed to conduct a proper inquiry into the applicant's allegations. For detention to be compatible with the formal requirements of Article 5, Section 1, for each person detained, a precise record had to be kept of the date, time and place of detention, the grounds for detention and the names of those in charge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Application to the applicant of the relevant provisions of the UK's Drug Trafficking Act 1994 as to the assumption that all property held by a person convicted of a drug-trafficking offence within the preceding six years represented the proceeds of drug trafficking was confined within reasonable limits, given the importance of what was at stake, and the rights of the defence were fully respected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A person of unsound mind who was compulsorily confined to an institution for an indefinite or lengthy period was entitled, at any rate where there was no automatic periodic review of a judicial character, to take proceedings at reasonable intervals before a court to put in issue the “lawfulness” — within the meaning of the Convention — of his or her detention, inasmuch as the reasons initially warranting confinement might have ceased to exist. This right included, following the institution of such proceedings, a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of detention and ordering its termination if it proved unlawful. While there was no guarantee of a right to appeal against decisions on the lawfulness of detention, its requirements must be respected by appeal courts if an appeal lies against a decision on the lawfulness of detention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Continued detention could be justified in a given case only if there were specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighed the rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of the Convention. To ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person did not exceed a reasonable time, the national judicial authorities must, paying due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of the above-mentioned demand of public interest justifying a departure from the rule in Article 5 and set them out in their decisions on the applications for release. In cases where a person was detained pending the determination of a criminal charge against him, the fact of his detention was itself a factor to be considered in assessing whether the requirement of a decision on the merits within a reasonable time had been met. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When campaigning for changes in legislation or to the legal or constitutional structures of the State, political parties enjoyed the protection of the provisions of the Convention and of Article 11 in particular provided they complied with two conditions: (1) the means used to those ends had to be lawful and democratic from all standpoints and (2) the proposed changes had to be compatible with fundamental democratic principles. Islamic law (the Sharia), was a system of law that was in marked contrast to the values embodied in the Convention. Even if States' margin of appreciation was narrow in the area of the dissolution of political parties, since pluralism of ideas and parties was an inherent element of democracy, the State concerned could reasonably prevent the implementation of a political programme which was incompatible with Convention norms, before it was given effect through specific acts that might jeopardise civil peace and the country's democratic regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that a person arrested had committed an offence was a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer sufficed. The other grounds given by the judicial authorities must continue to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the national authorities must also display “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured. In considering whether a treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3. Even the absence of such a purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3. Whilst strip searches may be necessary on occasions to ensure prison security or prevent disorder or crime, they must be conducted in an appropriate manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It was not sufficient for an accused to complain that he was not permitted to examine certain witnesses; he also had to support his request to call witnesses by explaining the importance of doing so and it had to be necessary for the court to take evidence from the witnesses concerned in order to be able to establish the true facts. That principle also applied to the examination of the complainant in a defamation case. In reviewing the decisions given by domestic courts by virtue of their power of appreciation the Court had to ensure that sanctions against the press were strictly proportionate and prompted by assertions which did indeed overstep the limits of acceptable criticism, while safeguarding assertions which might and therefore must enjoy the protection of Article 10. A careful distinction had to be made between facts and value-judgments. The existence of facts could be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value-judgments was not susceptible of proof. An opinion may, however, be excessive, in particular in the absence of any factual basis. Journalistic freedom covered possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. Article 10 protected not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they were conveyed. While judicial officers had to be protected against unfounded attacks, the press was nevertheless one of the means by which politicians and public opinion could verify that judges were discharging their heavy responsibilities in a manner that was in conformity with the aim which was the basis of the task entrusted to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Continued detention could be justified in a given case only if there were specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighed the rule of respect for individual liberty. The gravity of the charges could not by itself serve to justify long periods of detention on remand. Any system of mandatory detention on remand was per se incompatible with Article 5, Section 3 of the Convention. The guarantees of Article 5, Section 4 would be deprived of their substance if the judge could treat as irrelevant, or disregard, concrete facts invoked by the detainee and capable of putting into doubt the existence of the conditions essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of the Convention, of the deprivation of liberty. A State which instituted a system of appeals of applications for release from detention must in principle afford the detainees the guarantees of a judicial procedure. Thus, the proceedings must be adversarial and must adequately ensure “equality of arms” between the parties, the prosecutor and the detained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There did not exist a true legal remedy enabling a person to complain of the excessive length of proceedings in Croatia. Therefore there were no adequate and effective remedies for the purposes of Article [sub 35] of the Convention which the applicant was required to exhaust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Court established guiding principles in order to examine whether an expulsion which caused difficulties for the spouses to stay together and in particular for a spouse and/or children to live in the other's country of origin was necessary in a democratic society and so permissible under Article 8. The Court would consider the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant; the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he was going to be expelled; the time elapsed since the offence was committed as well as the applicant's conduct in that period; the nationalities of the various persons concerned; the applicant's family situation, such as the length of the marriage; and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple's family life; whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship; and whether there were children in the marriage, and if so, their age. Not least, the Court would also consider the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse was likely to encounter in the country of origin, though the mere fact that a person might face certain difficulties in accompanying her or his spouse could not in itself exclude an expulsion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responsibility of Russia and Moldova for arrest, detention, trial and sentence in a region of Moldova which has declared its secession (Transdniestria) and where Russian troops are stationed and accused of supporting the separatists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alleged immunity of local authority with regard to granting of permission to a company which subsequently emitted toxic fumes and failure to enforce decisions ordering cessation of the emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there was no evidence of any positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant detaining a severely disabled person in conditions where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty, constituted degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The applicant did not receive a public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There was a failure to investigate promptly or effectively establish the extent of official knowledge of or connivance in the abduction and killing of the applicant's brother. Article 13 required, in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the deprivation of life and including effective access for the complainant to the investigation procedure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When an emergency care order had to be made, it was not always possible, because of the urgency of the situation, or desirable to associate in the decision-making process those having custody of the child. However for there to be circumstances justifying the removal of children from the care of their parents without prior consultation, the national authorities had to establish that a careful assessment of the impact of the proposed care measure on the parents and the children, as well as of the possible alternatives to taking the children into public care, had been carried out before implementing any care measures. The taking of a new-born baby into public care at the moment of its birth was an extremely harsh measure. There needed to be extraordinarily compelling reasons before a baby could be physically removed from the care of its mother, against her will, immediately after birth, as a consequence of a procedure in which neither she nor her partner had been involved. It was incumbent on the national authorities to examine whether some less intrusive interference into family life, at such a critical point in the lives of the parents and the child, was possible. The guiding principle is that the public care of a child should in principle be regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permitted. Any measures implementing such temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child. The positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably feasible became more pressing the longer the period of care lasted, subject always to its being balanced against the duty to consider the best interests of the child. The minimum to be expected of the authorities is to examine the situation anew from time to time to see whether there has been any improvement in the family's situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax matters still formed part of the hard core of public-authority prerogatives, with the public nature of the relationship between the taxpayer and the tax authority remaining predominant. Tax disputes therefore fell outside the scope of “civil rights and obligations” covered by Article 6, Section 1, despite the pecuniary effects which they necessarily produced for the taxpayer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exclusion of German jurisdiction under a Settlement Convention adopted after the Second World War had a legitimate objective. The applicant's interest in bringing litigation in the Federal Republic of Germany was not sufficient to outweigh the vital public interests in regaining sovereignty and unifying Germany advanced by such a treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a number of important decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights from July to August 2001. Examples of these decisions are as follows. Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court implied that life imprisonment without the possibility of release would amount to inhuman or degrading punishment, prohibited by the Convention. The Court established guiding principles in order to examine whether an expulsion which causes difficulties for the spouses to stay together and in particular for a spouse and/or children to live in the other's country of origin is necessary in a democratic society and so permissible under Article 8. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed and reiterated certain principles among which include Article 2 which states that death after being taken into custody by the security forces and without putting forward any ground justifying recourse to lethal force by its agents engages the responsibility of the State.

Law conferring wide-ranging powers on the Minister of the Interior to issue administrative bans on the dissemination of publications of foreign origin or written in a foreign language were not, a priori, incompatible with the Convention; nevertheless, a legal framework was required that ensured both tight control over the scope of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any abuse of power. However, the judicial-review procedures in place in cases concerning administrative bans on publications under section 14 of the French Law of 1881, as amended, provided insufficient guarantees against abuse and the legislation appeared to be in direct conflict with the actual wording of Section 1 of Article 10 of the Convention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The highest importance is attached to the freedom of expression in the context of political debate and very strong reasons were required to justify restrictions on political speech. The limits of acceptable criticism concerning a public figure were wider than for a private individual. The establishment of a pressing social need for putting the protection of the personal rights of a public figure above the right to freedom of expression and the general interest of promoting this freedom where issues of public interest were concerned was necessary to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents summaries of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. "Phillips v. the United Kingdom"; "Erdem v. Germany"; "Aydin v. Turkey."

Presents various court cases admitted to the European Court of Human Rights. "Gorzelik v. Poland"; "M. G. v. the United Kingdom"; "Nivette v. France."

Interrogation and placement in detention on remand of very elderly person. Expression of views by public prosecutor during trial. Participation by same presiding judge in decision concerning challenge to first instance judges and in decision on appeal on points of law. Influence of press campaign on judges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents summaries of judgments made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against various cases related to human rights. In a judgment delivered on May 3, 2001, in the case of "J.B. v. Switzerland," the ECHR unanimously held that there had been a violation of Article 6, Section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Article 41 of the Convention, the Court unanimously awarded the applicant 2,000 Swiss francs (CHF) for pecuniary damage and CHF 10,409.80 for costs and expenses. In another case related to the violation of Article 9, proposing freedom of religion and conscience, the Court declared the application partly admissible. The case concerns the application brought by Ivailo Stefanov, a Bulgarian national born in 1975 and residing in Shoumen, Bulgaria. In a judgment delivered on May 10, 2001, in the case of "Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom," the ECHR held unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 3, proposing prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, of the European Convention on Human Rights.