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Since 2006 numerous insurers have stopped serving the low-income segment of the Medicare Part D program, forcing millions of beneficiaries to change prescription drug plans. Using data from participating plans, we found that Medicare payments do not sufficiently reimburse insurers for the relatively high medication use among this population, creating perverse incentives for plans to avoid this part of the Part D market. Plans can accomplish this by increasing their premiums for all beneficiaries to an amount above regional benchmarks. We demonstrate that improving the accuracy of Medicare's risk and subsidy adjustments could mitigate these perverse incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High deductible—based health insurance plans require consumers to pay for care until reaching the deductible amount. However, information is limited on how well consumers understand their benefits and how they respond to these costs. In telephone interviews, we found that consumers had limited knowledge about their deductibles yet frequently reported changing their care-seeking behavior because of the cost. Poor knowledge limited the effects of the deductible design, with some consumers avoiding care for services that were exempt from the deductible. Consumers need more information and decision support to understand their benefits and to differentiate when care is necessary, discretionary, or unnecessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]