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In recent decades, government intervention in welfare states has witnessed a shift from 'government' to 'governance': policy making shifted from hierarchical government steering to mixed forms involving government, market and civic actors. Such terminology has also entered Chinese policy language on public rental housing (PRH) provision. To unravel the perceived power distribution in the relationships between the involved actors, this article draws from in-depth interviews in two Chinese cities: Chongqing and Fuzhou. The article thereby contributes new insights to the perceived power relations in Chinese PRH provision on the ground. It also develops an analytical framework based on Billis by complementing it with Social Network Analysis to measure the power relations. Such a framework will allow the comparison of different governance systems across time and different jurisdictions within and beyond China. This study shows the structures and mechanisms for non-governmental actors to play a role, which they do not have in the 'government' period, in the governance of PRH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the recent Housing Memorandum ( MVROM, 2000 ), Dutch housing associations are expected to actively improve the control of tenants over their dwellings and their living environment and offer them more possibilities to choose their own type of tenure. Before the publication of the Memorandum, associations had already developed various innovative types of tenure, for example fixed rent contracts, tenant maintenance programmes and different forms of sale with discounts and risk-reducing conditions. With the introduction of these tenures, associations aim to contribute to their social objectives by improving tenants' satisfaction with their dwellings and to improve the market position of their stock as well. Our paper discusses innovative types of tenure that have been developed by the Dutch housing associations and their benefits and risks for tenant and landlord. We focus on the 'Client's Choice' programme that has been developed by the association WoonbronMaasoevers, which is recognised as a front-runner in offering households a wide range of choice in tenure and which is also illustrative of many of the benefits and risks of the innovative tenures. We conclude that many of the innovative tenures, including the Client's Choice programme, can contribute to tenant empowerment and freedom of choice. However, low-income households will mostly have to keep relying on (social) rented housing and other forms of empowerment. For the landlord, the Client's Choice programme has the benefit of increasing cash flow, which can be used for (social) housing investments. However, there are also substantial financial risks, concerning the rate of sales, the development of market values and the potential costs of having to buy back all the dwellings at the end of their economic lifespan. Thus, the implementation of the Client's Choice programme on a large scale should be accompanied by measures to control or provide for these risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]