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Objective. This paper uses a unique database to examine premiums paid by beneficiaries for Medigap supplemental coverage. Average premiums charged by insurers are reported, as well as premiums by enrollee age and gender, and additional policy characteristics. Marginal prices for Medigap benefits are estimated using hedonic price regressions. In addition, the paper considers how additional policy characteristics and geographic differences in the use and cost of medical care affect premiums. Data Sources/Study Setting. A comprehensive database on premiums paid by beneficiaries for newly issued Medigap policies in the year 2000 along with state-level characteristics. Study Design. Hedonic pricing equations are used to estimate implicit prices for Medigap benefits. Data Collection/Extraction Methods. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services contracted for the creation of a detailed database on Medigap premiums. Data were collected in three stages. First, letters were sent directly to insurers requesting premium data. Second, letters were directly to state insurance commissioner's offices requesting premium data. Last, each state insurance commissioner's office was visited to collect missing data. Principal Findings. With the exceptions of the part B deductible and drug benefit, Medigap supplemental insurance is priced consistent with the actuarial value of benefits offered under the standardized plans. Premiums vary substantially based on rating method, whether the policy is guaranteed issue, Medigap Select, or explicitly for smokers. Premiums increase with enrollee age, but do not vary between men and women. The relationship between premiums and enrollee age varies across rating methods. Attained-age policies show the strongest relationship between age and premiums, while community-rated premiums, by definition, do not vary with age. Medigap supplemental insurance premiums are higher in states with poorer health, greater utilization, and greater managed care penetration. Conclusions. Despite the high cost, Medigap plans are generally priced in accordance with the actuarial value of benefits. The primary exception is the drug benefit, which appears to be subject to substantial adverse selection. Benefits such as the part B deductible and at-home recovery benefit offer little value to consumers. Several states require insurers to community rate premiums. Such regulation has important implications for premiums, and research needs to consider the impact of such regulation on the Medigap market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective. To assess the impact of the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) on the distribution of health insurance coverage for low-income children. Data Source. The primary data for the study were from the 1997, 1999, and 2002 National Survey of America's Families (NSAF), which includes a total sample of 62,497 children across all 3 years, supplemented with data from other data sources. Study Design. The study uses quasi-experimental designs and tests the sensitivity of the results to using instrumental variable and difference-in-difference approaches. A detailed Medicaid and CHIP eligibility model was developed for this study. Balanced repeated replicate weights were used to account for the complex sample of the NSAF. Descriptive and multivariate analyses were conducted. Principle Findings. The results varied depending on the approach utilized but indicated that the CHIP program led to significant increases in public coverage (14–20 percentage points); and declines in employer-sponsored coverage (6–7 percentage points) and in uninsurance (7–12 percentage points). The estimated share of CHIP enrollment attributable to crowd-out ranged from 33 to 44 percent. Smaller crowd-out effects were found for Medicaid-eligible children. Conclusions. Implementation of the CHIP program resulted in large increases in public coverage with estimates of crowd-out consistent with initial projections made by the Congressional Budget Office. This paper demonstrates that public health insurance expansions can lead to substantial reductions in uninsurance without causing a large-scale erosion of employer coverage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective. To measure the change in U.S. women and children's health insurance coverage as a result of welfare reform (i.e. the creation of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or TANF) in 1996. Data Source. 1992–1999 longitudinal data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) merged with data on the timing of state implementation of welfare reform after 1996. Two key advantages of the SIPP data are that they permit matching type of insurance coverage to the welfare policy environment in each state in each month, and permit controlling for individual-level fixed effects. Study Design. We measure how much insurance coverage changed after welfare reform using a difference in differences method that eliminates the influence of time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity and of statewide trends in insurance coverage. Models also control for individual, state, and year fixed effects, individual-level characteristics such as education, age, and number of children, plus state-level variables such as real per capita income, real minimum wage, and Medicaid eligibility. Data Collection/Extraction Methods. We limit our analysis to the SIPP data specific to the month just completed prior to the interview; as a result, we have up to twelve observations for each individual in the SIPP. This paper uses pooled data from the 1992–1996 panels of the SIPP covering the period 1992–1999. Publicly available state identifiers permit the merger of state policies and macroeconomic variables with the SIPP. Principal Findings. TANF implementation is associated with an 8.1 percent increase in the probability that a welfare-eligible woman was uninsured. Welfare reform had less of an impact on the health insurance coverage of children. For example, TANF implementation was associated with a 3.0 percent increase in the probability that a welfare-eligible child lacked health insurance. Conclusions. An unintended consequence of welfare reform was to adversely impact the health insurance coverage of economically vulnerable women and children, and that this impact was several times larger than the previous literature implies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]