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The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) relies on about 55 million paper-based files to adjudicate applications for immigration status and other benefits. Ensuring the currency and availability of these manual files, referred to as alien files, or A-Files, is a major challenge. To address this challenge, USCIS has initiated efforts, both long and near term, to automate the A-Files. The long-term effort is now being re-examined within the context of a larger USCIS organizational transformation initiative. In the near term, USCIS has begun a digitization program, which it estimates will cost about $190 million over an 8-year period to electronically scan existing paper files and store and share the scanned images. GAO was asked to determine whether USCIS was effectively managing its A-Files automation efforts. USCIS's effectiveness in managing its long-term effort for automating the A-Files cannot yet be determined because the scope, content, and approach for moving from paper-based to paperless A-Files has yet to be defined. Nevertheless, GAO believes that USCIS's recent decision to re-examine prior agency plans for a strategic A-Files automation solution within the context of an agencywide transformation strategy appropriately recognizes the integral support role that information technology plays in organizational and business transformation. GAO also believes that the success of USCIS's organizational transformation depends on other key supporting practices, such as having a comprehensive and integrated transformation plan (goals and schedules) and results-oriented performance measures. With respect to USCIS's near-term A-Files automation effort, known as the Integrated Digitization Document Management Program (IDDMP), effective planning is not occurring. In particular, USCIS has not developed a plan governing how it will manage this program and its contractors, and it has not developed an evaluation plan for its ongoing digitization concept of operations pilot test, even though it has either awarded or plans to award contracts totaling about $20 million for this pilot. In addition, USCIS officials told us they do not yet know which A-Files immigration forms will be scanned. Without a defined scope and adequate planning, this program is at risk of falling short of expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimated the 2010 Census would cost $11.5 billion, including $3 billion on automation and technology. At a March hearing, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) stated that the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program was likely to incur significant cost overruns and announced a redesign effort. At that time, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census as high risk, citing long-standing concerns in managing information technology (IT) investments and uncertain costs and operations. This testimony is based on past work and work nearing completion, including GAO's observation of the address canvassing dress rehearsal. For IT acquisitions, GAO analyzed system documentation, including deliverables, cost estimates, other acquisitions-related documents, and interviewed Bureau officials and contractors. This testimony describes the implications of redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and decennial operations, (2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) Decennial Census costs. The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. On April 3, 2008, Commerce announced significant changes to the FDCA program. It also announced that it expected the cost of the decennial to be up to $3 billion greater than previously estimated. The redesign will have fundamental impacts on the dress rehearsal as well as 2010 Census operations. Changes this late in the decade introduce additional risks, making more important the steps the Bureau can take to manage those risks. The content and timing of dress rehearsal operations must be altered to accommodate the Bureau's design. For example, Commerce has selected an option that calls for the Bureau to drop the use of handheld computers (HHCs) during the nonresponse follow-up operation, and the Bureau may now be unable to fully rehearse a paper-based operation. Additionally, reverting to a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation presents the Bureau with a wide range of additional challenges, such as arranging for the printing of enumerator forms and testing the systems that will read the data from these forms once completed by enumerators. Given the redesign effort, implementing GAO's recommendations associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected. According to the Bureau, the redesign and related revision of the FDCA program is expected to result in significant... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimated the 2010 Census would cost $11.5 billion, including $3 billion on automation and technology. At a March hearing, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) stated that the Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program was likely to incur significant cost overruns and announced a redesign effort. At that time, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census as high risk, citing long-standing concerns in managing information technology (IT) investments and uncertain costs and operations. This testimony is based on past work and work nearing completion, including GAO's observation of the address canvassing dress rehearsal. For IT acquisitions, GAO analyzed system documentation, including deliverables, cost estimates, other acquisitions-related documents, and interviewed Bureau officials and contractors. This testimony describes the implications of redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and decennial operations, (2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) Decennial Census costs. The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under census-like conditions. Last week Commerce announced significant changes to the FDCA program. It also announced that it expected the cost of the decennial to be up to $3 billion greater than previously estimated. The redesign will have fundamental impacts on the dress rehearsal as well as 2010 Census operations. Changes this late in the decade introduce additional risks, making more important the steps the Bureau can take to manage those risks. The content and timing of dress rehearsal operations must be altered to accommodate the Bureau's design. For example, Commerce has selected an option that calls for the Bureau to drop the use of handheld computers (HHCs) during the nonresponse follow-up operation, and the Bureau may now be unable to fully rehearse a paper-based operation. Additionally, reverting to a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation presents the Bureau with a wide range of additional challenges, such as arranging for the printing of enumerator forms and testing the systems that will read the data from these forms once completed by enumerators. Given the redesign effort, implementing GAO's recommendations associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected. According to the Bureau, the redesign and related revision of the FDCA program is expected to result in significant increases to the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) spent about 38 percent of its $10.8 billion budget on processing returns and providing taxpayer assistance. GAO was asked to (1) assess IRS's 2006 filing season performance processing paper and electronically filed tax returns and providing telephone, Web site, and face-to-face assistance relative to 2006 goals and prior years' performance; (2) identify potential cost savings or other improvements; and (3) report on the status of IRS's Taxpayer Assistance Blueprint (TAB). To address these issues, GAO collected relevant information from IRS and other sources, reviewed performance measures and past filing season assessments, and interviewed officials. IRS improved most filing season services in 2006, continuing improvements since 2001. IRS also generated efficiencies from increased electronic filing and benefits for taxpayers through systems modernization. IRS's processing of individual tax returns and refunds improved by most measures, but the growth rate of electronic filing continued to slow in part because of changes to the Free File Program, which reduced the number of taxpayers eligible to use it and the elimination of a program that allowed taxpayers to file via the telephone. Access to IRS's telephone assistors was comparable to last year. The accuracy of responses to telephone inquiries was 90 percent or over in 2006. Use of IRS's Web site increased substantially and IRS reconfigured the site to improve service. Continuing past trends, fewer taxpayers used IRS walk-in sites and more used less-costly volunteer sites. Also, IRS completed Phase I of the TAB, which identified strategic themes for improving taxpayer service; TAB Phase II is expected to be completed by early 2007. With the slowing growth rate in electronic filing, IRS is missing an opportunity to generate additional savings. Federal and state mandates for electronic filing have demonstrated success in increasing electronic filing; however, IRS currently lacks the authority to mandate electronic filing for certain income tax returns such as individual returns filed by paid tax preparers. Using IRS estimates, savings from such a mandate could be on the order of $60 million per year. IRS has another opportunity to generate savings because of excess space at its call sites. However, IRS lacks a strategy for eliminating that space by consolidating call sites. To replace its aging legacy computer system, IRS continues to implement a modernized system for processing tax returns and refunds. However, IRS does not report information on the chief benefit realized to date, faster refund issuance. Such information could be useful for the Congress when making decisions about funding the completion of the individual tax return processing part of the system, estimated by IRS to require at least another $500 million. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every year, food stamp recipients exchange hundreds of millions of dollars in benefits for cash instead of food with retailers across the country, a practice known as trafficking. From 2000 to 2005, the Food Stamp Program has grown from $15 billion to $29 billion in benefits. During this period of time, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) replaced paper food stamp coupons with electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards that work much like a debit card at the grocery checkout counter. Given these program changes and continuing retailer fraud, GAO was asked to provide information on (1) what is known about the extent and nature of retailer food stamp trafficking, (2) the efforts of federal agencies to combat such trafficking, and (3) program vulnerabilities. To do this, GAO interviewed agency officials, visited 10 field offices, conducted case file reviews, and analyzed data from the FNS retailer database. FNS's estimates suggest trafficking declined between 1995 and 2005 from 3.8 cents per dollar of benefits redeemed to 1.0 cent, resulting in an estimated $241 million in food stamps trafficked in 2005. The rate of trafficking in small grocery and convenience stores is 7.6 cents per dollar, significantly higher than the rate for large stores, where it is estimated to be 0.2 cents per dollar. In addition, the use of EBT cards has changed the way some benefits are trafficked, for example eliminating middlemen who used to collect and redeem large amounts of paper coupons from program participants willing to sell them. FNS has taken advantage of EBT data to improve its ability to detect and disqualify trafficking retailers, while law enforcement agencies have conducted a decreasing number of investigations. Cases using only EBT transaction data now account for more than half of trafficking disqualifications, supplementing traditional, but more time-consuming, undercover investigations. Other federal entities, such as the USDA's Inspector General and the U.S. Secret Service, have reduced the number of traffickers they pursue in recent years and focused their efforts on high-impact cases. This has resulted in fewer cases referred for federal prosecution and fewer federal convictions for retailer trafficking. Despite FNS progress, the program remains vulnerable because retailers can enter the program intending to traffic, often without fear of severe criminal penalties. FNS authorizes some stores with limited food supplies so that low-income participants in areas with few supermarkets have access to food, but may not inspect these stores again for 5 years unless there is some indication of a problem. Oversight of early operations is important because newly authorized retailers can quickly ramp up the amount of benefits they traffic. One location that FNS disqualified for trafficking redeemed almost $650,000 in 9 months. In addition, FNS has not conducted analyses to identify high risk areas and to... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) manages the systems that process retirement benefits for most federal civilian employees. In fiscal year 2003, over 198,000 claims were processed and over $50 billion in benefits was paid through OPM's retirement systems. OPM is trying to modernize these systems through a program called Retirement Systems Modernization (RSM). The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2004 OPM appropriations act directed us to review the management of and challenges facing RSM. Specifically, our objectives were to determine (1) the current status of and plans for OPM's RSM program and (2) the challenges OPM faces in successfully managing the program. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is in the midst of an effort known as Retirement Systems Modernization (RSM). OPM's goals, through this program, are to improve customer service, reduce calculation errors, and reduce the amount of paper-based and manual processing. OPM expects RSM's total cost to be about $294 million from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2008, when the agency expects to have most of RSM implemented and integrated. As currently envisioned, RSM comprises four major components: licensed technology for pension benefits administration, data conversion of paper files and development of electronic processes for capture and storage of data, coverage determination and other applications, and foundation and infrastructure elements. GAO's experience with major systems acquisitions such as RSM has shown that having sound systems acquisition, change management, and investment management processes in place increases the likelihood of the acquisitions meeting cost and schedule estimates as well as performance requirements. However, GAO found that many of the processes in these areas for RSM are not sufficiently developed, are still under development, or are planned for future development. For example, OPM lacks needed processes for developing and managing requirements, planning and managing project activities, managing risks, and providing sound information to investment decision makers. Without these processes in place, RSM is at increased risk of not being developed and delivered on time and within budget and falling short of promised capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the tax filing season, millions of taxpayers file their returns and seek assistance by calling or visiting IRS's offices or Web site. GAO was asked to assess IRS's 2003 filing season performance in five areas: processing returns, refunds and remittances; electronic filing; telephone service; walk-in assistance, and Web site. We assessed for each of those five areas (1) IRS's performance in 2003, including any factors that helped or impeded its efforts, (2) any new initiatives that were intended to improve IRS's performance in 2003, and (3) IRS's performance over past filing seasons. Available data for each of five key filing season activities indicates that IRS's performance showed some improvements in 2003 compared to 2002 and IRS met or exceeded many of its 2003 performance goals. IRS processed returns and issued refunds more timely and accurately and increased the rate of electronic filing, although not at a rate that would allow IRS to meet its long-term goal. While IRS provided significantly more accessible telephone service, the accuracy rate of IRS responses declined. The accuracy of tax law assistance provided at walk-in sites improved, although the number of taxpayers assisted at IRS's walk-in sites declined, in part because taxpayers made greater use of the return-preparation assistance offered by volunteer organizations. In addition, IRS did not consolidate or disseminate data on how long taxpayers waited for walk-in assistance, making it difficult to balance quality and service. Finally, IRS's Web site performed well and was more user friendly than last year. IRS attributes improved performance, in part, to (1) fewer tax law changes that affected taxpayers and (2) continued emphasis on performance measures, a key part of IRS's strategy to improve its performance in processing returns and providing taxpayer assistance. IRS implemented initiatives in 2003 intended to improve filing season performance. For example, IRS entered into an agreement with a consortium of 17 tax preparation companies to offer free on-line tax preparation, established new toll-free telephone numbers to better target different taxpayers, and began certifying walk-in staff to answer tax law questions. Over a longer period of time, available data, although limited in some areas, also show that IRS's filing season performance has improved. Since the mid-1990s, the growth of electronic filing has allowed IRS to close one paper processing center and the accuracy and accessibility of telephone assistance has improved. While the Congress and taxpayers expect further progress, the improvements to date are a payoff from IRS's ongoing modernization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This testimony outlines (1) the impact of the recent increased operational tempo on the process used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses and the effect that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers and their families; (2) the adequacy of the overall design of controls over the processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on for Army Guard travel reimbursements; (3) whether the Department of Defense's (DOD) current efforts to automate its travel reimbursement process will resolve the problems identified; and (4) other DOD actions to improve the accuracy and timeliness of Army Guard travel reimbursements. Mobilized Army Guard soldiers have experienced significant problems getting accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursements for out-of-pocket travel expenses. These weaknesses were more glaring in light of the sustained increase in mobilized Guard soldiers following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To its credit, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) hired over 200 new personnel to address travel voucher processing backlogs and recently upgraded their training. However, Guard soldiers in our case study units reported a number of problems they and their families endured due to delayed or unpaid travel reimbursements, including debts on their personal credit cards, trouble paying their monthly bills, and inability to make child support payments. The soldier bears primary responsibility for travel voucher preparation, including obtaining paper copies of various types of authorizations. DFAS data indicate that it rejected and asked soldiers to resubmit about 18 percent of vouchers during fiscal year 2004--a churning process that added to delays and frustration. Also, existing guidance did not clearly address the sometimes complex travel situations of mobilized Army Guard soldiers, who were often housed off-post due to overcrowding on military installations. Further, DOD continued to be noncompliant with a law that requires payment of late payment interest and fees when soldiers' travel reimbursements are not timely. With respect to human capital, GAO found a lack of oversight and accountability and inadequate training. Automated systems problems, such as nonintegration of key systems involved in authorizing and paying travel expenses and failure to automate key processes, also contributed to the inefficient, error-prone process. DOD has been developing and implementing the Defense Travel System (DTS) to resolve travel-related deficiencies. However, DTS will not address some of the key systems flaws. For example, DTS is currently not able to process mobilized soldier travel authorizations and vouchers and identify and calculate late payment interest and fees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is modernizing the paper-intensive processes and antiquated information systems it uses to support the retirement of civilian federal employees through the Retirement Systems Modernization (RSM) program. In January 2008, we reported on the agency's management of this program, in which we noted concerns and made recommendations for improvement in four key areas: (1) system testing, (2) system defect resolution, (3) program cost estimation, and (4) program earned value management. The explanatory statement of the House Appropriations Committee regarding the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act directed OPM to submit to Cpngressional Committees and to GAO not later than February 20, 2008, a report of its actions on the four areas of concern that we identified. Further, the explanatory statement directed that GAO provide to Congressional Committees and to OPM our comments on the agency's report. Our study determined that OPM initial RSM system test results did not provide assurance that a major system component--the Defined Benefits Technology Solution (DBTS)--would perform as intended, and that the agency's compressed and concurrent testing schedule increased the risk that it would not have sufficient resources or time to verify that the system will work as intended. We recommended that OPM ensure that sufficient resources are provided to fully test functionality, actions for mitigating the risks inherent in concurrent testing are identified, test results verify that all system components perform as expected, and test activities and results are subjected to independent verification and validation. OPM's report did not address the results of other critical tests that the agency had planned to conduct starting in December 2007 and ending in February 2008. Specifically, the report did not discuss the results of the following tests: (1) parallel test to verify that the new system produces the same results as existing systems; (2) integrated product test to confirm that system components meet functional requirements; (3) performance test to confirm that the new system meets performance requirements (e.g., processing volume and execution time); (4) business capability test to confirm the operational readiness of the new system for end users. Our study of RSM determined that trends in identifying and resolving system defects indicated a growing backlog of problems to be resolved prior to deployment of the new system. We recommended that the agency monitor and review DBTS defects to ensure that all urgent and high priority defects are resolved prior to system deployment and that the resolution of urgent and high priority defects is subjected to independent verification and validation. OPM reported progress toward resolving defects between October 2007 and January 2008. However, the agency did not report actual defect resolution data for February 2008; instead it reported the projected... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Dept. of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program in partnership with private insurers. In 2006, the program cost $3.5 billion, including millions in losses from fraud, waste, and abuse, according to USDA. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 granted RMA authority to renegotiate the terms of RMA's standard reinsurance agreement with companies once over 5 years. This testimony is based on GAO's 2005 report, Crop Insurance: Actions Needed to Reduce Program's Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, and May 2007 testimony, Crop Insurance: Continuing Efforts Are Needed to Improve Program Integrity and Ensure Program Costs Are Reasonable. GAO discusses (1) USDA's processes to address fraud, waste, and abuse; (2) extent the program's design makes it vulnerable to abuse; and (3) reasonableness of underwriting gains and other expenses. USDA agreed with most of GAO's 2005 recommendations to improve program integrity. GAO reported that RMA did not use all available tools to reduce the crop insurance program's vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. RMA has since taken some steps to improve its procedures. In particular: (1) USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) inspections during the growing season were not being used to maximum effect. Between 2001 and 2004, FSA conducted only 64 percent of the inspections RMA requested. Without inspections, farmers may falsely claim crop losses. However, FSA said it could not conduct all requested inspections, as GAO recommended, because of insufficient resources. RMA now provides information more frequently so FSA can conduct timelier inspections. (2) RMA's data analysis of the largest farming operations was incomplete. In 2003, about 21,000 of the largest farming operations did not report all of the individuals or entities with an ownership interest in these operations, as required. Therefore, RMA was unaware of ownership interests that could help it prevent potential program abuse. FSA and RMA started sharing information to identify such individuals or entities, but have stopped temporarily to resolve producer privacy issues. USDA should recover up to $74 million in improper payments made during 2003. (3) RMA was not effectively overseeing insurance companies' efforts to control program abuse. According to GAO's review of 120 cases, companies did not complete all the required quality assurance reviews of claims, and those that were conducted were largely paper exercises. RMA agreed to improve oversight of their reviews, but GAO has not followed up to examine its implementation. RMA's regulations to implement the crop insurance program, as well as some statutory requirements, create design problems that hinder its efforts to reduce abuse. For example, the regulations allow farmers to insure fields individually rather than together. As such, farmers can "switch" reporting of yield among fields to make false claims or build up a... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Dept. of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program in partnership with private insurers. In 2006, the program cost $3.5 billion, including millions in losses from fraud, waste, and abuse, according to USDA. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 granted RMA authority to renegotiate the terms of RMA's standard reinsurance agreement with companies once over 5 years. This testimony is based on GAO's 2005 report, Crop Insurance: Actions Needed to Reduce Program's Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, as well as new analyses this Committee requested on underwriting gains and administrative and operating expenses USDA paid companies. GAO discusses (1) USDA's processes to address fraud, waste, and abuse; (2) extent the program's design makes it vulnerable to abuse; and (3) reasonableness of underwriting gains and other expenses. USDA agreed with most of GAO's 2005 recommendations to improve program integrity. RMA agreed that GAO's new analyses were technically accurate. GAO reported that RMA did not use all available tools to reduce the crop insurance program's vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. RMA has since taken some steps to improve its procedures. In particular, USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) inspections during the growing season were not being used to maximum effect. Between 2001 and 2004, FSA conducted only 64 percent of the inspections RMA requested. Without inspections, farmers may falsely claim crop losses. However, FSA said it could not conduct all requested inspections, as GAO recommended, because of insufficient resources. RMA now provides information more frequently so FSA can conduct timelier inspections. RMA's data analysis of the largest farming operations was incomplete. In 2003, about 21,000 of the largest farming operations did not report all of the individuals or entities with an ownership interest in these operations, as required. Therefore, RMA was unaware of ownership interests that could help it prevent potential program abuse. FSA and RMA now share information to identify such individuals or entities. USDA should be able to recover up to $74 million in improper payments made during 2003. RMA was not effectively overseeing insurance companies' efforts to control program abuse. According to GAO's review of 120 cases, companies did not complete all the required quality assurance reviews of claims, and those that were conducted were largely paper exercises. RMA agreed to improve oversight of their reviews, but GAO has not followed up to examine its implementation. RMA's regulations to implement the crop insurance program, as well as some statutory requirements, create design problems that hinder its efforts to reduce abuse. For example, the regulations allow farmers to insure fields individually rather than together. As such, farmers can "switch" reporting of yield among fields to make false claims or build up a higher yield history... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently began a 6-year, $425 million program called Sentinel to replace and expand on both its failed Virtual Case File (VCF) project and its antiquated, paper-based, legacy system for supporting mission-critical intelligence analysis and investigative case management activities. Because of the FBI's experience with VCF and the importance of Sentinel, GAO was requested to address a number of program management issues associated with acquiring Sentinel via a prime development contractor. This report focuses on one of these issues: whether the FBI is adequately providing for the program's human capital needs. The findings are based on GAO's review of relevant program documentation, interviews with program officials, and human capital management guidance. To its credit, the FBI has moved quickly to staff its Sentinel program office. During the last year, it created a staffing plan for Sentinel, which defines the positions needed for the program, and it has filled most of the positions in the plan, primarily by using contract staff (77 percent). However, a few key program management positions remain to be filled. More importantly, the Sentinel staffing plan addresses only the program office's immediate staffing needs. It does not provide for the kind of strategic human capital management focus that GAO's research and evaluations have shown to be essential to the success of any organizational entity. For example, the staffing plan was not derived using a documented, data-driven methodology and does not provide for inventorying the knowledge and skills of existing staff, forecasting future knowledge and skill needs, analyzing gaps in capabilities between the existing staff and future workforce needs, (including consideration of expected succession needs), and formulating strategies for filling expected gaps. Exacerbating this situation is that the FBI is not proactively managing Sentinel human capital availability as a program risk; it has not included human capital in the program's risk inventory nor has it developed and implemented a proactive risk mitigation strategy, even though program documents cite human capital as both a challenge and a risk. According to program officials, they plan to manage their human capital needs in the same way as when they initially staffed the program office, in part because the bureau's IT system life cycle management policies and procedures do not require them to do otherwise. Unless the FBI adopts a more strategic approach to managing human capital for the Sentinel program and treats human capital as a program risk, the chances of delivering required intelligence and investigative support capabilities in a timely and cost-effective manner are reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Dept. of Agriculture's (USDA) Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program in partnership with private insurers. In 2005, the program cost $2.7 billion, including an estimated $117 million in losses from fraud, waste, and abuse. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 (ARPA) provided new tools to monitor and control abuses, such as providing RMA sanction authority to address program abuse and having USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) inspect farmers' fields. This testimony is based on GAO's September 30, 2005, report, Crop Insurance: Actions Needed to Reduce Program's Vulnerability to Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (GAO-05-528). GAO assessed (1) USDA's processes to address fraud, waste, and abuse, and (2) the extent to which the program's design makes it vulnerable to abuse. RMA has taken a number of steps to improve its procedures and processes to address fraud, waste and abuse in selling and servicing crop insurance policies and has reported more than $300 million in savings from 2001 to 2004. However, RMA is not effectively using all of its tools. GAO identified weaknesses in four key areas. First, FSA inspections during the growing season are not being used to maximum effect. Between 2001 and 2004, FSA conducted only 64 percent of the inspections RMA had requested. Without inspections, farmers may falsely claim crop losses. Second, RMA's data analysis of the largest farming operations is incomplete. According to GAO's analysis, in 2003 about 21,000 of the largest farming operations in the program did not report individuals or entities with an ownership interest in these operations as required. Without this information RMA was unaware of ownership interests that could help it prevent potential program abuse. FSA did not give RMA access to the data needed to identify such individuals or entities. USDA should be able to recover up to $74 million in improper claims payments. Third, RMA is not effectively overseeing insurance companies' efforts to control program abuse. GAO's review of 120 cases showed that companies did not complete all of the required quality assurance reviews of claims and those that were conducted were largely paper exercises. Fourth, RMA has infrequently used its new sanction authority to address program abuse. RMA has not issued regulations to implement its new sanction authority under ARPA and imposed only 114 sanctions from 2001 through 2004, although it annually identifies about 3,000 questionable claims, not all of which are necessarily sanctionable. RMA's regulations to implement the crop insurance program, as well as some statutory requirements, create program design problems that hinder RMA's efforts to reduce program abuse. For example, RMA's regulations allow farmers to insure fields individually rather than all fields combined. This option enables farmers to "switch" reporting of yield among fields to either make false claims or build up a higher yield history on... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), through its Federal Housing Administration (FHA), insures billions of dollars in home mortgage loans made by private lenders. FHA insures low down payment loans and a number of parties have made proposals to either eliminate or otherwise change FHA's borrower contribution requirements. GAO was asked to (1) identify the key characteristics of existing low and no down payment products, (2) review relevant literature on the importance of loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and credit scores to loan performance, (3) report on the performance of low and no down payment mortgages supported by FHA and others, and (4) identify lessons for FHA from others in terms of designing and implementing low and no down payment products. FHA and many other mortgage institutions provide many low and no down payment products with requirements that vary in terms of eligibility, borrower investment, underwriting, and risk mitigation. While these products are similar, there are some important differences, including that FHA has lower loan limits, allows closing costs and the up-front insurance premium to be financed in the mortgage, and permits the down payment funds to come from nonprofits that receive funds from sellers. FHA also differs in that it does not require prepurchase counseling. A substantial amount of research GAO reviewed indicates that LTV ratio and credit score are among the most important factors when estimating the risk level associated with individual mortgages. GAO's analysis of the performance of low and no down payment mortgages supported by FHA and others corroborates key findings in the literature. Generally, mortgages with higher LTV ratios (smaller down payments) and lower credit scores are riskier than mortgages with lower LTV ratios and higher credit scores. Some practices of other mortgage institutions offer a framework that could help FHA manage the risks associated with introducing new products or making significant changes to existing products. Mortgage institutions may impose limits on the volume of the new products they will permit and on who can sell and service these products. FHA officials question the circumstances in which they can limit volumes for their products and believe they do not have sufficient resources to manage a product with limited volumes. Mortgage institutions sometimes require additional credit enhancements, such as higher insurance coverage; and sometimes require stricter underwriting, such as credit score thresholds, when introducing a new low or no down payment product. FHA is authorized to require an additional credit enhancement by sharing risk through co-insurance but does not currently use this authority. FHA has used stricter underwriting criteria but this has not included credit score thresholds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Department of Agriculture provided $15 billion in food stamp benefits to 17 million recipients in 2000. Until the mid-1990s, most recipients received paper coupons that they could use to buy food; today, 80 percent of all benefits are provided electronically. Recipients use cards, much like debit cards, to pay for their groceries at the checkout counter, and the costs are deducted from the recipients' monthly allocation. GAO found that 42 of the 53 jurisdictions it studied will likely meet the October 1, 2002, deadline for implementing a statewide electronic benefit transfer (EBT) system. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia had already implemented a statewide EBT system by October 2001, and six other states had signed EBT contracts and were on track to meet the October 2002 deadline for statewide implementation. GAO did not identify any technical barriers to statewide implementation of EBT systems that are interoperable and portable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Offshore tax evasion is difficult for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to address. IRS examines tax returns to deal with offshore evasion that has occurred. IRS's Qualified Intermediary (QI) program seeks to foster improved tax withholding and reporting. GAO was asked to testify on two topics. First, GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the length of, and assessments from, IRS's examination of tax returns with offshore activity and (2) the impact of the 3-year statute of limitations on offshore cases. Second, for the QI program, GAO was asked to address (1) program features intended to improve withholding and reporting, and (2) whether weaknesses exist in the U.S. withholding system for U.S. source income and QI external reviews and IRS's use of program data. GAO relied on prior work for the first topic. For the QI program, GAO used the latest data that were available and corroborated by IRS. Examinations involving offshore tax evasion take much more time to develop and complete than other examinations--a median of 500 more days for cases from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, but their resulting median assessment is almost three times larger than for all other examinations. Nevertheless, because they take more staff time, offshore examinations yielded tax assessments per hour of staff time that were about one-half of that for all other examinations. Because of the 3-year statute of limitations, the time needed to complete an offshore examination means that IRS sometimes prematurely ends offshore examinations or decides not to open an examination, despite evidence of likely noncompliance. Congress has granted a statute change or exception when enforcement challenges similar to those found in offshore cases have arisen in the past. QIs are foreign financial institutions that contract with IRS to withhold and report U.S. source income paid offshore to foreign customers. The QI program provides IRS some assurance that QIs are properly withholding and reporting tax on U.S. source income paid offshore. QIs (1) are more likely to have a direct working relationship with customers who claim reduced tax rates under tax treaties, (2) accept responsibilities for ensuring customers are in fact eligible for treaty benefits, and (3) agree to have independent parties review a sample of accounts and report to IRS. However, a low percentage of U.S. source income flows through QIs. For tax year 2003, about 12.5 percent of U.S. source income flowed through QIs. About 87.5 percent flowed through U.S. withholding agents, which provide somewhat less assurance of proper withholding and reporting than do QIs. In addition, U.S. persons may be able to evade taxes by masquerading as foreign corporations. The contractually required independent reviews of QIs' accounts do not require auditors to follow up on indications of illegal acts, as would reviews under U.S. Government Auditing Standards. While IRS obtains considerable data from withholding agents,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been shifting its priorities from taxpayer service to enforcement and its management of Business Systems Modernization (BSM) from contractors to IRS staff. Although there are sound reasons for these adjustments, they also involve risks. With respect to the fiscal year 2006 budget request, GAO assessed (1) how IRS proposes to balance its resources between taxpayer service and enforcement programs and the potential impact on taxpayers, (2) the status of IRS's efforts to develop and implement the BSM program, and (3) the progress IRS has made in implementing best practices in developing its Information Technology (IT) operations and maintenance budget. For the 2005 filing season, GAO assessed IRS's performance in processing returns and providing taxpayer service. IRS's fiscal year 2006 budget request of $10.9 billion proposes increased funding for enforcement, but reduced funding for taxpayer service and BSM. However, the potential impact of these changes on taxpayers in either the short- or long-term is unclear, because IRS has not provided details of proposed taxpayer service reductions, and although it is developing longterm goals, they are not yet finalized. Because of the proposed reductions and new and improved taxpayer services in recent years, this is an opportune time to examine the menu of services IRS provides. It may be possible to maintain the overall level of service to taxpayers by offsetting reductions in some areas with new and improved service in other areas. Taxpayers and IRS are seeing some payoff from the BSM program, with the deployment of initial phases of several modernized systems in 2004. Nevertheless, the BSM program continues to be high-risk, in part, because projects have incurred significant cost increases and schedule delays and the program faces major challenges in areas such as human capital and requirements management. As a result of budget reductions and other factors, IRS has made major adjustments. It is too early to tell what effect these adjustments will have on the program, but they are not without risk and could potentially impact future budgets. Further, the BSM program is based on strategies developed years ago, which, coupled with the delays and changes brought on by budget reductions, indicates that it is time for IRS to revisit its long-term goals, strategy, and plans for BSM. Because of these challenges, IRS is redefining and refocusing the BSM program. IRS has generally maintained or improved its filing season performance in 2005. Processing is more efficient, the accuracy of answers provided by telephone assistors is improved, and telephone access is relatively comparable to last year. This is particularly noteworthy, because IRS received less funding for taxpayer service in 2005 than it spent in 2004. Because the filing season is not over, the full impact on taxpayers and IRS operations is not yet known. However, there are indications of slippage in telephone access such as more abandoned calls and longer wait times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Congress asked GAO to review operational and programmatic aspects of the Census Bureau's ACS that will affect the reliability of small geographic area data. The ACS will be a mail survey of about 3 million households annually, whose results will be cumulated over 5 years to produce estimates that will replace information previously provided by the Decennial Census long form. In addition, annual data will be published for geographic areas with 65,000+ populations and as 3-year averages for areas with populations of 20,000 to 65,000. Annual data will be published beginning in 2006 with data for 2005. The 5-year averages for 2008-12 will provide data for small geographic areas. The Census Bureau's development of the American Community Survey goes back several decades and has included intensive research and field testing programs, as well as substantial outreach efforts, in particular through the reports and workshops at the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). However, if the ACS is to be an adequate replacement for the Decennial Census long form as the major source of data on small geographic areas and if it is to provide similar annual data for larger areas, the Census Bureau will need to incorporate in a timely manner the resolution of issues it has already identified in the ACS testing and 2000 Decennial Census evaluation programs, such as the residence concept, group quarters, and questions on disability; complete the ACS testing plan as originally planned, such as the comparison and evaluation of long form-ACS supplementary survey data at the state level, to identify other unresolved issues and to provide information for users of 2000 Decennial Census long-form data that will be necessary for the transition to the full ACS; evaluate and consult with stakeholders and users on the resolution of issues identified in this report, such as the methodology for deriving population and housing controls, guidance for users on the impact of the characteristics of multiyear averages for small geographic areas, and the presentation of dollar-denominated values; coordinate the results of the testing program for the 2010 Decennial Census short form with the ACS implementation schedule; and resolve all issues so that the ACS estimates beginning with 2008 are consistent with the ACS estimates for 2009-12 and with the 2010 Census short form. Although the Census Bureau has solicited advice from external stakeholders and users and has supported research by its own staff on most of the issues identified in this report, there is no indication that the Census Bureau has yet followed this advice or implemented plans for consultation on resolving these issues. In addition, it has been more than a year since the Census Bureau announced that it was looking into establishing an ACS partnership program that would involve advisory groups and expert panels to improve the program, but no such program has been established. Another issue related to the proposed ACS is how the Census Bureau might provide more timely and reliable small geographic area data. This goal could be accomplished, but it would require additional funding. The most direct approach would be to increase the sample size for 2009-11. This increase would enable the Bureau to provide small geographic area data that would be the replacement for the 2010 Census long form 1 year earlier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Securing the control systems that regulate the nation's critical infrastructures is vital to ensuring our economic security and public health and safety. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal corporation and the nation's largest public power company, generates and distributes power in an area of about 80,000 square miles in the southeastern United States. GAO was asked to determine whether TVA has implemented appropriate information security practices to protect its control systems. To do this, GAO examined the security practices in place at several TVA facilities; analyzed the agency's information security policies, plans, and procedures against federal law and guidance; and interviewed agency officials who are responsible for overseeing TVA's control systems and their security. TVA has not fully implemented appropriate security practices to secure the control systems and networks used to operate its critical infrastructures. Both its corporate network infrastructure and control systems networks and devices were vulnerable to disruption. The corporate network was interconnected with control systems networks GAO reviewed, thereby increasing the risk that security weaknesses on the corporate network could affect those control systems networks. On TVA's corporate network, certain individual workstations lacked key software patches and had inadequate security settings, and numerous network infrastructure protocols and devices had limited or ineffective security configurations. In addition, the intrusion detection system had significant limitations. On control systems networks, firewalls reviewed were either inadequately configured or had been bypassed, passwords were not effectively implemented, logging of certain activity was limited, configuration management policies for control systems software were inconsistently implemented, and servers and workstations lacked key patches and effective virus protection. In addition, physical security at multiple locations did not sufficiently protect critical control systems. As a result, systems that operate TVA's critical infrastructures are at increased risk of unauthorized modification or disruption by both internal and external threats. An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that TVA had not consistently implemented significant elements of its information security program. Although TVA had developed and implemented program activities related to contingency planning and incident response, it had not consistently implemented key activities related to developing an inventory of systems, assessing risk, developing policies and procedures, developing security plans, testing and monitoring the effectiveness of controls, completing appropriate training, and identifying and tracking remedial actions. For example, the agency lacked a complete inventory of its control systems and had not categorized all of its control systems according to risk, thereby limiting assurance that these... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The control systems that regulate the nation's critical infrastructures face risks of cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and potential attacks. Securing these systems is therefore vital to ensuring national security, economic well-being, and public health and safety. While most critical infrastructures are privately owned, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal corporation and the nation's largest public power company, provides power and other services to a large swath of the American Southeast. GAO was asked to testify on its public report being released today on the security controls in place over TVA's critical infrastructure control systems. In doing this work, GAO examined the security practices in place at TVA facilities; analyzed the agency's information security policies, plans, and procedures in light of federal law and guidance; and interviewed agency officials responsible for overseeing TVA's control systems and their security. TVA had not fully implemented appropriate security practices to secure the control systems used to operate its critical infrastructures at facilities GAO reviewed. Multiple weaknesses within the TVA corporate network left it vulnerable to potential compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of network devices and the information transmitted by the network. For example, almost all of the workstations and servers that GAO examined on the corporate network lacked key security patches or had inadequate security settings. Furthermore, TVA did not adequately secure its control system networks and devices on these networks, leaving the control systems vulnerable to disruption by unauthorized individuals. Network interconnections provided opportunities for weaknesses on one network to potentially affect systems on other networks. For example, weaknesses in the separation of network segments could allow an individual who gained access to a computing device connected to a less secure portion of the network to compromise systems in a more secure portion of the network, such as the control systems. In addition, physical security at multiple locations that GAO reviewed did not sufficiently protect the control systems. For example, live network jacks connected to TVA's internal network at certain facilities GAO reviewed had not been adequately secured from unauthorized access. As a result, TVA's control systems were at increased risk of unauthorized modification or disruption by both internal and external threats. An underlying reason for these weaknesses was that TVA had not consistently implemented significant elements of its information security program. For example, the agency lacked a complete and accurate inventory of its control systems and had not categorized all of its control systems according to risk, limiting assurance that these systems are adequately protected. In addition, TVA's patch management process lacked a mechanism to effectively prioritize... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing safe havens have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10 billion in funds and assistance. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas' (FATA) rugged terrain, poor economic conditions, low literacy, underdeveloped infrastructure, and unique legal structure, all add to the complexity of efforts to address the terrorist threat in the FATA. This testimony discusses the (1) progress of U.S. national security goals in the FATA, (2) status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan, and (3) oversight of U.S. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) provided to Pakistan. The testimony is based on recent reports on the status of a comprehensive plan (GAO-08-622) and preliminary observations on the use and oversight of U.S. CSF (GAO-08-735R). The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. According to U.S. officials and intelligence documents, since 2002, al Qaeda and the Taliban have used Pakistan's FATA and the border region to attack Pakistani, Afghan, as well as U.S. and coalition troops; plan and train for attacks against U.S. interests; destabilize Pakistan; and spread radical Islamist ideologies that threaten U.S. interests. GAO found broad agreement that al Qaeda had established a safe haven in the FATA. A 2008 DNI assessment states that al Qaeda is now using the FATA to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack against America. The United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address its national security goals in the FATA. Of the approximately $5.8 billion directed at efforts in the FATA border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent ($5.56 billion) was U.S. CSF, used to reimburse the Pakistani military. U.S. and Pakistani government officials recognize that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of a safe haven in the FATA. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), independent 9/11 Commission (2004), and congressional legislation (2004 and 2007) called for a comprehensive plan that included all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support to address the threat in the FATA. Since 2002, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan has not had a Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe haven. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan began an effort to focus on other elements of national power beyond military. However, as of last month there was not a formally approved comprehensive plan and support from the recently elected Pakistani government was uncertain. Continued oversight is required to ensure the development and effective implementation of a... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005, requires all full-power television stations in the United States to cease analog broadcasting by February 17, 2009, known as the digital television (DTV) transition. Prior to the transition date, the television broadcast industry must take a series of actions to ensure that over-the-air programming will continue to be available to television households once the transition is complete. For example, broadcast stations must obtain, install, and test the necessary equipment needed to finalize their digital facilities, and some stations will need to coordinate the movement of channels on the day the analog signal ceases transmission. This requested report examines (1) the status of broadcast stations in transitioning to digital, (2) the extent to which broadcast stations are encountering issues, and (3) the actions the Federal Communica- tions Commission (FCC) has taken to guide broadcasters in the digital transition. To address these issues, GAO conducted a Web-based survey of full-power television broadcast stations. GAO surveyed 1,682 stations and obtained completed questionnaires from 1,122 stations, for a response rate of 66.7 percent. GAO also reviewed legal, agency, and industry documents and interviewed public, private, and other stakeholders. We provided FCC with a draft of this report, and FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated where appropriate. Television broadcast stations have made substantial progress in transitioning to digital television, with the vast majority already transmitting a digital signal. Approximately 91 percent of the 1,122 full-power stations responding to our survey are currently transmitting a digital signal, with approximately 68 percent of survey respondents transmitting their digital signal at full strength and 68 percent transmitting their digital signal on the channel from which they will broadcast after the transition date. However, some stations still need to complete construction of their final digital facilities, and others need to relocate their digital channel to complete the transition. For example, 23 percent of survey respondents indicated they will be moving their digital channel to their analog channel. In addition, other stations need to move to a completely new channel. While almost all full-power stations are already broadcasting a digital signal, 9 percent of stations responding to our survey indicated that they are not currently broadcasting digitally. Almost all of these stations, however, indicated that they plan to have their digital signal operational by February 17, 2009. Some stations, including those already broadcasting a digital signal, need to resolve various technical, coordination, or other issues before their transition to digital is complete. For example, over 13 percent of stations responding to our survey reported that they need to install or relocate their digital or analog antennas.... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government and private-sector interest is growing in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for use in a variety of missions such as U.S. border protection, hurricane research, law enforcement, and real estate photography. However, UASs can fly only after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts a case-by-case safety analysis. GAO's research questions included (1) What are the current and potential uses and benefits of UASs? (2) What challenges exist in operating UASs safely and routinely in the national airspace system? and (3) What is the federal government's response to these challenges? To address these questions, GAO reviewed the literature, interviewed agency officials and aviation stakeholders, and surveyed 23 UAS experts. UASs are currently being used by federal agencies for border security, science research, and other purposes. Local governments see potential uses in law enforcement or firefighting and the private sector sees potential uses, such as real estate photography. An industry survey states that UAS production could increase in the future to meet such government and private-sector uses. Experts predict that UASs could perform some manned aircraft missions with less noise and fewer emissions. UASs pose technological, regulatory, workload, and coordination challenges that affect their ability to operate safely and routinely in the national airspace system. UASs cannot meet aviation safety requirements, such as seeing and avoiding other aircraft. UASs lack security protection--a potential challenge if UASs proliferate as expected after obtaining routine airspace access. The lack of FAA regulations for UASs limits their operation to case-by-case approvals by FAA. Anticipated increases in requests to operate UASs could pose a workload challenge for FAA. Coordinating multiple efforts to address these challenges is yet another challenge. FAA and the Department of Defense (DOD) are addressing technological challenges. DHS has not addressed the national security implications of routine UAS access to the airspace. FAA estimates that completing UAS safety regulations will take 10 or more years, but has not yet issued its program plan to communicate the steps and time frames required for providing routine UAS access. FAA is working to allow small UASs to have airspace access and has designated specific airspace for UAS testing. It plans to use data from this testing and from DOD to develop regulations, but has not yet analyzed data that it has already collected. To address its workload challenge, FAA is using more automation. Aviation stakeholders and experts suggested that an overarching entity could help coordinate and expedite federal, academic, and private-sector efforts. In 2003, Congress created a similar entity in FAA to coordinate planning for the next generation air transportation system among multiple federal agencies and the private sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1995, GAO first designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) business systems modernization program as "high risk," and GAO continues to do so today. To assist in addressing this high-risk area, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 contains provisions that are consistent with prior GAO investment management and enterprise architecture-related recommendations, and requires the department to submit annual reports to its congressional committees on its compliance with these provisions. The act also directs GAO to review each annual report. In response, GAO assessed the actions taken by DOD to comply with requirements of the act. To do so, GAO leveraged its recent reports on various aspects of the department's modernization management controls, and it reviewed, for example, the latest version of its business enterprise architecture and the associated transition plan and architecture federation strategy. GAO also interviewed key officials. As part of DOD's continuing efforts to strengthen management of its business systems modernization program, it has taken steps over the last year to build on past efforts and further comply with the National Defense Authorization Act's requirements and related federal guidance. Notwithstanding this progress, aspects of these requirements and relevant guidance have yet to be fully satisfied. In particular, the military departments, under DOD's "federated" and "tiered" approach to establishing institutional modernization management controls, have lagged well behind DOD's corporate efforts, and the corporate efforts are still not yet where they need to be. For example, the latest version of DOD's corporate business enterprise architecture continues to add content needed to improve its completeness, consistency, understandability, and usability. Moreover, its latest architecture federation strategy is more detailed and explicit than the prior version. However, the corporate architecture is still missing important content, such as business rules for, and information flows among, certain business activities. Moreover, the architecture has yet to be federated. Specifically, the military departments, which are the largest members of the federation, do not yet have mature enterprise architecture programs, and the federation strategy aimed at accomplishing this is still evolving. GAO has existing recommendations to address these and other architecture issues. The updated enterprise transition plan, which provides a temporal investment roadmap for transitioning from the current architectural environment to the target environment, continues to identify systems and initiatives that are to fill business capability gaps and address the DOD-wide and component business priorities that are contained in the business enterprise architecture. However, the plan still does not include investments for all components and does not reflect key factors associated with properly... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

GAO reports since 1998 have demonstrated that state surveyors, who evaluate the quality of nursing home care on behalf of CMS, sometimes understate the extent of serious care problems in homes because they miss deficiencies. CMS oversees the effectiveness of state surveys through the federal monitoring survey program. In this program, federal surveyors in CMS's regional offices either independently evaluate state surveys by resurveying a home (comparative surveys) or directly observe state surveyors during a routine nursing home survey (observational surveys). GAO was asked to evaluate the information federal monitoring surveys provide on understatement and the effectiveness of CMS management and oversight of the survey program. To do this, GAO analyzed the results of federal monitoring surveys for fiscal years 2002 through 2007, reviewed CMS guidance for the survey program, and interviewed headquarters and regional office officials. A substantial proportion of federal comparative surveys identify missed deficiencies at the potential for more than minimal harm level or above. During fiscal years 2002 through 2007, about 15 percent of federal comparative surveys nationwide identified state surveys that failed to cite at least one deficiency at the most serious levels of noncompliance--actual harm and immediate jeopardy. Overall, nine states missed serious deficiencies on 25 percent or more of comparative surveys; in seven states federal surveyors identified no such missed deficiencies. During the same period, missed deficiencies at the lowest level of noncompliance--the potential for more than minimal harm--were more widespread: nationwide, approximately 70 percent of federal comparative surveys identified state surveys missing at least one deficiency at the lowest level of noncompliance, and in all but five states the number of state surveys with such missed deficiencies was greater than 40 percent. Undetected care problems at this level are a concern because they could become more serious if nursing homes are not required to take corrective action. The most frequently missed type of deficiency on comparative surveys, at the potential for more than minimal harm level and above, was poor quality of care, such as ensuring proper nutrition and hydration and preventing pressure sores. Federal observational surveys highlighted two factors that may contribute to understatement of deficiencies: weaknesses in state surveyors' (1) investigative skills and (2) ability to integrate and analyze information collected to make an appropriate deficiency determination. These factors may contribute to understatement because they directly affect the appropriate identification and citation of deficiencies. CMS has taken steps to improve the federal monitoring survey program, but weaknesses remain in program management and oversight. For example, CMS has improved processes to ensure that comparative surveys more accurately reflect conditions at the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An accurate decennial census relies on finding and counting people--only once--in the right place and collecting complete and correct information. GAO reviewed the Department of Commerce's U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) plans to (1) improve the census's accuracy--or coverage--with its coverage follow-up operation, (2) assess the accuracy of the census through its census coverage measurement program, and (3) evaluate these efforts after 2010. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed Bureau officials about the Bureau's coverage follow-up and measurement plans. GAO compared plans for measuring coverage in 2000 and 2010 and interviewed 15 experts about changes to the plans. The Bureau plans to expand its coverage follow-up operation to improve the accuracy of enumeration data collected in 2010. As in Census 2000, coverage follow-up is intended to resolve count discrepancies (when the number of household members reported on a completed questionnaire fails to match the number of persons for whom information is collected) and complete the enumeration of large households (more than six persons living in a housing unit). For 2010, the Bureau researched new techniques to increase the number of ways a person or household could be selected for coverage follow-up. These include (1) using coverage probes on the census form to identify cases with potential under- or overcount problems, (2) using administrative records to identify households that include persons who may not have been counted, and (3) using computer matching to determine potential duplicate persons. However, it is not clear on what basis the Bureau will select or prioritize cases from this potentially expanded universe. The Bureau plans to further assess the techniques during the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, leaving little time to consider and implement improvements for the 2010 coverage follow-up operation. Because of the potential for the coverage follow-up workload to increase, it will be important for the Bureau to be clear on how it will decide which techniques to use and how it will select coverage follow-up cases to ensure that the operation may best improve coverage. Although the Bureau's overall design for measurement is similar in many respects to the design for 2000, its measurement plan differs in important ways. The Bureau is planning to use a sample design similar to that used in 2000 and still intends to produce net coverage error estimates. However, the Bureau does not plan to use measurement results to adjust the 2010 count of the nation's population and is planning to make four significant changes: (1) conduct the measurement interview 4 months later than it did in 2000, (2) use a different method--logistic regression--to estimate net error, (3) use estimates of the components of coverage error in an effort to improve future decennials, and (4) expand computer matching and clerical matching to match persons in its postenumeration survey to the entire census. Still,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress mandated that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) annually assess China's trade compliance and report its findings to Congress. In addition, USTR conducted an interagency "top-to-bottom review" of U.S. trade policies toward China. USTR's resulting February 2006 report outlined U.S objectives and action items. GAO was asked to (1) evaluate USTR's annual China trade compliance reports to Congress and the degree to which they present information necessary to fully understand China's compliance situation and (2) examine the status of the plans presented in USTR's February 2006 top-to-bottom report. GAO systematically analyzed the contents of USTR's compliance reports from 2002 to 2007 and reviewed information on the status of agencies' monitoring and enforcement activities. USTR's annual reports to Congress, which detail U.S. industry concerns with China's compliance and progress on resolving such concerns, are very consistent in format and language. However, they lack any summary analysis about the number, scope, and disposition of reported issues that would facilitate understanding of developments in China's trade compliance and better tracking of the effectiveness of U.S. monitoring and enforcement efforts with China. For example, USTR's narrative reports make it difficult to understand the relative level of progress China made in each trade area in a given year. USTR reported issues that spanned nine trade areas and ranged from very specific issues to broader concerns; however, USTR's narrative reports make it difficult to ascertain specific changes or trends. GAO's systematic content analysis quantified the number, type, and disposition of trade issues and identified 180 individual compliance issues from 2002 to 2007. GAO analysis showed that China resolved a quarter of these issues, but made no progress on one-third of them. Also, GAO's analysis revealed that China's progress in resolving compliance issues varied by trade area and has been slowing over time, especially since 2004, when most progress was made. GAO could only partially determine the status of U.S. agencies' implementation of USTR's 2006 top-to-bottom report, which outlines broad objectives and priority goals for U.S.-China trade relations as well as specific action items. GAO found that key trade agencies made considerable progress implementing planned action items. They increased bilateral engagement with the Chinese and monitoring and enforcement capacity by increasing staffing levels and training opportunities, but staffing gaps and limited Chinese language capacity are challenges at some agencies. However, GAO could not determine agencies' progress toward achieving some U.S. objectives and goals identified in the report. USTR does not formally assess its progress or measure program results. The lack of linkages between U.S. objectives and planned action items and undefined terms make it difficult to assess whether the steps agencies... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) oversight of the safety and effectiveness of medical devices marketed in the United States, it inspects certain foreign and domestic establishments where these devices are manufactured. To help FDA address shortcomings in its inspection program, the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 required FDA to accredit third parties to inspect certain establishments. In response, FDA has implemented two voluntary programs for that purpose. This statement is based primarily on GAO testimonies from January 2008 (GAO-08-428T) and April 2008 (GAO-08-701T). In this statement, GAO assesses (1) FDA's program for inspecting foreign establishments that manufacture medical devices for the U.S. market and (2) FDA's programs for third-party inspections of those establishments. For GAO's January and April 2008 testimonies, GAO interviewed FDA officials, analyzed information from FDA, and updated GAO's previous work on FDA's programs for inspections by accredited third parties. GAO updated selected information for this statement in early May 2008. FDA faces challenges managing its program to inspect foreign establishments that manufacture medical devices. GAO testified in January 2008 that two databases that provide FDA with information about foreign medical device establishments and the products they manufacture for the U.S. market contained inaccurate information about establishments subject to FDA inspection. In addition, comparisons between these databases--which could help produce a more accurate count--had to be done manually. Recent changes FDA made to its registration database could improve the accuracy of the count of establishments, but it is too soon to tell whether these and other changes will improve FDA's management of its foreign inspection program. Another challenge is that FDA conducts relatively few inspections of foreign establishments; officials estimated that the agency inspects foreign manufacturers of high-risk devices (such as pacemakers) every 6 years and foreign manufacturers of medium-risk devices (such as hearing aids) every 27 years. Finally, inspections of foreign manufacturers pose unique challenges to FDA, such as difficulties in recruiting investigators to travel to certain countries and in extending trips if the inspections uncovered problems. FDA is pursuing initiatives that could address some of these unique challenges, but it is unclear whether FDA's proposals will increase the frequency with which the agency inspects foreign establishments. Few inspections of foreign medical device manufacturing establishments have been conducted through FDA's two accredited third-party inspection programs--the Accredited Persons Inspection Program and the Pilot Multi-purpose Audit Program (PMAP). Under FDA's Accredited Persons Inspection Program, from March 11, 2004--the date when FDA first cleared an accredited organization to conduct independent... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its inception, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. More recently, TSA has taken actions to secure the nation's surface transportation modes. TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004, and for surface transportation security activities, about $175 million since fiscal year 2005. This testimony focuses on TSA's efforts to secure the commercial aviation system-- through passenger screening, air cargo, and watch-list matching programs--and the nation's surface transportation modes. It also addresses challenges remaining in these areas. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2004 through April 2008 including selected updates obtained in February through April 2008. DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's transportation system, including actions to address many recommendations made by GAO. With respect to aviation security, TSA has focused its efforts on, among other things, more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce--formerly known as screeners; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; strengthening domestic air cargo security; and developing a government operated watch-list matching program, known as Secure Flight. For example, in response to GAO's recommendation, TSA developed a plan to periodically review assumptions in its Staffing Allocation Model, and took steps to strengthen its evaluation of proposed procedural changes. TSA has also explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to better detect explosives and other threats, and has taken steps to strengthen air cargo security, including conducting compliance inspections of air carriers. Finally, TSA has instilled more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight's systems development, including preparing key documentation and strengthening privacy protections. With regard to surface transportation security, TSA has, among other things, taken steps to develop a strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicles, and highways; established security standards for certain transportation modes; and conducted threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly related to passenger and freight rail. While these efforts should be commended, GAO has identified several areas that should be addressed to further strengthen transportation security. For example, TSA has made limited progress in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and management challenges. In addition, TSA has not revised screening exemptions for air cargo transported into the... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, there have been allegations of discrimination in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs and workforce. Reports and congressional testimony by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a former Secretary of Agriculture, USDA's Office of Inspector General, GAO, and others have described weaknesses in USDA's programs--in particular, in resolving complaints of discrimination and in providing minorities access to programs. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 authorized the creation of the position of Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights (ASCR), giving USDA an executive that could provide leadership for resolving these long-standing problems. This testimony focuses on USDA's efforts to (1) resolve discrimination complaints, (2) report on minority participation in USDA programs, and (3) strategically plan its efforts. This testimony is based on new and prior work, including analysis of ASCR's strategic plan; discrimination complaint management; and about 120 interviews with officials of USDA and other federal agencies, as well as 20 USDA stakeholder groups. USDA officials reviewed the facts upon which this statement is based, and we incorporated their additions and clarifications as appropriate. GAO plans a future report with recommendations. ASCR's difficulties in resolving discrimination complaints persist--ASCR has not achieved its goal of preventing future backlogs of complaints. At a basic level, the credibility of USDA's efforts has been and continues to be undermined by ASCR's faulty reporting of data on discrimination complaints and disparities in ASCR's data. Even such basic information as the number of complaints is subject to wide variation in ASCR's reports to the public and the Congress. Moreover, ASCR's public claim in July 2007 that it had successfully reduced a backlog of about 690 discrimination complaints in fiscal year 2004 and held its caseload to manageable levels, drew a questionable portrait of progress. By July 2007, ASCR officials were well aware they had not succeeded in preventing future backlogs--they had another backlog on hand, and this time the backlog had surged to an even higher level of 885 complaints. In fact, ASCR officials were in the midst of planning to hire additional attorneys to address that backlog of complaints including some ASCR was holding dating from the early 2000s that it had not resolved. In addition, some steps ASCR had taken may have actually been counter-productive and affected the quality of its work. For example, an ASCR official stated that some employees' complaints had been addressed without resolving basic questions of fact, raising concerns about the integrity of the practice. Importantly, ASCR does not have a plan to correct these many problems. USDA has published three annual reports--for fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005--on the participation of minority farmers and ranchers in USDA... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With health care spending increasing, Congress enacted legislation effective in 2004 establishing Health Savings Accounts (HSA) to be coupled with eligible high-deductible health plans. The novel structure of eligible health plans coupled with HSAs has raised questions about who selects them and how they are used. Proponents contend that the lower premiums of the health plans and the tax-free savings potential of HSAs appeal to consumers, while the health plans' high deductibles encourage enrollees to be more astute health care consumers. However, critics are concerned that HSA-eligible plans may attract enrollees who seek lower premiums but lack the resources to contribute to an HSA, and wealthy enrollees who may use the HSA primarily to accumulate tax-advantaged savings. This statement focuses on (1) participation in HSA-eligible high-deductible health plans and HSAs, (2) the income characteristics of HSA account holders, and (3) the funding and use of HSAs. This statement is based primarily on findings from GAO's April 2008 report entitled Health Savings Accounts: Participation Increased and Was More Common among Individuals with Higher Incomes (GAO-08-474R). For that report GAO reviewed industry data on the participation in HSA-eligible plans and HSAs, and analyzed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on tax filers who claimed deductions for HSAs. The statement also draws on findings from related GAO reports issued in 2006. GAO found that the number of individuals participating in HSA-eligible high-deductible health plans and HSAs increased significantly since 2004. A series of health insurance carrier surveys reported that the number of lives covered by HSA-eligible plans increased significantly from about 438,000 in September 2004 to an estimated 6.1 million in January 2008. GAO's analysis of IRS data showed that the number of tax filers ages 19 to 64 reporting HSA activity nearly tripled from about 120,000 in 2004 to about 355,000 in 2005. Industry estimates indicated continued growth in HSA participation in 2006 and 2007. However, many HSA-eligible plan enrollees did not open an HSA. From 2005 through 2007, 42 percent to 49 percent of HSA-eligible plan enrollees reported that they had not opened an HSA, and 20 percent to 24 percent did not plan to open an HSA, citing their inability to afford an HSA or a belief they did not need an account. Tax filers who reported HSA activity and enrollees in certain HSA-eligible plans had higher incomes on average than other tax filers. For example, among tax filers between the ages of 19 and 64, the average adjusted gross income (AGI) for those reporting HSA activity in 2005 was about $139,000, compared with about $57,000 for other filers. About 59 percent of HSA filers had AGIs of $60,000 or more, compared with 26 percent of other tax filers. Moreover, income differences between HSA and other filers existed across all age groups and within different tax filing statuses, such as single... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1995, GAO designated Department of Defense (DOD) business systems modernization as a high-risk program, and the program remains on the high-risk list today. A key to successful systems modernization is having and using an enterprise architecture as an authoritative frame of reference, or blueprint, for system investment decisions. To assist DOD in modernizing its business systems, Congress passed legislation consistent with prior GAO recommendations for DOD to develop and implement a business enterprise architecture (BEA). In response, DOD developed a corporate BEA that it intends to federate, or extend, to the military departments and defense agencies. To support GAO's legislative mandate to review DOD's BEA, GAO evaluated the status of the Air Force, Navy, and Army architecture programs. To accomplish this, GAO used its Enterprise Architecture Management Maturity Framework and associated evaluation method. The enterprise architecture programs within the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and Army have yet to advance to a level that can be considered fully mature. Specifically, all three departments are at the initial stage of GAO's architecture maturity framework. This means that they have not fully satisfied all the core elements associated with the framework's second stage (establishing the management foundation for developing, maintaining, and using the architecture) or any of the framework's higher stages: Stage 3 (developing the architecture), Stage 4 (completing the architecture), and Stage 5 (leveraging the architecture for organizational change). An organization generally needs to have achieved the fifth stage in the framework for it to have an effective architecture program because, at this stage, the management controls and structures are in place for using an approved architecture to guide and constrain system investments in a way that produces institutional results. Although each department is at Stage 1, the status of the programs vary considerably. Specifically, the Air Force far exceeds both the Navy and the Army, while the Navy generally exceeds the Army, in terms of the total percentage of core elements that are fully satisfied. Moreover, of the core elements that have not been fully satisfied by at least one of the three departments, most relate to architecture content, use, and measurement. Even though none of the departments have fully satisfied sufficient core elements to advance beyond Stage 1, the Air Force has at least partially satisfied all the core elements associated with Stages 2 and 3, as well as all but three core elements across all stages, and the Navy has at least partially satisfied all the core elements for Stage 2. In addition, the Air Force has made important progress in the last 2 years in maturing its architecture program, while the Navy's progress has been mixed, and the Army has not made any progress. Collectively, this means that DOD, as a whole, is not as well positioned as it... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U. S. aquaculture--the raising of fish and shellfish in captivity--has generally been confined to nearshore coastal waters or in other water bodies, such as ponds, that fall under state regulation. Recently, there has been an increased interest in expanding aquaculture to offshore waters, which would involve raising fish and shellfish in the open ocean, and consequently bringing these types of operations under federal regulation. While the offshore expansion has the potential to increase U.S. aquaculture production, no comprehensive legislative or regulatory framework to manage such an expansion exists. Instead, multiple federal agencies have authority to regulate different aspects of offshore aquaculture under a variety of existing laws that were not designed for this purpose. In this context, GAO was asked to identify key issues that should be addressed in the development of an effective regulatory framework for U.S. offshore aquaculture. In conducting its assessment, GAO administered a questionnaire to a wide variety of key aquaculture stakeholders; analyzed laws, regulations, and key studies; and visited states that regulate nearshore aquaculture industries. Although GAO is not making any recommendations, this review emphasizes the need to carefully consider a wide array of key issues as a regulatory framework for offshore aquaculture is developed. Agencies that provided official comments generally agreed with the report. In developing a regulatory framework for offshore aquaculture, it is important to consider a wide array of issues, which can be grouped into four main areas. (1) Program administration: Addressing the administration of an offshore program at the federal level is an important aspect of a regulatory framework. Stakeholders that GAO contacted and key studies that GAO reviewed identified specific roles and responsibilities for federal agencies, states, and regional fishery management councils. Most stakeholders and the studies agreed that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) should be the lead federal agency and emphasized that coordination with other federal agencies will also be important. In addition, stakeholders and some of the studies recommended that the states play an important role in the development and implementation of an offshore aquaculture program. (2) Permitting and site selection: It will also be important to establish a regulatory process that clearly identifies where aquaculture facilities can be located and for how long. For example, many stakeholders stated that offshore facilities will need the legal right, through a permit or lease, to occupy an area of the ocean. However, stakeholders varied on the specific terms of the permits or leases, including their duration. Some stakeholders said that longer permits could make it easier for investors to recoup their investments, while others said that shorter ones could facilitate closer scrutiny of environmental impacts. This... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Millions of people rely on the services of Social Security Administration (SSA) field offices. In fiscal year 2007, SSA's approximately 1,300 field offices provided service to about 42 million customers. People use these offices to apply for Social Security cards, apply for retirement and disability benefits, establish direct deposit, and a host of other services. While customers may conduct their business using SSA's online, telephone, or other service options, many prefer the personalized contact provided in field offices. Over the last several years, staffing reductions have challenged field offices' ability to manage work, while continuing to deliver quality customer service. To assess how field offices are managing these challenges, GAO was asked to determine (1) the effect that reduced staffing levels may be having on field office operations and (2) the challenges that SSA faces in meeting future service delivery needs. This statement is drawn from GAO's ongoing study on field offices for the committee, which is expected to be issued later this year. To conduct this work, GAO interviewed SSA officials in headquarters, and other components, and analyzed various data on SSA's workloads and other data. In commenting on a draft of this testimony, SSA said that GAO understated the connection between staffing stresses from increased work demands and the agency's funding shortfalls. SSA field offices largely met work demands between fiscal years 2005 and 2007 despite operating with fewer staff and an increased demand for services, but staffing reductions may have had some adverse effects. Field offices were able to minimize the impact of staffing reductions on work because staff productivity increased by 4.9 percent. SSA and its field offices used various strategies to manage its work with fewer staff. Field offices shared work among offices and redirected staff to meet critical needs. SSA also encouraged customers to make greater use of Internet and other electronic services. Additionally, SSA deferred work that it deemed a relatively low priority, such as conducting reviews of beneficiaries' continuing eligibility. Deferring these reviews, means that beneficiaries who no longer qualify for benefits may still receive payments--which may decrease SSA's chances of recovering the erroneous payments. Despite SSA efforts to manage the staffing reductions, customers experienced longer waiting times and more unanswered calls to field offices, according to SSA data. Also, staff reported experiencing high stress levels and insufficient time for training. Growth in claims from the nation's baby boomers and a retirement wave of its most experienced staff may pose serious challenges for SSA if the agency does not have a clear plan. The first wave of approximately 80 million baby boomers is reaching the age of retirement eligibility, and SSA estimates that retirement and disability filings will increase the agency's work by approximately 1... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Physical infrastructure is critical to the nation's economy and affects the daily life of virtually all Americans--from facilitating the movement of goods and people within and beyond U.S. borders to providing clean drinking water. However, this infrastructure--including aviation, highway, transit, rail, water, and dam infrastructure--is under strain. Estimates to repair, replace, or upgrade aging infrastructure as well as expand capacity to meet increased demand top hundreds of billions of dollars. Calls for increased investment in infrastructure come at a time when traditional funding for infrastructure projects is increasingly strained, and the federal government's fiscal outlook is worse than many may understand. This testimony discusses (1) challenges associated with the nation's surface transportation, aviation, water, and dam infrastructure, and the principles GAO has identified to help guide efforts to address these challenges and (2) existing and proposed options to fund investments in the nation's infrastructure. This statement is primarily based on a body of work GAO has completed for the Congress over the last several years. To supplement this existing work, GAO also interviewed Department of Transportation officials to obtain up-to-date information on the status of the Highway Trust Fund and various funding and financing options and reviewed published literature to obtain information on dam infrastructure issues. The nation faces a host of serious infrastructure challenges. Demand has outpaced the capacity of our nation's surface transportation and aviation systems, resulting in decreased performance and reliability. In addition, water utilities are facing pressure to upgrade the nation's aging and deteriorating water infrastructure to improve security, serve growing demands, and meet new regulatory requirements. Given these types of challenges and the federal government's fiscal outlook, it is clear that the federal government cannot continue with business as usual. Rather, a fundamental reexamination of government programs, policies, and activities is needed. Through prior analyses of existing programs, GAO identified a number of principles that could guide a reexamination of federal infrastructure programs. These principles include: (1) creating well-defined goals based on identified areas of national interest, (2) establishing and clearly defining the federal role in achieving each goal, (3) incorporating performance and accountability into funding decisions, (4) employing the best tools and approaches to emphasize return on investment, and (5) ensuring fiscal sustainability. Various options are available to fund infrastructure investments. These options include altering existing or introducing new funding approaches and employing various financing mechanisms, such as bonds and loans. For example, a variety of taxes and user fees, such as tolling, can be used to help fund infrastructure projects. In addition,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a workforce of about 35,000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) provides engineering services for civil works and military programs in the United States and overseas. Recently, the Corps' focus has shifted to also support contingency operations, such as responding to natural disasters. To meet its mission and emerging priorities, the Corps must have effective human capital planning processes to ensure that it can maintain its workforce. In this context, GAO was asked to examine the (1) extent to which the Corps has aligned its human capital plan with its strategic plan, (2) extent to which the Corps has the information necessary to identify and meet current and future workforce needs, and (3) challenges the Corps faces in meeting its workforce needs. To address these issues, GAO reviewed agency human capital and strategic planning documents, conducted structured interviews with eight Corps divisions and a purposeful sample of 14 of its districts, and interviewed other Corps officials. The Corps' strategic human capital plan is outdated; is not aligned with the agency's most recent strategic plan, which was developed in 2005; and is inconsistently used across the agency. Specifically, the human capital plan has not been revised since it was developed in 2002, and it is therefore not aligned with the Corps' current strategic plan. Headquarters officials told GAO they "abandoned" the use of the plan and replaced it with the human capital updates required under a presidential initiative. While these updates list the Corps' human capital activities and milestones for completing them, they do not contain key components of an effective human capital plan, such as goals, strategies, and a system for measuring performance. Moreover, the outdated human capital plan is being used inconsistently across the agency. Some divisions and districts are still using the 2002 plan to guide their human capital efforts, while others are relying on guidance from headquarters or the Office of Personnel Management or developing their own guidance. Without a current, consistently implemented human capital plan that is aligned with its strategic plan, the Corps' ability to effectively manage its workforce is limited. The Corps lacks the necessary agencywide information on critical skills to identify and assess current and future workforce needs and therefore cannot effectively perform its workforce planning activities. Effective workforce planning depends on consistent agencywide data on the critical skills needed to achieve the agency's mission. However, the Corps does not have a process for collecting consistent agencywide data, and headquarters has not provided guidance to the divisions and districts on how to gather this information systematically. Without guidance, some divisions and districts have collected this information independently, using varying methods, leaving the Corps with inconsistent and incomplete data with which to assess... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To address the challenges that the nation faces, it will be important for federal agencies to change their cultures and create the institutional capacity to become high-performing organizations. This includes recruiting and retaining a federal workforce able to create, sustain, and thrive in organizations that are flatter, results-oriented, and externally focused. In 2001, GAO identified strategic human capital management as a governmentwide high-risk area because federal agencies lacked a strategic approach to human capital management that integrated human capital efforts with their missions and program goals. Although progress has been made since that time, strategic human capital management still remains a high-risk area. This testimony, based on a large body of completed work issued from January 2001 through April 2008, focuses on (1) challenges that federal agencies have faced in recruiting and hiring talented employees, (2) progress in addressing these challenges, and (3) additional actions that are needed to strengthen recruiting and hiring efforts. In its prior reports, GAO has made a range of recommendations to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)--the government's personnel agency--and to agencies in such areas as hiring, workforce planning, and diversity management; a number of these recommendations have since been implemented. GAO is making no new recommendations at this time. Numerous studies over the years have identified a range of problems and challenges with recruitment and hiring in the federal government. Some of these problems and challenges include passive recruitment strategies, unclear job vacancy announcements, and manual processes that are time consuming and paperwork intensive. In recent years, Congress, OPM, and agencies have made important strides in improving federal recruitment and hiring. For example, Congress has provided agencies with hiring flexibilities that could help to streamline the hiring process. OPM has sponsored job fairs and developed automated tools. Individual agencies have developed targeted recruitment strategies to identify and help build a talented workforce. Building on the progress that has been made, additional efforts are needed in the following areas: (1) Human capital planning: federal agencies will have to bolster their efforts in strategic human capital planning to ensure that they are prepared to meet their current and emerging hiring needs. Agencies must determine the critical skills and competencies necessary to achieve programmatic goals and develop strategies that are tailored to address any identified gaps. (2) Diversity management: developing and maintaining workforces that reflect all segments of society and our nation's diversity is another significant aspect of agencies' recruitment challenges. Recruitment is a key first step toward establishing a diverse workforce. Agencies must consider active recruitment strategies, such as building formal relationships... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Collaboration between the federal government and the aviation industry has led to reductions in aviation emissions, but growing air traffic has partially offset these reductions. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), together with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and others, is working to increase the efficiency, safety, and capacity of the national airspace system and at the same time reduce aviation emissions, in part, by transforming the current air traffic control system to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). This effort involves new technologies and air traffic procedures that can reduce aviation emissions and incorporates research and development (R&D) on emissions-reduction technologies. Reducing aviation emissions is important both to minimize their adverse health and environmental effects and to alleviate public concerns about them that could constrain the expansion of airport infrastructure and aviation operations needed to meet demand. This testimony addresses (1) the scope and nature of aviation emissions, (2) the status of selected key federal efforts to reduce aviation emissions, and (3) next steps and challenges in reducing aviation emissions. The testimony updates prior GAO work with FAA data, literature reviews, and interviews with agency officials, industry and environmental stakeholders, and selected experts. Aviation contributes a modest but growing proportion of total U.S. emissions, and these emissions contribute to adverse health and environmental effects. Aircraft and airport operations, including those of service and passenger vehicles, emit ozone and other substances that contribute to local air pollution, as well as carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. EPA estimates that aviation emissions account for less than 1 percent of local air pollution nationwide and about 2.7 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, but these emissions are expected to grow as air traffic increases. Two key federal efforts, if implemented effectively, can help to reduce aviation emissions--NextGen initiatives in the near term and research and development over the longer term. For example, NextGen technologies and procedures, such as satellite-based navigation systems, should allow for more direct routing, which could improve fuel efficiency and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Federal research and development efforts--led by FAA and NASA in collaboration with industry and academia--have achieved significant reductions in aircraft emissions through improved aircraft and engine technologies, and federal officials and aviation experts agree that such efforts are the most effective means of achieving further reductions in the longer term. Federal R&D on aviation emissions also focuses on improving the scientific understanding of aviation emissions and developing lower-emitting aviation fuels. Next... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2001, Labor has spent nearly $900 million on three workforce employment and training grant initiatives: High Growth Job Training Initiative (High Growth), Community-Based Job Training Initiative (Community Based), and the Workforce Innovation in Regional Economic Development (WIRED). GAO was asked to examine (1) the intent of the grant initiatives and the extent to which Labor will be able to assess their effects, (2) the extent to which the process used competition, was adequately documented, and included key players, and (3) what Labor is doing to monitor individual grantee compliance with grant requirements. To answer these questions, GAO obtained from Labor a list of grants for fiscal years 2001 through 2007, and reviewed relevant laws and Labor's internal grant award procedures. GAO interviewed grantees, and state and local workforce officials in seven states where grantees were located, Labor officials, and subject matter experts. According to Labor officials, the grant initiatives were designed to shift the focus of the public workforce system toward the training and employment needs of high-growth, in-demand industries, but Labor will be challenged to assess their impact. Under the initiatives, Labor awarded 349 grants totaling almost $900 million to foster this change. However, the grant initiatives were not fully integrated into Labor's strategic plan or overall research agenda; therefore, it is unclear what criteria Labor will use to evaluate their effectiveness. Labor lacks data that will allow it to compare outcomes for grant-funded services to those of other federally funded employment and training services. While grants under all three initiatives are now awarded competitively, the initial noncompetitive process for High Growth grants was not adequately documented and did not include key players. Community Based and WIRED grants have always been awarded competitively, but more than 80 percent of High Growth grants were awarded without competition. Labor began awarding some High Growth grants competitively in 2005 and Congress required Labor to award certain grants competitively in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. This requirement applies only to those years. Labor could not document criteria used to select the noncompetitive High Growth grants or whether these grants met internal or statutory requirements. Labor has taken steps to strengthen the noncompetitive process, but these procedures do not explicitly require documentation of compliance with statutory program requirements. Labor's process for identifying solutions for industry workforce challenges did not include the vast majority of local workforce investment boards, which oversee local employment and training services. Labor provides some monitoring for grantees under all three initiatives and uses a risk-based monitoring approach for the High Growth and Community Based grants, but not for WIRED. Labor has a process to address findings from single audit... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dissatisfaction with the federal tax system has led to a debate about U.S. tax reform, including proposals for a national consumption tax. One type of proposed consumption tax is a value-added tax (VAT), widely used around the world. A VAT is levied on the difference between a business's sales and its purchases of goods and services. Typically, a business calculates the tax due on its sales, subtracts a credit for taxes paid on its purchases, and remits the difference to the government. While the economic and distributional effects of a U.S. VAT type tax have been studied, GAO was asked to identify the lessons learned from other countries' experiences in administering a VAT. This report describes (1) how VAT design choices, such as exemptions and enforcement mechanisms, have affected compliance, administrative costs, and compliance burden; (2) how countries with federal systems administer a VAT; and (3) how countries that recently transitioned to a VAT implemented the new tax. GAO selected five countries to study--Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--that provided a range of VAT designs from relatively simple to more complex with multiple exemptions and tax rates. The study countries also included some with federal systems and some that recently implemented a VAT. GAO does not make any recommendations in this report. Like other tax systems, even a simple VAT--one that exempts few goods or services--has compliance risks and, largely as a consequence, generates administrative costs and compliance burden. For example, all of the study countries reported that they devoted significant enforcement resources to addressing compliance. Businesses whose taxable purchases exceed their taxable sales are entitled to a refund under a VAT, which makes VATs vulnerable to fraudsters creating phony invoices in order to falsely claim refunds. Also, similar to other taxes, adding complexity through exemptions of some goods or services and reduced tax rates generally decreases revenue and increases compliance risks because of the incentive to misclassify purchases and sales. Such complexity also increases the record-keeping burden on businesses and increases the government resources devoted to enforcement. Canada's experience administering a national VAT along with a variety of provincial VATs and sales taxes demonstrates that multiple arrangements in a federal system are feasible, but increase administrative costs and compliance challenges for both the governments and businesses. Businesses, particularly retailers, in provinces with a sales tax face greater compliance burdens than those in other provinces because they are subject to dual reporting, filing, and remittance requirements. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, all with relatively new VATs, built on preexisting consumption tax administrative structures to implement the new tax. Nevertheless, they devoted considerable resources to educate, assist, and register... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1996, the former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, now within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Social Security Administration (SSA) began operating a voluntary pilot program, recently named the E-Verify program, to provide participating employers with a means for electronically verifying employees' work eligibility. Legislation has been introduced in Congress to require all employers to electronically verify the work authorization status of their employees. In this testimony GAO provides observations on the E-Verify system's capacity and costs, options for reducing delays and improving efficiency in the verification process, ability to detect fraudulent documents and identity theft, and vulnerability to employer fraud and misuse. This testimony is based on GAO's products issued from August 2005 through June 2007 and updated information obtained from DHS and SSA in April 2008. We analyzed data on employer use, E-Verify guidance, and other reports on the employment verification process, as well as legislative proposals and regulations. A mandatory E-Verify program would necessitate an increased capacity at both U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and SSA to accommodate the estimated 7.4 million employers in the United States. According to USCIS, as of April 2008, more than 61,000 employers have registered for E-Verify, and about half are active users. Although DHS has not prepared official cost figures, USCIS officials estimated that a mandatory E-Verify program could cost a total of about $765 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2012 if only newly hired employees are queried through the program and about $838 million over the same 4-year period if both newly hired and current employees are queried. USCIS has estimated that it would need additional staff for a mandatory E-Verify program, but was not yet able to provide estimates for its staffing needs. SSA has estimated that implementation of a mandatory E-Verify program would cost a total of about $281 million and require hiring 700 new employees for a total of 2,325 additional workyears for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. USCIS and SSA are exploring options to reduce delays and improve efficiency in the E-Verify process. The majority of E-Verify queries entered by employers--about 92 percent--confirm within seconds that the employee is work-authorized. About 7 percent of the queries cannot be immediately confirmed as work authorized by SSA, and about 1 percent cannot be immediately confirmed as work authorized by USCIS because employees' information queried through the system does not match information in SSA or DHS databases. The majority of SSA erroneous tentative nonconfirmations occur because employees' citizenship or other information, such as name changes, is not up to date in the SSA database, generally because individuals do not request that SSA make these updates. USCIS and SSA are planning to implement initiatives to help... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disputes between policyholders and insurers after the 2005 hurricanes highlight the challenges of determining the cause and extent of damages when properties are subject to both high winds and flooding. Additionally, insurers want to reduce their exposure in high-risk areas, and state wind insurance programs have grown significantly. H.R. 3121, the Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2007, would create a combined federal insurance program with coverage for both wind and flood damage. GAO was asked to evaluate this potential program in terms of (1) what would be required to implement it; (2) the steps the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would need to take to determine premium rates that reflect all future costs; and (3) how it could affect policyholders, insurance market participants, and the federal government. To address these questions, GAO analyzed state and federal programs, examined studies of coastal wind insurance issues, and interviewed federal and state regulatory officials as well as industry participants and analysts. FEMA and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners generally agreed with GAO's report findings. FEMA emphasized the challenges it would face in addressing several key issues. FEMA also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. To implement a combined federal flood and wind insurance program, FEMA would need to complete certain challenging steps. First, FEMA would need to determine wind hazard prevention standards that communities would have to adopt in order to receive coverage. Second, FEMA would need to adapt existing programs to accommodate wind coverage--for example, the Write Your Own program. Third, FEMA would need to create a new rate-setting process, as the process for setting flood insurance rates is different from what is needed for wind coverage. Fourth, promoting the new program in communities would require that FEMA staff raise awareness of the combined program's availability and coordinate enforcement of the new building codes. Finally, FEMA would need to put staff and procedures in place to administer and oversee the new program while it faces current management and oversight challenges with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Setting premium rates adequate to cover all the expected costs of flood and wind damage would require FEMA to make sophisticated determinations. For example, FEMA would need to determine how the program would pay claims in years with catastrophic losses without borrowing from the Department of the Treasury. H.R. 3121 would require the program to stop renewing or selling new policies if it needed to borrow funds, effectively terminating the program. It is also unclear whether the program could obtain reinsurance to cover such losses, and attempting to fund losses by building up a surplus would potentially require high premium rates and an unknown number of years without large losses, something over... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than a decade, GAO has reported that Medicare has paid higher than market rates for medical equipment and supplies provided to beneficiaries under Medicare Part B. Since 1989, Medicare has used fee schedules primarily based on historical charges to set payment amounts. But this approach lacks flexibility to keep pace with market changes and increases costs to the federal government and Medicare's 44 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 required the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--the agency that administers Medicare--to test competitive bidding as a new way to set payments. CMS did this through a demonstration in two locations in which suppliers could compete on the basis of price and other factors for the right to provide their products. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) required CMS to conduct competitive bidding on a large scale and suppliers to obtain accreditation. GAO was asked to describe the effects that competitive bidding could have on Medicare program payments and suppliers and the need for adequate oversight to ensure quality and access for beneficiaries in a competitive bidding environment. This testimony is based primarily on GAO work conducted from May 1994 to January 2007, which GAO updated by interviewing CMS officials and reviewing agency documents. Competitive bidding could reduce Medicare program payments by providing an incentive for suppliers to accept lower payments for items and services to retain their ability to serve beneficiaries and potentially increase their market share. Fundamentally different from fee schedules based on historical charges to Medicare, competitive bidding allows the market to help CMS determine payment amounts. In the demonstration, the new fee schedule amounts were based on the winning suppliers' bids for items included and 50 percent to 55 percent of the bids from suppliers were selected. Evidence from CMS's competitive bidding demonstration suggests that competition saved Medicare $7.5 million and saved beneficiaries $1.9 million--without significantly affecting beneficiary access. For the competitive bidding program, CMS required suppliers to obtain accreditation based on quality standards and provide financial documents to participate. This added scrutiny gives CMS the chance to screen out suppliers that may not be stable, legitimate businesses, which could contribute to lower rates of improper payment. CMS also evaluated the bids based on demand, capacity, and price and chose suppliers whose bids were at or under a certain amount. CMS estimates that the first round of its competitive bidding program will result in payment amounts that average 26 percent less than the current fee schedule amounts. Competitive bidding also changes Medicare's relationship with suppliers and departs from Medicare's practice of doing business with any qualified provider, because it is... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Capitol Police (USCP) is responsible for securing the 276-acre Capitol Complex, including protecting Members of Congress, visitors, and congressional facilities. In response to heightened security concerns, various requests, and legislative mandates over the years, GAO has reported on management control problems in five key areas: (1) establishing an accountability framework for monitoring recommendations, (2) establishing a risk management framework, (3) ensuring financial management, (4) ensuring strategic and human capital planning, and (5) managing information technology (IT). From January 2004 through March 2007, GAO made 46 recommendations aimed at improving USCP administrative and management operations and achieving strategic goals. This testimony reports on the status of USCP's efforts to address GAO's recommendations. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed USCP documentation, such as risk matrices, budget documents, and strategic plans. GAO also conducted interviews with USCP officials and contractors on their efforts related to its recommendations. GAO performed this work from October 2007 through April 2008. USCP generally agreed with GAO's 46 prior recommendations and GAO's assessment of the status of USCP's efforts to implement those recommendations. Along these lines, USCP needs to complete those actions in progress and address those where there has been no progress. USCP has made significant progress in addressing the 46 recommendations GAO made since 2004. USCP has completed actions on 15 recommendations, is making progress toward addressing 28 recommendations, and has not made progress on 3 recommendations. With respect to the five areas, the status of USCP's efforts to address GAO's recommendations is as follows: (1) Accountability Framework for Monitoring Recommendations--USCP has completed actions on creating a framework to monitor progress on addressing GAO's recommendations and on reporting this progress to appropriate congressional committees and the USCP Police Board. (2) Linking Resources to Risks, Threats, and Vulnerabilities--USCP has taken steps to complete risk assessments for 18 of the 19 congressional facilities. However, additional actions will be required to adequately test and review its overall risk management approach. (3) Financial Management--USCP has completed actions on 8 GAO recommendations, including preparing its first full set of financial statements. USCP is making progress in addressing another 13 recommendations related to training, policies, procedures, and internal controls, but did not make progress toward addressing ongoing staff shortages and work imbalances. (4) Human Capital Management--USCP has implemented one recommendation by adopting a hiring policy and is making progress on seven other recommendations related to workforce planning and training. USCP has not yet addressed a ninth recommendation to monitor and evaluate the results of its strategic workforce... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agencies address their missions not only through regulations but also by issuing communication products--such as guidance, fact sheets, and brochures--that can provide crucial information to regulated parties and the public. Since 2000, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) developed new versions of such products to address the potential hazards of exposure to asbestos in automotive brakes. GAO was asked to describe (1) how OSHA and OPPTS prepared their products on asbestos in automotive brakes, (2) the general processes that OSHA and OPPTS use to prepare their communication products, and (3) how these processes compare to those for rulemaking and how recent administration initiatives might affect them. GAO reviewed and analyzed available documents and interviewed officials at OSHA, OPPTS, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OSHA and OPPTS followed different paths from 2000 through 2007 to update communication products on asbestos in automotive brakes and clutches. OSHA took longer than OPPTS to produce a final product, and OPPTS' process incorporated more steps to obtain input from external parties. Twice before final posting, OSHA officials had decided to not release drafts that had been prepared, because they needed more data to understand how pervasive asbestos in brake products were and wanted to avoid raising unnecessary alarm. For a time, staff from OSHA and OPPTS considered releasing a joint product. Overall, OSHA and OPPTS took years to complete all the process steps to produce their products on asbestos in automotive brakes and clutches--approximately 5-? years for OSHA and approximately 3-? years for OPPTS. In preparing their respective communication products, both OSHA and OPPTS generally followed applicable agency policies and procedures. Both OSHA and OPPTS have standard processes that guide the initiation, development, review, and dissemination of their communication products. OSHA publicly posts all of its applicable instructions, while OPPTS publicly posts only some. Under both agencies' processes, communication products may be initiated by various sources, developed only after getting management approval, and undergo intraagency coordination and management-level clearance. But interagency (including OMB) or other external reviews are not always required. OSHA's policies for disseminating products focus on responsibilities for posting and maintaining final products on the agency's Web site. Beginning at the development phase, OPPTS policies call for the formulation of a communication plan intended to ensure that the dissemination of a particular product is tailored to reach the intended audience. The agencies' processes establish no specific time frames or benchmarks for how long the preparation of a product should take. GAO identified at least five areas where the agencies'... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With health care spending increasing in the United States, you enacted legislation effective in 2004 establishing tax advantaged health savings accounts (HSA) to be coupled with high-deductible health insurance plans. HSA-eligible high-deductible health plans typically have lower premiums than traditional health plans and HSAs allow account holders to accumulate tax-free savings to pay for medical expenses. The novel structure of HSA-eligible plans coupled with HSAs has raised questions about who selects them and how they use the accounts. Proponents contend that the low premiums of HSA-eligible plans and the tax-free savings potential of HSAs appeal to many consumers, while the high deductibles encourage them to be more astute health care consumers. However, some critics are concerned that HSA-eligible plans may attract enrollees who seek lower premiums but lack the resources to contribute to an HSA, and wealthy enrollees who may seek to use the HSA primarily to accumulate tax-advantaged savings rather than pay for medical expenses. In a 2006 report, GAO described individuals' early experiences with HSA-eligible plans and HSAs and certain characteristics of HSA account holders. You asked us to update certain information from that report with more recently available data. For this report, GAO examined: (1) participation in HSA-eligible high-deductible health plans and HSAs, (2) the income characteristics of HSA account holders, and (3) contributions made to and withdrawals made from HSAs. The number of individuals participating in HSA-eligible health plans and HSAs increased significantly between 2004 and 2007; however, in all years, many HSA-eligible plan enrollees did not open an HSA. The number of individuals covered by HSA-eligible plans increased significantly between September 2004 and January 2007--from about 438,000 to approximately 4.5 million, according to industry estimates. Despite the growth, these plans represented a small share of individuals with private health coverage--about 2 percent in 2006. The number of tax filers reporting HSA activity also increased, nearly tripling between 2004 and 2005, from about 120,000 to about 355,000. Industry estimates suggest continued growth in HSA participation in 2006 and 2007. Despite the growth in HSA participation, nationally representative survey estimates from 2005, 2006, and 2007 found that more than 40 percent of HSA-eligible health plan enrollees did not open an HSA. Tax filers who reported HSA activity in 2005 had higher incomes on average than other tax filers. Among tax filers between the ages of 19 and 64, the average AGI for filers reporting HSA activity was about $139,000 compared with about $57,000 for all other filers. The income differences existed across all age groups. The total value of all HSA contributions reported to IRS in 2005 was about twice that of withdrawals--$754 million compared with $366 million. Among all filers reporting HSA activity in 2005,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) mission includes evaluating and regulating toxic chemicals. EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) program is a chemical evaluation program that is a critical component of EPA's capacity to support scientifically sound environmental regulations and policies. The IRIS database contains EPA's scientific position on the potential human health effects of exposure to more than 540 chemicals. This testimony highlights GAO's work on toxic substances, focusing on (1) its March 2008 report, Chemical Assessments: Low Productivity and New Interagency Review Process Limit the Usefulness and Credibility of EPA's Integrated Risk Information System and (2) key changes to the IRIS assessment process EPA included in its revised IRIS assessment process released on April 10, 2008. It also highlights the findings of two GAO reports on EPA's regulation of toxic chemicals. For the IRIS report, GAO analyzed EPA data and interviewed officials at relevant agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For this testimony, GAO supplemented the IRIS report with a review of EPA's revised IRIS assessment process announced earlier this month. Given the importance of the IRIS program to EPA's ability to protect public health and the environment, Congress should consider requiring EPA to suspend its new process and develop one that is responsive to GAO's recommendations. The IRIS database is at serious risk of becoming obsolete because EPA has not been able to routinely complete timely, credible assessments or decrease its backlog of 70 ongoing assessments--a total of 4 were completed in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. In addition, recent assessment process changes, as well as other changes EPA was considering at the time of GAO's review, further reduce the timeliness and credibility of IRIS assessments. Although EPA has taken steps to improve the IRIS program since 2000 and has developed a number of draft assessments for external review, its efforts to finalize assessments have been thwarted by a combination of factors, including two new OMB-required reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies; EPA management decisions, such as delaying some assessments to await new research; and the compounding effect of delays--even one delay can have a domino effect, requiring the process to essentially be repeated to incorporate changing science and methods. The OMB/interagency reviews of draft assessments involve other federal agencies in EPA's IRIS assessment process in a manner that limits the credibility of IRIS assessments and hinders EPA's ability to manage them. For example, the OMB/interagency reviews lack transparency, and OMB required EPA to terminate five assessments EPA had initiated to help it implement the Clean Air Act. The changes to the IRIS assessment process that EPA was considering, but had not yet issued at the time of GAO's review, would have added to the already... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) provides assistance for combating HIV/AIDS in 15 focus countries and elsewhere, with global targets for prevention, treatment, and care. The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria Act of 2003, which authorizes the $15 billion program, contains directives to guide the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator's (OGAC) allocation of this funding. The act expires in September 2008. The President announced his intention to ask Congress to authorize $30 billion for these efforts for the next 5 years. In 2007, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recommended eliminating the directives. GAO was asked to describe (1) the views of HIV/AIDS experts on these directives, (2) an alternative approach to allocating funds, and (3) potential challenges related to this approach. GAO interviewed 22 experts, surveyed PEPFAR officials in the 15 focus countries, and reviewed pertinent documentation. HIV/AIDS experts recognized that the Leadership Act's spending directives have ensured funding for prevention and treatment. However, many expressed concern about a directive to spend 33 percent of prevention funding on activities promoting abstinence and fidelity. Overall, the experts advocated replacing PEPFAR's current allocation process--based on the spending directives--with an approach based more on country-level data and needs. Experts also advocated that OGAC continue providing guidance and technical assistance to PEPFAR country teams. An alternative approach to allocating PEPFAR funds would include three elements of the current allocation process--setting targets, selecting interventions, and considering costs--but give country teams more responsibility for planning PEPFAR programs. OGAC would retain its leadership role, including reviewing and approving country plans. Teams would use country-level data to propose targets, and OGAC would work with teams to ensure these targets align with PEPFAR's global targets. Teams would select interventions to meet the proposed targets, without the constraints of spending directives but subject to OGAC review. Teams would consider country-specific data on interventions' costs using a consistent, OGAC-defined methodology; teams currently identify and analyze costs in varying ways. OGAC has not provided formal guidance or a methodology for identifying and analyzing costs, in contrast to federal standards that call for use of consistent methodologies to develop cost information. Most country team officials surveyed reported that the alternative approach to allocating funds would be feasible. However, some officials noted that reaching consensus on targets with external partners and within country teams could be a challenge. Officials also noted some ongoing challenges--including lack of host country capacity and limited cost data--that they would likely continue to face in implementing the alternative approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

DOD's investment in weapon systems represents one of the largest discretionary items in the budget. The department expects to invest about $900 billion (fiscal year 2008 dollars) over the next 5 years on development and procurement with more than $335 billion invested specifically in major defense acquisition programs. Every dollar spent inefficiently in acquiring weapon systems is less money available for other budget priorities--such as the global war on terror and growing entitlement programs. This testimony focuses on (1) the overall performance of DOD's weapon system investment portfolio; (2) our assessment of 72 weapon programs against best practices standards for successful product developments; and (3) potential solutions and recent DOD actions to improve weapon program outcomes. It is based on GAO-08-467SP, which included our analysis of broad trends in the performance of the programs in DOD's weapon acquisition portfolio and our assessment of 72 defense programs, and recommendations made in past GAO reports. DOD was provided a draft of GAO-08-467SP and had no comments on the overall report, but did provide technical comments on individual assessments. The comments, along with the agency comments received on the individual assessments, were included as appropriate. We recently released our sixth annual assessment of selected DOD weapon programs. The assessment indicates that cost and schedule outcomes for major weapon programs are not improving. Although well-conceived acquisition policy changes occurred in 2003 that reflect many best practices we have reported on in the past, these policy changes have not yet translated into practice at the program level. None of the weapon programs we assessed this year had proceeded through system development meeting the best practices standards for mature technologies, stable design, and mature production processes--all prerequisites for achieving planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. In addition, only a small percentage of programs used two key systems engineering tools--preliminary design reviews and prototypes to demonstrate the maturity of the product's design by critical junctures. This lack of disciplined systems engineering affects DOD's ability to develop sound, executable business cases for programs. Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This involves making tough decisions as to which programs should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued; making sure programs are executable; locking in requirements before programs are ever started; and making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable when responsibilities are not fulfilled. Moreover, the environment and incentives that lead DOD and the military services to overpromise on capability and underestimate costs in order to sell new programs and capture funding will need to change.... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) contains EPA's scientific position on the potential human health effects of exposure to more than 540 chemicals. IRIS is a critical component of EPA's capacity to support scientifically sound environmental decisions, policies, and regulations. GAO was asked to examine (1) the outcome of steps EPA has taken to ensure that IRIS contains current, credible chemical risk information, to address the backlog of ongoing assessments, and to respond to new requirements from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); and (2) the potential effects of planned changes to the IRIS assessment process on EPA's ability to ensure that IRIS provides current, credible risk information. To do this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed EPA data and interviewed officials at relevant agencies. EPA's actions since 2000 to ensure that IRIS contains current, credible risk information, to address its backlog of 70 ongoing assessments, and to respond to new OMB requirements--including increasing funding and revising the assessment process--have not enabled EPA to routinely complete credible IRIS assessments or decrease its backlog. Although in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 EPA sent 32 assessments to OMB for the first of three required external reviews, EPA finalized only 4 assessments during this period. This low level of productivity jeopardizes the viability of the IRIS database. Further, an EPA analysis indicated that many existing assessments may need to be updated, and EPA program offices and other IRIS users have requested assessments of hundreds of chemicals not yet in IRIS. Factors contributing to EPA's inability to complete IRIS assessments in a timely manner include new OMB-required reviews of IRIS assessments by OMB and other federal agencies; certain EPA management decisions, such as delaying some assessments to await new research; and the compounding effect of delays--even one delay can have a domino effect, requiring the process to essentially be repeated to incorporate changing science. As of December 2007, most of the 70 ongoing assessments had been in progress for over 5 years. Regarding new OMB requirements, the IRIS assessment process now includes two OMB/interagency reviews of draft assessments. These reviews have resulted in involvement of other federal agencies in EPA's IRIS assessment process in a manner that limits the credibility of IRIS assessments and hinders EPA's ability to manage them. That is, the OMB/interagency reviews lack transparency--OMB considers agencies' comments on IRIS assessments to be internal executive branch documents that may not be made public. Given the importance of IRIS assessments, it is essential that input from all parties, including other federal agencies, be part of the public record. Transparency is especially important because agencies providing input include those that may be affected by the assessments should they lead to... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]