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The technology used to cast and count votes is one aspect of the multifaceted U.S. election process. GAO examined voting technology, among other things, in a series of reports that it issued in 2001 following the problems encountered in the 2000 election. In October 2002, the Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act, which, among other things, established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assist in the administration of federal elections. The act also established a program to provide funds to states to replace older punch card and lever machine voting equipment. As this older voting equipment has been replaced with newer electronic voting systems over the last 2 years, concerns have been raised about the vulnerabilities associated with certain electronic voting systems. Among other things, GAO's testimony focuses on attributes on which electronic voting systems can be assessed, as well as design and implementation factors affecting their performance. GAO also describes the immediate and longer-term challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using any type of voting equipment, particularly electronic voting systems. An electronic voting system, like other automated information systems, can be judged on several bases, including how well its design provides for security, accuracy, ease of use, and efficiency, as well as its cost. For example, direct recording electronic systems offer advantages in ease of use because they can have features that accommodate voters with various disabilities, and they protect against common voter errors, such as overvoting (voting for more candidates than is permissible); a disadvantage of such systems is their capital cost and frequent lack of an independent paper audit trail. Advantages of optical scan voting equipment (another type of electronic voting system) include capital cost and the enhanced security associated with having a paper audit trail; disadvantages include lower ease of use, such as limited ability to accommodate voters with disabilities. One important determinant of voting system performance is how it is designed and developed, including the testing that determines whether the developed system performs as designed. In the design and development process, a critical factor is the quality of the specified system requirements as embodied in applicable standards or guidance. For voting technology, these voluntary standards have historically been problematic; the EAC has now been given responsibility for voting system guidelines, and it intends to update them. The EAC also intends to strengthen the process for testing voting system hardware and software. A second determinant of performance is how the system is implemented. In implementing a system, it is critical to have people with the requisite knowledge and skills to operate it according to well-defined and understood processes. The EAC also intends to focus on these people and process factors in its role of assisting in the administration of elections. In the upcoming 2004 national election and beyond, the challenges confronting local jurisdictions in using electronic voting systems are similar to those facing any technology user. These challenges include both immediate and more long term challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By positively confirming identifications and linking relevant records of arrests and prosecutions, fingerprint analysis provides a basis for making fundamental criminal justice decisions regarding detention, charging, bail, and sentencing. In 1999, the FBI implemented the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)--a computerized system for storing, comparing, and exchanging fingerprint data in a digital format. The FBI's goal under IAFIS is to ultimately achieve paperless processing and to provide a response within 2 hours to users who submit criminal fingerprints electronically. Maximizing the benefits of rapid responses under IAFIS depends largely on how quickly criminal fingerprints are submitted by local and state law enforcement agencies. Concerns have been raised that, after arrests are made by some local or state law enforcement agencies, periods of up to 6 months may elapse before the criminal fingerprints are submitted for entry into IAFIS. GAO examined (1) the importance of IAFIS processing to local and state law enforcement agencies, (2) the progress these agencies have made toward the goal of paperless fingerprint processing, and (3) efforts being made to improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions. IAFIS processing of criminal fingerprints is important to local and state law enforcement not only for updating national databases but also for obtaining an individual's criminal history and, at times, for obtaining positive identification of arrestees. For a recent 8-month period (October 2002 through May 2003) that GAO reviewed, law enforcement agencies wanted a response from the FBI for 78 percent of the approximately 5.3 million sets of criminal fingerprints submitted to IAFIS. The extent to which these responses were used to either positively identify arrestees or obtain criminal history records is unknown. However, the FBI provided GAO with examples of how IAFIS responses prevented the premature release of individuals who had used false names at arrest and were wanted in other jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies have made progress toward the FBI's goal of paperless processing of criminal fingerprints, although there is room for substantial improvement. The percentage of criminal fingerprints submitted electronically by state repositories to the FBI increased from 45 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2003. Also, for the recent 8-month period GAO reviewed, the overall average submission time for criminal fingerprints was 40 days (an average that encompasses both paper and electronic submissions)--whereas, before IAFIS, average submission times were much higher (e.g., 118 days in 1997). Although much progress has been made, many jurisdictions lack automation and have backlogs of paper fingerprint cards to be processed, in part because of competing priorities and resource constraints. Numerous efforts have been made to help improve the timeliness of criminal fingerprint submissions to IAFIS. To facilitate electronic processing, federal technical and financial assistance has encouraged law enforcement agencies to purchase optical scanning (Livescan) equipment for taking fingerprints and to establish automated systems compatible with FBI standards. GAO noted that the need for quick, fingerprint-based identifications--positively linking individuals to relevant criminal history records--is becoming increasingly important. Reasons for such importance are the mobility of criminals (many of whom have multistate records), the growing incidence of identity theft or identity fraud, the significance of homeland security concerns, and increasing demands stemming from background checksrequired for employment or other noncriminal justice purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimated the 2010 Census would cost $11.5 billion, including $3 billion on automation and technology. At a March hearing, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) stated that the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program was likely to incur significant cost overruns and announced a redesign effort. At that time, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census as high risk, citing long-standing concerns in managing information technology (IT) investments and uncertain costs and operations. This testimony is based on past work and work nearing completion, including GAO's observation of the address canvassing dress rehearsal. For IT acquisitions, GAO analyzed system documentation, including deliverables, cost estimates, other acquisitions-related documents, and interviewed Bureau officials and contractors. This testimony describes the implications of redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and decennial operations, (2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) Decennial Census costs. The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. On April 3, 2008, Commerce announced significant changes to the FDCA program. It also announced that it expected the cost of the decennial to be up to $3 billion greater than previously estimated. The redesign will have fundamental impacts on the dress rehearsal as well as 2010 Census operations. Changes this late in the decade introduce additional risks, making more important the steps the Bureau can take to manage those risks. The content and timing of dress rehearsal operations must be altered to accommodate the Bureau's design. For example, Commerce has selected an option that calls for the Bureau to drop the use of handheld computers (HHCs) during the nonresponse follow-up operation, and the Bureau may now be unable to fully rehearse a paper-based operation. Additionally, reverting to a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation presents the Bureau with a wide range of additional challenges, such as arranging for the printing of enumerator forms and testing the systems that will read the data from these forms once completed by enumerators. Given the redesign effort, implementing GAO's recommendations associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected. According to the Bureau, the redesign and related revision of the FDCA program is expected to result in significant... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimated the 2010 Census would cost $11.5 billion, including $3 billion on automation and technology. At a March hearing, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) stated that the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program was likely to incur significant cost overruns and announced a redesign effort. At that time, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census as high risk, citing long-standing concerns in managing information technology (IT) investments and uncertain costs and operations. This testimony is based on past work and work nearing completion, including GAO's observation of the address canvassing dress rehearsal. For IT acquisitions, GAO analyzed system documentation, including deliverables, cost estimates, other acquisitions-related documents, and interviewed Bureau officials and contractors. This testimony describes the implications of redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and decennial operations, (2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) Decennial Census costs. The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. Last week Commerce announced significant changes to the FDCA program. It also announced that it expected the cost of the decennial to be up to $3 billion greater than previously estimated. The redesign will have fundamental impacts on the dress rehearsal as well as 2010 Census operations. Changes this late in the decade introduce additional risks, making more important the steps the Bureau can take to manage those risks. The content and timing of dress rehearsal operations must be altered to accommodate the Bureau's design. For example, Commerce has selected an option that calls for the Bureau to drop the use of handheld computers (HHCs) during the nonresponse follow-up operation, and the Bureau may now be unable to fully rehearse a paper-based operation. Additionally, reverting to a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation presents the Bureau with a wide range of additional challenges, such as arranging for the printing of enumerator forms and testing the systems that will read the data from these forms once completed by enumerators. Given the redesign effort, implementing GAO's recommendations associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected. According to the Bureau, the redesign and related revision of the FDCA program is expected to result in significant increases to the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the United States reviews its plans to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq, GAO has enclosed a series of issue papers for Congressional consideration in developing its oversight agenda for the 110th Congress and analyzing the President's revised strategy for Iraq. These papers are based on the continuing work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies we have provided to the Congress since May 2003. Iraq has had three successful elections, adopted a constitution, and installed its first elected government. At the same time, since the initial ground offensive ended in 2003, the costs to secure and stabilize Iraq have grown substantially, as has the level of violence that afflicts Iraqi society. Such violence stems from an insurgency that has grown more complex and lethal over the past 3 and 1/2 years and the Sunni-Shi'a conflict, which escalated dramatically in 2006. This instability complicates meaningful political reconciliation among Iraq's religious and tribal groups, reduces the effectiveness of U.S. and Iraqi reconstruction and capacity-building efforts, and diminishes the hopes and expectations of an Iraqi people without adequate jobs, water, fuel, and electricity. Increasing Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to them have not resulted in reduced violence. Rather, attacks increased throughout 2006. Although more Iraqi troops have been trained and equipped, high absenteeism and divided loyalties have limited their overall effectiveness. At the same time, our service members are working with great courage and diligence to perform the roles the President has asked of them. Notwithstanding their noble efforts, the U.S. military has sustained significant casualties. In addition, wear and tear on military equipment and growing replacement costs have risen substantially. The resulting stress and strain on American forces have reduced troop readiness levels and the availability of reserve personnel. The U.S. rebuilding effort in Iraq has focused on helping the Iraqi government establish a sound economy with the capacity to deliver essential services. Although Iraq's economy has grown and U.S. efforts have helped restore portions of Iraq's infrastructure, the poor security environment and mismanagement have diminished the overall results of U.S. investments. Iraq will need U.S. and international support, including political and economic incentives, to strengthen its fragile government institutions, which have thus far failed to adequately deter corruption, stimulate employment, or deliver essential services. The enclosures discuss these issues and other critical challenges that the United States and its allies face in the ongoing struggle to help the Iraqis stabilize, secure, and rebuild Iraq. Forthright answers to the oversight questions we pose herein are needed from the U.S. agencies responsible for executing the President's strategy. Congress and... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This testimony outlines (1) the impact of the recent increased operational tempo on the process used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses and the effect that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers and their families; (2) the adequacy of the overall design of controls over the processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on for Army Guard travel reimbursements; (3) whether the Department of Defense's (DOD) current efforts to automate its travel reimbursement process will resolve the problems identified; and (4) other DOD actions to improve the accuracy and timeliness of Army Guard travel reimbursements. Mobilized Army Guard soldiers have experienced significant problems getting accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursements for out-of-pocket travel expenses. These weaknesses were more glaring in light of the sustained increase in mobilized Guard soldiers following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To its credit, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) hired over 200 new personnel to address travel voucher processing backlogs and recently upgraded their training. However, Guard soldiers in our case study units reported a number of problems they and their families endured due to delayed or unpaid travel reimbursements, including debts on their personal credit cards, trouble paying their monthly bills, and inability to make child support payments. The soldier bears primary responsibility for travel voucher preparation, including obtaining paper copies of various types of authorizations. DFAS data indicate that it rejected and asked soldiers to resubmit about 18 percent of vouchers during fiscal year 2004--a churning process that added to delays and frustration. Also, existing guidance did not clearly address the sometimes complex travel situations of mobilized Army Guard soldiers, who were often housed off-post due to overcrowding on military installations. Further, DOD continued to be noncompliant with a law that requires payment of late payment interest and fees when soldiers' travel reimbursements are not timely. With respect to human capital, GAO found a lack of oversight and accountability and inadequate training. Automated systems problems, such as nonintegration of key systems involved in authorizing and paying travel expenses and failure to automate key processes, also contributed to the inefficient, error-prone process. DOD has been developing and implementing the Defense Travel System (DTS) to resolve travel-related deficiencies. However, DTS will not address some of the key systems flaws. For example, DTS is currently not able to process mobilized soldier travel authorizations and vouchers and identify and calculate late payment interest and fees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Testifying before Congress in 2002, military beneficiary groups and civilian managed care support contractors described problems with the processing of TRICARE claims for civilian-provided care. These problems included slow payments and procedures that made claims processing inefficient. The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 required GAO to review improvements to TRICARE claims processing and continuing impediments to claims processing efficiency. Specifically, GAO describes (1) efforts to improve claims processing and changes in processing timeliness and (2) Department of Defense (DOD) procedures and data that continue to affect claims processing efficiency. To identify improvements to claims processing and impediments to processing efficiency, GAO analyzed 1999 and 2002 claims data for changes in processing timeliness. GAO also interviewed and analyzed claims processing documentation from DOD officials, managed care support contractors, and claims processors. In an effort to improve TRICARE claims processing, DOD and its managed care support (MCS) contractors have made changes that are designed to make it more efficient. First, they have jointly identified--and then eliminated or changed--certain DOD requirements they deemed inefficient and nonessential to accurate claims processing. For example, contractors are no longer required to hold claims with incomplete information and request the missing information from the provider or beneficiary. Instead, contractors may now return some claims with missing information. In another change, DOD eliminated preauthorization requirements for certain procedures and gave the MCS contractors more latitude for determining when preauthorizations are appropriate. To encourage providers to submit their claims electronically, DOD gave MCS contractors the authority to decide whether to adjudicate electronically submitted claims sooner than those submitted on paper. Further, MCS contractors have worked with their claims processors to implement new technologies for data input, claims routing, customer service, and claims submission. Finally, MCS contractors and their claims processors have improved the timeliness with which they process claims. In fiscal year 2002, claims processors processed over 97 percent of claims in 30 days or less--an improvement over fiscal year 1999, when 91 percent of claims were processed in 30 days or less. Although DOD and its MCS contractors have made changes to improve claims processing, some DOD procedures and inaccuracies in its data continue to create inefficiencies in TRICARE claims processing. Some DOD procedures may create inefficiencies by inadvertently increasing the demand for customer service, which claims processors are required to provide. Additionally, inaccuracies in DOD eligibility data--data that are needed to process TRICARE claims--can contribute to claims processing delays or rework if, for example, claims must be reprocessed when errors are identified. Finally, some DOD procedures lead to rework for claims processors, either in the form of reprocessing claims or reprogramming processing software. For example, when DOD makes program changes to TRICARE to alter or create a health benefit, it does not adhere to any schedule. In 2002, DOD made 123 program changes on 19 different dates throughout the year. Given the fact that implementing these changes often involves reprogramming and testing processing software, this approach can create rework for claims processors when DOD issues similar or related changes on separate occasions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO has reported on limitations in the management of U.S. low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). LLRW ranges from very low-activity to higher-activity waste. To identify potential approaches to overcome these limitations, GAO was asked to examine the extent to which other countries have (1) LLRW inventory databases, (2) timely removal of higher-activity LLRW from waste generator sites, (3) disposition options for all LLRW, and (4) requirements that LLRW generators have financial reserves to cover waste disposition costs, as well as any other approaches that might improve U.S. LLRW management. GAO primarily relied on a survey of 18 countries representing leading LLRW generators to identify their management approaches and to compare them with U.S. survey results and with approaches suggested by LLRW generators, disposal operators, and regulators in the United States. Academic, industrial, medical, utility, and government entities in the United States, particularly the Department of Energy (DOE), disposed of at least 15 million cubic feet of LLRW in 2005. This waste includes debris, rubble, soils, paper, liquid, metals, and clothing that have been exposed to radioactivity or contaminated with radioactive material, and sealed radiological sources that are no longer useful for industrial or other applications (disused). Other countries that have nuclear reactor units and use radioactive materials in other ways manage the residual LLRW in some ways that are different than in the United States. Of the countries surveyed, GAO found that most countries indicated they have national radioactive waste inventory databases that include information on all waste generators, waste types, storage locations, and disused sealed radiological sources, and that they use them to forecast future disposal capacity needs. Most countries indicated they facilitate the timely removal of higher-activity LLRW, essentially disused sealed radiological sources, from generator sites to enhance safety and security, including requiring the return of a disused source to a source supplier. Most countries indicated they have disposal options for lower-activity LLRW, central storage options for higher-activity LLRW, and alternative disposal options for very low-level radioactive waste that in most cases does not require an exemption review by a nuclear regulatory authority. Half the countries indicated they impose financial assurance requirements on all waste generators to cover disposition costs, and most of these countries also use other approaches to reduce government costs to recover higher-activity LLRW, such as requiring a disposal fee at the time that a sealed radiological source is purchased. GAO also found that most countries surveyed use national radioactive waste plans to guide the management of their radioactive wastes. Many representatives from LLRW generators, disposal operators, regulators, and others told GAO that the application of similar approaches to... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently began a 6-year, $425 million program called Sentinel to replace and expand on both its failed Virtual Case File (VCF) project and its antiquated, paper-based, legacy system for supporting mission-critical intelligence analysis and investigative case management activities. Because of the FBI's experience with VCF and the importance of Sentinel, GAO was requested to address a number of program management issues associated with acquiring Sentinel via a prime development contractor. This report focuses on one of these issues: whether the FBI is adequately providing for the program's human capital needs. The findings are based on GAO's review of relevant program documentation, interviews with program officials, and human capital management guidance. To its credit, the FBI has moved quickly to staff its Sentinel program office. During the last year, it created a staffing plan for Sentinel, which defines the positions needed for the program, and it has filled most of the positions in the plan, primarily by using contract staff (77 percent). However, a few key program management positions remain to be filled. More importantly, the Sentinel staffing plan addresses only the program office's immediate staffing needs. It does not provide for the kind of strategic human capital management focus that GAO's research and evaluations have shown to be essential to the success of any organizational entity. For example, the staffing plan was not derived using a documented, data-driven methodology and does not provide for inventorying the knowledge and skills of existing staff, forecasting future knowledge and skill needs, analyzing gaps in capabilities between the existing staff and future workforce needs, (including consideration of expected succession needs), and formulating strategies for filling expected gaps. Exacerbating this situation is that the FBI is not proactively managing Sentinel human capital availability as a program risk; it has not included human capital in the program's risk inventory nor has it developed and implemented a proactive risk mitigation strategy, even though program documents cite human capital as both a challenge and a risk. According to program officials, they plan to manage their human capital needs in the same way as when they initially staffed the program office, in part because the bureau's IT system life cycle management policies and procedures do not require them to do otherwise. Unless the FBI adopts a more strategic approach to managing human capital for the Sentinel program and treats human capital as a program risk, the chances of delivering required intelligence and investigative support capabilities in a timely and cost-effective manner are reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates that the 2010 Census will cost over $11.3 billion, making it the most expensive in our history. The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate appropriation bills propose to reduce the Bureau's fiscal year 2007 budget request, raising questions about the Bureau's design of the 2010 Census and associated costs. Based on issued GAO work, this testimony addresses the extent to which the Bureau has (1) made progress redesigning its approach, including nonresponse follow-up, a key cost driver; and (2) developed a comprehensive project plan for the 2010 Census, as well as timely, detailed cost data for effective oversight and cost control. Since 2000, the Bureau has made significant progress in redesigning the 2010 Census. Preparations for the 2010 Census appear to be further along than at a similar point of the 2000 Census; the Bureau plans to make the most extensive use of contractors in its history to implement such mission-critical tasks as data collection and processing, and updating addresses and maps; and it has developed new initiatives, such as changing to a short-form-only census and automating field operations to reduce nonresponse follow-up costs. Still, the Bureau will have to resolve challenges that could increase the costs of the census. For example, the Bureau will need to effectively monitor contracts, as $1.9 billion of the $11.3 billion life-cycle costs will be spent on seven major contracts. The Bureau has agreed to take steps to mitigate some of these challenges, such as enhancing the ability of key contract project offices to better manage contracts through such actions as developing action plans with milestones for key activities and regularly briefing senior managers. Also, the use of hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) to help reduce nonresponse follow-up costs by automating operations and managing the agency's payroll is a key component of the redesigned census. However, the MCDs experienced reliability problems during testing. The Bureau maintains that those problems will be fixed by developing a new MCD through a contract awarded in March 2006; however, the new MCD will not be tested until the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, and little time will remain to develop, test, and incorporate refinements if the MCDs do not perform as expected. If after the Dress Rehearsal the MCD is found to be unreliable, the Bureau could be faced with the remote but daunting possibility of having to revert to the costly paper-based census used in 2000. The Bureau has not developed and provided a comprehensive, integrated project plan that details milestones, itemized costs, and measurable goals for completing key activities. Also, the Bureau's $11.3 billion life-cycle cost estimate lacks timely and complete supporting data, because it does not contain the most current information from testing and evaluation nor does it provide sufficient information on how changing assumptions could affect... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is a relatively small agency that plays a vital role in transportation safety and has a worldwide reputation for investigating accidents. With a staff of about 400 and a budget of $76.7 million in fiscal year 2006, NTSB investigates all civil aviation accidents in the United States, and significant accidents in railroad, highway, marine, and pipeline; and issues safety recommendations to address issues identified during accident investigations. To support its mission, NTSB built a training academy, which opened in 2003 and provides training to NTSB investigators and others. It is important that NTSB use its resources efficiently to carry out its mission and maintain its preeminence. This testimony, based on ongoing work for this committee, addresses the extent to which NTSB follows leading practices in selected management areas, addresses challenges in completing accident investigations and closing safety recommendations, and generates sufficient revenues to cover costs at its academy. NTSB has recently made progress in following leading management practices, but overall has a mixed record. For example, NTSB has improved its financial management by hiring a Chief Financial Officer and putting controls on its purchasing activities, which should address past problems with unapproved purchases. However, NTSB lacks a full cost accounting system, which would inform managers of the resources spent on individual investigations and provide data to balance office workload. NTSB has also begun to develop a performance management system that should eventually link each individual's performance to the agency's strategic goals and objectives. However, the performance management system will not be fully functional until NTSB has developed a strategic plan with results-oriented goals and objectives and specific strategies for achieving them, which are lacking in the current strategic plan. Other areas, such as human capital and communications, partially follow leading practices. While NTSB is accomplishing its accident investigation mission, it faces challenges that affect the efficiency of the report production and recommendation close out processes. NTSB routinely takes longer than 2 years to complete major investigations. Several factors may affect the length of report production, including several revisions of draft reports through multiple layers of the organization. In addition, the processes for federal transportation agencies to implement NTSB's safety recommendations and for NTSB to change the status of recommendations are lengthy, paper-based, and labor intensive. While Department of Transportation officials have been working with NTSB to find acceptable means of implementing its recommendations, they cite the lengthy rule-making process as a challenge to speedy implementation. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, NTSB's academy did not generate sufficient revenues to cover the costs of... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rigorous planning is key to a successful census as it helps ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates the 2010 Census will cost around $11.3 billion, which would make it the most expensive census in our country's history, even after adjusting for inflation. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the Bureau's progress in preparing for the 2010 Census, (2) the challenges that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita might pose for the Bureau's future activities, and, (3) more broadly, the importance of planning for a range of events that could severely disrupt the census. The Bureau's preparations for the 2010 Census are making progress along several fronts. Of particular note is (1) the re-engineered design of the census, which holds promise for controlling costs and maintaining accuracy; (2) the Bureau's early planning process which was more rigorous than for the 2000 Census; and (3) the Bureau's greater willingness to outsource key census-taking operations that would be difficult for it to carry out on its own. At the same time, it will be important for the Bureau to resolve issues that pose a risk to a successful census. For example, the Bureau plans to use hand-held mobile computing devices (MCD) to develop the census address list and collect data from millions of households that do not respond to the initial census questionnaire. The MCDs are an important step forward because they are designed to replace many of the paper questionnaires and maps that were used in past censuses, and are a key element of the Bureau's Field Data Collection Automation program. The Bureau has never before used the devices in a decennial. In tests held in 2004 and 2006 to date, census workers found the MCDs easy to use, but sometimes unreliable, which reduced efficiency. Some workers also deviated from prescribed procedures which points to the need for better training. The Bureau has taken steps to address these issues and future tests will help determine the effectiveness of the Bureau's actions. The Bureau also faces a possible brain drain, as 45 percent of its workforce will be eligible to retire by 2010. Although the Bureau has taken preventative measures, it could improve those efforts by, among other actions, strengthening the monitoring of its mission-critical workforce. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlight the importance of contingency planning and examining whether the Bureau's existing operations are adequate for capturing the demographic and physical changes that have occurred along the Gulf Coast. Overall, as the Bureau's preparations for 2010 continue, it will be important for Congress to monitor the Bureau's progress in (1) identifying and diagnosing problems, (2) devising solutions, and (3) integrating refinements in time to be evaluated during the Census Dress Rehearsal scheduled for 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through an initiative known as AeDib, the Social Security Administration (SSA) is implementing a system in which medical images and other documents that have traditionally been kept in paper folders will be stored in electronic folders, enabling disability offices--including SSA's 144 Office of Hearings and Appeals sites and 54 state disability determination services--to process disability claims electronically. This initiative supports a program that, in 2004, made payments of approximately $113 billion to more than 14 million beneficiaries and their families. In March 2004, GAO recommended that SSA take steps to ensure the successful implementation of the electronic disability system. GAO was asked to assess SSA's status in implementing AeDib and the actions the agency has taken in response to GAO's prior recommendations on this initiative. Since January 2004, SSA has been implementing its electronic disability system at 53 state disability determination services and 85 Office of Hearings and Appeals sites. It plans to complete implementation in all state sites by October 2005 and all hearings and appeals sites by November 2005. Nonetheless, considerable work is needed before these entities will be ready to process all initial claims electronically. SSA's effort to certify all state offices to electronically process claims and maintain the electronic folder as an official claims record is not expected to be completed until January 2007. In addition, state disability officials expressed concerns about the system's operations and reliability and about limitations in their electronic processing capabilities. Accordingly, a number of the offices reported varying levels of system usage, and their officials said that processing claims electronically generally took longer and consumed more resources than the previous method. Further, SSA and the state disability determination services lacked continuity of operations plans for ensuring that states could continue to process disability claims during emergencies. As SSA has implemented its system, it has taken actions that supported three of GAO's five prior recommendations. It has initiated studies that could help validate AeDib planning assumptions, costs, and benefits. It has also approved new software and certified its systems for production. In addition, according to state disability officials, the agency had improved its communications with them. However, SSA did not demonstrate action on two recommendations calling for thorough testing of its interrelated system components before implementation and completion of risk mitigation strategies for the projects supporting the initiative. Thorough testing and risk mitigation strategies could have helped limit problems with the system's operation and other circumstances that could impede the project's success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2004, Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to administer the Millennium Challenge Account. MCC's mission is to promote economic growth and reduce extreme poverty in developing countries. The act requires MCC to rely to the maximum extent possible on quantitative criteria in determining countries' eligibility for assistance. MCC will provide assistance primarily through compacts--agreements with country governments. MCC aims to be one of the top donors in countries with which it signs compacts. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, Congress appropriated nearly $2.5 billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation; for fiscal year 2006, the President is requesting $3 billion. GAO was asked to monitor MCC's (1) process for determining country eligibility, (2) progress in developing compacts, (3) coordination with key stakeholders, and (4) establishment of management structures and accountability mechanisms. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the MCC board used the quantitative criteria as well as judgment in determining 17 countries to be eligible for MCA compacts. Although MCC chose the indicators based in part on their public availability, our analysis showed that not all of the source data for the indicators were readily accessible. In addition, we found that reliance on the indicators carried certain inherent limitations, such as measurement uncertainty. Between August 2004 and March 2005, MCC received compact proposals, concept papers, or both, from 16 eligible countries. It signed a compact with Madagascar in April 2005 and is negotiating compacts with four countries. MCC's 4-year compact with Madagascar for $110 million would make it the country's fifth largest donor. MCC is continuing to refine its compact development process. In addition, MCC has identified elements of program implementation and fiscal accountability that can be adapted to eligible countries' compact objectives and institutional capacities. MCC is taking steps to coordinate with key stakeholders to use existing expertise and conduct outreach. The U.S. agencies on the MCC Board of Directors--USAID, the Departments of State and Treasury, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative--have provided resources and other assistance to MCC, and five U.S. agencies have agreed to provide technical assistance. Bilateral and multilateral donors are providing information and expertise. MCC is also consulting with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and abroad as part of its outreach activities. MCC has made progress in developing key administrative infrastructures that support its mission and operations. MCC has also made progress in establishing corporatewide structures for accountability, governance, internal control, and human capital management, including establishing an audit capability through its Inspector General, adopting bylaws, providing ethics training to employees, and expanding its permanent full-time staff. However, MCC has not yet completed comprehensive plans, strategies, and related time frames for establishing these essential management structures and accountability mechanisms on a corporatewide basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2004, Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to administer the Millennium Challenge Account. MCC's mission is to promote economic growth and reduce extreme poverty in developing countries. The act requires MCC to rely to the maximum extent possible on quantitative criteria in determining countries' eligibility for assistance. MCC will provide assistance primarily through compacts--agreements with country governments. MCC aims to be one of the top donors in countries with which it signs compacts. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, Congress appropriated nearly $2.5 billion for the Millennium Challenge Corporation; for fiscal year 2006, the President is requesting $3 billion. GAO was asked to monitor MCC's (1) process for determining country eligibility, (2) progress in developing compacts, (3) coordination with key stakeholders, and (4) establishment of management structures and accountability mechanisms. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the MCC board used the quantitative criteria as well as judgment in determining 17 countries to be eligible for MCA compacts. Although MCC chose the indicators based in part on their public availability, our analysis showed that not all of the source data for the indicators were readily accessible. In addition, we found that reliance on the indicators carried certain inherent limitations, such as measurement uncertainty. Between August 2004 and March 2005, MCC received compact proposals, concept papers, or both, from 16 eligible countries. It signed a compact with Madagascar in April 2005 and is negotiating compacts with four countries. MCC's 4-year compact with Madagascar for $110 million would make it the country's fifth largest donor. MCC is continuing to refine its compact development process. In addition, MCC has identified elements of program implementation and fiscal accountability that can be adapted to eligible countries' compact objectives and institutional capacities. MCC is taking steps to coordinate with key stakeholders to use existing expertise and conduct outreach. The U.S. agencies on the MCC Board of Directors--USAID, the Departments of State and Treasury, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative--have provided resources and other assistance to MCC, and five U.S. agencies have agreed to provide technical assistance. Bilateral and multilateral donors are providing information and expertise. MCC is also consulting with nongovernmental organizations in the United States and abroad as part of its outreach activities. MCC has made progress in developing key administrative infrastructures that support its mission and operations. MCC has also made progress in establishing corporatewide structures for accountability, governance, internal control, and human capital management, including establishing an audit capability through its Inspector General, adopting bylaws, providing ethics training to employees, and expanding its permanent full-time staff. However, MCC has not yet completed comprehensive plans, strategies, and related time frames for establishing these essential management structures and accountability mechanisms on a corporatewide basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The District of Columbia's Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) is responsible for ensuring the safety and well being of about 3,000 children in its care and ensuring that services are provided to them and their families. In fiscal year 2003, CFSA's total budget was about $200 million. Concerns have been raised about CFSA's supply of caseworkers, the foster care and adoptive homes, and the quality and timeliness of mental health services for foster care children. To help address these issues, the Congress appropriated $14 million in fiscal year 2004 to CFSA, the Department of Mental Health (DMH), and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) specifically for foster care improvement. GAO examined CFSA's (1) strategies for recruiting, retaining, and managing its caseworkers; (2) efforts to license an adequate supply of safe foster and adoptive homes; and (3) efforts to collaborate with DMH and the Family Court to provide timely mental health services to foster care children. GAO also reviewed plans for and use of the federal foster care improvement funds. CFSA actively recruited caseworkers and implemented retention strategies; however, caseworkers cited several management practices they said lowered their morale and adversely affected their ability to perform their duties. CFSA employed several recruitment approaches recommended by a number of child welfare organizations and exceeded most of its staffing goals for fiscal year 2003. Caseworkers cited high salaries and the training for new caseworkers as factors that encouraged them to remain at CFSA. However, GAO found a general consensus among the caseworkers with which GAO met that some management practices--poor communication, a lack of resources, poor supervision, and no rewards and recognition program--adversely affected their performance and morale. Agency officials said they had made some changes and were planning to take other actions to address these issues. CFSA has developed goals and strategies for recruiting new foster and adoptive homes and improved licensing requirements. CFSA has made progress licensing new families, although more families have stopped serving than expected. Further, CFSA does not have processes for identifying the reasons foster parents stop serving or for determining the effectiveness of its recruitment strategies. CFSA has standardized and raised licensing requirements for all foster and adoptive homes, but as of May 2004, 308 foster homes were unlicensed, with about 22 percent of CFSA's foster children residing in them. CFSA has begun collaborating with DMH and the Family Court to centralize and track mental health services for foster care children, but challenges remain to ensuring timely delivery. CFSA and DMH designed a standard process for referring foster care children to DMH for assessment and treatment and for tracking service delivery. DMH has also started expanding its service capacity for foster care children. For example, it has begun recruiting additional evaluators to perform assessments. While CFSA began using a database to track service delivery in August 2004, it has not analyzed the service delivery data collected on paper prior to August 2004 to determine whether foster care children were receiving timely services. Additionally, CFSA and DMH still face certain challenges, such as integrating caseworkers and Family Court judges into the new referral process. CFSA, DMH, and COG have spending plans that are consistent with the statutory language providing the federal funds, but only a small portion of the foster care improvement funds had been obligated or spent as of June 2004, in part because funding was not received until March 2004. Further, it is unclear how the District and COG plan to support some of these programs in the long-term because future funding is uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent discovery of commercial nuclear power plants on a list of possible terrorist targets have focused considerable attention on the plants' capabilities to defend against a terrorist attack. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent agency established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials, is responsible for regulating and overseeing security at commercial nuclear power plants. GAO was asked to review (1) NRC's efforts since September 11, 2001, to improve security at nuclear power plants, including actions NRC has taken to implement some of GAO's September 2003 recommendations to improve security oversight and (2) the extent to which NRC is in a position to assure itself and the public that the plants are protected against terrorist attacks. This testimony reflects the preliminary results of GAO's review. GAO will issue a more comprehensive report in early 2005. NRC responded quickly and decisively to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with multiple steps to enhance security at commercial nuclear power plants. NRC immediately advised the plants to go to the highest level of security according to the system in place at the time and issued advisories and orders to the plants to make certain enhancements, such as installing more physical barriers and augmenting security forces, that could be completed quickly to shore up security. According to NRC officials, their inspections found that the plants complied with these advisories and orders. Later, in April 2003, NRC issued a new design basis threat (DBT), which establishes the maximum terrorist threat that a facility must defend against, and required the plants to develop and implement new security plans to address the new threat by October 2004. It is also improving its force-on-force exercises, as GAO recommended in its September 2003 report. These exercises are an important agency tool to ensure that the plants' security plans are adequate to protect against the DBT. While its efforts to date have enhanced security, NRC is not yet in a position to provide an independent determination that each plant has taken reasonable and appropriate steps to protect against the new DBT. According to NRC officials, the facilities' new security plans are on schedule to be implemented by October 2004. However, NRC's review of the plans, which are not available to the general public for security reasons, has primarily been a paper review and is not detailed enough for NRC to determine if the plans would protect the facility against the threat presented in the DBT. For example, the plans GAO reviewed are largely based on a template and often do not include important site-specific information, such as where responding guards are stationed, how the responders would deploy to their defensive positions, and how long deployment would take. In addition, NRC officials are generally not visiting the facilities to obtain site-specific information and assess the plans in terms of each facility's layout. NRC is largely relying on force-on-force exercises it conducts to test the plans, but these exercises will not be conducted at all facilities for 3 years. NRC's oversight of plants' security could also be improved. However, NRC does not plan to make some improvements in its inspection program that GAO previously recommended and still believes are needed. For example, NRC is not following up to verify that all violations of security requirements have been corrected or taking steps to make "lessons learned" from inspections available to other NRC regional offices and nuclear power plants. Moreover, if NRC needs to revise its DBT further as the terrorist threat is better defined, it will need longer to make and test all the necessary enhancements. The Department of Energy, for example, is currently reviewing the DBT for its nuclear facilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transformation of the Government Printing Office (GPO) is under way. This report captures the results of our efforts over the past year to assess and help strengthen GPO's transformation and strategic planning efforts. It is the final part of GAO's response to both a mandate requiring GAO to examine the current state of printing and dissemination of public government information and a congressional request that we conduct a general management review of GPO focusing on that GPO's transformation and management. Federal government printing and dissemination are changing due to the underlying changes to the technological environment. The Public Printer and his leadership team understand the effects of this technological change on GPO and have begun an ambitious effort to transform GPO and reexamine its mission. Federal agencies are publishing more documents directly to the Web and are doing more of their printing and dissemination of information without using GPO services. At the same time, the public is obtaining government information from government Web sites such as GPO Access rather than purchasing paper copies. As a result, GPO has seen declines in its printing volumes, printing revenues, and document sales. To assist in the transformation process under way at GPO, GAO convened a panel of printing and information dissemination experts, who developed a series of options for GPO to consider in its strategic planning. The panel suggested that GPO (1) develop a business plan to focus its mission on information dissemination as its primary goal, rather than printing; (2) demonstrate to its customers the value it can provide; (3) improve and extend partnerships with agencies to help establish itself as an information disseminator; and (4) ensure that its internal operations are adequate for efficient and effective management of core business functions and for service to its customers. GPO can also use other key practices that GAO identified to help agencies successfully transform, such as involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation. GPO fully applied one of these practices, related to ensuring that top management drives the transformation, and has partially implemented each of the remaining eight practices. To fully implement the remaining practices, GPO needs to take actions including establishing its mission and strategic goals and developing a documented plan for its transformation. GPO has taken some initial steps to adopt the best practices of other public and private sector organizations, most notably with respect to human capital management. GPO is actively implementing the recommendations GAO made in October 2003. For example, GPO reorganized the human capital office into customer-focused teams devoted to meeting the human capital needs of GPO's operating units. Continued leadership attention is needed to build on the initial progress made in information technology and financial management. For example, GPO should implement an information technology investment management process to help management choose, monitor, and evaluate projects, and GPO should train its line managers to effectively use financial data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is widespread agreement that the basic approach to federal pay is broken and that it needs to be more market- and performance-based. Doing so will be essential if the federal government is to maximize its performance and assure accountability for the benefit of the American people. While there will be debate and disagreement about the merits of individual reform proposals, all should be able to agree that a performance management system with adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms in place, must serve as the fundamental underpinning of any fair, effective, and appropriate pay reform. At the request of the Subcommittee on Civil Service and Agency Organization, House Committee on Government Reform, GAO discussed the key practices for effective performance management that federal agencies should consider as they develop and implement performance management systems as part of any pay reform. The need for results-oriented pay reform is one of the most pressing human capital issues facing the federal government today. To implement results-oriented pay reform, commonly referred to as "pay for performance," agencies must have modern, effective, credible, and validated performance management systems that are capable of supporting pay and other personnel decisions. Pay for performance works only with adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms in place, to ensure its fair, effective, and responsible implementation. Modern performance management systems are the centerpiece of those safeguards and accountability. Most federal agencies are a long way from meeting this test. All too often, agencies' performance management systems are based on episodic and paper intensive exercises that are not linked to the strategic plan of the organization and have only a modest impact on the pay, use, development, and promotion potential of federal workers. Leading organizations, on the other had, use their performance management systems to accelerate change, achieve desired organizational results, and facilitate two-way communication throughout the year so that discussions about individual and organizational performance are integrated and ongoing. Effective performance management systems are not merely used for once- or twice-yearly individual expectation setting and ratings processes, but are tools to help the organization manage on a day-to-day basis. GAO identified key practices leading public sector organizations both here in the United States and abroad have used in their performance management systems to link organizational goals to individual performance and create a "line of sight" between an individual's activities and organizational results. These practices can help agencies develop and implement performance management systems with the attributes necessary to effectively support pay for performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax-exempt organizations seeking to influence political elections--called Section 527 organizations--are estimated to spend millions of dollars annually in federal elections. These organizations use unregulated "soft money" for issue advocacy, such as sponsoring an advertisement that supports or opposes a candidate's position on an issue. Although all states require these groups to publicly release data on their finances and activities, no central source for such data exists. In July 2000, Congress passed legislation requiring Section 527 organizations to provide data on their purposes, officers, contributors, and expenses to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for public disclosure. IRS has established a website for this purpose, but GAO found that the website is difficult to use, and most of the disclosed data are not electronically searchable and downloadable--which can inhibit timely analysis of the relationship between political organizations and the influence of soft money on federal campaigns. IRS has done little to oversee Section 527 organizations' compliance with the law's filing and reporting requirements. As a result, IRS can provide four assurances that the data it disclosed on its website are timely, complete, and correct. IRS officials said that oversight has been limited because of (1) competing demands for resources, (2) the focus on educating Section 527 organizations and on publicly disclosing the data, and (3) having the lack of electronic data on Section 527 organizations. IRS has not developed a strategic plan to ensure that the law's requirements are met. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the fourth anniversary of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, which established Congress' expectation that IRS modernize to better meet taxpayer needs, GAO gave an overview of IRS's current performance and resources and then assessed the progress that IRS has made modernizing and the risks to continued progress. Overall, IRS has seen increased workload, decreased staffing, and significant changes in the allocation of resources between taxpayer assistance programs and its compliance and collection programs. Between 1995 and 2001, IRS's workload, measured by returns filed, increased by 10 percent while aggregate staffing declined by 14 percent. Over the same time, there was a significant internal reallocation of resources with a disproportionate decline in compliance and collection program staffing to accommodate more emphasis on taxpayer service, such as telephone assistance, and to information systems operation and investment. Electronic filing of returns increased but not enough to reduce paper returns sufficiently to free significant processing resources for use elsewhere. The reallocation of resources shows signs of beginning to produce more accurate service for taxpayers, but the compliance and collection programs have seen large and pervasive declines in performance indicators such as audit rates, collection cases closed, enforcement actions such as liens and levies, and raw productivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the fiscal year (FY) 2000 performance plan for the Department of State, which was submitted to Congress as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, focusing on: (1) assessing the usefulness of the agency's plan for decisionmaking; and (2) identifying the degree of improvement the agency's FY 2000 performance plan represents over its FY 1999 plan. GAO noted that: (1) State's FY 2000 annual performance plan provides a partial picture of: (a) intended performance across the agency; (b) the strategies and resources that will be used to achieve the performance goals; and (c) the methods it will employ to ensure the credibility of the information used to assess agency performance; (2) for example, State's strategic goal of opening foreign markets has two areas of emphasis; (3) however, the plan provides performance information for only one of them; (4) State's FY 2000 performance plan represents a moderate improvement over the FY 1999 plan in that it shows some progress in addressing the weaknesses GAO identified in its assessment of that plan; (5) in reviewing the FY 1999 plan, GAO observed that: (a) many of the goals were not clearly stated or extended beyond State's span of control; (b) the plan did not have baselines and targets for each performance indicator; and (c) crosscutting issues and data limitations were not addressed; and (6) among improvements in the FY 2000 plan are the addition of baselines, targets, and quantifiable measures to gauge performance, and results-oriented goals that better capture what State can accomplish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Education reported that in fiscal year 1997 it awarded more than $43 billion in financial aid to 8.1 million students. In response to concerns about unreliable data in its student loan database as well as its ability to effectively manage its student loan programs, the Department developed the National Student Loan Data System. The system has three main goals: improving the quality and accessibility of student financial aid data, reducing the burden of administering the Department's student financial aid programs, and minimizing fraud and abuse in these programs. The Department intended for the system to be used by schools, lenders, third-party servicers, and guaranty agencies to help determine student eligibility for aid, identify borrowers' loan status, update student information, and serve as an overall financial aid history file on program participants. As of February 1997, the Department required all schools to use the system to report, confirm, and update the enrollment dates and the status of borrowers--key information in determining student eligibility for federal aid. However, in July 1997, GAO found that several schools it visited chose to use paper transcripts to obtain student financial aid histories because they considered the system's electronic data unreliable. This report discusses (1) the extent to and the purposes for which schools are using the system, (2) any problems these schools are having and the benefits they are getting from using the system, (3) why some schools are not using the system, and (4) the extent to which the Department is taking or plans to take steps to help ensure that schools are fully using the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in ongoing efforts to share medical information, which is important in helping to ensure high-quality health care for active-duty military personnel and veterans. These efforts include a long-term program to develop modernized health information systems based on computable data: that is, data in a format that a computer application can act on--for example, to provide alerts to clinicians of drug allergies. In addition, the departments are engaged in short-term initiatives involving existing systems. GAO was asked to summarize its recent testimony on the history and current status of these long- and short-term efforts to share health information. To develop that testimony, GAO reviewed its previous work, analyzed documents, and interviewed VA and DOD officials about current status and future plans. For almost a decade, VA and DOD have been pursuing ways to share health information and create comprehensive electronic medical records. However, they have faced considerable challenges in these efforts, leading to repeated changes in the focus of their initiatives and target dates. In prior reviews of the departments' efforts, GAO noted management weaknesses, including the lack of a detailed project management plan to guide their efforts. Currently, the two departments are pursuing both long- and short-term initiatives to share health information. Under their long-term initiative, the modern health information systems being developed by each department are to share standardized computable data through an interface between data repositories associated with each system. The repositories have now been developed, and the departments have begun to populate them with limited types of health information. In addition, the interface between the repositories has been implemented at seven VA and DOD sites, allowing computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data to be exchanged. Implementing this interface is a milestone toward the departments' long-term goal, but more remains to be done. Besides extending the current capability throughout VA and DOD, the departments must still agree to standards for the remaining categories of medical information, populate the data repositories with this information, complete the development of the two modernized health information systems, and transition from their existing systems. While pursuing their long-term effort to develop modernized systems, the two departments have also been working to share information in their existing systems. Among various short-term initiatives are a completed effort to allow the one-way transfer of health information from DOD to VA when service members leave the military, as well as ongoing demonstration projects to exchange limited data at selected sites. One of these projects, building on the one-way transfer capability, developed an interface between certain existing systems that... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 2000 national elections, concerns have been raised by various groups regarding the election process, including voting technologies. Beginning in 2001, GAO published a series of reports examining virtually every aspect of the elections process. GAO's complement of reports were used by Congress in framing the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which, among other things, provided for replacement of older voting equipment with more modern electronic voting systems and established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to lead the nation's election reform efforts. GAO's later reports have raised concerns about the security and reliability of these electronic voting systems, examined the EAC's efforts to address these concerns, and surveyed state and local officials about practices used during the 2004 election, as well as plans for their systems for the 2006 election. Using its published work on electronic voting systems, GAO was asked to testify on (1) the contextual role and characteristics of electronic voting systems, (2) the range of security and reliability concerns that have been reported about these systems, (3) the experiences and management practices of states and local jurisdictions regarding these systems, and (4) the longstanding and emerging challenges facing all levels of government in using these systems. Voting systems are one facet of a multifaceted, year-round elections process that involves the interplay of people, processes, and technology, and includes all levels of government. How well these systems play their role in an election depends in large part on how well they are managed throughout their life cycle, which begins with defining system standards; includes system design, development, and testing; and concludes with system operations. Important attributes of the systems' performance are security, reliability, ease of use, and cost effectiveness. A range of parties knowledgable about elections or voting systems have expressed concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting systems; these concerns can be associated with stages in the system life cycle. Examples of concerns include vague or incomplete voting system standards, system design flaws, poorly developed security controls, incorrect system configurations, inadequate testing, and poor overall security management. For the 2004 national elections, states' and local governments' responses to our surveys showed that they did not always ensure that important life cycle and security management practices were employed for their respective electronic voting systems. In particular, responses indicated that the most current standards were not always adopted and applied, security management practices and controls were employed to varying degrees, and certain types of system testing were not commonly performed. Moreover, jurisdictions' responses showed that they did not consistently monitor the performance of their systems. In GAO's view,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although recycling can generate environmental and economic benefits, the national recycling rate has increased only slightly since 2000, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). While local governments have the primary role in operating recycling programs, EPA and the Department of Commerce (Commerce) have some legal responsibilities for encouraging recycling. GAO was asked to (1) identify key practices cities are using to increase recycling, (2) describe what EPA and Commerce are doing to encourage recycling, and (3) identify federal policy options that could help increase recycling. GAO interviewed recycling coordinators in 11 large cities about key practices and 13 additional recycling stakeholders about policy options. GAO selected both groups based on geographic representation and recycling expertise, among other factors. Recycling coordinators with whom we spoke in selected cities across the country identified several key practices they are using to increase recycling in their cities. The three practices they cited most frequently were (1) making recycling convenient and easy for their residents, (2) offering financial incentives for recycling, such as allowing residents who produce less waste through recycling to use smaller garbage cans and pay lower fees, and (3) conducting public education and outreach. In addition, both recycling coordinators and the recycling literature identified other ways to increase recycling, such as targeting a wide range of materials for recycling and extending recycling programs to the commercial sector. As a part of its Resource Conservation Challenge strategy, EPA operates several national and regional programs that are designed to increase recycling and help EPA achieve its national municipal solid waste recycling goal of 35 percent by 2008. One of EPA's principal national recycling programs, WasteWise, creates voluntary partnerships with groups, such as universities, states, and businesses, to help them increase their recycling. EPA also provides competitive grants to support projects designed to increase recycling. The impact of EPA's programs is unknown, however, because the programs lack performance measures and comprehensive data on program performance. Although Commerce is required under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to stimulate the development of markets for recycled materials, the agency is not currently taking any actions to do so in the United States. For example, Commerce is not identifying the location of markets for recycled materials, identifying economic and technical barriers to recycling, or encouraging the development of new uses for recycled materials in the United States. However, agency officials told GAO that Commerce supports increased international trade in recycled and recyclable materials as part of its general trade promotion responsibilities. The recycling stakeholders we interviewed identified various federal policy options that they... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The volume and complexity of patent applications to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have increased significantly in recent years, lengthening the time needed to process patents. Annual applications have grown from about 185,000 to over 350,000 in the last 10 years and are projected to exceed 450,000 by 2009. Coupled with this growth is a backlog of about 750,000 applications. USPTO has long recognized the need to automate its patent processing and, over the past two decades, has been engaged in various automation projects. Accordingly, GAO was asked to, among other things, assess progress to date and any problems facing USPTO as it develops the capability to efficiently handle patent information electronically. As part of its strategy to achieve a paperless, electronic patent process, USPTO had planned to deliver an operational patent system by October 2004. It has been able to deliver important capabilities, such as allowing patent applicants to electronically file and view the status of their patent applications and the public to search published patents. Nonetheless, after spending over $1 billion on its efforts from 1983 through 2004, the agency's existing automation has not provided the fully integrated, electronic patent process articulated in its automation plans, and when and how this process will be achieved is uncertain. Key systems that USPTO is relying on to help reach this goal--an electronic application filing system and a document imaging system--have not provided capabilities that are essential to operating in a fully electronic environment. Contributing to this situation is that the agency took an ad hoc approach to planning and managing its implementation of these systems, in which it lacked effective analysis of system requirements, alternatives, and costs; made acquisition decisions based on management judgment; and acquired software that did not meet its needs. USPTO's ineffective planning and management of its patent automation initiatives, in large measure, can be attributed to enterprise-level, systemic weaknesses in its information technology investment management processes. Although the agency had begun instituting essential investment management mechanisms, such as its enterprise architecture framework, it had not yet finalized its capital planning and investment control process nor established necessary linkages between the process and its architecture to guide the development and implementation of its information technology. The Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and USPTO's chief information officer acknowledged the need for improvement, but specific plans for resolving problems have not yet been developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks exposed the vulnerability of U.S. financial markets to wide-scale disasters. Because the markets are vital to the nation's economy, GAO's testimony discusses (1) how the financial markets were directly affected by the attacks and how market participants and infrastructure providers worked to restore trading; (2) the steps taken by 15 important financial market organizations to address physical security, electronic security, and business continuity planning since the attacks; and (3) the steps the financial regulators have taken to ensure that the markets are better prepared for future disasters. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks severely disrupted U.S. financial markets as the result of the loss of life, damage to buildings, loss of telecommunications and power, and restrictions on access to the affected area. However, financial market participants were able to recover relatively quickly from the terrorist attacks because of market participants' and infrastructure providers' heroic efforts and because the securities exchanges and clearing organizations largely escaped direct damage. The attacks revealed limitations in the business continuity capabilities of some key financial market participants that would need to be addressed to improve the ability of U.S. markets to withstand such events in the future. GAO's review of 15 stock exchanges, clearing organizations, electronic communication networks, and payments system providers between February and June 2002 showed that all were taking steps to implement physical and electronic security measures and had developed business continuity plans. However, some organizations still had limitations in one or more of these areas that increased the risk that their operations could be disrupted by future disasters. Although the financial regulators have begun efforts to improve the resiliency of clearance and settlement functions within the financial markets, they have not fully developed goals, strategies, or sound practices to improve the resiliency of trading activities. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) technology and operations risk oversight, which is increasingly important, has been hampered by program, staff, and resource issues. GAO's report made recommendations designed to better prepare the markets to deal with future disasters and to enhance SEC's technology and operations risk oversight capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) aimed at identifying sustained leadership commitment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in implementing its integrated strategy for high-risk management. The need for DHS leadership commitment to strengthen its management functions and address the priority recommendations of GAO is tackled. The progress in transforming its original component agencies into a single cabinet-level department is also explored.

The article focuses on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) financial report for fiscal year 2018. Topics covered include several initiatives launched by the agency to address the evolving nature of the securities markets, enterprise risk and cybersecurity management, and limitations of the financial statements. Also discussed are the agency's strategic and performance and planning framework.

The article offers information on the discussion and analysis of the management at the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for fiscal year (FY) 2018. Topics discussed include the history, mission, vision and values of the agency, its strategic plan for 2018 until 2022, and empowering and enabling taxpayers to meet their tax obligations.

The article discusses a U.S. Government Accountability Office study that assessed Data Center Optimization Initiative agencies' data center inventories and reviewed agencies' reported cost savings documentation. Topics covered include December 2014 information technology acquisition reform legislation, number of agencies that had submitted a strategic plan as of April 2017, and weaknesses in the oversight of agencies' savings information by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.

The article presents a 2016 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office that examined the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) progress on its regulatory science efforts related to medical products. Topics include the FDA's strategic planning efforts to address its regulatory science priorities, its funding targeted at regulatory science projects, and the achievements of selected FDA regulatory science projects.

The article presents a 2016 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) that examined the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) implementation of a strategic integrated management plan (SIMP) for its centers that oversee biologics, drugs and medical devices. Topics include the extent to which the SIMP serves as a strategic planning document, the types of plan initiatives, and the mechanisms FDA has to evaluate the effectiveness of its plan initiatives.

The article discusses the actions of the U.S. Coast Guard, recommended by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in order to develop acquisition plans through the Strategic Planning Directions and to improve the asset allocation process. The tables of the statutory missions of the coast guard which are divided into non-homeland security and homeland security missions are discussed. Also mentions the operation of the two types of aircraft and vessels by the coast guard.

The article discusses the audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2015 and 2014. It examines the efficacy of the internal control over financial reporting in relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt managed by the Bureau of the Fiscal Service. It also stresses the weakness or significant deficiencies on the attention and action of management in financial reporting.

The article focuses on a report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess the actions of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to address Swine Enteric Coronavirus Diseases (SECD) outbreak occurred in May 2013. Topics discussed include no measures taken by USDA during initial stages of outbreak, limited knowledge on first infected flock's site, funding to manage SECD in June 2014, and concerns related to USDA's drafted policies for investigation.

The article focuses on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Agency Financial Report (AFR). Topics discussed include laws and regulations related to U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; strategic and performance planning framework; and civil monetary penalties inflation adjustment.

The article presents a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) which explores the factors considered and actions taken by airport operators, government officials, developers, and others to facilitate airport-centric development. GAO elaborates that these factors include the development at the airport, the air and surface connectivity and the funding sources. It also mentions that the said parties explore opportunities to strategically develop airports and regions.

The article presents a report made by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) for Congressional requesters on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) which works on missions to prevent terrorism and enhance security. The report evaluates shortcomings in the departmentwide efforts and suggests the use of five leading principles for strategic workforce planning such as set strategic direction, workforce gap analysis, workforce strategies to fill up gaps and monitor and evaluate.

The article reports on the findings of an audit of financial management and performance measurement efforts of the exchange program of Open World Leadership Center conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). The comparison between performance measures in the strategic plan of Open World and the Key Attributes of Successful Performance Measures of GAO is tackled. Open World was found to have followed leading financial management and performance measurement practices.

The article presents a report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the U.S. strategic approaches to counter-narcotics assistance in the Andes region. It aims to check the flow of cocaine to the U.S. which threatens the security and well-being of U.S. citizens. It is recommended that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) should submit performance summary reports to the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to facilitate good management and oversight.

The article discusses the need of improving the transparency and long term plan to clarify capital funding priorities. It focuses on the development of federal Buildings fund balance in the U.S. which belies revenue and cost challenges. The General Service Administrator (GSA) measures its investment needs for maintaining and improving the condition of its own facilities through its maintenance and repair liability.

The article focuses on a report of the U.S Government Accountability office regarding the efforts taken for the enhancement of workforce planning and training by incorporating principles of strategic management. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is taking initiative steps by employing workforce responsible for leading and supporting the nation. It states that the efforts of FEMA can be enhanced by establishing lines of authority.

The article presents information on a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) on five star quality rating system given by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). It is discussed that GAO review the five star system and found that the CMS develop this system in eight months and modify it according to the issues raised by the stakeholders and availability of new data sources. GAO further recommends strategic planning for the improvement of the system.

The article presents information on a study conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) strategies for addressing the GAO's high-risk designation and expected outcomes. As per the GAO, the DHS's strategies are responsive to the expected results and have identified 10 root causes of problems. The GAO suggests that the strategies can be improved by regularly reporting on available resources and by taking corrective steps.

The article discusses the need strategic outcomes for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and its visibility over the improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. The actions to be taken by the Secretary of Defense are presented which include defining outcome related strategic goals, assessment of Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) strategic plan in February 2006 and development of an implementation plan for DOD's counter-IED database establishment.

The article presents a testimony by David C. Maurer, director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, Committee on Homeland Security of the U.S. House of Representatives. Maurer discusses Department of Homeland Security (DHS) strategic planning. He cites the efforts of the DHS to strategically plan its homeland security missions department, to set strategic priorities, and to build and implement a unified department.

The article assesses the effectiveness of U.S. science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education programs. It examines concerns of overlapping and fragmentation among the agencies that funded STEM programs in 2010, as well as the issue of insufficient performance measures for effective evaluation. Specific recommendations are offered for improved government-wide strategic planning, including a monitoring framework if STEM programs are to foster U.S. educational competitiveness.

The article presents information on the importance of redevelopment of acquisition workforce which the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) considers as a strategic priority. As stated, DOD reported that it hired about 5,900 people into the acquisition workforce in 2010. As further stated, the U.S. Government Accountability Office has reported that DOD needs to assess the ability of the people who are acting as acquisition workforce and provide them effective training to enhance their skills.