Search

Companies today increasingly rely on teams that span many industries for radical innovation, especially to solve "wicked problems." So leaders have to understand how to promote collaboration when roles are uncertain, goals are shifting, expertise and organizational cultures are varied, and participants have clashing or even antagonistic perspectives. HBS professor Amy Edmondson has studied more than a dozen cross-industry innovation projects, among them the creation of a new city, a mango supply-chain transformation, and the design and construction of leading-edge buildings. She has identified the leadership practices that make successful cross-industry teams work: fostering an adaptable vision, promoting psychological safety, enabling knowledge sharing, and encouraging collaborative innovation. Though these practices are broadly familiar, their application within cross-industry teams calls for unique leadership approaches that combine flexibility, open-mindedness, humility, and fierce resolve.

Three years ago, when a cave-in at the San José mine in Chile trapped 33 men under 700,000 metric tons of rock, experts estimated the probability of getting them out alive at less than 1%. Yet, after spending a record 69 days underground, all 33 were hoisted up to safety. The inspiring story of their rescue is a case study in how to lead in situations where the stakes, risk, and uncertainty are incredibly high and time pressure is intense. Today executives often find themselves in similar straits. When they do, many feel torn. Should they be directive, taking charge and commanding action? Or should they be empowering, enabling innovation and experimentation? As the successful example of André Sougarret, the chief of the mine rescue operation, shows, the answer is yes--to both. The choice is a false dichotomy. Implementing this dual approach involves three key tasks. Each has directive and enabling components. The first task is envisioning, which requires instilling both realism and hope. The second task is enrolling, which means setting clear boundaries for who is on and off the team, but inviting in helpful collaborators. The third task is engaging--leading disciplined execution while encouraging innovation and experimentation. The authors of this article describe how Sougarret ably juggled all of these tasks, orchestrating the efforts of hundreds of people from different organizations, areas of expertise, and countries in an extraordinary mission that overcame impossible odds.

Many executives believe that all failure is bad (although it usually provides Lessons) and that Learning from it is pretty straightforward. The author, a professor at Harvard Business School, thinks both beliefs are misguided. In organizational life, she says, some failures are inevitable and some are even good. And successful learning from failure is not simple: It requires context-specific strategies. But first leaders must understand how the blame game gets in the way and work to create an organizational culture in which employees feel safe admitting or reporting on failure. Failures fall into three categories: preventable ones in predictable operations, which usually involve deviations from spec; unavoidable ones in complex systems, which may arise from unique combinations of needs, people, and problems; and intelligent ones at the frontier, where "good" failures occur quickly and on a small scale, providing the most valuable information. Strong leadership can build a learning culture-one in which failures large and small are consistently reported and deeply analyzed, and opportunities to experiment are proactively sought. Executives commonly and understandably worry that taking a sympathetic stance toward failure will create an "anything goes" work environment. They should instead recognize that failure is inevitable in today's complex work organizations.

Most executives believe that relentless execution--efficient, timely, consistent production and delivery of goods or services--is the surefire path to customer satisfaction and positive financial results. But this is a myth in the knowledge economy, argues Edmondson, a Harvard Business School professor. She points to General Motors, which for years has remained wedded to a well-developed competency in centralized controls and efficient execution but has steadily lost ground, posting a record $38.7 billion loss in 2007. Such an execution-as-efficiency model results in employees who are exceedingly reluctant to offer ideas or voice questions and concerns. Placing value only on getting things right the first time, organizations are unable to take the risks necessary to improve and evolve. By contrast, firms that put a premium on what Edmondson calls execution-as-learning focus not so much on how a process should be carried out as on how it should evolve. Since 1980 General Electric, for instance, has continued to reinvent itself in every field from wind energy to medical diagnostics; and it enjoyed a $22.5 billion profit in 2007. Organizations that foster execution-as-learning provide employees with psychological safety. No one is penalized for asking for help or making a mistake. These companies also employ four distinct approaches to day-to-day work: They use the best available knowledge (which is understood to be a moving target) to inform the design of specific process guidelines. They encourage employee collaboration by making information available when and where it's needed. They routinely capture data on processes to discover how work really happens. Finally, they study these data in an effort to find ways to improve execution. Taken together, these practices form the basis of a learning infrastructure that makes continual learning part of business as usual.

An organization with a strong learning culture faces the unpredictable deftly. However, a concrete method for understanding precisely how an institution learns and for identifying specific steps to help it learn better has remained elusive. A new survey instrument from professors Garvin and Edmondson of Harvard Business School and assistant professor Gino of Carnegie Mellon University allows you to ground your efforts in becoming a learning organization. The tool's conceptual foundation is what the authors call the three building blocks of a learning organization. The first, a supportive learning environment, comprises psychological safety, appreciation of differences, openness to new ideas, and time for reflection. The second, concrete learning processes and practices, includes experimentation, information collection and analysis, and education and training. These two complementary elements are fortified by the final building block: leadership that reinforces learning. The survey instrument enables a granular examination of all these particulars, scores each of them, and provides a framework for detailed, comparative analysis. You can make comparisons within and among your institution's functional areas, between your organization and others, and against benchmarks that the authors have derived from their surveys of hundreds of executives in many industries. After discussing how to use their tool, the authors share the insights they acquired as they developed it. Above all, they emphasize the importance of dialogue and diagnosis as you nurture your company and its processes with the aim of becoming a learning organization. The authors' goal--and the purpose of their tool--is to help you paint an honest picture of your firm's learning culture and of the leaders who set its tone.

On February 1, 2003, the world watched in horror as the Columbia space shuttle broke apart while reentering the earth's atmosphere, killing all seven astronauts. Some have argued that NASA's failure to respond with appropriate intensity to the so-called foam strike that led to the accident was evidence of irresponsible or incompetent management. The authors' research, however, suggests that NASA was exhibiting a natural, albeit unfortunate, pattern of behavior common in many organizations. The foam strike is a prime example of what the authors call an ambiguous threat-a signal that may or may not portend future harm. Ambiguous threats differ from threats with obvious causes-say, a fire in the building-for which the response is clear. They also differ from unmistakable threats that may lack straightforward response paths (such as the frightening oxygen-tank explosion aboard Apollo 13). However, when the warning sign is ambiguous and the threat's potential effect is unclear, managers may choose to ignore or discount the risk. Such an approach can be catastrophic. Firms that do a good job of dealing with ambiguous threats do not improvise during a crisis; rather, they apply a rigorous set of detection and response capabilities that they have developed and practiced beforehand. In this article, the authors outline how to put such capabilities in place long before a crisis strikes. First, companies need to hone their teamwork and rapid problem-solving skills through practice. Second, they must learn to recognize weak signals, amplify the threat, and encourage employees to ask disconcerting "what if" questions in a safe environment. Finally, they should explore possible responses to threats through quick, low-cost experimentation.