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The District of Columbia's Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) is responsible for ensuring the safety and well being of about 3,000 children in its care and ensuring that services are provided to them and their families. In fiscal year 2003, CFSA's total budget was about $200 million. Concerns have been raised about CFSA's supply of caseworkers, the foster care and adoptive homes, and the quality and timeliness of mental health services for foster care children. To help address these issues, the Congress appropriated $14 million in fiscal year 2004 to CFSA, the Department of Mental Health (DMH), and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) specifically for foster care improvement. GAO examined CFSA's (1) strategies for recruiting, retaining, and managing its caseworkers; (2) efforts to license an adequate supply of safe foster and adoptive homes; and (3) efforts to collaborate with DMH and the Family Court to provide timely mental health services to foster care children. GAO also reviewed plans for and use of the federal foster care improvement funds. CFSA actively recruited caseworkers and implemented retention strategies; however, caseworkers cited several management practices they said lowered their morale and adversely affected their ability to perform their duties. CFSA employed several recruitment approaches recommended by a number of child welfare organizations and exceeded most of its staffing goals for fiscal year 2003. Caseworkers cited high salaries and the training for new caseworkers as factors that encouraged them to remain at CFSA. However, GAO found a general consensus among the caseworkers with which GAO met that some management practices--poor communication, a lack of resources, poor supervision, and no rewards and recognition program--adversely affected their performance and morale. Agency officials said they had made some changes and were planning to take other actions to address these issues. CFSA has developed goals and strategies for recruiting new foster and adoptive homes and improved licensing requirements. CFSA has made progress licensing new families, although more families have stopped serving than expected. Further, CFSA does not have processes for identifying the reasons foster parents stop serving or for determining the effectiveness of its recruitment strategies. CFSA has standardized and raised licensing requirements for all foster and adoptive homes, but as of May 2004, 308 foster homes were unlicensed, with about 22 percent of CFSA's foster children residing in them. CFSA has begun collaborating with DMH and the Family Court to centralize and track mental health services for foster care children, but challenges remain to ensuring timely delivery. CFSA and DMH designed a standard process for referring foster care children to DMH for assessment and treatment and for tracking service delivery. DMH has also started expanding its service capacity for foster care children. For example, it has begun recruiting additional evaluators to perform assessments. While CFSA began using a database to track service delivery in August 2004, it has not analyzed the service delivery data collected on paper prior to August 2004 to determine whether foster care children were receiving timely services. Additionally, CFSA and DMH still face certain challenges, such as integrating caseworkers and Family Court judges into the new referral process. CFSA, DMH, and COG have spending plans that are consistent with the statutory language providing the federal funds, but only a small portion of the foster care improvement funds had been obligated or spent as of June 2004, in part because funding was not received until March 2004. Further, it is unclear how the District and COG plan to support some of these programs in the long-term because future funding is uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a report by the U.S. based Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the suspected counterfeit electronic parts on the Internet platforms used in military-grade electronic parts. It says that such parts may disrupt the U.S. Department of Defense supply chain, harm weapon's integrity and endanger troops' lives. A fictitious company of GAO gained access to the Internet platforms with access to the vendors selling such parts.

The article presents a report by Washington DC-based Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States on the safety of motor carriers. It says that Washington DC-based Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), United States ensures the motor carriers to operate safely in interstate commerce. Its objectives include the examination of the prevalence chameleon carriers, design of the programs for suspected ones and constraints faced by the FMCSA against their enforcement.

The article presents a testimony by Washington DC-based Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States on the U.S. Department of Homeland and Security (DHS). It mentions the DHS to be the third-largest cabinet-level agency in the federal government, employing more than 200,000 employees in a broad range of jobs. It presents observations including the work satisfaction of a DHS employee compared to the federal one and the efforts made by the DHS to satisfy the employee with his job.

The article focuses on the statement by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in relation to repatriation of Indian human remains and objects. It discusses the July 2010 report showing agencies' inadequate compliance to Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)requirements and the lack of repatriation governmentwide reporting. It mentions on the May 2011 report depicting slow repatriation process by the Smithsonian Institution due to lengthy inventory.

The article focuses on the study conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on several governance reforms and accountability in operational matters in the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C. The study examine the effectiveness and usefulness of the proposed reform towards the improvement of the institution's operations. The governance reforms aimed three main areas such as executive compensation benefits, operational policies and Board's responsibilities and performance.

This testimony is based on GAO's review of schedules and financial reports for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; GAO's observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and GAO's discussions with the CVC team (Architect of the Capitol (AOC) and its major CVC contractors) and AOC's Chief Fire Marshal. GAO also reviewed AOC's construction management contractor's periodic schedule assessments, proposed change order log, and weekly reports on construction progress. In addition, GAO reviewed the contract modifications made to date. Since the March 12, 2008, CVC hearing, the project's construction and fire alarm acceptance testing have moved forward, and despite continued delays in certain CVC and expansion space work, AOC still believes that the project will be ready to open in November 2008. According to AOC's construction management contractor, in dollar terms, the overall CVC project remains 99 percent complete. However, risks to the project's schedule remain in several time-critical activities, including the fire alarm acceptance testing. Many punch list items also remain to be completed, and a steady number of proposed change orders have to be resolved. At this time, however, AOC does not expect the punch list items or the proposed change orders to affect the project's completion date. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discovery in 2004 of lead contamination in the District of Columbia's drinking water resulted in an administrative order between the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the District's Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), requiring WASA to take a number of corrective actions. WASA also took additional, longer-term measures, most notably a roughly $400 million program to replace what may be 35,000 lead service lines in public space within its service area. As in WASA's case, water utilities nationwide are under increasing pressure to make significant investments to upgrade aging and deteriorating infrastructures, improve security, serve a growing population, and meet new regulatory requirements. In this context, GAO's testimony presents observations on (1) WASA's efforts to address lead contamination in light of its other pressing water infrastructure needs, and (2) the extent to which WASA's challenges are indicative of those facing water utilities nationwide. To address these issues, GAO relied primarily on its 2005 and 2006 reports on lead contamination in drinking water, as well as other recent GAO reports examining the nation's water infrastructure needs and strategies to address these needs. With the introduction of orthophosphate to its drinking water WASA has consistently tested below the federal action level for lead. However, WASA is reevaluating its roughly $400 million, longer-term solution for replacement of what may be 35,000 lead service lines within its jurisdiction. In addition to the program's high cost, a key problem WASA faces is that, by law, it may only replace the portion of the service line that it owns; replacing the portion on private property is at the homeowner's discretion. Accordingly, WASA has been encouraging homeowners to participate in the program by replacing their own portion of the lead lines. Despite these efforts, however, homeowner replacement of lead service lines remains limited. Of the 14,260 lead service lines WASA replaced through the first quarter of fiscal year 2008, there were only 2,128 instances in which the homeowner participated in private side replacement. Many questions remain about the benefits of partial lead service line replacement. In fact, some research to date suggests that partial service line replacement results in (1) short-term spikes in lead levels immediately after partial replacement and (2) little long-term reduction in lead levels. WASA's dilemma over this program is taking place within the context of its other staggering infrastructure needs. Most notably, WASA is undertaking a $2.2 billion effort to meet the terms of a consent decree with EPA requiring the utility to control its sewer overflow problems. WASA's challenges in addressing its lead contamination problems and other infrastructure demands are mirrored across the country, where infrastructure needs are estimated to range from $485 billion to nearly $1.2 trillion nationwide over the next 20... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this testimony is to assist the Committees in monitoring progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. This testimony will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress since the last CVC hearing on March 13, 2007; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding status. GAO's remarks are based on our review of schedules and financial reports for the CVC project and related records maintained by AOC and its construction management contractor, Gilbane Building Company; observations on the progress of work at the CVC construction site; and discussions with the CVC team (AOC and its major CVC contractors), AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, and representatives from the U.S. Capitol Police. Since the March 13, 2007, CVC hearing, the CVC team has continued to move the project's construction forward, but AOC has extended the project's scheduled completion date by about 2 months, to June 2008, and further delays are possible. This delay was attributable to problems with activities on the project's critical path--the fire protection system. During the past month, the CVC team has made progress on the project's heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system, interior wall stone and ceiling installation, and other interior and exterior construction work. AOC will be able to meet or come close to meeting its new scheduled project completion date only if the CVC team promptly makes significant improvements in its execution of the project and the project's schedule. To date, AOC's implementation of actions identified in its November 2006 action plan has not been completely effective in curtailing additional schedule slippages. Furthermore, ongoing communication and coordination breakdowns between the contractors and AOC's Chief Fire Marshal, as well as the large number of proposed change orders (over 450 as of February 2007), continue to present risks to the project's completion time frames and costs. For example, because of inadequate communication and coordination, some above-ceiling fire protection equipment has to be inspected, even though the ceilings are already in place, risking damage to ceilings and additional work if the inspections reveal deficiencies. Most of the new construction change order proposals that the project continues to generate each month are relatively small compared with the project's total cost; however, a subcontractor has expressed concerns about the cumulative effect of these proposals on subcontractors' cash flows and on the ability of subcontractors to complete their work on schedule. As we reported at the last CVC hearing, we previously estimated that the total cost of the entire CVC project at completion would likely be about $592 million without an allowance for risks and uncertainties, and over $600 million with such an allowance. Because of the uncertainty over the project's expected completion date, we have not updated these estimates. To... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2006, the Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) announced that it had entered into a 30-year contract with Showtime Networks Inc., (Showtime) to create a digital on-demand television channel. Members of Congress and other interested parties, particularly filmmakers, raised issues about the contract's potential effects on public access to and use of the Smithsonian's collections, its confidential nature, and the process by which the Smithsonian negotiated it. This report discusses (1) the extent to which the Smithsonian followed its internal contracting guidelines, (2) what the Smithsonian gave up and received in return under the contract, (3) the Smithsonian's implementation of the contract, and (4) the contract's potential impact on outside parties. GAO reviewed the contract and pertinent documents, and interviewed Smithsonian and Showtime officials. The Smithsonian followed its internal contracting guidelines regarding competition, oversight, and conflicts of interest. When it began exploring a television venture in 2002, it approached 18 major media companies and negotiated with two before reaching a deal with Showtime. The process was overseen by Smithsonian Business Ventures' (SBV) Board of Directors and the Smithsonian's Board of Regents, who approved the contract in November 2005. When SBV's Chief Executive Officer disclosed a potential conflict of interest, the Smithsonian's Ethics Officer reviewed the disclosure in accordance with Smithsonian policies and concluded that no conflict existed. GAO's Ethics Officer concurred with the Smithsonian's decision. The Smithsonian granted the new venture a 30-year, semiexclusive right to produce and commercially distribute audiovisual programs using Smithsonian trademarks and/or content in exchange for national television exposure and new revenue. The Smithsonian projects that the new channel will reach more than 31 million households by 2010 and will have a total value of over $150 million after 10 years. The Smithsonian's major concession is a noncompete clause that generally prohibits it from engaging in activities that would compete with the new venture. The Smithsonian negotiated exceptions for various news and educational programs. The Smithsonian has been working to implement policies and procedures necessary under the contract since it became effective in January 2006, but the information that it has provided to interested parties has been insufficient. The Smithsonian and Showtime waited until March 2006 to publicly announce the new venture and did not implement internal processes to review filming requests for compliance with the contract until after the public announcement. The Smithsonian has created a committee to review filming requests, but does not document in detail its rationale for key decisions or attempt to synthesize these decisions over time. Also, the "Frequently Asked Questions" on the Smithsonian's Web site provides little information for... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are pleased to assist the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch in monitoring progress on the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. Our remarks will focus on (1) the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) construction progress and problems since the Subcommittee's September 21, 2006, hearing and their impact on the project's schedule; and (2) the project's expected cost at completion and funding situation. As part of this discussion, we will address a number of key challenges and risks that continue to face the project as well as actions AOC has recently taken, and plans or needs to take, to meet its currently scheduled completion date. Since the Subcommittee's September 21 CVC hearing, the CVC team has continued to move the project's construction forward, but the project's scheduled completion date has slipped by 6 weeks, to October 26, 2007,3 and further delays are possible. The 6-week delay was attributable to problems with the project's most critical activity--the fire protection system. Under the current schedule, the construction of the House and Senate expansions spaces will be completed before the CVC's construction, but both the CVC and the expansion spaces will be available for occupancy at the same time because final acceptance testing of both is slated to be done concurrently. During the past month, the CVC team has made progress on the project's heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system, interior floor stone and ceiling installation, and other interior and exterior construction work. In addition, AOC sent Congress an action plan for improving its execution of the project and the project's schedule, as the Subcommittee requested and we had recommended, and this plan is responsive to our recommendations. AOC is also considering other action not discussed in this plan. Despite this progress, problems have occurred in many important activities besides the CVC's fire protection system, according to AOC's construction management contractor. Although these delays did not add time to the project's schedule this month, additional delays could do so in the future. Recently identified issues associated with the CVC's HVAC system, fire protection system, and security system--including issues associated with their coordination and testing--also pose risks to the project's scheduled completion date. In addition, concerns have arisen about AOC's ability to achieve a high-quality, complete, and usable facility within the current estimated time frame and cost now that the contractual date for completing sequence 2 construction work--September 15, 2006--has passed. In particular, there is a risk that, without negative consequences, the resolve of some major stakeholders to complete the project in a timely and efficient manner could be adversely affected. Finally, all the indicators of progress that we have been tracking for the Subcommittee, together with other risks and uncertainties,... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Companies form the basis of most commercial and entrepreneurial activities in market-based economies; however, "shell" companies, which have no operations, can be used for illicit purposes such as laundering money. Some states have been criticized for requiring minimal ownership information to form a U.S. company, raising concerns about the ease with which companies may be used for illicit purposes. In this report, GAO describes (1) the kinds of information each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia and third party agents collect on companies, (2) law enforcement concerns about the use of companies to hide illicit activity and how company information from states and agents helps or hinders investigations, and (3) implications of requiring states or agents to collect company ownership information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The District of Columbia's Jail and Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF), which are the District's detention facilities for misdemeanant and pretrial detainees, have been repeatedly cited for violations of health and safety standards. The Jail also has had problems with releasing inmates before or after their official release date, in part, because of inaccuracies in its electronic inmate records. As a follow-on to problems at the Jail reported in 2002 by the District's Inspector General, GAO addressed the following questions: (1) What are the results of recent health and safety inspections? (2) What is the status of the Jail's capital improvement projects, and what policies and procedures does the Department of Corrections (DoC) use in managing the projects? and (3) What progress has been made in improving electronic inmate records at the Jail? Health and safety inspection reports for the Jail and CTF that were prepared from January 2002 through April 2004 by the District's Department of Health consistently identified problems with air quality, vermin infestation, fire safety, plumbing, and lighting. Officials attributed some of the health and safety deficiencies to the age of the Jail and inmate behavior at both facilities. DoH inspection reports did not always document the specific locations where deficiencies were identified and did not document the date and time when the deficiencies were identified. For example, one report might identify a problem in a specific cell, while another report might state that the problem occurred in some locations, most locations, or throughout the Jail. This limits DoC's ability to determine how prevalent the health and safety deficiencies are, whether problems are recurring in the same locations, or whether conditions changed over time. Of the 16 capital improvement projects for the Jail approved for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, 1 project was completed and 15 were in various stages of development. In addition, the Office of Property Management lacked written policies and procedures concerning project management, which could be important tools in guiding project managers through the planning and management of projects. Although the Office of Property Management established a working group to develop standard operating procedures for managing projects, time frames had not been established for when the working group should complete this work. With respect to early and late inmate release errors, DoC has taken several steps to improve its efficiency and accuracy in processing inmate records, but release errors continue to occur. DoC's improvement efforts have included simplifying the workflow in the Records Office, issuing an operations manual, and developing additional guidance and training for staff. Additionally, DoC developed a database to capture detailed information on incidents that led to each inmate release error. DoC analyzed the information in this database to determine how frequently the incidents occurred. Based on this information, DoC has developed proposals for corrective action to reduce release errors. DoC officials attributed staff processing errors to limited staff resources and the large volume of documents that are continuously received in the Records Office. Because DoC did not have complete data on early and late inmate releases, DoC does not know the full extent to which the release errors occurred. Specifically, DoC may not discover an early release error until long after the inmate has been released. For late releases, DoC used an incomplete methodology, which led to an understated number of actual late releases. During our review, DoC modified this methodology to more accurately identify the number of late releases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The report presents the results of GAO's audit of the District of Columbia Highway Trust Fund's financial statements for fiscal year 1997. GAO also examines the forecasted statements of the Fund's expected conditions and operations for the next five years. This report presents (1) GAO's opinion on District management's assertion about the effectiveness of the Fund's internal controls as of September 1997 and (2) the results of GAO's evaluation of the District's compliance with laws and regulations during fiscal year 1997 as they relate to the Fund. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]