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A report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is presented, focusing on the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and how their coordination can be improved. Topics discussed include the U.S. Congress' reliance on the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide oversight of the operations; the need for documented agreements of roles; and the aid provided to Afghanistan.

The article offers information on analysis by U.S. General Accountability Office(GAO) on operational services contract provided by U.S. Department of Defense. Topics discussed include analyses on services during Iraq and Afghanistan support operations in 2002, focus of analysis on planning and policies followed during contract services and recommendations by GAO on providing guidance over operational contact services.

The article offers information on the report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) associated with the U.S. plans to reduce the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. The reports shows that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has started working on this plan and identified approximately 750,000 military weapons and vehicles that can be returned from Afghanistan.

The article reports on the efforts and success of development programs implemented in Afghanistan since 2002 as a part of the U.S. civilian-military strategic framework by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of Defense (DOD) of the U.S. It also discusses the coordination of two agencies for developmental programs in Afghanistan through interviews with officials. It suggests the agencies to keep shared and written records of the developmental reports.

The article focuses on the draft report "Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting" from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). The draft shows that the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide several services. Also, they have relied on recipients of grants and cooperative agreements.

The article discusses the compliance of fiscal law by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Department of State to meet the requirements of critical goods and services in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study, the State and DOD didn't comply with the requirements for management of assisted acquisitions. It also mentions that State did not assess the cost-effectiveness of using DOD's contracts for five of the 20 interagency acquisitions

The article discusses various challenges that may impact the progress and sustainment of capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Among the challenges include cost, key skill gaps in Afghan forces and limited ministerial capacity. It notes the allocation of 43 billion dollars to build, train, equip and sustain ANSF from fiscal year 2002 to 2011. Moreover, it mentions the gorwth of ANSF as reported by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

The article discusses the health care services provided by the U.S. Veterans Health Administration (VA) to various veteran populations. It informs that veteran populations include an aging veteran population and a growing number of younger veterans returning from the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also informs that services that are not the part of the VA's medical benefits package such as long-term care provided in nursing homes are also provided by it.

The article presents a report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) on funds provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist Afghanistan. It reports that USAID aims at building potentials of Afghanistan to provide security, enhance governance and develop a sustainable economy. The report adds that USAID assists Afghanistan through contracts which include grants and agreements. It further informs that a high risk environment has been faced by USAID officials.

The article presents a report of the U.S. the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the need of warfighter by the U.S Department of Defense (DOD) after Iraq and Afghanistan war. According to the GAO, the agencies who were given the contract to supply the warfighter took longer time to identify the need and supply the fund. It also provides the GAO's recommendations including the need of DOD's communication with the central command.

The article discusses the report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the acquisition and management of contractors by the Department of Defense (DOD) in Afghanistan. It discusses inability of the DOD to train the contracting officer's representatives (Cores) who perform the oversight duties in Afghanistan. The GAO recommends the DOD to enhance the current strategy for managing and overseeing contracts in Afghanistan.

The article presents information on a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the presence of the U.S. civilians in Afghanistan. According to the GAO, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) needs to improve its policies regarding the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce in order to make the U.S. civilians more capable of handling the mission work assigned to them. It also presents the comments made by the DOD in response to the GAO's report.

The article discusses the U.S strategy in Afghanistan which aimed to provide training and equipment to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It is stated that the U.S. has allocated an amount of 43 billion U.S. dollars for ANSF which includes 14 billion U.S. dollars for Afghan National Police (ANP). It is further stated that ANP training will provide a professionally-led police force which will be capable of maintaining civil order and enforcing laws.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that examines the capabilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) to sustain and support the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. It mentions the failure of the DOD to conduct a full assessment of its delivery performance for surface shipments. GAO has further recommended to address gaps in distribution to support current deployments and redeployments that has affected the supply operations.

The article presents the performance audit conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) for Afghanistan's Donor Dependence for September 2011. The audit aims to estimate the country's total public expenditures and the amounts funded by the donors. Result shows that Afghanistan's estimated total public expenditures grow from 5.5 billion dollar to 14.3 billion dollar from 2006 to 2010.

The article focuses on the effort of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the state to gather imposed billion dollars for assistance and contracts to aid the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. It discusses the creation of a process to examine non-U.S. sellers to insure that resources are not utilized to aid insurgents. It also explores the scrutiny of information that is shared among the DOD, USAID, and the state.

The article focuses on the report by U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) concerning security in Afghanistan. It mentions that GAO tries to examine the challenge and progress faced in expanding the Afghan National Army (ANA). It notes that GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense with the help of international partners should try to end the shortage of trainers in ANA. It cites that ANA has grown from 104,000 to 134,000 which is the interim growth goal set by the Afghan government.

The article presents the study of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which deals on open pit burning and solid waste management in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), burn pit emissions can potentially harm human health that may even lead them to death. Also noted are the various DOD guidance documents to discourage the long-term use of burn pits and encourage the use of incinerators and landfills to manage the risk.

The article discusses the report "USAID Continues to Face Challenges in Managing and Overseeing U.S. Development Assistance Programs" presented by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). It offers an overview of the U.S. assistance programs in Afghanistan by providing 11.5 billion dollars grant by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for counterinsurgency. It highlights the challenges encountered by the U.S. in managing development programs to reduce waste, fraud and abuse.

The June 15, 2010 report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on its strategic framework for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is presented. It focuses on the goal of the U.S. to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It highlights the reaffirmation of the U.S. strategic goal by U.S. President Barack Obama and the underscoring of the importance of the country's efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan and to help ensure the safety of the American people.

The article presents the report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) about updated information on the security environment in Afghanistan. It reports that as enemy-initiated attacks rise, the security situation in the country continues to worsen which becomes a huge challenge to the U.S. government. It adds that U.S. development programs are usually delayed or abandoned, supply transportation is disrupted and insurgency activities challenges counternarcotics operations.

The article reports on the need to improve the agency tracking of contracts and contractor personnel information in Iraq and Afghanistan. It states that the information is important to help various agencies in the U.S. such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State) to decide when and how to use contractors and ensure they are properly managed and overseen. It notes that the agencies have implemented the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT).

The article reports on the study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the compensation of deployed civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO states several issues involving medical care, worker's compensation, and post-deployment health assessments that affect the benefits of deployed civilians. GAO made recommendations to the Department of Defense (DOD) to clarify the guidance of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to review worker's compensation schemes.

The article presents a report on the condition of the U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan reform its Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The report examines the challenges of the programs which include the lack of military personnel and the resistance of Afghan commanders to cooperate. It recommends that the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State must take on an effort to provide dedicated military personnel to support the development of police mentor teams in Afghanistan.

The article presents the 2008 reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) related to Afghanistan reconstruction. It examines the status of the donor-funded road reconstruction projects since 2002 and the factors that affect the ability of donors to implement the planned projects. It evaluates the efforts of U.S. agencies to assess the impact of road reconstruction projects and to develop a sustainable maintenance program for donor-funded roads.

There are a number of ways that the U.S. government provides assistance to Iraqi or Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or suffer property damage as a result of U.S. and coalition forces' actions. For instance, the U.S. Agency for International Development funds projects to assist Iraqi and Afghan civilians and communities directly impacted by actions of U.S. or coalition forces. Also, the Department of State administers a program that makes payments, in accordance with local custom, to Iraqi civilians who are harmed in incidents involving U.S. protective security details. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) administers a program that provides compensation under the Foreign Claims Act to inhabitants of foreign countries for death, injury, or property damage caused by noncombat activities of U.S. military personnel overseas. Further, DOD provides monetary assistance in the form of solatia and condolence payments to Iraqi and Afghan nationals who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of U.S. or coalition forces' actions during combat. From fiscal years 2003 to 2006, DOD has reported about $1.9 million in solatia payments and more than $29 million in condolence payments to Iraqi and Afghan civilians who are killed, injured, or incur property damage as a result of U.S. or coalition forces' actions during combat. These payments are expressions of sympathy or remorse based on local culture and customs, but not an admission of legal liability or fault. Commanders make condolence payments using funds provided by Congress for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), whereas solatia payments are funded from unit operations and maintenance accounts. Pub. L. No. 108-106 (2003) requires DOD to provide quarterly reports on the source, allocation, and use of CERP funds. To administer the CERP, DOD has established 19 project categories for the use of funds, including categories for condolence payments and battle damage payments. At Congress's request, we reviewed DOD's solatia and condolence payment programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, we examined the following questions: (1) To what extent has DOD established guidance for making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan? (2) How are commanders making and documenting solatia and condolence payments in Iraq and Afghanistan and what factors do commanders consider when determining whether to make payments or payment amounts? (3) To what extent does DOD collect and analyze solatia and condolence payment data? We also are providing information on the other aforementioned programs established by the U.S. government to provide assistance to Iraqi and Afghan civilians who have been affected by U.S. or coalition forces' actions. These programs include (1) DOD's Foreign Claims Act, (2) the Department of State's Claims and Condolence Payment Program, and (3) the U.S. Agency for International Development's Marla Ruzicka Iraqi... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2001, the United States has appropriated over $15 billion to help secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan. In February 2007, the administration requested $12.3 billion in additional funding to accelerate some of these efforts to prevent the conflict-ridden nation from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and from devolving into a narco-state. More than 50 nations, including the United States, and several multilateral organizations are engaged in securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan. Progress has been made in areas such as economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan army and police, but after more than 5 years of U.S. and international efforts, the overall security situation in this poor and ethnically diverse country has not improved and, moreover, has deteriorated significantly in the last year. The lack of security limits the success of efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Direct challenges to these efforts include a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, inadequate infrastructure, limited government capacity, corruption, a largely illiterate and untrained labor force, a dramatic increase in drug production, and a lack of viable licit economic opportunities. Since 2003, we have issued five reports on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan--one on food and agricultural assistance, two on reconstruction assistance, one on efforts to establish Afghan national security forces, and one on drug control programs. We identified programmatic improvements that were needed, as well as many obstacles that limited success and should be taken into consideration in program design and implementation. A key improvement we identified in most of the U.S. efforts was the need for improved planning, including the development of strategic plans with elements such as measurable goals, specific time frames, cost estimates, and identification of external factors that could significantly affect efforts. Some additional needed improvements we identified include better coordination among the United States and other donor nations, more flexible options for program implementation, and timelier project implementation. We also concluded that several obstacles, especially deteriorating security and the limited institutional capacity of the Afghan government, challenge the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Responsiveness to our recommendations for programmatic improvements varied. Progress to date has been mixed in all areas we have reported on, including reform of Afghanistan's security sector. We reported that progress needs to be congruent in all five pillars of the security reform agenda established by the United States and several coalition partners. The United States has been involved to some degree with each of the five pillars and initially was charged with taking the lead in establishing the Afghan army, but has since allocated significant resources... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan imperils the stability of its government and threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation once again into a safe haven for traffickers and terrorists. To combat the drug trade, the U.S. government developed a counternarcotics strategy consisting of five pillars--alternative livelihoods, elimination and eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and justice, and public information. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2005 directed GAO to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) for Afghan counternarcotics programs. To comply with this mandate, we examined progress under each counternarcotics pillar, challenges faced, and efforts to ensure that funds were used for intended purposes. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent USAID and State documents and met with cognizant U.S. and international officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. USAID, State, Department of Defense, and Department of Justice were provided a draft of this report, but did not provide formal comments. USAID and State received about $532 million fiscal year 2005 funds and initiated a number of projects under each counternarcotics pillar, but delays in implementation limited progress. For example, State's provision of aircraft enhanced the mobility of eradicators, but coordination difficulties between Afghan officials and security forces delayed the eradicators' fielding. Despite increased eradication and other U.S. efforts, the poppy crop grew by 50 percent in 2006 to a record level. However, many projects have not been in place long enough to assess progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. For example, projects to provide rural credit and to field teams to discourage poppy cultivation were not in place prior to the 2005-2006 growing season. The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are tremendous challenges to the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. The security situation continues to decline; during the 2005-2006 growing season, eradicators were attacked several times and alternative livelihoods project personnel were killed. Moreover, due to Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental institutions, significantly reducing poppy cultivation and drug trafficking is expected to take at least a decade. USAID and State have made efforts to oversee the use of funds, including the use of self certifications, contract clauses, and vetting, when applicable. However, a lack of official records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and State have made efforts to monitor ongoing projects, security concerns and poor... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had no army or functioning police and, before September 11, 2001, was a haven for international terrorists. In April 2002, the United States and several other nations agreed to reform the five pillars of Afghanistan's security sector--creating an Afghan army, reconstituting the police force, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the Afghan militias. As the leader for the army pillar, the United States has provided about $3.3 billion. For the German-led effort to reconstitute the Afghan police, the United States has provided over $800 million. We examined the progress made, and limitations faced, in developing the army and police forces. We also identified challenges that must be addressed to complete and sustain these forces. As of March 2005, Defense had trained more than 18,300 Afghan combat troops--over 42 percent of the army's projected total of 43,000--and deployed them throughout the country. During 2004, the Department of Defense significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training. However, Defense efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat troops have fallen behind, and efforts to establish sustaining institutions, such as a logistics command, needed to support these troops have not kept pace. Plans for completing these institutions are not clear. Germany and the United States had trained more than 35,000 police as of January 2005 and expect to meet their goal of training 62,000 police by December 2005. However, the Department of State has just begun to address structural problems that affect the Afghan police force. Trainees often return to police stations where militia leaders are the principal authority; most infrastructure needs repair, and the police do not have sufficient equipment--from weapons to vehicles. Furthermore, limited field-based mentoring has just begun although previous international police training programs have demonstrated that such mentoring is critical for success. Moreover, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (which oversees the police force) requires reform and restructuring. Finally, neither State nor Germany has developed plans specifying how much the program will cost and when it will be completed. Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces and concurrent progress in the other pillars of security sector reform, Afghanistan could again become a haven for terrorists. However, establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly take years and substantial resources. Available information suggests that these programs could cost up to $7.2 billion to complete and about $600 million annually to sustain. Furthermore, the other lead nations have made limited progress in reforming Afghan's judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the militias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]