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This paper offers an approach to assessing quality of life, based on Sen's (1985) theory, which it uses to understand loss in quality of life due to mobility impairment. Specifically, it provides a novel theoretical analysis that is able to account for the possibility that some functionings may increase when a person's capabilities decrease, if substitution effects are large enough. We then develop new data consistent with our theoretical framework that permits comparison of quality of life between those with a disability (mobility impairment) and those without. Empirical results show that mobility impairment has widespread rather than concentrated impacts on capabilities and is associated with high psychological costs. We also find evidence that a small number of functionings are higher for those with a disability, as our theory allows. The paper concludes by discussing possible implications for policy and health assessment methods., (© 2020 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Organisations across diverse health care systems making decisions about the funding of new medical technologies face extensive stakeholder and political pressures. As a consequence, there is quite understandable pressure to take account of other attributes of benefit and to fund technologies, even when the opportunity costs are likely exceed the benefits they offer. Recent evidence suggests that NICE technology appraisal is already approving drugs where more health is likely to be lost than gained. Also, NICE recently proposed increasing the upper bound of the cost-effectiveness threshold to reflect other attributes of benefit but without a proper assessment of the type of benefits that are expected to be displaced. It appears that NICE has taken a direction of travel, which means that more harm than good is being, and will continue to be, done, but it is unidentified NHS patients who bear the real opportunity costs., (Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Discounting costs and health benefits in cost-effectiveness analysis has been the subject of recent debate - some authors suggesting a common rate for both and others suggesting a lower rate for health. We show how these views turn on key judgments of fact and value: on whether the social objective is to maximise discounted health outcomes or the present consumption value of health; on whether the budget for health care is fixed; on the expected growth in the cost-effectiveness threshold; and on the expected growth in the consumption value of health. We demonstrate that if the budget for health care is fixed and decisions are based on incremental cost effectiveness ratios (ICERs), discounting costs and health gains at the same rate is correct only if the threshold remains constant. Expecting growth in the consumption value of health does not itself justify differential rates but implies a lower rate for both. However, whether one believes that the objective should be the maximisation of the present value of health or the present consumption value of health, adopting the social time preference rate for consumption as the discount rate for costs and health gains is valid only under strong and implausible assumptions about values and facts., (2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

There are some general considerations which have implications for the delivery and finance of health care in all countries, not only Canada and the USA. Beginning with two propositions: that access to health care is a right of citizenship, which should not depend on individual income and wealth; and that the objective of health services is to maximise the impact on the nation's health of the resources available; the paper examines the ethical justification for pursuing efficiency in health care provision. The different meanings of efficiency are discussed in detail, and the use of quantitative indicators of health benefit, such as the QALY, placed in context. It is argued that the determination of health care resource allocations should take account of costs at both the macro planning level and the micro level of the individual doctor-patient relationship. Given the starting points the overall conclusion is that it is ethical to be efficient, since to be inefficient implies failure to achieve the ethical objective of maximising health benefits from available resources.