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The 1997 peer review of the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) done by the Environmental Protection Agency IG resulted in a qualified opinion. The peer review report questioned the quality assurance system used by the DOD IG and said that the reviewed audits did not fully comply with Government Auditing Standards. The 2000 peer review done by the Department of the Treasury IG for Tax Administration (TIGTA) also resulted in a unqualified opinion. Although TIGTA cited several problems, the peer review report concluded that the quality assurance system used by the DOD IG reasonably ensured compliance with auditing standards. However, after the peer review had been completed, a letter was sent to Congress, the press, and others questioning the integrity of the documentation that the DOD IG provided to the TIGTA peer review staff. A DOD IG internal investigation later confirmed that the work papers for one of the audits chosen for peer review had been altered and destroyed. The report concluded that these actions violated Government Auditing Standards, internal DOD IG audit policies, and the expectations of the external peer review staff. TIGTA then withdrew its 2000 peer review opinion and issued a disclaimer of opinion in May 2001, stating that it was unable to determine whether the substantiated allegations would materially affect the DOD IG's system of quality control. As a result, the DOD IG failed to meet the requirement that it obtain a peer review at least once every three years. The DOD IG began qualifying its audit reports to explain its lack of compliance with the peer review requirements set forth in Government Auditing Standards. The 2001 peer review done by the Department of Health and Human Services IG similarly resulted in a qualified opinion. The 2001 peer review report said that the DOD IG's quality assurance system needs improvement and that audits were not always in compliance with Government Auditing Standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a study investigating complaints related to alleged failures of some companies to comply with the U.S. government auditing standards (GAGAS) on the U.S. Defense Contract Audit Agency's (DCAA's) audits. The DCAA works under the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), while the study was conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). It was observed that the DCAA management pressures to complete audit work on time to meet performance metrics.

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the the Department of Defense's (DOD) initiatives to change export and procurement policies and procedures that relate to the transfer or sale of defense articles and services that may have national security implications. GAO noted that: (1) in 1999, DOD compiled a list of 81 initiatives designed to facilitate cross-border industrial relationships and address possible security risks; (2) at the time of this report, 43 of the initiatives are ongoing, 21 are completed, 17 have been terminated, placed on hold, duplicated other initiatives, or the status was uncertain; (3) 47 of the initiatives addressed disclosure of classified information, export controls, industrial base, and industrial security procedures and policies; (4) the remaining 34 initiatives focused on efforts to reinvent the Foreign Military Sales Program; (5) some of the initiatives were developed to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of internal business practices while others sought to change export and procurement policies; and (6) senior officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense were responsible for developing the initiatives and invited high-level officials from the military departments and the Departments of State and Commerce to participate in their discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 requires GAO to report on the timeliness of Department of Defense (DOD) payments made to small businesses. GAO's report focuses on (1) whether, at DOD payment centers for which data were available, small business invoices were more likely to be paid late; (2) whether systemic weaknesses in DOD payment processes result in late payments to contractors--including small business contractors; and (3) the impact of late payments on small businesses. To calculate timeliness rates, GAO used the data DOD was able to provide for 9 of its 20 vendor payment locations as well as its one contract pay location. GAO used a case study approach for the third objective because data limitations did not permit the use of statistically reliable sampling techniques for assessing the experiences of DOD small business contractors as a whole. Case study contractors were selected because they experienced a high frequency of late payments and may not be reflective of all small businesses. DOD paid small business invoices late more often than all invoices paid at the nine locations for which data were available. Ten percent of all invoices at these locations were paid late--compared with 14.5 percent of small business invoices. According to DOD officials, the disparity may have occurred because DOD's cash management and prioritization practices tend to favor paying larger vendors first. Although DOD has reported significant improvements in its metrics related to late payments, these improvements have come through dedicating additional resources to the problem and not through addressing the underlying weaknesses that cause late payments. Resolving the payment timing disparity will involve improving the overall timeliness of DOD payments to contractors regardless of size. Systemic weaknesses in DOD's payment processes result in late payments to contractors, including small business contractors. DOD continues to process mostly paper payment documents, which can often result in redundant data entry; misplaced documents; higher than necessary transaction processing fees; and ultimately, payment delays. To its credit, DOD has invested in a Web-based tool, WAWF, that could facilitate the electronic exchange of payment data and documents, but the initiative lacks the requisite management focus and strategic direction needed to be successful. For example, the WAWF program lacks performance metrics and does not have a clear strategy for ensuring that WAWF will be effectively utilized. Finally, in many cases, the military services and defense agencies are not required to acknowledge receipt and acceptance electronically. Instead, they submit paper documents that must be matched with contractor invoices to complete the payment transaction, which can lead to payment delays. Disruptions of cash flow caused by late payments--depending on the extent and duration--can significantly affect the day-to-day operations... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ineffective oversight and management of the Department of Defense's (DOD) travel card program, which GAO previously reported on, have led to concerns about airline tickets DOD purchased but did not use and for which it did not claim refunds. GAO was asked to (1) determine whether, and to what extent, airline tickets purchased through the centrally billed accounts were unused and not refunded and (2) determine whether DOD's internal controls provided reasonable assurance that all unused tickets were identified and submitted for refunds. Control breakdowns over the centrally billed accounts resulted in DOD paying for airline tickets that were not used and not processed for refund. DOD was not aware of this problem before our audit and did not maintain data on unused tickets. We determined, based on airline data, that DOD had purchased--primarily in fiscal years 2001 and 2002--about 58,000 tickets with a residual (unused) value of more than $21 million that remained unused and not refunded as of October 2003. We also identified more than 81,000 partially unused airline tickets with a purchase price of about $62 million that will require additional analysis to determine the residual value. Based on further analysis of the limited data, it is possible that DOD purchased at least $100 million in airline tickets that it did not use and for which it did not claim refunds from fiscal years 1997 through 2003. Although GAO asked DOD's five most frequently used airlines for fiscal year 2001 and 2002 unused ticket data, the airlines did not provide uniform, complete, or consistent responses. For example, one airline did not provide partially unused ticket data, another airline's fiscal year 2001 data covered only September 2001, while yet another airline provided data on electronic tickets dating back to November 1998. Although additional data on unused tickets may be available from the airlines' archives, our attempts to obtain additional information were unsuccessful. DOD's unused ticket problems were caused by a flawed process that relied extensively on DOD personnel to report unused tickets to the travel offices. Although it appears that many unused tickets were processed for a refund, the internal controls DOD had in place did not detect millions of dollars of unused airline tickets. Specifically, DOD did not systematically implement compensating procedures to identify instances in which DOD personnel did not report unused tickets, or reconcile the centrally billed accounts to travel claims to determine whether airline tickets were used. Although some units had instituted a process by fiscal year 2002 to more systematically identify instances of unused tickets, the process was not implemented DOD-wide, DOD did not verify that units were consistently implementing the process, and the process could only identify unused electronic--not paper--tickets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Testifying before Congress in 2002, military beneficiary groups and civilian managed care support contractors described problems with the processing of TRICARE claims for civilian-provided care. These problems included slow payments and procedures that made claims processing inefficient. The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 required GAO to review improvements to TRICARE claims processing and continuing impediments to claims processing efficiency. Specifically, GAO describes (1) efforts to improve claims processing and changes in processing timeliness and (2) Department of Defense (DOD) procedures and data that continue to affect claims processing efficiency. To identify improvements to claims processing and impediments to processing efficiency, GAO analyzed 1999 and 2002 claims data for changes in processing timeliness. GAO also interviewed and analyzed claims processing documentation from DOD officials, managed care support contractors, and claims processors. In an effort to improve TRICARE claims processing, DOD and its managed care support (MCS) contractors have made changes that are designed to make it more efficient. First, they have jointly identified--and then eliminated or changed--certain DOD requirements they deemed inefficient and nonessential to accurate claims processing. For example, contractors are no longer required to hold claims with incomplete information and request the missing information from the provider or beneficiary. Instead, contractors may now return some claims with missing information. In another change, DOD eliminated preauthorization requirements for certain procedures and gave the MCS contractors more latitude for determining when preauthorizations are appropriate. To encourage providers to submit their claims electronically, DOD gave MCS contractors the authority to decide whether to adjudicate electronically submitted claims sooner than those submitted on paper. Further, MCS contractors have worked with their claims processors to implement new technologies for data input, claims routing, customer service, and claims submission. Finally, MCS contractors and their claims processors have improved the timeliness with which they process claims. In fiscal year 2002, claims processors processed over 97 percent of claims in 30 days or less--an improvement over fiscal year 1999, when 91 percent of claims were processed in 30 days or less. Although DOD and its MCS contractors have made changes to improve claims processing, some DOD procedures and inaccuracies in its data continue to create inefficiencies in TRICARE claims processing. Some DOD procedures may create inefficiencies by inadvertently increasing the demand for customer service, which claims processors are required to provide. Additionally, inaccuracies in DOD eligibility data--data that are needed to process TRICARE claims--can contribute to claims processing delays or rework if, for example, claims must be reprocessed when errors are identified. Finally, some DOD procedures lead to rework for claims processors, either in the form of reprocessing claims or reprogramming processing software. For example, when DOD makes program changes to TRICARE to alter or create a health benefit, it does not adhere to any schedule. In 2002, DOD made 123 program changes on 19 different dates throughout the year. Given the fact that implementing these changes often involves reprogramming and testing processing software, this approach can create rework for claims processors when DOD issues similar or related changes on separate occasions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO has reported on limitations in the management of U.S. low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). LLRW ranges from very low-activity to higher-activity waste. To identify potential approaches to overcome these limitations, GAO was asked to examine the extent to which other countries have (1) LLRW inventory databases, (2) timely removal of higher-activity LLRW from waste generator sites, (3) disposition options for all LLRW, and (4) requirements that LLRW generators have financial reserves to cover waste disposition costs, as well as any other approaches that might improve U.S. LLRW management. GAO primarily relied on a survey of 18 countries representing leading LLRW generators to identify their management approaches and to compare them with U.S. survey results and with approaches suggested by LLRW generators, disposal operators, and regulators in the United States. Academic, industrial, medical, utility, and government entities in the United States, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE), disposed of at least 15 million cubic feet of LLRW in 2005. This waste includes debris, rubble, soils, paper, liquid, metals, and clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity or contaminated with radioactive material, and sealed radiological sources that are no longer useful for industrial or other applications (disused). Other countries that have nuclear reactor units and use radioactive materials in other ways manage the residual LLRW in some ways that are different than in the United States. Of the countries surveyed, GAO found that most countries indicated they have national radioactive waste inventory databases that include information on all waste generators, waste types, storage locations, and disused sealed radiological sources, and that they use them to forecast future disposal capacity needs. Most countries indicated they facilitate the timely removal of higher-activity LLRW, essentially disused sealed radiological sources, from generator sites to enhance safety and security, including requiring the return of a disused source to a source supplier. Most countries indicated they have disposal options for lower-activity LLRW, central storage options for higher-activity LLRW, and alternative disposal options for very low-level radioactive waste that in most cases does not require an exemption review by a nuclear regulatory authority. Half the countries indicated they impose financial assurance requirements on all waste generators to cover disposition costs, and most of these countries also use other approaches to reduce government costs to recover higher-activity LLRW, such as requiring a disposal fee at the time that a sealed radiological source is purchased. GAO also found that most countries surveyed use national radioactive waste plans to guide the management of their radioactive wastes. Many representatives from LLRW generators, disposal operators, regulators, and others told GAO that the application of similar approaches to... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Department of Defense (DOD) contractors perform numerous services that require access to classified information. With access comes the possibility of compromise, particularly as foreign entities increasingly seek U.S. military technologies. To ensure the protection of classified information, the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) establishes requirements that contractors must meet. In administering the NISP for DOD and 24 other government agencies, DOD's Defense Security Service (DSS) monitors whether 11,000- plus contractor facilities' security programs meet NISP requirements. In response to a Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, GAO assessed DSS's oversight and examined DSS's actions after possible compromises of classified information. DSS cannot provide adequate assurances to government agencies that its oversight of contractor facilities reduces the risk of information compromise. DSS is unable to provide this assurance because its performance goals and measures do not relate directly to the protection of classified information. While DSS maintains files on contractor facilities' security programs and their security violations, it does not analyze this information. Further, the manner in which this information is maintained--geographically dispersed paper-based files--does not lend itself to analysis. By not analyzing information on security violations and how well classified information is being protected across all facilities, DSS cannot identify systemic vulnerabilities and make corrective changes to reduce the risk of information compromise. When a contractor facility reports a violation and the possible compromise of classified information, DSS does not always follow established procedures. After receiving a report of a possible information compromise, DSS is required to determine whether compromise occurred and to notify the affected government agency so it can assess any damage and take actions to mitigate the effects of the suspected compromise, compromise, or loss. However, DSS failed to make determinations in many of the 93 violations GAO reviewed and made inappropriate determinations in others. In 39 of the 93 violations, DSS made no determinations regarding compromise. For 30 of the remaining 54 violations, DSS's determinations were not consistent with established criteria. As a result, government agencies are not being kept informed of possible compromises of their information. In addition, weeks or months can pass before government agencies are notified by DSS of possible information compromises because of difficulties in identifying the affected agencies. In 11 out of 16 instances GAO reviewed, it took DSS more than 30 days to notify the affected agency that its information had been lost or compromised. DSS relies on contractor facilities to identify the affected government agencies, but some facilities cannot readily provide DSS with this information because they are subcontractors that have to obtain the identity of the government agency from the prime contractors. In one case, 5 months passed before a subcontractor facility could provide DSS with the identity of the government agency whose information was suspected of being compromised. Such delays limit the government agencies' opportunity to assess and mitigate any damage from loss or compromise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the U.S. Government Accountability Office's review of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to provide affordable and quality care for military families' children under its child care program. Topics discussed include ways in which the DOD child care program supports the learning and development of young children, how the program supports the readiness of service members and their families, and the effects of high-quality child care on children in general.

The article focuses on the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) review of tactical aircraft studies conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) Joint Staff and the military services. Topics discussed include the gaps and shortfalls found in the DOD tactical aircraft studies, the tactical aircraft investments, and recommendations by GAO to DOD regarding its studies.

The article discusses the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report which reviewed the aircraft maintenance and staffing metrics of the U.S. Navy (USN) and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) from September 2020 to June 2022. Topics explored include the mission capable rates recorded for several selected aircraft, the need for the USN and USAF to mitigate fixed-wing aircraft sustainment risks, and the aircraft maintenance capabilities of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

The article presents a report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services which examines the execution of the Rapid Innovation Program (RIP) by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Topics include the establishment of a merit-based process for awarding RIP contracts, the identification of factors that lead to successful transition of innovative technologies and the need for the DOD to develop a program transition goal.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which assess the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) compliance on the statutory requirements of Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs) and its impact on mitigating cost and schedule risks. The study surveyed major defense acquisition programs of DOD, interviewed relevant military service, and reviewed the CSB. Results show that there is a need for DOD components to amend their CSB policies for its statute consistency.

The article focuses on the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives to better develop the sharing of medical information. VA and DOD are sharing and exchanging health information as well as creating electronic medical records. However, these exchanges are limited and not yet integrated to a strategy to reach the goal of comprehensive exchange of health information.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in ongoing efforts to share medical information, which is important in helping to ensure high-quality health care for active-duty military personnel and veterans. These efforts include a long-term program to develop modernized health information systems based on computable data: that is, data in a format that a computer application can act on--for example, to provide alerts to clinicians of drug allergies. In addition, the departments are engaged in short-term initiatives involving existing systems. GAO was asked to summarize its recent testimony on the history and current status of these long- and short-term efforts to share health information. To develop that testimony, GAO reviewed its previous work, analyzed documents, and interviewed VA and DOD officials about current status and future plans. For almost a decade, VA and DOD have been pursuing ways to share health information and create comprehensive electronic medical records. However, they have faced considerable challenges in these efforts, leading to repeated changes in the focus of their initiatives and target dates. In prior reviews of the departments' efforts, GAO noted management weaknesses, including the lack of a detailed project management plan to guide their efforts. Currently, the two departments are pursuing both long- and short-term initiatives to share health information. Under their long-term initiative, the modern health information systems being developed by each department are to share standardized computable data through an interface between data repositories associated with each system. The repositories have now been developed, and the departments have begun to populate them with limited types of health information. In addition, the interface between the repositories has been implemented at seven VA and DOD sites, allowing computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data to be exchanged. Implementing this interface is a milestone toward the departments' long-term goal, but more remains to be done. Besides extending the current capability throughout VA and DOD, the departments must still agree to standards for the remaining categories of medical information, populate the data repositories with this information, complete the development of the two modernized health information systems, and transition from their existing systems. While pursuing their long-term effort to develop modernized systems, the two departments have also been working to share information in their existing systems. Among various short-term initiatives are a completed effort to allow the one-way transfer of health information from DOD to VA when service members leave the military, as well as ongoing demonstration projects to exchange limited data at selected sites. One of these projects, building on the one-way transfer capability, developed an interface between certain existing systems that... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in ongoing efforts to share medical information, which is important in helping to ensure high-quality health care for active-duty military personnel and veterans. These efforts include a long-term program to develop modernized health information systems based on computable data: that is, data in a format that a computer application can act on--for example, to provide alerts to clinicians of drug allergies. In addition, the departments are engaged in near-term initiatives involving existing systems. GAO was asked to testify on the history and current status of these long- and near-term efforts to share health information. To develop this testimony, GAO reviewed its previous work, analyzed documents, and interviewed VA and DOD officials about current status and future plans. For almost a decade, VA and DOD have been pursuing ways to share health information and create comprehensive electronic medical records. However, they have faced considerable challenges in these efforts, leading to repeated changes in the focus of their initiatives and target dates. Currently, the two departments are pursuing both long- and short-term initiatives to share health information. Under their long-term initiative, the modern health information systems being developed by each department are to share standardized computable data through an interface between data repositories associated with each system. The repositories have now been developed, and the departments have begun to populate them with limited types of health information. In addition, the interface between the repositories has been implemented at seven VA and DOD sites, allowing computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data to be exchanged. Implementing this interface is a milestone toward the departments' long-term goal, but more remains to be done. Besides extending the current capability throughout VA and DOD, the departments must still agree to standards for the remaining categories of medical information, populate the data repositories with this information, complete the development of the two modernized health information systems, and transition from their existing systems. While pursuing their long-term effort to develop modernized systems, the two departments have also been working to share information in their existing systems. Among various near-term initiatives are a completed effort to allow the one-way transfer of health information from DOD to VA when service members leave the military, as well as ongoing demonstration projects to exchange limited data at selected sites. One of these projects, building on the one-way transfer capability, developed an interface between certain existing systems that allows a two-way view of current data on patients receiving care from both departments. VA and DOD are now working to link other systems via this interface and extend its capabilities. The... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the planned Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen OPIR) defense system of the U.S. Space Force. Topics discussed include the plan to replace the Space Based Infrared System under the system, technical and managerial problems encountered by the Next Gen OPIR program such as developing a mission payload, and the need for the Department of Defense (DOD) to document roles, responsibilities and plans.

The article presents a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the Department of Defense (DOD) management of the Defense-Wide Working Capital Fund (DWWCF) cash balance and response of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to the COVID-19 pandemic. Topics discussed include the use of generally accepted government auditing standards by GAO in the review, role of the DWWCF in DLA operations, and factors considered by DOD agencies in setting cash requirements for working capital funds.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the accomplishments of the Department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of a new electronic health record system at its Military Health System (MHS). Also cited are the beneficiaries of the MHS like service members, retirees and family members, and the steps take by the DOD in addressing challenges and risks to its MHS GENESIS program.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on how the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed the various procurement fraud schemes it faced. The strategies are in align with GAO's "Fraud Risk Framework." Also mentioned are the amount recovered by the DOD from defense-contracting fraud, and how filling vacancies at the Fraud Reduction Task Force will strengthen the DOD's fraud risk management.

The National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 authorized the military archives to (1) charge fees to persons requesting information and (2) retain collected fees to help defray costs of providing the information. Although none of the archives has yet implemented a fee, one archive plans to do so by October 2001. The Department of Defense's (DOD) archives and other offices are also authorized under both the User Charge Statute and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to charge for information provided to the public. However, neither of these statutes authorizes an agency to retain those fees. The four designated archives are charging fees to public requesters but are not using the fee schedule mandated by the DOD regulation implementing the User Charge Statute. Similarly, DOD's fee schedules for charges under FOIA are outdated. DOD's inconsistent use of the authority to charge fees and the use of outdated DOD fees schedules result in uncollected fees of a million dollars or more annually and inconsistent handling of public requests for historical information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of the risk and challenges facing the Department of Defense (DOD) in implementing information technology (IT) and addressing cybersecurity practices. Topics discussed include the DOD investment of 2.8 billion dollars on 29 major business IT programs in 2019, role of modernization changes and requirements changes in cost or schedule changes in 20 programs, and the need for DOD to report program risks accurately.

The article presents a study of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), that focuses on several actions for the U.S. Congress or executive branch agencies like National Nuclear Security Administration and the Dept. of Defense to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government. It mentions federal agencies could improve coordination of fragmented cybersecurity requirements and Dept. of Health & Human Services could improve coordination of its infectious disease modeling efforts.

The article looks at the past work of the Government Accountability Office related to efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to improve the management of its operations. Topics discussed include efforts by the DOD to improve data and baselines to monitor and inform reform efforts, roles, responsibilities and authorities for leading reform efforts, and progress in the reform efforts of the DOD.

The article reports that Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State) have similar processes for formal challenges to the classification of information. Topics include examines that DOD and State encourage authorized holders to resolve classification challenges informally before pursuing a formal classification challenge.

The article presents a study of the suspense accounts of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Topics discussed include the accounting systems used to record and summarize the financial transactions of individual DOD components, efforts of DOD and Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to reduce aged suspense account balances, and the lack of corrective action plans to address the causes of deficiencies in suspense account control.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office on the review of Department of Defense's efforts to schedule and hold timely entrance conferences. Topics include that entrance conferences provide GAO an opportunity to communicate its audit objectives and enable agencies to assign key points of contact to support its work.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office recommending the Departments of State and Commerce for improvement of their export control guidance and outreach. Topics include its assistance to address gaps in university export control compliance practices; and that the Department of Defense (DOD) should take steps to ensure its officials consistently interpret export control regulations.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the implementation by the Department of Defense (DOD) of its utilities privatization program, particularly its awarding of contracts for military installations. Topics include the efforts by the DOD to shorten the timeframe in awarding contracts and adopt best practices like introducing revised guidance and gathering data via working groups and conferences.

The article presents a study on the need for more progress for the Department of Defense (DOD)to complete statutory requirements of section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act . Topics include the extent to which DOD has made progress in implementing the requirements of section 911 and establishing cross-functional teams, comparison of DOD's actions to section 911 requirements, and recommendation to the DOD that it identifies and documents specific implementation steps.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), which reveals that the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), is Taking Steps to Obtain Interagency Input and Finalize Strategy. It reports that DOT in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense and other federal agencies, is responsible for federal programs to ensure that this industry meets defense needs.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggesting the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to collect and use key information to make decisions about incentives for physicians and dentists. It reports that provides substantial deferred and noncash benefits, such as retirement pensions and tuition-free education, whose value to service members is difficult to determine.

The article presents a U.S. Government Accountability Office report on missile defense. Topics discussed include challenges Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the defense intelligence community face in meeting the agency's threat assessment needs; extent to which MDA engages the defense intelligence community on missile defense acquisitions; and the take of Department of Defense on same.

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC). Topics include the FFRDC's aim to develop solutions to counter threats to national security, the allocation provided to FFRDCs, and the reasons behind the use by the DOD of Study and Analysis (S&A) Centers for research.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office related to nuclear weapons sustainment and improvements made to the defense budget in the U.S. It mentions that the U.S. Dept. of Defense (DOD) and the Dept. of Energy (DOE), through its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), are undertaking an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and modernize U.S. nuclear weapons.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office on the Space Command and Control (C2) program. Topics discussed include the use of Agile software development by the Air Force efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop space command and control capabilities; and a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), on the status of regulatory changes governing the use of the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) process as established under the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) in federal contracts for fiscal years 2017 and 2019. It mentions about the use of LPTA by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy.

The article presents a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office on foreign military sales (FMS). Topics include the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) should strengthen oversight of its growing transportation account balances, and foreign partners can arrange for their own transportation of FMS items or pay DOD a transportation fee to cover the costs of DOD transporting them.

The article presents a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which reveals that small businesses conduct reverse engineering for the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). It mentions that aviation and land and maritime officials check for patent markings on parts to ensure patented parts. It also mentions that the DLA is the U.S. Dept. of Defense (DOD's) combat logistics support agency and is responsible for purchasing, storing, and distributing consumable reparable parts.

The article presents a report on efforts needed to achieve greater progress on high-risk areas by U.S. Government Accountability Office as of March 2019. Topics discussed include improved ratings from the High- Risk List by Department of Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management; Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data; and ensuring the cybersecurity of the U.S.

The article presents a report on efforts needed to achieve greater progress on high-risk areas by U.S. Government Accountability Office as of March 2019. Topics discussed include improved ratings from the High- Risk List by Department of Defense (DOD) Supply Chain Management; ensuring the cybersecurity of the U.S. and Mitigating Gaps in Weather Satellite Data.

The article offers information on several aspects associated with a need of an improvement to monitor and assess review process by the U.S. based Department of Defense (DOD). The topics addressed include details on changes implemented by DOD for reviewing contractor business systems comprising systems such as accounting, estimating, and purchasing.

The article offers information on the report presented by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on the requirements of U.S. Department of Defense for implementation of plans for managing the military services. Topics discussed include information on the management of prepositioned stock programs; discussions on the National Defense Authorization Act which underlines national security threats, strategic mobility and service requirements; and the investment in prepositioned stocks.

The article talks about the US Department of Defense (DOD) lacking guidance and strategy to implement the National Guard counterdrug program. Topics discussed include the DOD's 2011 Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy having not been updated to reflect changing drug threats, though the National Drug Control Strategy has been updated accordingly.

The article reports on the review conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the implementation of Buy American Act of 1933, law that promotes domestic purchasing. It mentions the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) which reveals the procured foreign products by several federal agencies including Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The article presents a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which examines the military departments' planning processes for determining operational medical personnel requirements, including an assessment of the mix of federal civilian, contractor, and active and reserve medical personnel. The findings include the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), among other things assess the suitability of federal civilians and contractors to provide operational medical care.

The article informs that a report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that recommends the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) clarifying criteria for using lowest price technically acceptable process. Topics discussed include use of the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) process; regulations to defined by the National Defense Authorization Act; and the DOD's need to issue additional guidance.

The article discusses how the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) can enhance corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts of weapon system programs and infrastructure. It has been found by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that the Office has not issued guidance for identifying funding levels and maintaining documentation.

The article presents information from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the need for actions from the Department of Defense (DOD) to achieve efficiencies in government document services and services, including efforts to implement a transformation plan to consolidate Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Document Services facilities. Information on the study conducted by GAO on DOD's programs, efficiency initiatives and budget data from 2012-2016 is also given.

The article presents a report submitted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to congressional committees for cybersecurity requirements for utilities privatization contracts. The GAO examined guidance by the U.S. Department of Defense on installation energy management as well as documentation from all military departments regarding performance of utilities privatization contracts.