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This paper analyses the socio-demographic attributes and political attitudes of protesters in Germany. In doing so, the paper studies participation at demonstrations, one of the key forms of non-electoral political participation in Germany and a central political arena in which to negotiate political and cultural conflicts. Methodologically, we draw on original data from nine protest surveys collected between 2003 and 2020. The demonstrations under scrutiny address a wide variety of issues such as peace, climate change, global justice, immigration, international trade and social policy. Analysing protesters' profiles, we focus on differences both within and across demonstrations. We show that demonstrators' socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics diverge considerably across the surveyed demonstrations. In particular, we identify two clusters of demonstrations, differing most prominently regarding participants' political trust, satisfaction with democracy, and perceptions of self-efficacy – the 'disenchanted critics' and the 'confident critics'. Based on a regression analysis across all nine demonstrations, we further show that the distinction of these two demonstration clusters is not the result of the presence or absence of certain groups of demonstrators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most observers point to the importance of short-time work (Kurzarbeit) as one of the key explanations for Germany's stellar employment performance during the economic downturn in 2008–09. In this paper, I reveal previously unidentified causal mechanisms that have led to the widespread application of Kurzarbeit: the Christian Democrats' embrace of the Social Market Economy, the formation of an 'informal' neo-corporatist alliance, the well-functioning communication channels within the public employment service and social partner organisations, and the 'watch dog' role of firm-level metal labour unions. This paper also reflects on the state of Germany's coordinated market economy despite the neoliberal discourse at European level, its labour market responses to the Corona pandemic of 2020, and the possible lessons for the Italian case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains the extent to which the export-led growth strategies deployed in Germany and Italy turn out to be self-defeating. The problem lies in the impact of those strategies on the banking systems of the two countries. The German banks become more international; the Italian banks become more locally oriented. In turn, these changes create tensions that cannot be reconciled easily within the institutional framework that made the export-led growth model successful in the first place. The paper also seeks to explain why tensions in export-led growth models today do not always resemble those it experienced in the past – and it examines what are the implications both for how the two countries responded to the economic and financial crisis and how they are responding to the economic consequences of the novel coronavirus pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares the evolution of critical characteristics of the party systems in Eastern and Western Germany since unification. While the institutionalisation hypothesis implies that the party system in Eastern Germany should adjust towards its Western German counterpart, the ongoing dealignment suggests a loosening of party-voter-linkages and, ultimately, non-institutionalisation in Eastern Germany and party system de-institutionalisation in Western Germany. However, both hypotheses predict a convergence. Against the backdrop of persisting regional differences in party strengths, a third hypothesis assumes that Eastern and Western Germany still have two distinct party systems thirty years after reunification. Using election results and survey data since the 1990s, we inspect the development of five indicators of party systems – volatility, vote-switching, electoral availability, fragmentation, and differences in vote shares – in light of the hypotheses. There are three main results: First, most of the indicators point to party system institutionalisation in Eastern Germany and convergence to Western Germany in the 1990s. Second, for the last 20 years or so, the indicators point to parallel developments of dealignment and partial party system de-institutionalisation. Third, regarding the specific parties and their vote shares, there has been no convergence between Eastern and Western Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies of economic voting suggest that beyond the traditional valence conception of voters rewarding or punishing incumbent administrations for economic performance, there are patrimonial (assets) and positional (economic policy) dimensions to the economic vote too. To date, investigations of economic voting in Germany have primarily concentrated on the valence model. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 4 component included in the 2013 German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), our paper examines the multifaceted nature of economic voting in Germany. Our analysis reveals there are patrimonial and positional economic dimensions to the vote in Germany, implying that the compleat economic voter is also a German phenomenon. Beyond contributing to studies of German voting behaviour, our paper breaks new ground by unpacking individual heterogeneity associated with patrimonial and positional economic voting. We demonstrate political sophistication moderates to some extent the prevalence of asset motivated and economic policy voting. Patrimonial voting is somewhat more likely among the less politically sophisticated, while positional economic voting is somewhat more probable among highly sophisticated citizens. Our study confirms the multidimensionality of economic voting and also highlights the conditionality of patrimonial and positional economic voting is an individual level phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electoral systems are a fundamental feature of any democratic system, and the design of an electoral system can have a tremendous impact on party-, candidate-, and voter-behaviour. However, in order to use all features of an electoral system as intended, voters must have a clear understanding of how their electoral system actually works. While earlier studies have already shown that many German voters have limited knowledge about the characteristics of their electoral systems, we shift the focus to the more fundamental understanding of electoral systems' objectives. Therefore, this paper addresses the question of how competent voters are in understanding and applying six core functions of electoral systems: (1) proportionality, (2) minority representation, (3) party system concentration, (4) personalisation, (5) legitimacy, and (6) comprehensibility. Based on an original representative survey of German citizens, we demonstrate that only a minority of the electorate is competent enough to capture these functions. We further demonstrate how education and political interest influence voters' understanding of electoral systems. While the political logic of compromises in electoral reforms tends to create electoral systems of growing complexity, our findings strongly suggest policymakers must bear in mind voters' limited resources and capabilities to fully understand electoral systems' functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the Covid-19 pandemic hit internationally in March 2020, governments and political incumbents received exceptionally high approval ratings. Such a sudden spike of public support in times of crisis is often explained as the 'rally 'round the flag' effect. This paper has three goals: first, to examine whether a rally effect indeed occurred; second, to analyse whether and how much it is related to (i) affectedness, i.e. the occurrence of infections on individual and aggregate level, and (ii) fear of Covid-19; and third, to examine an assumed moderating effect of partisanship. We merged individual survey data from an online survey conducted in September 2020 as part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) with infection rates on the state level (Bundesländer) published by the Robert Koch Institute. We detect a striking rally effect in all partisan camps. Furthermore, we identify fear of Covid-19 as the driving mechanism while there is no evidence that affectedness is a major force behind the rally effect. Furthermore, we show that partisanship takes on a moderating role for fear of Covid-19 regarding satisfaction with government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While communication generally embodies an essential part of public leadership, this is even more true in times of crisis when uncertainty prevails, and the public expects the leader not only to take adequate measures to mitigate the crisis, but also to justify and explain these measures. In the COVID-19 pandemic, Angela Merkel's communication differed from other Western political leaders who strongly relied on a war narrative. This paper focuses on the framing by the German Chancellor during the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (March--July 2020). We examine Merkel's crisis communication in three different public arenas: her public speeches, her press conference appearances and her weekly podcasts. Based on a qualitative content analysis, our study provides three relevant insights. First, it proves that the claim for solidarity -- national as well as European solidarity - represents the crucial element of Merkel's meaning-making narrative. Second, the study shows that both statements on the protection of public health and of economy strongly resonate in her communication, but that the prioritisation shifted over time. Finally, our analysis manifests how Merkel's framing differs in the three communicative arenas. Additionally, our findings indicate that Merkel followed a modified leadership style during the COVID- 19 crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As one of the founding states of the European Union (EU) and a long-standing member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Germany has made significant contributions to both organisations and to European security. Despite being frequently accused as a free rider, this article claims that Germany takes the position of balancer in the EU-NATO relationship whereby it facilitates cooperation through mediating between both organisations and their member states. This article analyses Germany's role and conceptualises it as balancer in interorganisational relations. As a member of both organisations, the debates concern how Germany can make effective use of its geographical, cultural and economic positions to contribute to European security. It takes a 'midstream' position in which it balances between the EU and NATO and among other member states. This article argues that due to its expansive network of bilateral and minilateral relations, Germany emphasises its role as balancer by using its diplomatic skills to broker among fellow member states. A well-working and amicable EU-NATO relationship is indispensable for its own interests. This paper therefore takes into account its particular position and capabilities as well as its multilateral linkages to examine how Germany positions itself as balancer in the EU-NATO relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies party-movement interactions in Germany, focusing on Die Linke and the AfD, the two most recent additions to Germany's multi-party system. The electoral rise of both challenger parties went along with mass protests, opposition to Hartz IV in the mid-2000s and anti-Islamic PEGIDA mobilisation in the mid-2010s. We shift the emphasis from how social movements turn into political parties, including significant organisational and personal overlap, to more indirect ways of how protest and electoral politics interact. Specifically, we identify a process composed of two interrelated mechanisms: an external politicisation spiral and an intra-party innovation spiral. We show how mass protest triggers both discursive shifts in the public sphere and internal strategic realignment, providing an opportunity for parties to ride the wave, secure their competitive advantages, and mobilise on the protestors' grievances in the electoral arena. In such a way, challenger parties can take advantage of street protests even when they do not directly emerge from a movement. Methodologically, the article is based on a paired comparison, relying on survey data and an original protest event analysis that provides novel data on anti-Hartz IV and PEGIDA protest mobilisation in Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the third-largest exporting country in the world, Germany is a clear beneficiary and proponent of free trade. Few, therefore, expected the magnitude of contention that emerged within Germany during the negotiations between the EU and the United States for a transatlantic trade deal (TTIP). This paper explores the politicisation process of TTIP within the context of the broader transformations of German politics including not only the entry of new issues and new players in the electoral and protest arenas but also the increased hybridisation of forms of protest. Theoretically, we draw on the 'Players and Arenas' framework to put forward a sequential, strategic interactionist approach to the unfolding process of politicisation, in which various types of players face dilemmas when interacting with each other over time. Applying this analytical framework to the politicisation of TTIP in Germany, we reveal previously overlooked players, interactions and dilemmas, while opening up multiple opportunities for empirical analysis of cases beyond this area. We show how the politicisation of TTIP brought about an important intensification of relations between Germany's protest and electoral arenas, and confronted all players involved with choices with long-lasting consequences for both mobilisation and coalition building dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of Angela Merkel's chancellorship, German care policy changed considerably. Social policy has gained in prominence and this has affected people with caring responsibilities. Against this background, this paper compares childcare and elderly care policies in terms of gender equality. We focus on policy measures introduced and implemented during the Merkel era and we consider Chancellor Merkel's role in shaping these policies. Based on interviews with parents of young children as well as male and female elderly carers, our analysis discusses the impacts of Merkel-era care policies on lived experiences. We concentrate on effects on caregivers' employment status (maintaining, reducing, or leaving gainful employment for caring). Furthermore, we focus on gender equality effects depending on socio-economic status (SES). The comparison of both policy fields shows that gender in/equality and the gendered division of labour are essentially moderated by Merkel's way of facilitating reconciliation policies. We argue that recent childcare and elderly care policies particularly address middle-class caregivers. In both fields, care policies offer a framework that is used, interpreted, and negotiated differently by individuals, couples, and families, depending on their SES and existing gender norms. Consequently, Merkel-era care policies can reinforce or mitigate gender inequalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Marriage Equality Act (2017) provides an example for Chancellor Angela Merkel's strategy of 'leading from behind' in the form of evolved facilitation as she changed her stance from publicly resisting to enabling this policy. Merkel's objections against marriage equality were shared by large parts of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU): A draft version of the bill was postponed for two years in the justice committee due to internal conflicts in the CDU/CSU. Scholars argue that Merkel's shift from blocking to enabling the reform has been influenced by international as well as domestic developments. The focus of this paper is on a domestic factor that has been neglected so far, namely interactions between the far right and the conservative camp. Based on data from a case study on 'anti-gender' mobilisations against marriage equality in Germany and their influence on the parliamentary process, this article analyses shifts in the conservative camp. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European research has largely ignored the role that religion has played in the recent growth of right-wing populist (RWP) parties. In this paper we focus on how religiosity affects electoral support for RWP parties in Germany. Based on a tripartite concept of religiosity (religious practice, religious affiliation, and religious beliefs), we assume that the effect of religiosity is mediated by two intervening determinants of RWP support, namely, anti-immigrant attitudes and party identification. The existing studies have not covered Germany because until recently no significant RWP party existed. To test our hypotheses, we use pooled data from the Long-term Online Tracking of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES). The results show that anti-immigrant attitudes are strongly correlated with RWP support and that citizens with party identification are less likely to vote for an RWP party. More importantly, religiosity influences the RWP vote because, first, church attendance is negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes, and, second, all dimensions of religiosity are positively associated with identification with established parties. Our results confirm the thesis that religiosity tends to indirectly 'immunise' citizens against voting for RWP parties. We conclude that the recent success of RWP parties in East Germany is partly due to advanced secularisation in this part of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How has the Netherlands sought to influence the redesign of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the financial crisis? Based on the case studies of the 'New Hanseatic League' and the 'Frugal Four' this study finds, firstly, that the Netherlands chooses strategies of foot-dragging when initiatives are brought up to deepen integration when the Dutch prefer the status quo. Secondly, its strategy is more bargaining-based but at times also persuasion-based; the bargaining occurs in part because the Netherlands builds occasional alliances with like-minded member states to counterbalance the asymmetry of power between it and Germany. Finally, the Netherlands oscillates between trying to influence Germany directly and bypassing it by reaching out to like-minded member states on various dossiers and tempting them to declare their positions in advance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

German governments and European Union (EU) member states forming the New Hanseatic League (HL) have had very similar preferences on EU / Eurozone financial support mechanisms. We would expect German and HL governments to be close allies on these matters. However, empirically, we detect differences. German governments have repeatedly resisted participating in HL joint positions on EU financial support mechanisms and accepted compromises with France. In order to explain this divergence we consider the relative explanatory merit of economic preferences, based on both material interests and economic ideas—here ordoliberalism—on the one hand, and norms of cooperation—here Franco-German 'embedded bilateralism'—and geo-strategic interests on the other hand. We disentangle economic preference formation and the choice in favour of a political strategy to pursue these preferences. Economic preferences are one factor explaining the extent of concessions made by Germany to the HL countries and France. However, norms of cooperation and geostrategic interests explain the choice of German governments on how and with whom best to pursue their preferences. German governments have performed a balancing act between the HL and France, skewed towards the latter. The presence of economic crises increases the degree to which this balancing act is skewed towards France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is uncontested that political trust is highly relevant in democratic political systems. Although scholars have begun to study to a larger extent political trust in new democracies, this latter interest has faded away in recent times. To reinvigorate awareness of this area, thirty years after German reunification, we take stock of political trust in East and West Germany. Drawing on ESS data from 2002 to 2018 (ESS 1–9), we study empirically the convergence hypothesis in view of both the levels of political trust and the particular quality of citizens' trust in its democratic institutions. Our findings show that we can still not speak of a convergence of the mere levels of trust in East and West Germany: East Germans do still display lower levels of trust in both representative and regulatory institutions. Regarding the quality of political trust, however, the gap between East and West is less pronounced. These findings are highly relevant for both research on the social and psychological underpinnings of trust and the assessment of the consequences of the undemocratic heritage for the German political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do lasting differences in the political cultures of social subgroups call into question the legitimacy of democracy? This danger has been discussed for three decades now, always in the run up to German Unity Day, which marks the reunification of Germany in 1990. Is there still a 'wall in people's minds', as postulated in the late 1990s? This article examines the question comparatively and over time: Do political cultures and their main political attitudes still differ between Western and Eastern Germany 30 years after reunification? And, if so, to what extent? Using an extended concept of political support, we analyse East–West differences by drawing on different data material from representative surveys. What we show that there is no deficit of legitimacy in Eastern Germany in terms of democracy. Nevertheless, there are consistent East–West differences in terms of people's satisfaction with democracy as it is currently practised. These differences can be explained neither by existing socio-economic and socio-structural inequalities between Eastern and Western Germany, and nor by feelings of nostalgia for socialism. Rather, they are due to a combination of feelings of disadvantage, of a lack of recognition, and corresponding narratives that can draw on objective manifestations of inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proportion of voters casting their votes by mail days or even weeks before election day has risen from initially five per cent to nearly thirty per cent in the 2017 German federal election. At the same time, the differences in election results between postal and election day voters are increasing, reaching a record at the Bundestag election in 2017. Against this background, it seems particularly surprising that there are only a small number of empirical studies on postal voting in Germany. For an evaluation (of the development) of postal voting, it is crucial to investigate the factors responsible for the different election results between the two voter groups. This requires more precise knowledge of postal voters and how they differ from voters who cast their ballots on election day. Using data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), we investigate in how far composition effects – differences between the voter types in the composition of factors potentially relevant for party choice – and association effects – differences regarding their vote functions or criteria applied for vote choice – can help to explain the different electoral outcomes. We conclude that the voter types do not differ substantially from each other with regards to their decision criteria but that their composition differs with regards to certain characteristics relevant for party choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Election reforms have taken place in many German municipalities since the 1980s, leading to the implementation of complex systems that allow voters to cast more than one vote for a candidate ('cumulative voting') or to select candidates from different party lists ('vote splitting/panachage'). Although voting with open lists gives voters more influence on the composition of parliaments, it may also lead voters to discriminate against certain groups, such as women. Considering the persistently low proportion of women in German municipal councils, despite reforms to the electoral system, this study questions whether and how different mechanisms of the electoral system affect female representation at the municipal level. The data in this study allow us to investigate the outcomes of cumulative voting and vote splitting, both the prospects of success and sequential effects on the individual level of candidates ('order effects'). Our results show that women have a lower chance of success in open-list systems than in closed systems. Furthermore, women are elected 'downwards' in electoral systems with cumulative voting and vote splitting. Nevertheless, election mechanisms can only explain gender-specific differences to a limited extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of partisanship in the Bundesrat, Germany's second chamber designed to represent the territorial interest of the 16 Länder, has been at the centre of debates for decades. In this contribution, we revisit the topic from a novel perspective, focusing on the Bundesrat's Finance Committee, a central, but so far overlooked actor in the realm of fiscal and financial policies in the Federal Republic. Based on around 1,300 roll call votes, we are able to analyse the voting behaviour of the committee members, the 16 Länder finance ministers and senators, on a large empirical basis. We find, first, that unanimity is an important feature of decision-making, reflecting the existence of joint policy perspectives among the finance ministers and senators. Nevertheless, there is, second, no 'consensus by default' as around 40 percent of the roll call votes are contested. The W-Nominate ideal point estimation thereby provides strong evidence that partisanship instead of territorial interests accounts for the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between Austria and Germany is characterised by many political and cultural commonalities and strong economic interdependencies. Moreover, the asymmetry between the two countries, both in terms of economic size and political power, has long time characterised the relationship as one between 'leader' and 'follower'. Yet, despite these strong ties, Austria has assumed an increasingly independent role in recent EMU politics. Therefore, this article asks whether and why the close partnership of the two countries is slowly growing apart. Based on the analysis of three periods of EMU reform, the article shows that Austria followed Germany during the fast-burning phase of the euro crisis (2010–12), became more self-reliant in its slow-burning phase (2012–16), and even opposed German positions in post-crisis reform (2016–20). Converging economic preferences and the strong power asymmetry between the two countries can explain Austria's cooperative strategy until 2016. By contrast, Austria's shift from loyal followership towards more pronounced independence is largely caused by domestic developments. The reluctance of the Austrian government to share risks and build joint capacities in EMU reflects a Europe-wide trend, as an increasing 'constraining dissensus' at the national level makes it difficult for small state governments to compromise at the European level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution applies the theoretical framework developed by Schoeller and Falkner (this issue) to the case of Belgium. First, it examines Belgium's preferences and the status quo before and after the financial crisis, juxtaposed against Germany's preferred outcomes. Belgium has traditionally favoured more integration, leading to Belgium's strategy of co-shaping and pace-setting in regards to monetary integration through persuasion, cultivating alliances, and brokering compromises that satisfied Germany's interests in EMU versus those of the European Commission and France. The global financial crisis changed Belgium's strategy, as it became constrained by the effects of the crisis on its economy and the domestic political turmoil that ensued. Belgium went from a pre-crisis pace-setter to a fence-sitter, relying on the persuasion of its allies to convince Germany to agree to reform the architecture of euro area governance. Finally, this contribution considers the institutional fabric of Belgium's relation to the hegemon. This is relatively weak between Belgium and Germany, making multilateral settings the preferred forum rather than bilateral. Nevertheless, Belgium's famous capacity for forging compromises among disparate interests was demonstrated through the diplomacy of former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy as the European Council's first full-time president. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite its traditional adherence to gender roles limiting women's responsibilities to Kinder, Küche, Kirche, the Christian Democratic Party itself has been ruled by three powerful females since 2018: Chancellor Angela Merkel, Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, and CDU General-Secretary Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Despite occasional waves of conservative-hardliner resistance, all three women have helped to modernise the German gender regime while opening new doors for future women leaders across the party spectrum. Having exited the political stage after the 2021 elections, the Chancellor played a significant role in advancing the political fortunes of German women, beginning with von der Leyen, who now enjoys supranational prominence as EU Commission President, and Kramp-Karrenbauer, ostensibly descending the national power ladder despite her earlier successes. These diverging trajectories raise new questions as to the conditions under which we might expect women to prove 'effective' leaders. This article explores biographical parallels, stylistic differences, and the changing political landscape that may have facilitated or impeded each woman's ability to transfer the leadership skills she acquired at one level to the mastering of challenges at another. It concludes with reflections on Merkel's legacy in relation to 'gender and politics'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Angela Merkel served as Chancellor at a time when German society was quickly diversifying due to immigration. Her policy choices now shape the life chances of millions of immigrants and their descendants. These choices also set the terms on which Germans will decide which divisions and which forms of solidarity will characterise the society in the years to come. Merkel was more willing to accept the reality of immigration than earlier CDU leaders. And yet I argue that, faced with rapid societal change, the Merkel governments generally avoided deep reforms of existing institutions, even those that yield sharp disparities by immigration status and gender. I find that, although Merkel focused on economic integration and female labour force participation, immigrant-origin residents have made only slow progress in these areas, though educational disparities have narrowed. Additionally, millions of long-term residents still lack German citizenship and the right to vote, so that their voices are muted in debates over what it means to be German. Meanwhile support for anti-immigrant extremists has surged. I conclude that it is an open question whether Merkel's conservative approach will provide a stable basis for the economic, social, and political consolidation of a more diverse Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a stark departure from the historical stance that Germany is "not a country of immigration", Angela Merkel has made it a priority to welcome and integrate newcomers into German society. Over the course of her four terms, various Merkel-led governments have paid increased attention to the integration of newcomers, and specifically to the integration of women and girls. Drawing on key documents, including the four coalition agreements, I identify three different phases in the incorporation of gender into German integration policy. I also find evidence of several different, yet at times overlapping frames which shape the ways in which gender is framed into the integration discourse. Drawing on two case studies, I then draw attention to the fact that the shifts in discursive and policy frames at the federal level, are not immediately evident in policy initiatives as. As such, barriers to the integration of women and girls remain, even though Merkel has made this a central priority in her governments [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dissatisfaction with democracy is among the central determinants of voting for a populist radical right party, such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). At the same time, elections have been shown to increase political satisfaction, especially when voters see themselves as winners of the election. In this article, we ask, first, whether voters of the AfD have partly been reconciled with democracy during the 2017 federal election in Germany in which the party entered the Bundestag for the first time since its foundation. Second, we investigate which individual level factors conditioned the change in democratic satisfaction among AfD voters. Our empirical analysis, which is based on panel survey data from the 2017 Germany Longitudinal Election Studies (GLES), shows that AfD voters experienced a stronger increase in support for the political regime than any other voter group. Moreover, policy congruence with the AfD on socioeconomic issues as well as identifying with a party other than the AfD enhanced this boost in satisfaction with democracy. Our findings point to the importance of political representation and opportunities for protest-based voting behaviour regarding public support and the legitimacy of democratic political systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explanations of Italy's and Germany's position within the Eurozone commonly focus on trade 'competitiveness,' a concept measured in terms of unit labour costs. This trade-centric view offers a poor explanation for the evolution of the two countries external debt levels following the adoption of the Euro. It also fails to explain the external financial fragility that Italy has repeatedly experienced in the period since 2010. Both outcomes are better explained by dynamics in cross-border financial markets. Monetary union created large incentives for banks in the Eurozone's core states, including Germany, to direct funds to banks in the Eurozone's periphery (those countries whose banks had earlier faced higher currency-related risk premia in obtaining external financing). Domestic policy decisions in Germany further contributed to this outcome. In the period since 2010, the Eurozone's rules-based governance model and the failure of governments to create a common safe asset for banks became a major factor contributing to Italy's financial fragility. It remains to be seen whether Europe's response to the COVID-crisis will mark a watershed, and break these financial markets dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically examines the main assumptions underlying the reforms embedded in EMU and European Semester recommendations. We proceed in three steps. First, we question the notion that Italy and Germany embody two distinctive politico-economic models and challenge the conclusion, drawn from this assumption, that structural rigidities are the primary cause of Italy's economic woes and that its lackluster performance since the 1990s is due to its insufficient determination to implement structural reforms. Rather we show, second, that both countries have undertaken remarkably similar reforms which, however, have yielded different results both because of the different public debt levels they started with and because the interdependence created by the euro and the hyper-financialised markets rewarded those countries with low, and penalises those with high, sovereign debt. Third, we contest the assumption that the two economies would converge towards a common growth path if only Italy could adapt to the requirements of a globalised economy like Germany has apparently done, which leads us, in conclusion, to question the appropriateness of the EU's current strategy for both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the questions that motivate this special issue: the growing divergence among Eurozone member states and the overall disappointing performance of the Eurozone as a whole. It justifies the choice of Germany and Italy as the two countries that can best exemplify what are considered, respectively, the northern and southern politico-economic models coexisting in the Eurozone and proposes an approach to these questions that deviates from the mainstream. It argues that comparing the performance of Eurozone member economies as if they were independent of one another prevents an accurate assessment of the externalities created by the common currency and claims that microeconomic solutions to macroeconomic problems have the effect of reinforcing the divergence, rather than attenuating it. Incorporating the insights drawn from the detailed analysis of the various aspects of the German and Italian models provided by the contributors to this special issue, it concludes by assessing the likely impact of the impending reform of EMU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article extends the literature on the varieties of capitalism within the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe with an analysis of the financial drivers of fiscal policies in creditor and debtor countries from the euro crisis up to the coronavirus pandemic, with an application to Germany and Italy. Market perceptions of sovereign creditworthiness, as grounded in national political economies, cause a persistent segmentation of the euro area capital market between peer countries regarded as safe or risky. As a consequence, cross-border capital flows have an asymmetric effect on the public and private finances of creditor and debtor countries, adding to the asymmetric impact from their economic growth models. These financial asymmetries interact with public opinion and are in turn endogenous drivers of political choices for or against fiscal discipline and of political preferences for a stable domestic investor base of public debt. A common safe asset for the eurozone is necessary to mitigate the asymmetric systemic risks from volatile capital flows and establish a symmetric financial driver of steady output growth, fiscal soundness, and financial stability. This common mechanism for endogenous stabilisation would help to sustain euro area capital market integration and support the long-term viability of the euro. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]