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For over 125 years, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP), within the Department of the Treasury, has relied on a single contractor to supply the paper for U.S. currency. Such a long-term contracting relationship could contribute to higher costs and other risks. Another federal agency that relied on a single contractor, the U.S. Mint, decided to obtain a second supplier for coin metal. In solicitations for currency paper contracts in 1999 and 2003, BEP took steps to address barriers to competition that GAO had identified in 1998 through a survey of paper manufacturers. This report updates GAO's 1998 report using data from a second survey. It addresses (1) the changes BEP made to encourage competition and the results of its efforts, (2) the steps BEP took to ensure that it paid fair and reasonable prices, and (3) the analysis BEP has done of the advantages and disadvantages of obtaining a second supplier. To encourage competition for the 1999 and 2003 contracts, BEP modified its solicitations to, among other things, indicate that it would provide bidders with the security thread that is inserted into most currency paper and extend the time for initial deliveries. For the 1999 contract, one additional supplier submitted an initial proposal but later withdrew it, and for the 2003 contract, only the current supplier submitted a proposal. This company remains the sole supplier of U.S. currency paper. According to paper manufacturers, several barriers to competition remain, including the high capital costs of and technological requirements for producing currency paper. BEP said it has not addressed these barriers because the requirements are either essential to preserve the security of currency paper or they are outside BEP's control (e.g., anticounterfeiting features are recommended by a federal committee). While some of the remaining barriers are outside BEP's control, BEP's outreach to paper manufacturers has been limited. For example, BEP does not meet regularly with them, as the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security meet with potential suppliers of their procurements, to identify additional steps that could be taken to encourage competition. To the extent that BEP has reached out to paper manufacturers, it has generally done so in conjunction with other BEP procurements. For the contracts awarded in 1999 and 2003, BEP took several steps, consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation's requirements, to determine that the prices it paid under these contracts were fair and reasonable. For the 1999 contract, it used price analysis (a comparison of two proposals) to determine that the two proposals it initially received were fair and reasonable. This analysis was sufficient because BEP had determined that adequate price competition existed. For the 2003 contract, BEP performed several cost analysis activities to ensure that the final agreed-to price was fair and reasonable, since the current supplier was the only company that submitted a proposal. For example, BEP obtained certified cost and pricing data from the current supplier, requested an audit review of the current supplier's price proposal, and established a technical analysis team to examine steps in the current supplier's manufacturing process that affect price. BEP also arranged for postaward audits of the current supplier. BEP has not analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of obtaining a second supplier of currency paper since 1996. At that time, it concluded that the costs would outweigh the benefits, but it did not analyze the long-term effects. As a result, it does not know how a second supplier would affect the costs, quality, security, and supply of currency paper over time. Analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of obtaining a second supplier would help BEP determine the need for one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1879, virtually all paper purchased by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing for U.S. currency production has come from one supplier--Crane & Co. Although Crane has consistently provided quality paper, the Bureau at times was forced to pay prices it was unable to determine were fair and reasonable because it had no other U.S. source for paper. The Bureau's assessment of Crane's proposed prices were hampered by several factors, including the lack of market prices for currency paper and the limited analyses of proposed costs and prices it performed, especially on earlier contracts in GAO's sample. In addition, some Bureau practices, such as understating the quantities of currency paper needed, caused the government to pay more for currency paper than it should have. The Bureau is responsible for ensuring that the government's supply of paper is not disrupted. Although no disruptions have occurred, the Bureau for many years did not maintain a reserve inventory of paper to provide for contingencies. As a result, it was more vulnerable to adverse consequences if a disruption had occurred and it was at a disadvantage in its contract negotiations because it lacked an alternative source for currency paper. The Bureau recently has been purchasing paper to build a three-month reserve supply and, under the law, could buy paper from a foreign source if no domestic source exists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the effect of the elimination of paper U.S. saving bonds by the Department of the Treasury on the savings bond program and bond purchases. Topics include an online system TreasuryDirect, the Treasury's future plans for the Tax Time Savings Bond program, and challenges of lower-income households' savings.

The article discusses the need of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to improve its management of paper case files. Missing case files could cause a loss in revenue, create unnecessary taxpayer burden, and make case files unavailable for other units. Moreover, the agency acknowledged its historic difficulties in locating and retrieving case files and its attempts to recreate them by requesting information from taxpayers.

The article presents the October 2011 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on electronic-filing (e-filing) individual tax returns in the country. The report highlights the country's Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) e-file mandate, its implementation, and the benefits of filing tax returns electronically. It also explores e-file rates and the experiences of tax preparers on the mandate, IRS's options for data digitalization, and data processing and e-file planning.

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) relies on about 55 million paper-based files to adjudicate applications for immigration status and other benefits. Ensuring the currency and availability of these manual files, referred to as alien files, or A-Files, is a major challenge. To address this challenge, USCIS has initiated efforts, both long and near term, to automate the A-Files. The long-term effort is now being re-examined within the context of a larger USCIS organizational transformation initiative. In the near term, USCIS has begun a digitization program, which it estimates will cost about $190 million over an 8-year period to electronically scan existing paper files and store and share the scanned images. GAO was asked to determine whether USCIS was effectively managing its A-Files automation efforts. USCIS's effectiveness in managing its long-term effort for automating the A-Files cannot yet be determined because the scope, content, and approach for moving from paper-based to paperless A-Files has yet to be defined. Nevertheless, GAO believes that USCIS's recent decision to re-examine prior agency plans for a strategic A-Files automation solution within the context of an agencywide transformation strategy appropriately recognizes the integral support role that information technology plays in organizational and business transformation. GAO also believes that the success of USCIS's organizational transformation depends on other key supporting practices, such as having a comprehensive and integrated transformation plan (goals and schedules) and results-oriented performance measures. With respect to USCIS's near-term A-Files automation effort, known as the Integrated Digitization Document Management Program (IDDMP), effective planning is not occurring. In particular, USCIS has not developed a plan governing how it will manage this program and its contractors, and it has not developed an evaluation plan for its ongoing digitization concept of operations pilot test, even though it has either awarded or plans to award contracts totaling about $20 million for this pilot. In addition, USCIS officials told us they do not yet know which A-Files immigration forms will be scanned. Without a defined scope and adequate planning, this program is at risk of falling short of expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that reviews the progress of the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) has made toward meeting the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia order to provide meaningful access to U.S. currency to visually impaired persons. It mention that GAO recommends BEP evaluation of its currency reader program while developing a tactile feature in the next redesign of currency.

From fiscal years 1997 through 2000, the number of individual and business tax returns filed electronically increased from 23 million to 41 million. During the same period, the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) expenditures for submission processing grew from $795 million to $924 million, an increase of 16 percent. Because it costs less to process an electronic return than a paper return, a growth in processing costs seemed improbable. Interviews with IRS officials and an analysis of relevant documentation identified several factors that limited the impact of electronic filing. Specifically, (1) the overall number of individual and business tax returns filed increased, and the resources needed to process that increase partially offset the resources saved by processing more electronic returns; (2) the number of the most costly to process individual income tax returns filed on paper essentially stayed the same; and (3) the number of individual income tax returns filed on paper and received during the peak filing period stayed relatively the same, and peak processing needs drive the resources needed to process individual paper returns. Although electronic filing increased, so did the demands placed on paper processing staff. In particular, (1) processing changes increased the workload for units responsible for reviewing returns for completeness and coding them for entry data, and correcting errors; (2) because most electronic filers still sent a paper signature document to IRS, the work done by paper processing staff was not entirely eliminated when taxpayers filed electronically; and (3) front-line paper processing staff spent increasing amounts of time on activities, including training, not specifically related to processing returns. Future reductions in processing costs as a result of electronic filing are possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1997 peer review of the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) done by the Environmental Protection Agency IG resulted in a qualified opinion. The peer review report questioned the quality assurance system used by the DOD IG and said that the reviewed audits did not fully comply with Government Auditing Standards. The 2000 peer review done by the Department of the Treasury IG for Tax Administration (TIGTA) also resulted in a unqualified opinion. Although TIGTA cited several problems, the peer review report concluded that the quality assurance system used by the DOD IG reasonably ensured compliance with auditing standards. However, after the peer review had been completed, a letter was sent to Congress, the press, and others questioning the integrity of the documentation that the DOD IG provided to the TIGTA peer review staff. A DOD IG internal investigation later confirmed that the work papers for one of the audits chosen for peer review had been altered and destroyed. The report concluded that these actions violated Government Auditing Standards, internal DOD IG audit policies, and the expectations of the external peer review staff. TIGTA then withdrew its 2000 peer review opinion and issued a disclaimer of opinion in May 2001, stating that it was unable to determine whether the substantiated allegations would materially affect the DOD IG's system of quality control. As a result, the DOD IG failed to meet the requirement that it obtain a peer review at least once every three years. The DOD IG began qualifying its audit reports to explain its lack of compliance with the peer review requirements set forth in Government Auditing Standards. The 2001 peer review done by the Department of Health and Human Services IG similarly resulted in a qualified opinion. The 2001 peer review report said that the DOD IG's quality assurance system needs improvement and that audits were not always in compliance with Government Auditing Standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some states and countries allow taxpayers to prepare and file tax returns on their Internet Web sites at no charge, an option not available to federal taxpayers. Such a service might mitigate the concerns taxpayers have about current electronic filing options, which require filing through a third party and may involve fees. Increased electronic filing would reduce IRS's paper processing costs, reduce transcription errors, and speed up refunds. However, the idea is controversial. IRS already has a Free File program which offers free return preparation and filing by private companies for some people via IRS's Web site. Some are opposed to IRS competing with tax preparation software companies. GAO was asked to (1) describe IRS's options for on-line preparation and filing (I-file) based on states' experiences; (2) determine the benefits and costs of I-file based on the experiences of the states; and (3) describe the potential for IRS to realize cost savings from I-file. GAO profiled 7 states and the District of Columbia, 2 foreign countries and 3 federal agencies to describe I-file options and determine their benefits and costs. The options available to IRS for implementing I-file system vary in technology, features, and eligibility. The states profiled all employed an interactive format on their Web sites for tax return preparation. The systems varied in whether they included features such as the ability to save and return. Systems also varied in eligibility, i.e. limiting income or residency. For the systems profiled, both reported benefits and costs were relatively modest and it is unclear whether benefits were greater than costs. I-file systems may generate benefits by increasing electronic filing and reducing filing fees for taxpayers. California and Pennsylvania estimated savings of $1.00 per return and $3.47 respectively per return converted from paper. However, the benefits were limited by low usage. I-file usage rates were less than 6 percent. Available data on I-file costs, while limited, shows costs are a very small percentage of state tax agencies' budgets. For example, California reported spending $700,000 to develop and operate CalFile from 2003 to 2005--less than 0.1 percent of the tax agency's annual budget. States kept I-file costs relatively modest by restricting eligibility and features. Several states used contractors to develop and operate their I-file system as well as provide the computer hardware. Low usage also contributed to modest costs. For example, some states said low usage meant they could use existing computer equipment. IRS's potential to realize net cost savings from an I-file system depends on the costs of developing the system and the number of taxpayers converted from paper to electronic filing. IRS's costs could be higher than the states'. First, the federal tax system is more complex. Second, unlike states which already had Web sites with Internet transaction capabilities, IRS would have to... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the U.S. Government Accountability Office's review of reforms implemented by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in its money market mutual fund (MMF) rules designed to reduce run risk at MMFs exposed by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Topics discussed include the vulnerability of certain MMFs to runs as highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and evidences showing the effectiveness of the reforms during the pandemic.

Over a trillion dollars in income was distributed in tax year 2002 by flow-through entities, such as partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and trusts, to their partners, shareholders, or beneficiaries, respectively. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that from 6 to 15 percent of such income is unreported on individual tax returns. This income is reported to both IRS and to the recipients on a Schedule K-1 (K-1). IRS uses K-1 data in its document-matching program to identify noncompliance and for other purposes. GAO was asked to (1) assess the accuracy of K-1 data, specifically transcription errors and taxpayer identification numbers (TIN); (2) determine whether any limitations in the availability or accuracy of K-1 data have affected IRS's ability to identify noncompliance; and (3) identify the benefits and challenges of increasing e-filing of K-1s. The accuracy of paper-filed K-1 data is reduced by transcription errors; paper and e-filed K-1s have inaccurate TINs. IRS estimates that transcription errors for tax year 2002 ranged from 5 and 9.5 percent and is taking steps to address such errors. Although e-filed K-1s do not require transcription, for tax year 2002, the percentage of invalid TINs for e-filed K-1s and paper-filed K-1s were comparable (7 and 6 percent, respectively). Due to potential burden on flow-through entities and resource constraints, IRS does not notify the entities of invalid TINs on K-1s for correction. If IRS did so, this would likely give e-filing entities enough time to correct invalid TINs before IRS runs its document-matching program. Inaccurate or limited K-1 data have created problems for IRS researchers and examiners. IRS research staff indicated that inaccurate TINs adversely affected their analysis of flow-through entity networks. Further, because IRS captures limited data from flow-through entity returns, including the K-1, IRS staff lack data they consider helpful, such as "Other Income" to help identify tax shelters. In at least 40 percent of closed examination cases we sampled, IRS examiners found errors with return line items not entered into IRS's databases when returns are received. If these lines were available up front, researchers say they would be able to better identify returns with potential noncompliance. Increased e-filing of K-1s would provide benefits and challenges to both IRS and taxpayers. Benefits for IRS include faster, more complete information and millions in annual cost reductions. Benefits for taxpayers include fewer IRS contacts with them because IRS would have more accurate information in its systems. The primary challenge for IRS is its current inability to electronically process all flow-through entity returns and related forms, including the K-1. For taxpayers, the primary challenge is the cost of converting from paper to e-filing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the Electronic Funds Transfer 99 (EFT 99) program is interfering with the capacity of the Financial Management Service (FMS) and financial institutions to complete year 2000 remediation efforts. GAO noted that: (1) EFT 99 requirements are not expected to affect FMS' year 2000 remediation efforts; (2) FMS has made payments electronically for many years and thus the applications software and telecommunications infrastructure necessary for initiating electronic payments and transmitting them to financial institutions are already in place; (3) the process of converting recipients from paper to electronic payment is relatively easy and is done by the program agencies; (4) FMS does not expect to make any system changes in preparation for EFT 99; (5) EFT 99 requirements should also not affect FMS year 2000 efforts because converting benefit recipients from paper to electronic payment is a relatively easy process that is conducted by program agencies, not FMS; (6) the volume of unbanked benefit recipients who will need to be switched from paper to electronic payments is likely to be much less than originally planned because of the Department of the Treasury's recently announced waivers to the regulation; (7) initially, FMS and Treasury expected that when the electronic transfer accounts (ETA) became available, most benefit recipients without a bank account would be converted from paper to electronic payment; (8) FMS' Assistant Commissioner for Federal Finance said that given the new waiver policy, he estimates that prior to the year 2000 only 20 to 30 percent of recipients without bank accounts will switch to using ETAs; (9) like FMS, the year 2000 conversion efforts of financial institutions are not expected to be affected by EFT 99; (10) the systems infrastructure for receiving electronic payments from FMS through the Federal Reserve is already established and many institutions already offer accounts that are similar to those being proposed for the ETAs; (11) the financial institutions said that if conflicts do arise between completing year 2000 efforts or offering ETAs, they will not offer ETAs; (12) some financial institutions expressed concern that because the account structure for ETAs has not yet been announced, they cannot determine how much system development will be necessary to tailor their accounts to meet ETA account specifications; (13) these institutions said that the longer that the definition of ETAs is delayed, the more likely it is that banks will not initially offer the accounts; (14) Treasury originally expected to announce the ETA account structure in the spring of 1998, then delayed it until the summer of 1998; and (15) Treasury officials now expect to announce the structure in the fall of 1998 and estimate that accounts will become available in 1999. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report focuses on three types of prescription drug labeling approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA). These include the prescribing information intended for health care practitioners, the medication guides intended to inform patients about drugs FDA has determined that pose a serious and significant public health concern, and patient package inserts required for oral contraceptives and estrogens. It discusses the merits and demerits of relying on electronic labeling.

The article presents the report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office on the accomplishments and postal opportunities on postal service and mailing industry mail-related recycling of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS). The report describes the recent initiatives of USPS, the mailing industry and other stakeholders with respect to four mail-related recycling topics. It conveys stakeholder-identified opportunities for USPS to engage in activities related to these topics.

As the frontline regulator of mutual funds, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays a key role in protecting the nearly half of all U.S. households owning mutual funds, valued around $8 trillion in 2005. Mutual fund abuses raised questions about the integrity of the industry and quality of oversight provided by SEC and self-regulatory organizations (SRO) that regulate broker-dealers selling funds. This report assesses (1) changes SEC has made to, or is planning for, its mutual fund exam program; (2) key aspects of SEC's quality control framework for routine fund exams; and (3) the adequacy of SEC's oversight of NASD and the New York Stock Exchange in protecting shareholders from mutual fund sales abuses. SEC is initiating several changes intended to strengthen its mutual fund exam program but faces challenges overseeing the fund industry. In the wake of the fund abuses, SEC has revised its past approach of primarily conducting routine exams of all funds on a regular schedule. It concluded these exams were not the best tool for identifying emerging problems, since funds were not selected for examination based on risk. To quickly identify problems, SEC is shifting resources away from routine exams to targeted exams that focus on specific risks. It will conduct routine exams on a regular schedule but only of funds deemed high risk. SEC also is forming teams to monitor some of the largest groups of advisers and funds. Although SEC is seeking to focus its resources on higher risk funds and activities, the resource tradeoffs it made in revising its oversight approach raise significant challenges. The tradeoffs may limit SEC's capacity not only to examine funds considered lower risk within a 10-year period but also to accurately identify which funds pose higher risk and effectively target them for routine examination. Potentially taxing its resources further, SEC recently adopted a rule to require advisers to hedge funds (investment vehicles generally not widely available to the public) to register with it. This rule is expected to increase SEC's exam workload, but the precise extent is not yet known. SEC has integrated some quality controls into its routine exams, but certain aspects of its framework could be improved. It relies on experienced staff to oversee all exam stages but does not expressly require supervisors to review work papers or document their review. GAO found deficiencies in key SEC exam work papers, raising questions about the quality of supervisory review. SEC also does not require examiners to prepare written exam plans, though they use considerable judgment in customizing each exam. Written plans could serve as a guide for conducting exams and reviewing whether exams were completed as planned. As done by other regulators, SEC also could review a sample of work papers to test compliance with its standards. A primary tool that SEC uses to assess the adequacy of SRO oversight of broker-dealers offering mutual funds provides limited information for achieving its objective and imposes duplicative costs on firms. To assess SRO oversight, SEC reviews SRO exam programs and conducts oversight exams of broker-dealers, including their mutual fund sales practices. SEC's oversight exams take place 6 to 12 months after SROs conduct their exams and serve to assess the quality of SRO exams. However, GAO reported in 1991 that SEC's oversight exams provided limited information in helping SROs to improve their exam quality, because SEC and the SROs used different exam guidelines and their exams often covered different periods. GAO found that these problems remain, raising questions about the considerable resources SEC devotes to oversight exams. GAO also found that SEC has not developed an automated system to track the full scope of work done during its oversight exams. Thus, SEC cannot readily determine the extent to which these exams assess mutual fund sales practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting technology, among other things, in a series of reports that it issued in 2001 following the problems encountered in the 2000 election. In October 2002, the Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration of federal elections. The act also established a program to provide funds to states to replace older punch card and lever machine voting equipment. As this older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2 years, concerns have been raised about the vulnerabilities associated with certain electronic voting systems. Among other things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which electronic voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also describes the immediate and longer-term challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting systems. An electronic voting system, like other automated information systems, can be judged on several bases, including how well its design provides for security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as its cost. For example, direct recording electronic systems offer advantages in ease of use because they can have features that accommodate voters with various disabilities, and they protect against common voter errors, such as overvoting (voting for more candidates than is permissible); a disadvantage of such systems is their capital cost and frequent lack of an independent paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment (another type of electronic voting system) include capital cost and the enhanced security associated with having a paper audit trail; disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as limited ability to accommodate voters with disabilities. One important determinant of voting system performance is how it is designed and developed, including the testing that determines whether the developed system performs as designed. In the design and development process, a critical factor is the quality of the specified system requirements as embodied in applicable standards or guidance. For voting technology, these voluntary standards have historically been problematic; the EAC has now been given responsibility for voting system guidelines, and it intends to update them. The EAC also intends to strengthen the process for testing voting system hardware and software. A second determinant of performance is how the system is implemented. In implementing a system, it is critical to have people with the requisite knowledge and skills to operate it according to well-defined and understood processes. The EAC also intends to focus on these people and process factors in its role of assisting in the administration of elections. In the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting systems are similar to those facing any technology user. These challenges include both immediate and more long term challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By positively confirming identifications and linking relevant records of arrests and prosecutions, fingerprint analysis provides a basis for making fundamental criminal justice decisions regarding detention, charging, bail, and sentencing. In 1999, the FBI implemented the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)--a computerized system for storing, comparing, and exchanging fingerprint data in a digital format. The FBI's goal under IAFIS is to ultimately achieve paperless processing and to provide a response within 2 hours to users who submit criminal fingerprints electronically. Maximizing the benefits of rapid responses under IAFIS depends largely on how quickly criminal fingerprints are submitted by local and state law enforcement agencies. Concerns have been raised that, after arrests are made by some local or state law enforcement agencies, periods of up to 6 months may elapse before the criminal fingerprints are submitted for entry into IAFIS. GAO examined (1) the importance of IAFIS processing to local and state law enforcement agencies, (2) the progress these agencies have made toward the goal of paperless fingerprint processing, and (3) efforts being made to improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions. IAFIS processing of criminal fingerprints is important to local and state law enforcement not only for updating national databases but also for obtaining an individual's criminal history and, at times, for obtaining positive identification of arrestees. For a recent 8-month period (October 2002 through May 2003) that GAO reviewed, law enforcement agencies wanted a response from the FBI for 78 percent of the approximately 5.3 million sets of criminal fingerprints submitted to IAFIS. The extent to which these responses were used to either positively identify arrestees or obtain criminal history records is unknown. However, the FBI provided GAO with examples of how IAFIS responses prevented the premature release of individuals who had used false names at arrest and were wanted in other jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies have made progress toward the FBI's goal of paperless processing of criminal fingerprints, although there is room for substantial improvement. The percentage of criminal fingerprints submitted electronically by state repositories to the FBI increased from 45 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2003. Also, for the recent 8-month period GAO reviewed, the overall average submission time for criminal fingerprints was 40 days (an average that encompasses both paper and electronic submissions)--whereas, before IAFIS, average submission times were much higher (e.g., 118 days in 1997). Although much progress has been made, many jurisdictions lack automation and have backlogs of paper fingerprint cards to be processed, in part because of competing priorities and resource constraints. Numerous efforts have been made to help improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions to IAFIS. To facilitate electronic processing, federal technical and financial assistance has encouraged law enforcement agencies to purchase optical scanning (Livescan) equipment for taking fingerprints and to establish automated systems compatible with FBI standards. GAO noted that the need for quick, fingerprint-based identifications--positively linking individuals to relevant criminal history records--is becoming increasingly important. Reasons for such importance are the mobility of criminals (many of whom have multistate records), the growing incidence of identity theft or identity fraud, the significance of homeland security concerns, and increasing demands stemming from background checksrequired for employment or other noncriminal justice purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June 2000, the House Committee on Science identified a significant discrepancy between an amount reported in the National Aeronautic and Space Administration's (NASA) audited financial statements for fiscal year 1999 and its submission in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2001. NASA's 1999 financial statement was misstated by a reported $644 million. The misstatement was in the "Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations" line of the statement. NASA had relied on an ad hoc process that included a data call from the reporting units' (nine centers and headquarters) separate systems and a compilation of reported amounts using a spreadsheet. In addition, when compiling these data, NASA headquarters mistakenly added amounts that were not relevant to the recoveries line. Headquarters officials said that the error resulted from their misinterpretation of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance on what to include in the recoveries line. NASA is now acquiring and implementing a single, commercial off-the-shelf core accounting system that it believes will solve the problem. In its audit of NASA's financial statements for fiscal year 1999, Arthur Andersen did not detect the error in NASA's Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR). Evidence in Arthur Andersen's working papers was not adequate to support unqualified opinions on NASA's SBR and Statement of Financing in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS). Arthur Andersen's working papers did not adequately document the evaluation of the internal controls related to the two budgetary statements or the independent validation of key amounts in the statements for fiscal year 1999. The NASA Inspector General (IG) did a quality control review of the audit by Arthur Andersen using a detailed checklist based on GAGAS. According to the checklist, the objectives of the NASA IG quality control review were to (1) ensure that the independent public accountant conducted the audit in accordance with applicable auditing standards and OMB bulletin requirements, (2) identify any follow-up work that needs to be done by the independent public accountant, and (3) identify issues that may require management attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A study on the electronic disclosure laws and regulations in the U.S. and the pros and cons of electronic disclosure, conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), is presented, with focus on pension plans documentation. The study contains multiple appendices which include a graph, showing the availability of Internet access for individuals aged 15 and older, comments from the U.S. Department of Labor, and a table with examples of participant disclosures.