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As the United States reviews its plans to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq, GAO has enclosed a series of issue papers for Congressional consideration in developing its oversight agenda for the 110th Congress and analyzing the President's revised strategy for Iraq. These papers are based on the continuing work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies we have provided to the Congress since May 2003. Iraq has had three successful elections, adopted a constitution, and installed its first elected government. At the same time, since the initial ground offensive ended in 2003, the costs to secure and stabilize Iraq have grown substantially, as has the level of violence that afflicts Iraqi society. Such violence stems from an insurgency that has grown more complex and lethal over the past 3 and 1/2 years and the Sunni-Shi'a conflict, which escalated dramatically in 2006. This instability complicates meaningful political reconciliation among Iraq's religious and tribal groups, reduces the effectiveness of U.S. and Iraqi reconstruction and capacity-building efforts, and diminishes the hopes and expectations of an Iraqi people without adequate jobs, water, fuel, and electricity. Increasing Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to them have not resulted in reduced violence. Rather, attacks increased throughout 2006. Although more Iraqi troops have been trained and equipped, high absenteeism and divided loyalties have limited their overall effectiveness. At the same time, our service members are working with great courage and diligence to perform the roles the President has asked of them. Notwithstanding their noble efforts, the U.S. military has sustained significant casualties. In addition, wear and tear on military equipment and growing replacement costs have risen substantially. The resulting stress and strain on American forces have reduced troop readiness levels and the availability of reserve personnel. The U.S. rebuilding effort in Iraq has focused on helping the Iraqi government establish a sound economy with the capacity to deliver essential services. Although Iraq's economy has grown and U.S. efforts have helped restore portions of Iraq's infrastructure, the poor security environment and mismanagement have diminished the overall results of U.S. investments. Iraq will need U.S. and international support, including political and economic incentives, to strengthen its fragile government institutions, which have thus far failed to adequately deter corruption, stimulate employment, or deliver essential services. The enclosures discuss these issues and other critical challenges that the United States and its allies face in the ongoing struggle to help the Iraqis stabilize, secure, and rebuild Iraq. Forthright answers to the oversight questions we pose herein are needed from the U.S. agencies responsible for executing the President's strategy. Congress and... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on analysis by U.S. General Accountability Office(GAO) on operational services contract provided by U.S. Department of Defense. Topics discussed include analyses on services during Iraq and Afghanistan support operations in 2002, focus of analysis on planning and policies followed during contract services and recommendations by GAO on providing guidance over operational contact services.

The article focuses on the draft report "Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting" from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). The draft shows that the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide several services. Also, they have relied on recipients of grants and cooperative agreements.

The article discusses the compliance of fiscal law by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Department of State to meet the requirements of critical goods and services in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study, the State and DOD didn't comply with the requirements for management of assisted acquisitions. It also mentions that State did not assess the cost-effectiveness of using DOD's contracts for five of the 20 interagency acquisitions

The article presents a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessing the U.S. plans for transitioning to the State-led diplomatic mission in Iraq, and the extent to which State and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) have established basic infrastructure and support for Mission Iraq. As mentioned, State and DOD are facing challenges in finalizing support and security capabilities.

The article discusses the health care services provided by the U.S. Veterans Health Administration (VA) to various veteran populations. It informs that veteran populations include an aging veteran population and a growing number of younger veterans returning from the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also informs that services that are not the part of the VA's medical benefits package such as long-term care provided in nursing homes are also provided by it.

The article presents a report of the U.S. the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the need of warfighter by the U.S Department of Defense (DOD) after Iraq and Afghanistan war. According to the GAO, the agencies who were given the contract to supply the warfighter took longer time to identify the need and supply the fund. It also provides the GAO's recommendations including the need of DOD's communication with the central command.

The article focuses on the report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GOA), about the plans and processes of Army for the disposition of nontactical and tactical nonstandard equipment, and mine resistant ambush protected (MRAPs) that are not needed in Iraq. It presents analyses of relevants documents and interviews of Army officials about the said issue. It mentions recommendations of GAO about the actions and things to accomplish by the Secretary of Defense direct Army authorities.

The article reports on the study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which assesses the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) plans for risk mitigation in Iraq. It examines the role of DOD in mitigating risks of transferring and removing equipment from Iraq, restricting unnecessary contract, and facilitating transition. It recommends the DOD to maintain real-time visibility on equipment, participate in demobilizing workforces, and clarify its role in post-2011 Iraq.

The article presents the study of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which deals on open pit burning and solid waste management in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), burn pit emissions can potentially harm human health that may even lead them to death. Also noted are the various DOD guidance documents to discourage the long-term use of burn pits and encourage the use of incinerators and landfills to manage the risk.

The article presents the study conducted by U.S. the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the progress of the Department of Defense (DOD) plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with the timelines set the Security Agreement. It notes that the execution of the drawdown may be affected by the lack of inventory of equipment and shipping containers. It says that an effective drawdown is dependent upon the establishment of transfer mechanisms.

The article reports on the study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the compensation of deployed civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO states several issues involving medical care, worker's compensation, and post-deployment health assessments that affect the benefits of deployed civilians. GAO made recommendations to the Department of Defense (DOD) to clarify the guidance of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to review worker's compensation schemes.

The article reports on the implementation of U.S. government programs to help rebuild Iraq. The U.S. Department of State (State) and Army Corps of Engineers operate with Iraqis in Iraq's provinces to develop projects such as building schools through the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee program. However, weaknesses in the management control of State have blocked the attainment of program objective to construct provincial government capacity.-

The article presents a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concerning fundamental issues for congressional oversight and ways in providing security and stabilization in Iraq. These include setting a timetable for the disengagement of U.S. forces in Iraq, implementation of operational requirements of the security agreement the two countries, and the need to consider the level of engagement of the international community.

The article offers information on a survey conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in order to determine stability and security in Iraq. The survey has revealed that violence in Iraq has dropped to about 70%, from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008. The GAO recommends that the U.S. Department of Defense should develop an updated strategy for Iraq.

GAO has reported in recent years on a number of human capital issues that have hampered the Department of State's (State) ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy priorities and objectives, particularly at posts central to the war on terror. In 2002, State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to address shortfalls in the number and skills of State employees. This testimony addresses State's progress in (1) addressing staffing shortfalls since the implementation of DRI and (2) filling gaps in the language proficiency of Foreign Service officers and other staff. To accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed staffing and language data and met with State officials. State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since implementing the DRI in 2002; however, the initiative did not fully meet its goals, and staffing shortfalls remain a problem. From 2002 to 2004, the DRI enabled State to hire more than 1,000 employees above attrition to respond to emerging crises and allow staff time for critical job training. However, according to State officials, much of this increase was absorbed by the demand for personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the desired crises and training reserve was not achieved. State officials told us that they now estimate they need more than 1,000 new positions to support foreign language training needs and respond to crises and emerging priorities. In an effort to address staffing shortfalls, particularly at critical hardship posts, State has implemented various incentives, including offering extra pay to officers who serve an additional year at these posts and allowing employees to negotiate shorter tours of duty. State has also taken steps to ensure all Iraq positions are staffed. While State has not yet used its authority to direct staff to accept assignments, it has in several cases identified qualified staff and convinced them to accept reassignments. However, despite these and other efforts, mid-level positions at many posts are staffed by inexperienced junior officers with minimal guidance. An experience gap at critical posts can severely compromise the department's diplomatic readiness and its ability to carry out its foreign policy objectives and execute critical post-level duties. State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities, but significant language gaps remain. State has increased the number of worldwide positions requiring language proficiency since 2001 and has enhanced efforts to recruit individuals proficient in certain languages. However, State continues to have difficulties filling some positions with language proficient staff. State officials told us these gaps have worsened in recent years. In response to our recommendations to enhance the language proficiency of State's staff, officials told us that the department has placed an increased focus on language training in critical areas. State has recently implemented a new initiative that would... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I. As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces. DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents. However, GAO's review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel to maintain the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are a number of ways that the U.S. government provides assistance to Iraqi or Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or suffer property damage as a result of U.S. and coalition forces' actions. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development funds projects to assist Iraqi and Afghan civilians and communities directly impacted by actions of U.S. or coalition forces. Also, the Department of State administers a program that makes payments, in accordance with local custom, to Iraqi civilians who are harmed in incidents involving U.S. protective security details. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) administers a program that provides compensation under the Foreign Claims Act to inhabitants of foreign countries for death, injury, or property damage caused by noncombat activities of U.S. military personnel overseas. Further, DOD provides monetary assistance in the form of solatia and condolence payments to Iraqi and Afghan nationals who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of U.S. or coalition forces' actions during combat. From fiscal years 2003 to 2006, DOD has reported about $1.9 million in solatia payments and more than $29 million in condolence payments to Iraqi and Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of U.S. or coalition forces' actions during combat. These payments are expressions of sympathy or remorse based on local culture and customs, but not an admission of legal liability or fault. Commanders make condolence payments using funds provided by Congress for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), whereas solatia payments are funded from unit operations and maintenance accounts. Pub. L. No. 108-106 (2003) requires DOD to provide quarterly reports on the source, allocation, and use of CERP funds. To administer the CERP, DOD has established 19 project categories for the use of funds, including categories for condolence payments and battle damage payments. At Congress's request, we reviewed DOD's solatia and condolence payment programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, we examined the following questions: (1) To what extent has DOD established guidance for making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan? (2) How are commanders making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan and what factors do commanders consider when determining whether to make payments or payment amounts? (3) To what extent does DOD collect and analyze solatia and condolence payment data? We also are providing information on the other aforementioned programs established by the U.S. government to provide assistance to Iraqi and Afghan civilians who have been affected by U.S. or coalition forces' actions. These programs include (1) DOD's Foreign Claims Act, (2) the Department of State's Claims and Condolence Payment Program, and (3) the U.S. Agency for International Development's Marla Ruzicka Iraqi... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2003, a U.S.-led multinational force began operations in Iraq. At that time, 48 nations, identified as a "coalition of the willing," offered political, military, and financial support for U.S. efforts in Iraq, with 38 nations other than the United States providing troops. In addition, international donors met in Madrid in October 2003 to pledge funding for the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure, which had deteriorated after multiple wars and decades of neglect under the previous regime. This testimony discusses (1) the troop commitments other countries have made to operations in Iraq, (2) the funding the United States has provided to support other countries' participation in the multinational force, and (3) the financial support international donors have provided to Iraq reconstruction efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's prior work and data collected for this hearing. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents. We completed this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As of May 2007, 25 countries were contributing 12,600 troops to multinational forces in Iraq. Compared with 145,000 U.S. troops, coalition countries represent about 8 percent of multinational forces in Iraq. From December 2003 through May 2007, the number of coalition troops decreased from 24,000 to 12,600; the number of coalition nations contributing troops decreased from 33 to 25. The United Kingdom, Poland, and Republic of Korea are responsible for leading operations in three of seven security sectors in Iraq. In addition, coalition troops have performed humanitarian, medical, and reconstruction missions. Some have provided combat capabilities, such as infantry and explosive ordinance capabilities. The United States has spent about $1.5 billion to transport, sustain, and provide other services for military troops from 20 countries other than the United States and Iraq. The United States used about $1 billion of the $1.5 billion to feed, house, and equip these countries. In terms of allocation by country, about $988 million, or 66 percent, was used to support Poland and the countries under its command, and $300 million, or 20 percent, supported Jordan for border operations and other activities. In addition to support for operations in Iraq, the United States, through the State Department, has provided about $1.9 billion in security assistance for military training and equipment to 10 coalition members and Jordan since 2003. As of April 2007, international donors had pledged about $14.9 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Some countries exceeded their pledges by an additional $744 million for a total of $15.6 billion. About $11 billion, or 70 percent, of these pledges are loans, with the remaining $4.6 billion in the form of grants. As of April 2007, Iraq had accessed about $436 million in loans and $3 billion in grants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This testimony discusses some of the systemic conditions in Iraq that contribute to the fraud, waste, or abuse of U.S.-provided funds. Since 2003, DOD has reported total costs of about $257.5 billion for military operations in Iraq; these have increased from about $38.8 billion in fiscal year 2003 to about $83.4 billion in fiscal year 2006. The largest increase has been in operation and maintenance expenses, including items such as support for housing, food, and services; the repair of equipment; and transportation of people, supplies and equipment. Many of the operation and maintenance expenses are for services. Other U.S. government agencies had reported obligations of $29 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization, as of October 2006. These funds have been used for, among other things, infrastructure repair of the electricity, oil, water, and health sectors; training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces; and administrative expenses. Specifically, the testimony focuses on (1) security, (2) management and reporting of the program to train and equip Iraqi security forces, (3) contracting and contract management activities, and (4) Iraqi capacity and commitment to manage and fund reconstruction and security efforts. Despite U.S. and Iraqi efforts to shift a greater share of the country's defense on Iraqi forces, the security situation continues to deteriorate. Poor security conditions have hindered the management of the more than $29 billion that has been obligated for reconstruction and stabilization efforts since 2003. Although the State Department has reported that the number of Iraqi army and police forces that has been trained and equipped has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to about 323,000 in December 2006, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex. These conditions have hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and demonstrate the difficulty in making political and economic progress in the absence of adequate security conditions. GAO's ongoing work has identified weaknesses in the $15.4 billion program to support the development and sustainment of Iraqi security forces. Sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi units, and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside the areas where they were recruited. Corruption and infiltration by militias and others loyal to parties other than the Iraqi government have resulted in the Iraqi security forces being part of the problem in many areas instead of the solution. While unit-level transition readiness assessments (TRA) provide important information on Iraqi security force capabilities, the aggregate reports DOD provides to Congress based on these assessments do not provide adequate information to judge the capabilities of Iraqi forces. The DOD reports do not detail the adequacy of Iraqi security forces' manpower, equipment, logistical support, or training and may overstate the number of... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2005, the President issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. According to the strategy, victory will be achieved when Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terror. To help Iraq achieve this, the U.S. is, among other efforts, helping strengthen the capabilities of the Iraq Ministries of Defense and Interior (police forces) so they can assume greater responsibility for the country's security. The United States has provided about $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi security forces and institutions. In this testimony, GAO discusses preliminary observations on (1) U.S. and Iraqi funding to develop and sustain the Iraqi security forces, and (2) key challenges the United States and Iraq face in improving the security ministries' operations and management. This statement is based on prior GAO reports, recent fieldwork in Iraq and Department of Defense, U.S. Treasury and Embassy budget documents. GAO added information to this statement in response to comments from Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq. We completed the work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In March 2007, DOD reported that Iraq will increase its 2007 security budget from $5.4 billion to $7.3 billion (a 37-percent increase). DOD states this increase provides evidence of the country's growing self-sufficiency and commitment to security. However, our analysis shows that some of this increase is due to the appreciation of the Iraqi dinar against the dollar. Using a constant exchange rate, Iraq's 2007 security budget grows by 15 percent. Also, Iraq faced problems spending its 2006 security budget. As of November 2006, the Iraq Ministry of Defense had spent only about 1 percent of its capital goods budget for weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. DOD has requested $5.8 billion in additional U.S. funds to help purchase these items for Iraq and provide assistance to its security ministries. The United States and Iraq face personnel and logistical challenges in developing ministries that can sustain Iraq's growing security forces. For example, the ministries have inadequate systems to account for personnel and inexperienced staff with limited budgeting and technology skills. Also, both security ministries have difficulties acquiring, distributing, and maintaining weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The U.S.-led coalition has provided significant resources to develop Iraq's security forces and has 215 military and civilian advisors at the ministries. The United States signed a foreign military sales agreement with Iraq that, according to U.S. officials, allows Iraq to bypass its ineffective procurement systems to purchase equipment directly from the United States. Iraq has deposited $1.9 billion into its account for foreign military sales. However, it is unclear whether this program will help improve the ministries' procurement and... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued in November 2005, implies a conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence there. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported to Congress in November 2006 that although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior had about 323,000 trained and equipped forces, there was a serious shortcoming for both Ministries in the planning and executing of their logistics and sustainment requirements. According to DOD, without a developed logistical system the ISF will require continued Coalition support. Today's testimony addresses (1) the current state of the ISF's logistical capabilities, and (2) the challenges the ISF is facing to achieve logistical self-sufficiency. This testimony contains unclassified portions of a classified report that was issued on March 7, 2007. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from January 2006 through March 2007. Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in place, the implementation of that concept has been hampered by numerous challenges. For example, the development of national and regional logistics centers has lagged behind the development of other logistics formations because of manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, poor maintenance, and funding procurement issues. DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot and for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities on Garrison Support Units and Regional Support Units. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of all echelons of logistics units is crucial in order for the Ministry of Defense to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. Furthermore, the policies and procedures intended to guide implementation of the logistics concept have not been effectively distributed. In addition, the training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been hindered by an insufficiency in the supply of Arabic-literate students, of fuel needed to power generators, and of cadre qualified to serve as faculty at the logistics schools. Finally, maintenance of the vehicle fleet poses challenges because of its diversity, the shortage of trained mechanics, and the Ministry's failure to budget for and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment. As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. For instance, in July 2006, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the Ministry, in addition to funding a contractor to... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO provided a strategic overview of GAO's work related to securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq. In our statement today, as requested, GAO highlighted (1) GAO's scope, authority, and coordination; (2) some of the insights stemming from our work in Iraq; and (3) the rigorous quality assurance framework that GAO uses to ensure relevant, reliable, and consistent results in all of our work. This testimony is based upon extensive work spanning several years. Since 2003, we have issued 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. For example, GAO sent a report to the Congress last week on a range of key issues for congressional oversight of efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq. Although many of our sources are classified, we strive to report information to the Congress in a public format to promote greater transparency and accountability of U.S. government policies, programs, and activities. As provided for in our congressional protocols, most of our work in Iraq has been performed under my authority to conduct evaluations on my own initiative since it is a matter of broad interest to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both chambers. Our work also helped inform the deliberations of the Iraq Study Group; the Comptroller General personally briefed this group on the results of our Iraq work in June 2006. GAO also provided significant additional information to the Iraq Study Group for its use. GAO and the Inspectors General (IG) of individual departments and agencies have different roles and responsibilities. GAO's broad audit authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding. Our work spans the security, political, and economic prongs of the U.S. national strategy in Iraq. The broad, cross-cutting nature of this work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by any individual Inspector General. Based on our work, we have made some unique contributions to Congress. Our past and ongoing work has focused on the U.S. strategy and costs of operating in Iraq, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, governance issues, the readiness of U.S. military forces, and acquisition outcomes. Some highlights from our work follow. Our analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq recommended that the National Security Council improve the strategy by articulating clearer roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In our examination of the cost of U.S. military operations abroad, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense improve the transparency and reliability of Department of Defense's (DOD) Global War on Terror (GWOT) obligation data. We also recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more predictable. In assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining these problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq and DOD's increasing use of contractors to support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on review under the Comptroller General's statutory authority. Specifically, GAO's objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces since our 2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and interviewed military and contractor officials both at deployed locations and in the United States. DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since the mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces. Also, while DOD's new guidance is a noteworthy step, a number of problems we have previously reported on continue to pose difficulties for military personnel in deployed locations. For example, DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. For example, when Multi-National Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed to bases in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being performed. While a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in more demanding contracting environments in deployed locations presents unique difficulties. Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing procedures to systematically collect and share its institutional knowledge using... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of Defense's (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining these problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq and DOD's increasing use of contractors to support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this follow-on review under the Comptroller General's statutory authority. Specifically, GAO's objective was to determine the extent to which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces since our 2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and interviewed military and contractor officials both at deployed locations and in the United States. DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since the mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces. Also, while DOD's new guidance is a noteworthy step, a number of problems we have previously reported on continue to pose difficulties for military personnel in deployed locations. For example, DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on contractors to support their operations. For example, when Multi-National Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan, officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed to bases in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-building the capacity of the consolidated bases. DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being performed. While a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in more demanding contracting environments in deployed locations presents unique difficulties. Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing procedures to systematically collect and share its institutional knowledge using... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Of the $18.4 billion that Congress appropriated for Iraq relief and reconstruction in fiscal year 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) received the largest share--$13.5 billion. As of September 30, 2006, DOD had obligated about $13.1 billion and disbursed about $9.7 billion--$5.6 billion for construction, $3.6 billion for nonconstruction (e.g., engineering, procurement, and the delivery of equipment), and about $480 million for related overhead costs. Among the many contracts DOD uses in Iraq, DOD has obligated about $3.7 billion for 12 large-scale, multiple-year design-build contracts for major construction projects. The design-build contracting approach makes one award for both the design and construction of a project, thus eliminating the need for a separate bidding process for the construction phase. To help Congress monitor the current progress and costs of DOD's reconstruction activities in Iraq, this report discusses (1) the status of the current construction work and targeted completion dates and (2) the support costs incurred by the design-build contractors in DOD's construction program. While financial data show that DOD has obligated most (97 percent) of its $13.5 billion in fiscal year 2004 reconstruction funds, work-in-place data show that about 29 percent, or $2.3 billion, of DOD's construction program is incomplete, as of October 8, 2006. Continued congressional oversight of these activities will be needed since DOD estimates that this work will not be completed until mid- to late 2008. The incomplete work varies by sector, with 10 percent of planned construction remaining in the security and justice sector and 38 percent remaining in the communications and transportation sector. Activities in the public works and water sector; the buildings, education, and health sector; and the transportation and communications sector will not be completed until mid- to late 2008. Although the United States has generally not met its goals for reconstruction activities in Iraq, DOD projects that its remaining construction projects will enable Iraq to increase its production of oil, electricity, and clean water and treated sewerage. As GAO's past work has shown, the challenging security environment, persistent attacks on U.S.-funded infrastructure projects, and sustainment challenges could make it difficult for DOD to achieve this progress. DOD's design-build contractors will incur estimated support costs of about $1.2 billion or about 33 percent of projected completion costs of $3.7 billion. The support costs include estimated security costs of about $359.6 million. In response to higher-than-anticipated support costs, DOD officials have pursued alternative contracting strategies. For example, DOD officials have contracted directly with Iraqi firms in the electricity and transportation sectors rather than relying exclusively on U.S. design-build contractors to complete the work. U.S. officials state that the transition to direct... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States, along with its coalition partners and various international organizations, has undertaken a challenging, complex, and costly effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. The Department of Defense (DOD) has responsibility for a significant portion of the reconstruction effort. Amid signs of progress, the coalition faces numerous political, security, and economic challenges in rebuilding Iraq. Within this environment, many reconstruction projects have fallen short of expectations, resulting in increased costs, schedule delays, reduced scopes of work, and in some cases project cancellations. This testimony (1) discusses the overall progress that has been made in rebuilding Iraq and (2) describes challenges faced by DOD in achieving successful outcomes on individual projects. This testimony reflects our reviews of reconstruction and DOD contract management issues, as well as work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. In our previous reports, we have made several recommendations to improve outcomes in Iraq. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations. Overall, the United States generally has not met its goals for reconstruction activities in Iraq with respect to the oil, electricity, and water sectors. As of August 2006, oil production is below the prewar level, and the restoration of electricity and new or restored water treatment capacity remain below stated goals. One-third of DOD's planned construction work still needs to be completed and some work is not planned for completion until late 2008. Continuing violence in the region is one of the reasons that DOD is having difficulty achieving its goals. The contracting challenges encountered in Iraq are emblematic of systemic issues faced by DOD. When setting requirements for work to be done, DOD made assumptions about funding and time frames that later proved to be unfounded. The failure to define realistic requirements has had a cascading effect on contracts and has made it difficult to take subsequent steps to get successful outcomes. For example, in the absence of settled requirements, agencies sometimes rely on what are known as undefinitized contract actions, which can leave the government exposed to increased costs. Further, DOD lacked the capacity to provide effective oversight and manage risks. We also found that DOD, at times, improperly used interagency contracts and was not able to take advantage of full and open competition during the initial stages of reconstruction. Just as multiple factors contribute to success or failure, multiple actors play a role in achieving successful acquisition outcomes, including policy makers, program managers, contracting officers, and the contractors themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The viability of the All Volunteer Force depends, in large measure, on the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to recruit several hundred thousand individuals each year. Since the involvement of U.S. military forces in Iraq in March 2003, several DOD components have been challenged in meeting their recruiting goals. In fiscal year 2005 alone, three of the eight active and reserve components missed their goals. Some recruiters, reportedly, have resorted to overly aggressive tactics, which can adversely affect DOD's ability to recruit and erode public confidence in the recruiting process. GAO was asked to address the extent to which DOD and the services have visibility over recruiter irregularities; what factors may contribute to recruiter irregularities; and what procedures are in place to address them. GAO performed its work primarily at the service recruiting commands and DOD's Military Entrance Processing Command; examined recruiting policies, regulations, and directives; and analyzed service data on recruiter irregularities. DOD and the services have limited visibility to determine the extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. DOD, for example, has not established an oversight framework that includes guidance requiring the services to maintain and report data on recruiter irregularities and criteria for characterizing irregularities and establishing common terminology. The absence of guidance and criteria makes it difficult to compare and analyze data across services and limits DOD's ability to determine when corrective action is needed. Effective federal managers continually assess and evaluate their programs to provide accountability and assurance that program objectives are being achieved. Additionally, the services do not track all allegations of recruiter wrongdoing. Accordingly, service data likely underestimate the true number of recruiter irregularities. Nevertheless, available service data show that between fiscal years 2004 and 2005, allegations and service-identified incidents of recruiter wrongdoing increased, collectively, from 4,400 cases to 6,500 cases; substantiated cases increased from just over 400 to almost 630 cases; and criminal violations more than doubled from just over 30 to almost 70 cases. The department, however, is not in a sound position to assure Congress and the general public that it knows the full extent to which recruiter irregularities are occurring. A number of factors within the recruiting environment may contribute to irregularities. Service recruiting officials stated that the economy has been the most important factor affecting recruiting success. Almost three-quarters of active duty recruiters responding to DOD's internal survey also believed that ongoing hostilities in Iraq made it hard to achieve their goals. These factors, in addition to the typical challenges of the job, such as demanding work hours and pressure to meet monthly goals, may lead to recruiter... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1996, the United Nations (UN) and Iraq began the Oil for Food program after sanctions were imposed in 1990. The program was intended to allow the Iraqi government to sell oil to pay for humanitarian goods and prevent it from obtaining goods for military purposes. More than $67 billion in oil revenue was obtained through the program, with $31 billion in assistance delivered to Iraq. Internal controls serve as the first line of defense in preventing fraud, waste, and abuse and in helping agencies achieve desired outcomes. GAO assesses (1) the control environment the UN established for managing the sanctions and Oil for Food program and (2) other key internal control elements. In addition, we provide observations on the lessons learned from the program. The UN--the Security Council, the Secretariat, and member states--established a weak control environment for the Oil for Food program at the beginning. The UN allowed Iraq to control contract negotiations for imported commodities with little oversight, enabling the regime to obtain illicit funds through surcharges and kickbacks. The UN did not take steps to address the economic impact that the sanctions had on countries that depended on Iraqi trade, which undermined international support for sanctions and allowed Iraq to smuggle oil outside the Oil for Food program. Overall, the sanctions were effective in helping to prevent the Iraq regime from obtaining military items, but the UN was less rigorous in overseeing economic activities such as monitoring the price and value of Iraq's contracts. The UN's neglect of Iraq's illicit revenue streams helped support a sanctioned regime and undermined the goals of using oil revenues to benefit the Iraqi people. The UN did not adequately address key internal control elements as it implemented the Oil for Food program. First, UN entities lacked clear lines of authority. For example, the Office of the Iraq Program lacked clear authority for rejecting commodity contracts based on pricing concerns. In addition, the customs contractor at Iraq's border was not authorized to evaluate imports for price and quality. Second, the UN did not assess emerging risks as the Oil for Food program expanded from a 6-month emergency measure to deliver food and medicine to a 6-year program providing more than $31 billion to 24 economic sectors. Third, some monitoring activities constrained Iraq's ability to obtain illicit oil surcharges, but smuggling continued despite the presence of inspectors. In addition, the UN's internal audit office identified hundreds of weaknesses and irregularities in its reports. However, it lacked the resources and independence to provide effective oversight of this costly and complex UN effort. The Oil for Food program offers several lessons for designing future sanctions and strengthening existing UN programs: assess whether the sanctions program gives undue control to the sanctioned country; consider the economic impact that... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In summary, we determined that VA has not fully met any of 24 Special Committee recommendations in our review related to clinical care and education. Specifically, we determined that VA has not met 10 recommendations and has partially met 14 of these 24 recommendations. For example, the Special Committee recommended that VA develop, disseminate, and implement a best practice treatment guideline for PTSD. The Special Committee designated the recommendation as met because VA had developed and disseminated the guideline. However, because we found that VA does not have documentation to show that the treatment part of the guideline is being implemented at its medical facilities and community-based clinics, we designated the recommendation as partially met. We also determined that VA does not plan to fully implement 23 of 24 recommendations until fiscal year 2007 or later. Ten of these are longstanding recommendations that were first made in the Special Committee report issued in 1985. VA's delay in fully implementing the recommendations raises questions about VA's capacity to identify and treat veterans returning from military combat who may be at risk for developing PTSD, while maintaining PTSD services for veterans currently receiving them. This is particularly important because we reported in September 2004 that officials at six of seven VA medical facilities stated that they may not be able to meet an increase in demand for PTSD services. In addition, the Special Committee reported in its 2004 report that VA does not have sufficient capacity to meet the needs of new combat veterans while still providing for veterans of past wars. If servicemembers returning from military combat do not have access to PTSD services, many mental health experts believe that the chance may be missed, through early identification and treatment of PTSD, to lessen the severity of the symptoms and improve the overall quality of life for these combat veterans with PTSD. Moreover, VA has identified geographic areas of the country where large numbers of servicemembers are returning from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. VA could consider focusing first on ensuring service availability at facilities in areas that are likely to experience the most demand for PTSD services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 1994, two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters assigned to Operation Provide Comfort were shot down by two U.S. F-15 fighters, whose pilots misidentified the Black Hawks as Iraqi helicopters. All 26 persons aboard were killed. Following an Air Force investigation, one officer was tried by court-martial and later acquitted; another officer received a letter of reprimand; and nine others received administrative letters of either reprimand, admonition, or counseling. This testimony reviews the Air Force's investigation of this incident. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]