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The District of Columbia's Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) is responsible for ensuring the safety and well being of about 3,000 children in its care and ensuring that services are provided to them and their families. In fiscal year 2003, CFSA's total budget was about $200 million. Concerns have been raised about CFSA's supply of caseworkers, the foster care and adoptive homes, and the quality and timeliness of mental health services for foster care children. To help address these issues, the Congress appropriated $14 million in fiscal year 2004 to CFSA, the Department of Mental Health (DMH), and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) specifically for foster care improvement. GAO examined CFSA's (1) strategies for recruiting, retaining, and managing its caseworkers; (2) efforts to license an adequate supply of safe foster and adoptive homes; and (3) efforts to collaborate with DMH and the Family Court to provide timely mental health services to foster care children. GAO also reviewed plans for and use of the federal foster care improvement funds. CFSA actively recruited caseworkers and implemented retention strategies; however, caseworkers cited several management practices they said lowered their morale and adversely affected their ability to perform their duties. CFSA employed several recruitment approaches recommended by a number of child welfare organizations and exceeded most of its staffing goals for fiscal year 2003. Caseworkers cited high salaries and the training for new caseworkers as factors that encouraged them to remain at CFSA. However, GAO found a general consensus among the caseworkers with which GAO met that some management practices--poor communication, a lack of resources, poor supervision, and no rewards and recognition program--adversely affected their performance and morale. Agency officials said they had made some changes and were planning to take other actions to address these issues. CFSA has developed goals and strategies for recruiting new foster and adoptive homes and improved licensing requirements. CFSA has made progress licensing new families, although more families have stopped serving than expected. Further, CFSA does not have processes for identifying the reasons foster parents stop serving or for determining the effectiveness of its recruitment strategies. CFSA has standardized and raised licensing requirements for all foster and adoptive homes, but as of May 2004, 308 foster homes were unlicensed, with about 22 percent of CFSA's foster children residing in them. CFSA has begun collaborating with DMH and the Family Court to centralize and track mental health services for foster care children, but challenges remain to ensuring timely delivery. CFSA and DMH designed a standard process for referring foster care children to DMH for assessment and treatment and for tracking service delivery. DMH has also started expanding its service capacity for foster care children. For example, it has begun recruiting additional evaluators to perform assessments. While CFSA began using a database to track service delivery in August 2004, it has not analyzed the service delivery data collected on paper prior to August 2004 to determine whether foster care children were receiving timely services. Additionally, CFSA and DMH still face certain challenges, such as integrating caseworkers and Family Court judges into the new referral process. CFSA, DMH, and COG have spending plans that are consistent with the statutory language providing the federal funds, but only a small portion of the foster care improvement funds had been obligated or spent as of June 2004, in part because funding was not received until March 2004. Further, it is unclear how the District and COG plan to support some of these programs in the long-term because future funding is uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report by the U. S. Government Accountability Office on efforts of the U. S. Capitol to update the U.S. Cannon House Office Building's renovation cost and schedule estimates. Topics discussed include the status of the Cannon project; changes to the project's estimated cost at completion; and analysis of risks by undertaking an integrated cost-schedule risk analysis.

The article presents the report by United States Government Accountability Office on the federally funded District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant program. Topics of discussion includes data on college graduation, tuition, and fees from the Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System and recommended the report presented by Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE).

The article presents a report by the U.S. based Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the suspected counterfeit electronic parts on the Internet platforms used in military-grade electronic parts. It says that such parts may disrupt the U.S. Department of Defense supply chain, harm weapon's integrity and endanger troops' lives. A fictitious company of GAO gained access to the Internet platforms with access to the vendors selling such parts.

The article presents a report by Washington DC-based Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States on the safety of motor carriers. It says that Washington DC-based Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), United States ensures the motor carriers to operate safely in interstate commerce. Its objectives include the examination of the prevalence chameleon carriers, design of the programs for suspected ones and constraints faced by the FMCSA against their enforcement.

The article presents a testimony based report on the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management: The Army Faces Significant Challenges in Achieving Audit Readiness for Its Military Pay by Washington DC-based Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States. The focus of the testimony is based on accepted government auditing standards. The standards require proper evidence to support the findings and conclusions in order to obtain audit's objectives.

The article presents a testimony by Washington DC-based Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States on the U.S. Department of Homeland and Security (DHS). It mentions the DHS to be the third-largest cabinet-level agency in the federal government, employing more than 200,000 employees in a broad range of jobs. It presents observations including the work satisfaction of a DHS employee compared to the federal one and the efforts made by the DHS to satisfy the employee with his job.

The article presents a report by Washington DC-based Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States on pipeline safety. It mentions pipeline as a transportation mode for hazardous liquid and natural gas regulated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and state entities. It identifies the safety risks with onshore hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines not under PHMSA regulation and their safety practices.

The article presents a report by Washington DC-based Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States on the interim results for 2012 tax filing season and summary of the fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Washington DC-based Internal Revenue Service (IRS), United States. Main objectives include an interim assessment of the performance of IRS in processing tax returns and refunds and telephone services in 2012 and dollar and staffing trends in the fiscal year budget request of 2013.

The article focuses on the statement by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in relation to repatriation of Indian human remains and objects. It discusses the July 2010 report showing agencies' inadequate compliance to Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)requirements and the lack of repatriation governmentwide reporting. It mentions on the May 2011 report depicting slow repatriation process by the Smithsonian Institution due to lengthy inventory.

The article focuses on the study conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on several governance reforms and accountability in operational matters in the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C. The study examine the effectiveness and usefulness of the proposed reform towards the improvement of the institution's operations. The governance reforms aimed three main areas such as executive compensation benefits, operational policies and Board's responsibilities and performance.

This testimony is based on GAO's review of schedules and financial reports for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; GAO's observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and GAO's discussions with the CVC team (Architect of the Capitol (AOC) and its major CVC contractors) and AOC's Chief Fire Marshal. GAO also reviewed AOC's construction management contractor's periodic schedule assessments, proposed change order log, and weekly reports on construction progress. In addition, GAO reviewed the contract modifications made to date. Since the March 12, 2008, CVC hearing, the project's construction and fire alarm acceptance testing have moved forward, and despite continued delays in certain CVC and expansion space work, AOC still believes that the project will be ready to open in November 2008. According to AOC's construction management contractor, in dollar terms, the overall CVC project remains 99 percent complete. However, risks to the project's schedule remain in several time-critical activities, including the fire alarm acceptance testing. Many punch list items also remain to be completed, and a steady number of proposed change orders have to be resolved. At this time, however, AOC does not expect the punch list items or the proposed change orders to affect the project's completion date. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discovery in 2004 of lead contamination in the District of Columbia's drinking water resulted in an administrative order between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the District's Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), requiring WASA to take a number of corrective actions. WASA also took additional, longer-term measures, most notably a roughly $400 million program to replace what may be 35,000 lead service lines in public space within its service area. As in WASA's case, water utilities nationwide are under increasing pressure to make significant investments to upgrade aging and deteriorating infrastructures, improve security, serve a growing population, and meet new regulatory requirements. In this context, GAO's testimony presents observations on (1) WASA's efforts to address lead contamination in light of its other pressing water infrastructure needs, and (2) the extent to which WASA's challenges are indicative of those facing water utilities nationwide. To address these issues, GAO relied primarily on its 2005 and 2006 reports on lead contamination in drinking water, as well as other recent GAO reports examining the nation's water infrastructure needs and strategies to address these needs. With the introduction of orthophosphate to its drinking water WASA has consistently tested below the federal action level for lead. However, WASA is reevaluating its roughly $400 million, longer-term solution for replacement of what may be 35,000 lead service lines within its jurisdiction. In addition to the program's high cost, a key problem WASA faces is that, by law, it may only replace the portion of the service line that it owns; replacing the portion on private property is at the homeowner's discretion. Accordingly, WASA has been encouraging homeowners to participate in the program by replacing their own portion of the lead lines. Despite these efforts, however, homeowner replacement of lead service lines remains limited. Of the 14,260 lead service lines WASA replaced through the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, there were only 2,128 instances in which the homeowner participated in private side replacement. Many questions remain about the benefits of partial lead service line replacement. In fact, some research to date suggests that partial service line replacement results in (1) short-term spikes in lead levels immediately after partial replacement and (2) little long-term reduction in lead levels. WASA's dilemma over this program is taking place within the context of its other staggering infrastructure needs. Most notably, WASA is undertaking a $2.2 billion effort to meet the terms of a consent decree with EPA requiring the utility to control its sewer overflow problems. WASA's challenges in addressing its lead contamination problems and other infrastructure demands are mirrored across the country, where infrastructure needs are estimated to range from $485 billion to nearly $1.2 trillion nationwide over the next 20... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In February 2007, a series of Washington Post articles about conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center highlighted problems in the Army's case management of injured servicemembers and in the military's disability evaluation system. These deficiencies included a confusing disability evaluation process and servicemembers in outpatient status for months and sometimes years without a clear understanding about their plan of care. These reported problems prompted various reviews and commissions to examine the care and services to servicemembers. In response to problems at Walter Reed and subsequent recommendations, the Army took a number of actions and DOD formed a joint DOD-VA Senior Oversight Committee. This statement updates GAO's September 2007 testimony and is based on ongoing work to (1) assess actions taken by the Army to help ill and injured soldiers obtain health care and navigate its disability evaluation process; and to (2) describe the status, plans, and challenges of DOD and VA efforts to implement a joint disability evaluation system. GAO's observations are based largely on documents obtained from and interviews with Army, DOD, and VA officials. The facts contained in this statement were discussed with representatives from the Army, DOD, and VA. Over the past year, the Army significantly increased support for servicemembers undergoing medical treatment and disability evaluations, but challenges remain. To provide a more integrated continuum of care for servicemembers, the Army created a new organizational structure--the Warrior Transition Unit--in which servicemembers are assigned key staff to help manage their recovery. Although the Army has made significant progress in staffing these units, several challenges remain, including hiring medical staff in a competitive market, replacing temporarily borrowed personnel with permanent staff, and getting eligible servicemembers into the units. To help servicemembers navigate the disability evaluation process, the Army is increasing staff in several areas, but gaps and challenges remain. For example, the Army expanded hiring of board liaisons to meet its goal of 30 servicemembers per liaison, but as of February 2008, the Army did not meet this goal at 11 locations that support about half of servicemembers in the process. The Army faces challenges hiring enough liaisons to meet its goals and enough legal personnel to help servicemembers earlier in the process. To address more systemic issues, DOD and VA promptly designed and are now piloting a streamlined disability evaluation process. In August 2007, DOD and VA conducted an intensive 5-day exercise that simulated alternative pilot approaches using previously-decided cases. This exercise yielded data quickly, but there were trade-offs in the nature and extent of data that could be obtained in that time frame. The pilot began with "live" cases at three treatment facilities in the Washington, D.C. area in November 2007, and DOD... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the 1998 embassy bombings, the Department of State (State) determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities did not meet security standards and were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has undertaken a program to replace or upgrade the security of these facilities. As of 2007, OBO had constructed more than 50 new embassies and moved nearly 15,000 staff to safer facilities. However, most remaining facilities will not be replaced in the near term. To address these facilities, OBO has obligated about $140 million per year for its Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP). GAO was asked to (1) describe the process that OBO follows to prioritize and plan CSUP projects, including stakeholder involvement; (2) determine the extent to which CSUP projects met contracted cost and time frames and whether OBO has procedures to ensure security upgrades are installed; and (3) assess whether State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts' abilities to comply with State's physical security standards. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent State documents, met with State officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas, and traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. State provided written comments on a draft of this report and agreed with our findings. OBO has a threat- and vulnerability-based process for prioritizing which posts receive CSUP projects and a planning process that utilizes input from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and post officials. DS assessments are currently based on physical security of each post's main compound, although many posts have facilities located outside the compound. DS is developing a prioritization process that will factor in the number of personnel, threat levels, and vulnerabilities at each facility, including those off compound. OBO has improved its planning processes by conducting a comprehensive survey of posts' physical security needs, including off-compound facilities. GAO found that 96 percent of 47 projects undertaken since fiscal year 2004 were completed within 30 days of their contractual completion date. However, OBO modified 81 percent of the contracts to extend their completion dates. GAO also found that while OBO paid the contractors the amount specified in the contracts, contract modifications resulted in cost adjustments to all but two contracts, which GAO found in prior work is not uncommon in government renovation projects. OBO cited factors outside the contractors' control as the cause of most delays and cost increases, such as lengthy local permitting issues. To help ensure security upgrades contracted for are completed, OBO assigns a project manager who is responsible for the project's completion and relies on regional and post officials to provide additional monitoring. CSUP projects have enhanced posts' compliance with physical security standards by constructing compound access... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the series of article which discloses the deficiencies in the provision of outpatient services at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington D.C. According to the author, the situation at Walter Reed is alarming whether the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs are prepared to meet the needs of the returning servicemembers. Meanwhile, this information are based on the testimony and documents from Army officials and DOD representatives.

The purpose of this testimony is to assist the Committees in monitoring progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. This testimony will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress since the last CVC hearing on March 13, 2007; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding status. GAO's remarks are based on our review of schedules and financial reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and discussions with the CVC team (AOC and its major CVC contractors), AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and representatives from the U.S. Capitol Police. Since the March 13, 2007, CVC hearing, the CVC team has continued to move the project's construction forward, but AOC has extended the project's scheduled completion date by about 2 months, to June 2008, and further delays are possible. This delay was attributable to problems with activities on the project's critical path--the fire protection system. During the past month, the CVC team has made progress on the project's heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system, interior wall stone and ceiling installation, and other interior and exterior construction work. AOC will be able to meet or come close to meeting its new scheduled project completion date only if the CVC team promptly makes significant improvements in its execution of the project and the project's schedule. To date, AOC's implementation of actions identified in its November 2006 action plan has not been completely effective in curtailing additional schedule slippages. Furthermore, ongoing communication and coordination breakdowns between the contractors and AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, as well as the large number of proposed change orders (over 450 as of February 2007), continue to present risks to the project's completion time frames and costs. For example, because of inadequate communication and coordination, some above-ceiling fire protection equipment has to be inspected, even though the ceilings are already in place, risking damage to ceilings and additional work if the inspections reveal deficiencies. Most of the new construction change order proposals that the project continues to generate each month are relatively small compared with the project's total cost; however, a subcontractor has expressed concerns about the cumulative effect of these proposals on subcontractors' cash flows and on the ability of subcontractors to complete their work on schedule. As we reported at the last CVC hearing, we previously estimated that the total cost of the entire CVC project at completion would likely be about $592 million without an allowance for risks and uncertainties, and over $600 million with such an allowance. Because of the uncertainty over the project's expected completion date, we have not updated these estimates. To... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) is the world's largest museum complex and research organization. The age of the Smithsonian's structures, past inattention to maintenance needs, and high visitation levels have left its facilities in need of revitalization and repair. This testimony discusses our prior work on some effects of the condition of the Smithsonian's facilities and whether the Smithsonian has taken steps to maximize facility resources. It also discusses the current estimated costs of the Smithsonian's needed facilities projects. In addition, it describes preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work on the extent to which the Smithsonian developed and implemented strategies to fund these projects, as GAO recommended in prior work. The work for this testimony is based on GAO's 2005 report, Smithsonian Institution: Facilities Management Reorganization Is Progressing, but Funding Remains a Challenge; GAO's review of Smithsonian documents and other pertinent information; and interviews with Smithsonian officials. In 2005, GAO reported that facilities-related problems at the Smithsonian had resulted in a few building closures and posed a serious long-term threat to the collections. For example, the 1881 Arts and Industries Building on the National Mall was closed to the public in 2004 for an indefinite period over concern about its deteriorating roof structure. Currently, this building remains closed. GAO also found that the Smithsonian had taken steps to maximize the effectiveness of its existing resources for facilities. Preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work indicate that as of March 30, 2007, the Smithsonian estimated it would need about $2.5 billion for its revitalization, construction, and maintenance projects from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2013, up from an estimate of $2.3 billion in 2005. In 2005, GAO recommended that the Smithsonian develop and implement a strategic funding plan to address its facilities needs. The Smithsonian Board of Regents--the Smithsonian's governing body--has taken some steps to address GAO's recommendation regarding a strategic funding plan. The board created an ad-hoc committee, which, after reviewing nine options, such as establishing a special exhibition fee, decided to request an additional $100 million annually in federal funds for facilities for the next 10 years, for a total of an additional $1 billion. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget proposal, however, proposes an increase of about $44 million over the Smithsonian's fiscal year 2007 appropriation. It is not clear how much of this proposed increase would be used to support facilities, and how Congress will respond to the President's budget request. Absent significant changes in the Smithsonian's funding strategy or significant increases in funding from Congress, the Smithsonian faces greater risk to its facilities and collections over time. GAO is continuing to evaluate the Smithsonian's efforts to... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To improve acquisition outcomes, in 1997 the District established the Office of Contracting and Procurement under the direction of a newly created chief procurement officer (CPO). Since then, the District's inspector general and auditor have identified improper contracting practices. This report examines whether the District's procurement system is based on procurement law and management and oversight practices that incorporate generally accepted key principles to protect against fraud, waste, and abuse. GAO's work is based on a review of generally accepted key principles identified by federal, state, and local procurement laws, regulations, and guidance. GAO also reviewed District audit reports and discussed issues with current and former District officials as well as select state and local officials. The District's procurement law generally does not apply to all District entities nor does it provide authority to the CPO to effectively carry out and oversee the full scope of procurement responsibilities across all agencies. A lack of uniformity in its procurement law and the CPO's limited authority not only undermines transparency, accountability, and competition but also increases the risk of preferential treatment for certain vendors and ultimately drives up costs. The current law exempts certain entities and procurements from following the law's competition and other requirements, and according to current and former District procurement officials, there is a push to expand independent procurement authority--a move that would reverse action taken by the District a decade ago. Other provisions of current law further erode competition. Notably, the law provides broad authority for sole source contracting and establishes high-dollar thresholds for small purchases, which are generally not subject to full and open competition. Also, in implementing the law, sufficient management oversight is lacking to ensure employees do not make unauthorized commitments. The District has been challenged to effectively manage and oversee its procurement function, due in large part to the low-level position of the procurement office in the governmental structure, the rapid turnover of CPOs, and multiple players having authority to award contracts and affect contract decisions. At the same time, the District does not have the basic tools that contracting and agency staff and financial managers need to effectively manage and oversee procurements--including a procurement manual, a professional development program, and an integrated procurement data system. In summary, the District's procurement system does not incorporate a number of generally accepted key principles and practices for protecting taxpayer resources from fraud, waste, and abuse. Specifically, the District lacks a comprehensive procurement law that applies to all District entities over which the CPO has sole procurement authority and promotes competition; an organizational alignment that... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2006, the Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) announced that it had entered into a 30-year contract with Showtime Networks Inc., (Showtime) to create a digital on-demand television channel. Members of Congress and other interested parties, particularly filmmakers, raised issues about the contract's potential effects on public access to and use of the Smithsonian's collections, its confidential nature, and the process by which the Smithsonian negotiated it. This report discusses (1) the extent to which the Smithsonian followed its internal contracting guidelines, (2) what the Smithsonian gave up and received in return under the contract, (3) the Smithsonian's implementation of the contract, and (4) the contract's potential impact on outside parties. GAO reviewed the contract and pertinent documents, and interviewed Smithsonian and Showtime officials. The Smithsonian followed its internal contracting guidelines regarding competition, oversight, and conflicts of interest. When it began exploring a television venture in 2002, it approached 18 major media companies and negotiated with two before reaching a deal with Showtime. The process was overseen by Smithsonian Business Ventures' (SBV) Board of Directors and the Smithsonian's Board of Regents, who approved the contract in November 2005. When SBV's Chief Executive Officer disclosed a potential conflict of interest, the Smithsonian's Ethics Officer reviewed the disclosure in accordance with Smithsonian policies and concluded that no conflict existed. GAO's Ethics Officer concurred with the Smithsonian's decision. The Smithsonian granted the new venture a 30-year, semiexclusive right to produce and commercially distribute audiovisual programs using Smithsonian trademarks and/or content in exchange for national television exposure and new revenue. The Smithsonian projects that the new channel will reach more than 31 million households by 2010 and will have a total value of over $150 million after 10 years. The Smithsonian's major concession is a noncompete clause that generally prohibits it from engaging in activities that would compete with the new venture. The Smithsonian negotiated exceptions for various news and educational programs. The Smithsonian has been working to implement policies and procedures necessary under the contract since it became effective in January 2006, but the information that it has provided to interested parties has been insufficient. The Smithsonian and Showtime waited until March 2006 to publicly announce the new venture and did not implement internal processes to review filming requests for compliance with the contract until after the public announcement. The Smithsonian has created a committee to review filming requests, but does not document in detail its rationale for key decisions or attempt to synthesize these decisions over time. Also, the "Frequently Asked Questions" on the Smithsonian's Web site provides little information for... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are pleased to assist the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch in monitoring progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress and problems since the Subcommittee's September 21, 2006, hearing and their impact on the project's schedule; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding situation. As part of this discussion, we will address a number of key challenges and risks that continue to face the project as well as actions AOC has recently taken, and plans or needs to take, to meet its currently scheduled completion date. Since the Subcommittee's September 21 CVC hearing, the CVC team has continued to move the project's construction forward, but the project's scheduled completion date has slipped by 6 weeks, to October 26, 2007,3 and further delays are possible. The 6-week delay was attributable to problems with the project's most critical activity--the fire protection system. Under the current schedule, the construction of the House and Senate expansions spaces will be completed before the CVC's construction, but both the CVC and the expansion spaces will be available for occupancy at the same time because final acceptance testing of both is slated to be done concurrently. During the past month, the CVC team has made progress on the project's heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system, interior floor stone and ceiling installation, and other interior and exterior construction work. In addition, AOC sent Congress an action plan for improving its execution of the project and the project's schedule, as the Subcommittee requested and we had recommended, and this plan is responsive to our recommendations. AOC is also considering other action not discussed in this plan. Despite this progress, problems have occurred in many important activities besides the CVC's fire protection system, according to AOC's construction management contractor. Although these delays did not add time to the project's schedule this month, additional delays could do so in the future. Recently identified issues associated with the CVC's HVAC system, fire protection system, and security system--including issues associated with their coordination and testing--also pose risks to the project's scheduled completion date. In addition, concerns have arisen about AOC's ability to achieve a high-quality, complete, and usable facility within the current estimated time frame and cost now that the contractual date for completing sequence 2 construction work--September 15, 2006--has passed. In particular, there is a risk that, without negative consequences, the resolve of some major stakeholders to complete the project in a timely and efficient manner could be adversely affected. Finally, all the indicators of progress that we have been tracking for the Subcommittee, together with other risks and uncertainties,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance (Commission) was created on December 28, 2000, by the National Moment of Remembrance Act. The Commission's purpose is to sustain the American spirit through acts of remembrance, not only on Memorial Day but also throughout the year, for those who died serving our country. Congress appropriated $1.25 million to the Commission to fund its operations for fiscal years 2002 through 2005. In fiscal year 2005, the Commission received net appropriations of approximately $248,000, along with cash and in-kind donations of approximately $103,000 from individuals and businesses. In addition, it had approximately $244,000 in unexpended appropriations from prior fiscal years. The Commission expended approximately $239,000 of appropriated funds and funded costs of approximately $103,000 with cash and in-kind donations received during the fiscal year. The National Moment of Remembrance Act requires GAO to annually audit the financial transactions of the Commission. However, as reflected in an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memorandum, the Commission is subject to the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 which was enacted on November 7, 2002. This act requires the Commission to annually prepare and submit audited financial statements to OMB and Congress. This is the first year the Commission has prepared a complete set of financial statements and contracted with an independent public accountant (IPA) to conduct the financial statement audit. In lieu of performing an audit of the Commission's fiscal year 2005 financial transactions, which would duplicate much of the work performed by the IPA, we performed a review of the IPA's audit of the Commission's financial statements. This report provides the results of our review of the Commission's fiscal year 2005 financial statement audit and provides the status of the Commission's implementation of recommendations made by us during prior years' audits of the Commission's financial transactions. We found no instances in which the IPA did not perform sufficient work to support its opinion and no instances in which the IPA did not comply, in all material respects, with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. In its audit of the Commission's fiscal year 2005 financial statements, the IPA found that (1) the financial statements were presented fairly, except for the Commission's failure to provide a legal representation letter; (2) the Commission's failure to provide a legal representation letter also resulted in a reportable condition; and (3) there was no reportable noncompliance with selected provisions of laws and regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To improve fleet support activities, the Navy is consolidating maintenance facilities and converting its shipyards from financing under the Navy Working Capital Fund to funding through direct appropriations (direct funding). Puget Sound Naval Shipyard was converted to direct funding in 2003. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 directed the Navy to assess the impact of converting Puget Sound to direct funding and directed that GAO review the Navy's report. The Navy submitted its report to Congress in March 2006, confirming its position that direct funding was more advantageous than working capital funding and can best satisfy fleet maintenance priorities. GAO's objectives were to evaluate the extent to which the Navy's report (1) provided data and other supporting evidence for its overall assessment of the impact of converting Puget Sound to direct funding, (2) addressed unresolved issues that had been identified in prior studies, and (3) disclosed any other issues that have affected the implementation of direct funding. The Navy's March 2006 report to Congress did not provide data and other supporting evidence for its overall assessment of the impact of converting Puget Sound Naval Shipyard to direct funding. While the Navy reported on the matters specified in the defense authorization act, it did not provide data needed to support the Navy's position that direct funding was more advantageous than working capital funding and can best satisfy fleet maintenance priorities. More specifically, the report did not provide evidence that direct funding had provided for a more agile workforce--the ability to more easily move workers among maintenance projects in response to fleet priorities--which was a key benefit the Navy claimed was achieved by converting to direct funding. The Navy's March 2006 report did not show data that adequately addressed two key issues--cost visibility and performance metrics--which had been identified as unresolved in prior studies by GAO and others. First, the report did not present the Navy's approach and methodology for achieving total cost visibility for specific work performed. Determining the total cost of delivering specific ship maintenance work is recommended by federal accounting standards and is a key metric for evaluating a consolidated facility's productivity and performance. Although the Navy was attempting to gather cost data to show the full costs of operations at its shipyards, GAO found that the Navy has not developed policies and procedures to routinely and systematically accumulate these total cost data. Second, with respect to performance metrics, the Navy's report did not provide data that demonstrated improved results, such as increased productivity, of consolidating ship maintenance facilities at Puget Sound and converting the shipyard to direct funding. Prior reviews have raised issues related to total cost visibility and performance metrics as unresolved issues... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Companies form the basis of most commercial and entrepreneurial activities in market-based economies; however, "shell" companies, which have no operations, can be used for illicit purposes such as laundering money. Some states have been criticized for requiring minimal ownership information to form a U.S. company, raising concerns about the ease with which companies may be used for illicit purposes. In this report, GAO describes (1) the kinds of information each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia and third party agents collect on companies, (2) law enforcement concerns about the use of companies to hide illicit activity and how company information from states and agents helps or hinders investigations, and (3) implications of requiring states or agents to collect company ownership information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As required by the 2005 D.C. Appropriations Act, we examined the performance of D.C. charter school authorizers in their approval and oversight roles. In fall 2005, we will publish the full results of our research. However, as required by law, we provided Congress with an interim report on our work. For this interim report, we addressed the following questions: (1) what are the responsibilities specified for the D.C. charter school authorizers in the School Reform Act? and (2) how are the D.C. authorizers carrying out these responsibilities? In summary, we found that the School Reform Act outlines the responsibilities of the D.C. charter school authorizers. The law requires that the authorizers review charter school applications and approve qualified applicants. Additionally, the law requires the D.C. Board of Education (BOE) and the D.C. Public Charter School Board (PCSB) to monitor charter schools and determine if charters should be renewed or revoked. The authorizers are also required by the School Reform Act to create and distribute annual reports on their activities. Also, we found that although the authorizers carry out their responsibilities in different manners, both the BOE and PCSB have developed processes to meet their legal responsibilities. Each authorizer has established timelines, guidance, and procedures for reviewing and approving charter school applications. Additionally, both authorizers conduct annual and 5-year monitoring reviews to ensure that charter schools are complying with applicable laws, achieving student academic goals, and using sound financial practices. The BOE has revoked charters of schools that fail to meet required standards, and the PCSB is in the process of revoking a school's charter. Finally, each year both authorizers have created annual reports that include the information required by the School Reform Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since fiscal year 1995, the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Kennedy Center) has received nearly $203 million in federal funds to complete capital projects and intends to request an additional $43 million in appropriations through fiscal year 2008. The Kennedy Center's Comprehensive Building Plan identifies these capital projects as necessary to renovate the Center and to meet or exceed relevant life safety and disabled access regulations. GAO was asked to examine (1) the progress the Center has made in completing key capital projects within estimated costs and the information it has communicated about this progress to key stakeholders; and (2) the status of the Center's plans to address fire life safety and disabled access requirements. The Kennedy Center has achieved its goal of renovating the Opera House, Concert Hall, and plaza-level public spaces, and installed a building wide fire alarm system, but each of these projects exceeded its budget estimates, sometimes by substantial amounts. Project cost growth resulted from modifications made during the renovation process, due, in part, to the Kennedy Center's lack of knowledge of the building's site conditions. Unexpected site conditions and related challenges make renovation projects, like those undertaken by the Kennedy Center, difficult to complete. Modifications led to overtime charges paid to meet tight construction schedules. Also, the Center may have paid higher costs than necessary by negotiating the value of contract modifications after work was completed. The Kennedy Center lacks comprehensive policies and procedures related to capital improvements that could impact its ability to safeguard federal funds. Furthermore, our review of communication documents showed that Kennedy Center management did not always provide timely or accurate information on project cost growth and delays to its Board of Trustees or Congress. The Kennedy Center has worked to address fire life safety deficiencies, and improvements are ongoing, but after requesting and obtaining funds from Congress the Kennedy Center decided against its plan to meet fire safety code requirements by installing sprinklers and smoke evacuation systems in the Grand Foyer, the Hall of States, and the Hall of Nations. Furthermore, the Kennedy Center did not have its decisions independently reviewed nor did it clearly inform its Board or Congress that it was not spending the funds as planned. Two additional areas of concern are (1) doors in critical areas do not provide adequate protection from fire, and (2) the Millennium Stages have exit deficiencies and lack sprinkler and smoke evacuation systems required by code. The Kennedy Center has complied with disabled access requirements in renovated areas of the Center. Refer to our April 2005 report, GAO-05-334, for our recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The District of Columbia's Jail and Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF), which are the District's detention facilities for misdemeanant and pretrial detainees, have been repeatedly cited for violations of health and safety standards. The Jail also has had problems with releasing inmates before or after their official release date, in part, because of inaccuracies in its electronic inmate records. As a follow-on to problems at the Jail reported in 2002 by the District's Inspector General, GAO addressed the following questions: (1) What are the results of recent health and safety inspections? (2) What is the status of the Jail's capital improvement projects, and what policies and procedures does the Department of Corrections (DoC) use in managing the projects? and (3) What progress has been made in improving electronic inmate records at the Jail? Health and safety inspection reports for the Jail and CTF that were prepared from January 2002 through April 2004 by the District's Department of Health consistently identified problems with air quality, vermin infestation, fire safety, plumbing, and lighting. Officials attributed some of the health and safety deficiencies to the age of the Jail and inmate behavior at both facilities. DoH inspection reports did not always document the specific locations where deficiencies were identified and did not document the date and time when the deficiencies were identified. For example, one report might identify a problem in a specific cell, while another report might state that the problem occurred in some locations, most locations, or throughout the Jail. This limits DoC's ability to determine how prevalent the health and safety deficiencies are, whether problems are recurring in the same locations, or whether conditions changed over time. Of the 16 capital improvement projects for the Jail approved for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, 1 project was completed and 15 were in various stages of development. In addition, the Office of Property Management lacked written policies and procedures concerning project management, which could be important tools in guiding project managers through the planning and management of projects. Although the Office of Property Management established a working group to develop standard operating procedures for managing projects, time frames had not been established for when the working group should complete this work. With respect to early and late inmate release errors, DoC has taken several steps to improve its efficiency and accuracy in processing inmate records, but release errors continue to occur. DoC's improvement efforts have included simplifying the workflow in the Records Office, issuing an operations manual, and developing additional guidance and training for staff. Additionally, DoC developed a database to capture detailed information on incidents that led to each inmate release error. DoC analyzed the information in this database to determine how frequently the incidents occurred. Based on this information, DoC has developed proposals for corrective action to reduce release errors. DoC officials attributed staff processing errors to limited staff resources and the large volume of documents that are continuously received in the Records Office. Because DoC did not have complete data on early and late inmate releases, DoC does not know the full extent to which the release errors occurred. Specifically, DoC may not discover an early release error until long after the inmate has been released. For late releases, DoC used an incomplete methodology, which led to an understated number of actual late releases. During our review, DoC modified this methodology to more accurately identify the number of late releases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We reviewed the audit reports covering the financial statements of the National Conference of State Societies, Washington, DC, for fiscal years 2001 and 2000. GAO's review disclosed no reportable instances of noncompliance with the financial reporting requirements of the law. The audit reports included the auditors' opinions that the financial statements of the corporation were presented fairly on the cash basis of accounting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The District of Columbia (D.C.) Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) is responsible for protecting children at risk of abuse and neglect and ensuring that critical services are provided for them and their families. GAO was asked to discuss the extent to which CFSA has (1) met the requirements of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 and other selected performance criteria, (2) adopted and implemented child protection and foster care placement policies, and (3) enhanced its working relationship with the D.C. Family Court. To address these questions, GAO analyzed data in the District's automated child welfare information system, known as FACES; reviewed laws, regulations, and reports; examined case files; and interviewed officials. CFSA's performance relative to three sets of measures--nine ASFA requirements, eight selected performance criteria, and six of the agency's foster care policies--has been mixed. The agency took actions to implement six of the nine ASFA requirements related to the safety and well-being of foster children, and met or exceeded four of the eight selected foster care performance criteria, but its plans do not address all unmet requirements and criteria. CSFA has established many foster care policies, but caseworkers did not consistently implement the six GAO examined. In addition, FACES lacked data on four of these six policies for at least 70 percent of its active foster care cases. CFSA has enhanced its working relationship with the D.C. Family Court, but several factors hindered this relationship. For example, CFSA's top management and Family Court judges talk frequently about foster care case issues. However, differing opinions among CFSA caseworkers and judges about their responsibilities have hindered the relationships. CFSA officials and Family Court judges have been working together to address these hindrances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effective coordination of the many agencies that participate in a criminal justice system is key to overall success. Although any criminal justice system faces coordination challenges, the unique structure and funding of the District of Columbia (D.C.) criminal justice system, in which federal and D.C. jurisdictional boundaries and dollars are blended, creates additional challenges. Almost every stage of D.C.'s criminal justice process presents such challenges, and participating agencies are sometimes reluctant to coordinate because the costs to implement needed changes may fall on one or more federally funded agencies, while any savings accrue to one or more D.C. funded agencies, or vice versa. The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) was established and staffed as an independent entity to improve systemwide coordination and cooperation. During its two and a half-year existence, CJCC has served as a useful, independent, discussion forum at a modest cost. It has had notable success in several areas in which agencies perceived a common interest, such as developing technology that permits greater information sharing. It has been less successful in other areas, such as papering, in which forging consensus on the need for and the parameters of change has been difficult. CJCC has achieved some successes at a modest cost and served as a useful, independent forum for discussing issues that affect multiple agencies. CJCC's future is uncertain because its funding source, the D.C. Control Board, is scheduled to disband and key CJCC officials have left. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many children have languished in the care of the District of Columbia's child welfare system for extended periods of time. Years of indifference, managerial shortcomings, and long-standing organizational divisiveness have undermined the system's ability to safeguard these children. As a result of these prolonged deficiencies, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a remedial order in 1991 to improve the performance of the child welfare agency. GAO assessed the agency's progress in complying with the court's requirements, specifically examining how financial and operational changes made by the Children and Family Services Agency (CFSA) have affected the protection of children and the provision of services to children and families, the extent to which critical elements of an effective child welfare system have been applied in the District, and issues that need to be addressed in planning for the transfer of CFSA back to local governance. GAO found that the financial and operational changes have not significantly improved the protection of children or the delivery of other child welfare services. Although the District has started to integrate child welfare services with other support services, it still lacks a fully developed collaborative structure to help foster more efficient day-to-day operations and improve program accountability. Furthermore, multiple issues must be resolved before CFSA can be transferred back to local governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This testimony focuses on the District of Columbia's progress and challenges in performance management. GAO discusses whether the District: (1) met the 29 performance goals that it scheduled for completion by the end of fiscal year 2000 that Congress chose from the more than 400 performance measures contained in the Mayor's fiscal year 2001 budget request, and (2) provided evidence that the performance data are sufficiently reliable for measuring progress toward goals. Mayor Williams' performance management system contains many--but not all--of the elements used successfully by leading organizations. The District could improve the usefulness of its mandated annual performance plans and reports by ensuring that the District government's most significant performance goals are included in both the annual performance plan and the annual performance report that federal law requires the Mayor to send to Congress every year. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the District of Columbia's funding for certain union employee pay bonuses. GAO noted that: (1) the District reported a surplus of about $445 million for fiscal year (FY) 1998, thus triggering the need to reopen negotiations about bonus compensation with certain union employees, based on a 1998 agreement; (2) negotiations took place and an agreement was reached during November 1999; (3) the bonus payment of $9.9 million applied to 5,746 District union employees in two compensation plans represented by several union organizations; (4) the $9.9 million represents a one-time, lump-sum bonus of about $1,700 per employee, which the District paid in December 1999; (5) several funding plans were advanced before arriving at the final approach; (6) initially, the bonuses were to be funded from the following sources: (a) $4.2 million from the Tobacco Settlement Fund (TSF); (b) $3.5 million from FY 2000 budget; and (c) $2.2 million in grants from the Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority; (7) the District proposed to reimburse the TSF by reprogramming funds from the Department of Public Works and through short-term borrowing; and (8) the District of Columbia Council and the Authority approved the proposed reprogramming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the District of Columbia (DC) Courts' payment processing procedures for defender services. GAO noted that: (1) GAO identified several weaknesses in DC Courts' payment processing procedures; (2) specifically, GAO found that DC Courts did not: (a) always follow its policies and procedures for processing vouchers for court appointed attorneys; (b) always properly track vouchers submitted for court appointed attorney services; and (c) have written procedures for reprogramming and obligating funds; and (3) while these matters were not significant to GAO's certification, they have the potential, if not resolved, to affect future payment transactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report examines expenditures made by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department using $15 million appropriated by Public Law 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-12. GAO discusses (1) whether the funds have been spent according to the police department's spending plan, (2) the time frame involved in spending the money, and (3) whether the items bought with the funds were received and distributed to the appropriate offices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The federal government funds hundreds of education programs, of which 103 are available for preschool, elementary, and secondary education. Most of these are administered by the Department of Education. Congress and the press have raised concerns that the District of Columbia Public Schools may not have taken full advantage of available federal education dollars. This report answers the following questions: (1) What federal education grant programs are available to the District of Columbia? (2) What is the status of efforts to optimize the District's ability to apply for or receive federal education grants? (3) What is the process for ensuring timely application for federal education grant programs and what office is responsible for ensuring the success and efficiency of this process? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until this past June, the District of Columbia--lacking the structure and the resources--had made little progress in addressing the Year 2000 problem. The pace of the District's Year 2000 effort has picked up considerably since then. The District hired a contractor to help remediate systems, created a Year 2000 program management office, assigned more resources, and began a more aggressive strategy to compensate for lost time. However, because the District is so far behind in dealing with the problem, the risk that critical processes could fail has greatly increased. It is vital that the District promptly identify its most important operations, determine which systems supporting them can be fixed before the Year 2000 deadline, and ensure that business continuity and contingency plans are developed for systems that will not be renovated in time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The report presents the results of GAO's audit of the District of Columbia Highway Trust Fund's financial statements for fiscal year 1997. GAO also examines the forecasted statements of the Fund's expected conditions and operations for the next five years. This report presents (1) GAO's opinion on District management's assertion about the effectiveness of the Fund's internal controls as of September 1997 and (2) the results of GAO's evaluation of the District's compliance with laws and regulations during fiscal year 1997 as they relate to the Fund. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the audit reports covering the financial statements of the National Conference of State Societies, Washington, DC, for the fiscal years ended May 31, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997, focusing on whether the audit reports complied with the financial reporting requirements of the law. GAO noted that: (1) nothing came to GAO's attention that would cause it to believe that the financial reporting requirements of the law have not been met; (2) the audit reports included the auditors' opinion that the financial statements of the corporation were fairly presented on a cash basis for receipts and disbursements; and (3) the notes to the financial statements indicate that the corporation has operated at a deficit for the last 6 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The District of Columbia Public Schools is eligible for 72 of the 103 federal education grant programs available for preschool, elementary, and secondary education in fiscal year 1998. The District of Columbia applied for 46 of the 72 federal programs. According to D.C. Public School officials, the District did not apply for the remaining 26 programs because it lacked the resources to pursue these grants. For example, budgetary constraints precluded its applying for grants requiring matching funds, such as Even Start-Migrant Education, and the D.C. Public Schools said that it had insufficient staff to apply for some grants or to implement the grant if received, such as Bilingual Education-Professional Development. The grant application process can vary by grant and involves several officials in the D.C. Public Schools and the District government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The District of Columbia has spent about $60 million, or about 98 percent of the estimated total cost of predevelopment activities, for the sports arena project. The District's $5 million in remaining funds for predevelopment costs for the sports arena appears to be enough to meet all estimated remaining expenditures. Collections from the dedicated arena tax have been more than sufficient to pay principal and interest of about $5.9 million annually on the bonds issued to finance predevelopment expenses. GAO's analysis shows that, if the present levels of collections are sustained and revenues from the ground lease of the sports arena and the existing debt service reserve funds are used, all of the arena bonds would be paid by 2002, about eight years before the 2010 maturity date. This redemption schedule would save the District about $16.4 million in interest costs and would allow about $7.7 million to be transferred to the District's general fund. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looks into the status of the new convention center project in Washington, D.C. Increase in estimated project costs; Proposed components of the Guaranteed Maximum Price; Source of funding for the said project.

Looks into the plan of the Washington Convention Center Authority to build a new convention center in Washington, D.C. Discussion of the objectives, methodology and scope of the project; Increase in estimated project costs; Framework for evaluating dedicated tax financing.

This testimony updates the status of the District of Columbia Public Schools' roof replacement work for fiscal year 1998. Congress had received information questioning the D.C. Public Schools' ability to complete the roof repairs without delaying the opening of schools in September 1998. GAO's statement covers four main areas: the availability of funds to pay for roof repairs, the current status of the roof repair process, the estimated cost of the roof repairs, and additional capital improvements in fiscal year 1999 and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the Fiscal Year 1998 District of Columbia Appropriations Act, a law that mandates a study to assess the applicability of taxation and other regulation on alcoholic beverages in reducing alcohol abuse in Washington D.C. Impact of alcoholism on the social and economic conditions in the state; Consequences of alcohol abuse; Actions taken by various states in the U.S. in reducing alcohol abuse in their respective territories.