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Background In March 2009, the Task Force for Innovative International Financing for Health Systems recommended "a health systems funding platform for the Global Fund, GAVI Alliance, the World Bank and others to coordinate, mobilize, streamline and channel the flow of existing and new international resources to support national health strategies." Momentum to establish the Health Systems Funding Platform was swift, with the World Bank convening a Technical Workshop on Health Systems Strengthening (HSS), and serial meetings organized to progress the agenda. Despite its potential significance, there has been little comment in peer-reviewed literature, though some disquiet in the international development community around the scope of the Platform and the capacity of the partners, which appears disproportionate to the available information. Methods This case study uses documentary analysis, participant observation and 24 in-depth interviews to examine the processes of development and key issues raised by the Platform. Results The findings show a fluid and volatile process, with debate over whether ongoing engagement in HSS by Global Fund and GAVI represents a dilution of organizational focus, risking ongoing support, or a paradigm shift that facilitates the achievement of targeted objectives, builds systems capacity, and will attract additional resources. Uncertainty in the development of the Platform reflects the flexibility of the recently formed global health initiatives, and the instability of donor commitments, particularly in the current financial climate. But implicit in the conflict is tension between key global stakeholders over defining and ownership of the health systems agenda. Conclusions The tensions appear to have been resolved through a focus on national planning, applying International Health Partnership principles, though the global financial crisis and key personnel changes may yet alter outcomes. Despite its dynamic evolution, the Platform may offer an incremental path towards increasing integration around health systems, that has not been previously possible.

It has been argued that the international community is moving 'beyond aid'. International co-financing in the international collective interest is expected to replace altruistically motivated foreign aid. The World Health Organization promotes 'universal health coverage' as the overarching health goal for the next phase of the Millennium Development Goals. In order to provide a basic level of health care coverage, at least some countries will need foreign aid for decades to come. If international co-financing of global public goods is replacing foreign aid, is universal health coverage a hopeless endeavor? Or would universal health coverage somehow serve the international collective interest? Using the Sustainable Development Solutions Network proposal to finance universal health coverage as a test case, we examined the hypothesis that national social policies face the threat of a 'race to the bottom' due to global economic integration and that this threat could be mitigated through international social protection policies that include international cross-subsidies - a kind of 'equalization' at the international level. The evidence for the race to the bottom theory is inconclusive. We seem to be witnessing a 'convergence to the middle'. However, the 'middle' where 'convergence' of national social policies is likely to occur may not be high enough to keep income inequality in check. The implementation of the international equalization scheme proposed by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network would allow to ensure universal health coverage at a cost of US$55 in low income countries-the minimum cost estimated by the World Health Organization. The domestic efforts expected from low and middle countries are far more substantial than the international co-financing efforts expected from high income countries. This would contribute to 'convergence' of national social policies at a higher level. We therefore submit that the proposed international equalization scheme should not be considered as foreign aid, but rather as an international collective effort to protect and promote national social policy in times of global economic integration: thus serving the international collective interest.

Background There is increasing debate about whether the scaled-up investment in HIV/AIDS programs is strengthening or weakening the fragile health systems of many developing countries. This article examines and assesses the evidence and proposes ways forward. Discussion Considerably increased resources have been brought into countries for HIV/AIDS programs by major Global Health Initiatives. Among the positive impacts are the increased awareness of and priority given to public health by governments. In addition, services to people living with HIV/AIDS have rapidly expanded. In many countries infrastructure and laboratories have been strengthened, and in some, primary health care services have been improved. The effect of AIDS on the health work force has been lessened by the provision of antiretroviral treatment to HIV-infected health care workers, by training, and, to an extent, by task-shifting. However, there are reports of concerns, too – among them, a temporal association between increasing AIDS funding and stagnant reproductive health funding, and accusations that scarce personnel are siphoned off from other health care services by offers of better-paying jobs in HIV/AIDS programs. Unfortunately, there is limited hard evidence of these health system impacts. Because service delivery for AIDS has not yet reached a level that could conceivably be considered "as close to Universal Access as possible," countries and development partners must maintain the momentum of investment in HIV/AIDS programs. At the same time, it should be recognized that global action for health is even more underfunded than is the response to the HIV epidemic. The real issue is therefore not whether to fund AIDS or health systems, but how to increase funding for both. Summary The evidence is mixed – mostly positive but some negative – as to the impact on health systems of the scaled-up responses to HIV/AIDS driven primarily by global health partnerships. Current scaled-up responses to HIV/AIDS must be maintained and strengthened. Instead of endless debate about the comparative advantages of vertical and horizontal approaches, partners should focus on the best ways for investments in response to HIV to also broadly strengthen the primary health care systems.

Background: Global constitutionalism is a way of looking at the world, at global rules and how they are made, as if there was a global constitution, empowering global institutions to act as a global government, setting rules which bind all states and people. Analysis: This essay employs global constitutionalism to examine how and why global health governance, as currently structured, has struggled to advance the right to health, a fundamental human rights obligation enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It first examines the core structure of the global health governance architecture, and its evolution since the Second World War. Second, it identifies the main constitutionalist principles that are relevant for a global constitutionalism assessment of the core structure of the global health governance architecture. Finally, it applies these constitutionalist principles to assess the core structure of the global health governance architecture. Discussion: Leading global health institutions are structurally skewed to preserve high incomes countries' disproportionate influence on transnational rule-making authority, and tend to prioritise infectious disease control over the comprehensive realisation of the right to health. Conclusion: A Framework Convention on Global Health could create a classic division of powers in global health governance, with WHO as the law-making power in global health governance, a global fund for health as the executive power, and the International Court of Justice as the judiciary power.