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US health care use declined during the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Although utilization is known to have recovered in 2021 and 2022, it is unknown how revenue in 2020-22 varied by physician specialty and practice setting. This study linked medical claims from a large national federation of commercial health plans to physician and practice data to estimate pandemic-associated impacts on physician revenue (defined as payments to eligible physicians) by specialty and practice characteristics. Surgical specialties, emergency medicine, and medical subspecialties each experienced a greater than 9 percent adjusted gross revenue decline in 2020 relative to prepandemic baselines. By 2022, pathology and psychiatry revenue experienced robust recovery, whereas surgical and oncology revenue remained at or below baseline. Revenue recovery in 2022 was greater for physicians practicing in hospital-owned practices and in practices participating in accountable care organizations. Pandemic-associated revenue recovery in 2021 and 2022 varied by specialty and practice type. Given that physician financial instability is associated with health care consolidation and leaving practice, policy makers should closely monitor revenue trends among physicians in specialties or practice settings with sustained gross revenue reductions during the pandemic.

Value-based payment has been promoted for increasing quality, controlling spending, and improving patient and practitioner experience. Meanwhile, needed reforms to fee-for-service payment (the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule) have been ignored as policy makers seek to move payment toward alternatives, even though the fee schedule is an intrinsic part of Alternative Payment Models. In this article, we show how value-based payment and the fee schedule should be viewed as complementary, rather than as separate silos. We trace the origins of embedded flaws in the fee schedule that must be fixed if value-based payment is to succeed. These include payment distortions that directly compromise value by overpaying for certain procedures and imaging services while underpaying for services that add value for beneficiaries. We also show how the fee schedule can accommodate bundled payments and population-based payments that are central to Alternative Payment Models. We draw two conclusions. First, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services should correct misvalued services and establish a hybrid payment for primary care that blends fee-for-service and population-based payment. Second, Congress should alter the thirty-five-year-old statutory basis for setting Medicare fees to allow CMS to explicitly consider policy priorities such as workforce shortages in refining fee levels.

When physicians whom patients do not choose and cannot avoid can bill out of network for care delivered within in-network hospitals, it exposes patients to financial risk and undercuts the functioning of health care markets. Using data for 2015 from a large commercial insurer, we found that at in-network hospitals, 11.8 percent of anesthesiology care, 12.3 percent of care involving a pathologist, 5.6 percent of claims for radiologists, and 11.3 percent of cases involving an assistant surgeon were billed out of network. The ability to bill out of network allows these specialists to negotiate artificially high in-network rates. Out-of-network billing is more prevalent at hospitals in concentrated hospital and insurance markets and at for-profit hospitals. Our estimates show that if these specialists were not able to bill out of network, it would lower physician payments for privately insured patients by 13.4 percent and reduce health care spending for people with employer-sponsored insurance by 3.4 percent (approximately $40 billion annually).

Because of workforce needs and demographic and chronic disease trends, nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs) are taking a larger role in the primary care of medically complex patients with chronic conditions. Research shows good quality outcomes, but concerns persist that NPs' and PAs' care of vulnerable populations could increase care costs compared to the traditional physician-dominated system. We used 2012-13 Veterans Affairs data on a cohort of medically complex patients with diabetes to compare health services use and costs depending on whether the primary care provider was a physician, NP, or PA. Case-mix-adjusted total care costs were 6-7 percent lower for NP and PA patients than for physician patients, driven by more use of emergency and inpatient services by the latter. We found that use of NPs and PAs as primary care providers for complex patients with diabetes was associated with less use of acute care services and lower total costs.

Alternative Payment Models (APMs) can address the limitations inherent in fee-for-service payment to support new approaches to health care delivery that produce greater value. But the models being tested are directly layered on top of fee-for-service architecture, specifically the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. Shoring up that architecture to produce greater value, in combination with APMs, should be considered an integral part of the movement to value-based payment. We propose ending the split within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services between the people managing the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule and those creating and testing APMs, with both groups advised by a revamped Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee that covers both dimensions of creating greater value.

Evidence suggests that growth in providers' prices drives growth in health care spending on the privately insured. However, existing work has not systematically differentiated between the growth rate of hospital prices and that of physician prices. We analyzed growth in both types of prices for inpatient and hospital-based outpatient services using actual negotiated prices paid by insurers. We found that in the period 2007-14 hospital prices grew substantially faster than physician prices. For inpatient care, hospital prices grew 42 percent, while physician prices grew 18 percent. Similarly, for hospital-based outpatient care, hospital prices grew 25 percent, while physician prices grew 6 percent. A majority of the growth in payments for inpatient and hospital-based outpatient care was driven by growth in hospital prices, not physician prices. Our work suggests that efforts to reduce health care spending should be primarily focused on addressing growth in hospital rather than physician prices. Policy makers should consider a range of options to address hospital price growth, including antitrust enforcement, administered pricing, the use of reference pricing, and incentivizing referring physicians to make more cost-efficient referrals.

There is a chronic shortage of physicians to cover emergency departments (EDs) in critical access hospitals. A 2013 memorandum from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services clarified that a telemedicine physician could fulfill the regulatory requirements for physician backup when advanced practice providers were at telemedicine-equipped critical access hospital EDs but local physicians were not. In a sample of nineteen hospitals, coverage schedules in 2016 showed that seven had begun the use of tele-ED physician backup for advanced practice providers, decreasing local physician coverage in their EDs. These seven hospitals tended to have decreasing ED staffing costs, while the hospitals not applying this policy showed continually increasing staffing costs over time. Telemedicine also provided other benefits, such as improved physician recruitment and retention. In the future, more critical access hospitals will likely use telemedicine to provide physician backup for advanced practice providers staffing the ED.

The administrative costs of providing health insurance in the US are very high, but their determinants are poorly understood. We advance the nascent literature in this field by developing new measures of billing complexity for physician care across insurers and over time, and by estimating them using a large sample of detailed insurance "remittance data" for the period 2013-15. We found dramatic variation across different types of insurance. Fee-for-service Medicaid is the most challenging type of insurer to bill, with a claim denial rate that is 17.8 percentage points higher than that for fee-for-service Medicare. The denial rate for Medicaid managed care was 6 percentage points higher than that for fee-for-service Medicare, while the rate for private insurance appeared similar to that of Medicare Advantage. Based on conservative assumptions, we estimated that the health care sector deals with $11 billion in challenged revenue annually, but this number could be as high as $54 billion. These costs have significant implications for analyses of health insurance reforms.

In 2015 Medicare launched the Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier program, the largest US ambulatory care pay-for-performance program to date and a precursor to the forthcoming Merit-based Incentive Payment System. In its first year, the program included practices with a hundred or more clinicians. We found that 1,010 practices met this criterion, 899 of which had at least one attributed beneficiary. Of these latter practices, 263 (29.3 percent) failed to report performance data and received a 1 percent reporting-based penalty. Of the 636 practices that reported performance data, those that elected quality tiering-voluntarily receiving performance-based penalties or bonuses-and those with high use of electronic health records had better performance on quality and costs than other practices. Practices with a primary care focus had better quality than other practices but similar costs. These findings translated into differences in the receipt of penalties and bonuses and may have implications for performance patterns under the Merit-based Incentive Payment System.

In the face of growing competition, traditional practices have begun trying to guarantee same-day appointments.

In 2015, Congress repealed the Sustainable Growth Rate formula for Medicare physician payment, eliminating mandatory payment cuts when spending exceeded what was budgeted. In its place, Congress enacted the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), which established a two-track performance-based payment system that encourages physicians to participate in alternative payment models. MACRA could have huge effects on health care delivery, but the nature of those effects is highly uncertain. Using the RAND Corporation's Health Care Payment and Delivery Simulation Model, we estimated the effects of MACRA on Medicare spending and utilization and examined how effects would differ under various scenarios. We estimate that MACRA will decrease Medicare spending on physician services by -$35 to -$106 billion (-2.3 percent to -7.1 percent) and change spending on hospital services by $32 to -$250 billion (0.7 percent to -5.1 percent) in 2015-30. The spending effects are critically dependent on the strength of incentives in the alternative payment models, particularly the incentives for physicians to reduce hospital spending and physician responses to MACRA payment rates., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

Provider consolidation has been associated with higher health care prices and spending. The prevailing wisdom is that payment reform will accelerate consolidation, especially between physicians and hospitals and among physician groups, as providers position themselves to bear financial risk for the full continuum of patient care. Drawing on data from a number of sources from 2008 onward, we examined the relationship between Medicare's accountable care organization (ACO) programs and provider consolidation. We found that consolidation was under way in the period 2008-10, before the Affordable Care Act (ACA) established the ACO programs. While the number of hospital mergers and the size of specialty-oriented physician groups increased after the ACA was passed, we found minimal evidence that consolidation was associated with ACO penetration at the market level or with physicians' participation in ACOs within markets. We conclude that payment reform has been associated with little acceleration in consolidation in addition to trends already under way, but there is evidence of potential defensive consolidation in response to new payment models., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

A surprise medical bill is a bill from an out-of-network provider that was not expected by the patient or that came from an out-of-network provider not chosen by the patient. In 2014, 20 percent of hospital inpatient admissions that originated in the emergency department (ED), 14 percent of outpatient visits to the ED, and 9 percent of elective inpatient admissions likely led to a surprise medical bill., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

Proposed mergers among large US health insurers and growing consolidation among providers have renewed concerns about the effects of market concentration on commercial health care prices. Using multipayer claims for physician services provided in office settings, we estimated that-within the same provider groups-insurers with market shares of 15 percent or more (average: 24.5 percent), for example, negotiated prices for office visits that were 21 percent lower than prices negotiated by insurers with shares of less than 5 percent. Analyses stratified by provider market share suggested that insurers require greater market shares to negotiate lower prices from large provider groups than they do when negotiating with smaller provider groups. For example, office visit prices for small practices were $88, $72, and $70, for insurers with market shares of <5 percent, ≥5 to <15 percent, and ≥15 percent, respectively, whereas prices for large provider groups were $97, $86, and $76, exhibiting a continued decrease across higher insurer-market-share categories. These results suggest that mergers of health insurers could lower the prices paid to providers, particularly providers large enough to obtain higher prices from insurers with modest market shares. Continued monitoring will be important for determining the net effects of the countervailing trends of insurer and provider consolidation on the affordability of health care., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) imposed new restrictions on the formation and expansion of physician-owned hospitals. These restrictions provided incentives for the hospitals and their owners to take preemptive actions before the effective dates of ACA provisions and modify their operations thereafter. We studied 106 physician-owned hospitals in Texas to determine how they responded to ACA restrictions. We found that there were significant pre-ACA increases in the formation, physician ownership, and physical capacity of physician-owned hospitals, which suggests that they reacted quickly to the policy changes. After the ACA's provisions took effect, the hospitals improved the use of their assets to generate increased amounts of services, revenue, and profits. We found no evidence that existing physician-owned hospitals stopped accepting Medicare to avoid the ACA restrictions, although some investors adopted a seemingly unsuccessful strategy of not accepting Medicare at physician-owned hospitals formed after implementation of the ACA. We conclude that the ACA restrictions effectively eliminated the formation of new physician-owned hospitals, thus accomplishing what previous legislative efforts had failed to do., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

Primary payments--those made by insurance carriers--to office-based physicians rose moderately between 2013 and 2014. Payments declined for orthopedics and surgery while increasing for primary care and obstetrics-gynecology. Patients' payment obligations rose for all specialties, and deductibles were the largest category of increased patient spending.

About half of the $2.1 trillion of US health services spending constitutes compensation to employees. We examined how the wages paid to health-sector employees compared to those paid to workers with similar qualifications in other sectors. Overall, we found that health care workers are paid only slightly more than workers elsewhere in the US economy, but the patterns are starkly different for nonprofessional and professional employees. Nonprofessional health care workers earn slightly less than their counterparts elsewhere in the economy. By contrast, the average nurse earns about 40 percent more than the median comparable worker in a different sector. The average physician earns about 50 percent more than a comparable worker in another sector of the economy, and this differential has increased sharply since 1993. Cost containment is likely to lead to reductions in the earnings of health care professionals, but it will also require using fewer or less skilled employees to produce a given service., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

Congress is again attempting to repeal the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) formula. The formula is a failed mechanism intended to constrain Medicare Part B physician spending by adjusting annual physician fee updates. Congress has averted formula-driven physician fee cuts each year beginning in 2003 by overriding the SGR, usually accompanied with last-minute disputes about how these overrides should be paid for. Last year Congress achieved bipartisan and bicameral agreement on legislation to replace the SGR—the SGR Repeal and Medicare Provider Payment Modernization Act of 2014, which we refer to as the "2014 SGR fix"—but was unable to find a way to pay for the legislation under current budget rules. Current congressional deliberations appear focused on how to pay for the fix, with wide consensus that the 2014 legislation should remain the basic model for reform. We describe key features of the 2014 SGR fix, place it in the context of both past and ongoing Medicare health policy, assess its strengths and weaknesses as a mechanism to foster improved care and lower costs in Medicare, and suggest further actions to ensure success in meeting these goals., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

For 2011-13, US health spending is projected to grow at 4.0 percent, on average--slightly above the historically low growth rate of 3.8 percent in 2009. Preliminary data suggest that growth in consumers' use of health services remained slow in 2011, and this pattern is expected to continue this year and next. In 2014, health spending growth is expected to accelerate to 7.4 percent as the major coverage expansions from the Affordable Care Act begin. For 2011 through 2021, national health spending is projected to grow at an average rate of 5.7 percent annually, which would be 0.9 percentage point faster than the expected annual increase in the gross domestic product during this period. By 2021, federal, state, and local government health care spending is projected to be nearly 50 percent of national health expenditures, up from 46 percent in 2011, with federal spending accounting for about two-thirds of the total government share. Rising government spending on health care is expected to be driven by faster growth in Medicare enrollment, expanded Medicaid coverage, and the introduction of premium and cost-sharing subsidies for health insurance exchange plans.

To calculate physicians' fees under Medicare--which in turn influence the physician fee schedules of other public and private payers--one of the essential decisions the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) must make is how much physician time and effort, or work, is associated with various physician services. To make this determination, CMS relies on the recommendations of an advisory committee representing national physician organizations. Some experts on primary care who are concerned about the income gap between primary and specialty care providers have blamed the committee for increasing that gap. Our analysis of CMS's decisions on updating work values between 1994 and 2010 found that CMS agreed with 87.4 percent of the committee's recommendations, although CMS reduced recommended work values for a limited number of radiology and medical specialty services. If policy makers or physicians want to change the update process but keep the Medicare fee schedule in its current form, CMS's capacity to review changes in relative value units could be strengthened through long-term investment in the agency's ability to undertake research and analysis of issues such as how the effort and time associated with different physician services is determined, and which specialties--if any--receive higher payments than others as a result.

More-sophisticated chemotherapy regimens have improved the outlook for cancer patients since the 1970s, but the payment system for cancer chemotherapy has not changed during that time span. The "buy and bill" approach for reimbursement provides incentives for medical oncologists to use expensive medications when less costly alternatives that deliver similar results are available. Furthermore, the system does nothing to assess how much value society derives from high-price drugs. This paper reviews the historical context of "buy and bill" reimbursement and considers the use of clinical pathways and bundled payments, two alternative strategies that are being tried to reward physicians for improving outcomes and reducing the total cost of cancer care.

Public report cards with quality and cost information on physicians, physician groups, and hospital providers have proliferated in recent years. However, many of these report cards are difficult for consumers to interpret and have had little impact on the provider choices consumers are making. To gain a more focused understanding of why these reports cards have not been more successful and what improvements could be made, we interviewed experts and surveyed registrants at the March 2011 AHRQ National Summit on Public Reporting for Consumers in Health Care. We found broad agreement that public reporting has been disconnected from consumer decisions about providers because of weaknesses in report card content, design, and accessibility. Policy makers have an opportunity to change the landscape of public reporting by taking advantage of advances in measurement, data collection, and information technology to deliver a more consumer-centered report card. Overcoming the constraint of limited public funding, and achieving the acceptance of providers, is critical to realizing future success.

Inefficiency and low quality of health services are common in many developing countries. To mitigate these problems, we conducted an experiment in rural China in which we changed the existing fee-for-service method of paying village doctors to a mixed payment method that included a salary plus a bonus based on performance. The new payment method also removed a feature that previously allowed doctors to purchase medications to prescribe to patients and earn a markup on each prescription. Changing these payment incentives reduced spending at the village level, curbed unnecessary care for healthier patients, and also decreased the prescribing of unnecessary drugs. However, other features of the arrangement encouraged doctors to refer sicker patients to township and county facilities, where costs were higher. As a result, total health care spending was not significantly reduced. The findings underscore that policy makers should design payment methods carefully to both contain costs and improve quality.

Higher health care prices in the United States are a key reason that the nation's health spending is so much higher than that of other countries. Our study compared physicians' fees paid by public and private payers for primary care office visits and hip replacements in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We also compared physicians' incomes net of practice expenses, differences in financing the cost of medical education, and the relative contribution of payments per physician and of physician supply in the countries' national spending on physician services. Public and private payers paid somewhat higher fees to US primary care physicians for office visits (27 percent more for public, 70 percent more for private) and much higher fees to orthopedic physicians for hip replacements (70 percent more for public, 120 percent more for private) than public and private payers paid these physicians' counterparts in other countries. US primary care and orthopedic physicians also earned higher incomes ($186,582 and $442,450, respectively) than their foreign counterparts. We conclude that the higher fees, rather than factors such as higher practice costs, volume of services, or tuition expenses, were the main drivers of higher US spending, particularly in orthopedics.

Prior research has suggested that gender differences in physicians' salaries can be accounted for by the tendency of women to enter primary care fields and work fewer hours. However, in examining starting salaries by gender of physicians leaving residency programs in New York State during 1999-2008, we found a significant gender gap that cannot be explained by specialty choice, practice setting, work hours, or other characteristics. The unexplained trend toward diverging salaries appears to be a recent development that is growing over time. In 2008, male physicians newly trained in New York State made on average $16,819 more than newly trained female physicians, compared to a $3,600 difference in 1999.

What would best motivate more doctors and nurses to work in rural areas of poor countries, where they are badly needed? We presented doctors and nurses in Ethiopia with a series of hypothetical job combinations of wages, working conditions, housing benefits, and training opportunities. For doctors, we found that higher wages and quality housing incentives had the biggest impact on their willingness to practice in towns in rural areas. For nurses, improvements in the availability of medical equipment and supplies were the factors most likely to bring about a move to a rural village. Choosing the right incentive package requires a consideration of both the effects of different packages on health workers' choices and the cost of those packages.

The U.S. system of billing third parties for health care services is complex, expensive, and inefficient. Physicians end up using nearly 12 percent of their net patient service revenue to cover the costs of excessive administrative complexity. A single transparent set of payment rules for multiple payers, a single claim form, and standard rules of submission, among other innovations, would reduce the burden on the billing offices of physician organizations. On a national scale, our hypothetical modeling of these changes would translate into $7 billion of savings annually for physician and clinical services. Four hours of professional time per physician and five hours of practice support staff time could be saved each week.

Physicians have long expressed dissatisfaction with the time they and their staffs spend interacting with health plans. However, little information exists about the extent of these interactions. We conducted a national survey on this subject of physicians and practice administrators. Physicians reported spending three hours weekly interacting with plans; nursing and clerical staff spent much larger amounts of time. When time is converted to dollars, we estimate that the national time cost to practices of interactions with plans is at least $23 billion to $31 billion each year.

New strategies to control U.S. health spending growth are urgently needed. Although provider payment cuts are likely, cutting fee-for-service (FFS) payments will hurt quality and access. A more sensible approach would be to restructure the delivery system into organized networks of providers delivering reliable, evidence-based care. But restructuring will not occur without payment policy reform. Four policy options are commonly cited: recalibrating FFS, instituting pay-for-performance, creating episode-based payments, and adopting global payments. We argue that episode payments are the most immediately viable approach, and we recommend that payment reforms precede any payment reductions so that new delivery models can gain traction.

Massachusetts has the fourth-highest median malpractice settlement payments for all states. The American Medical Association (AMA) declares it a crisis state. As a test case, we analyzed its premiums from 1975 to 2005. In 2005 mean premiums were $17,810 for the coverage level and policy type most frequently purchased. Most physicians paid lower inflation-adjusted premiums in 2005 than in 1990. Mean premiums increased in only three specialties comprising 4 percent of physicians: obstetrics, neurology, and orthopedists-spinal surgery. However, because of discounts and surcharges, in 2005 premiums within the three highest-risk specialties varied nearly threefold, and nearly one-third paid less than in 1990.

In October 2002 the federal government issued a draft "Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers." The draft Guidance questioned the legality of many arrangements heretofore left to the discretion of physicians and drug companies, including industry-funded educational and research grants, consultantcies, and gifts. Medical organizations and drug manufacturers proposed major revisions to the draft, arguing that current practices were in everyone's best interest. To evaluate the impact of their responses, we compare the draft, the changes requested by industry and organized medicine, and the final Guidance document (issued in April 2003). We also explore the implications--some intended, others unanticipated--of the final document.

We used data from the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) to study the growth of physician malpractice payments. Judgments at trial account for 4 percent of all malpractice payments; settlements account for the remaining 96 percent. The average payment grew 52 percent between 1991 and 2003 (4 percent per year) and now exceeds dollar 12 per capita each year. These increases are consistent with increases in the cost of health care. A preoccupation with data on judgments, extreme awards, or specific specialties results in an incomplete understanding of the growth of physician malpractice payments.

Leaders of health insurance companies, hospital systems, and physician organizations believe that when Medicare and Medicaid reduce payment rates to hospitals or physicians, these providers respond by raising prices to private insurers to offset a portion of the loss in revenue. This would mean that payment reductions in public programs contribute to increasing premiums for private insurance. But on both theoretical and empirical grounds, economists have been skeptical about the existence of this "cost shifting." I show that more realistic models of the behavior of hospitals and physicians than exist in basic economics texts provide a conceptual basis for cost shifting.