1. Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Author
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Cole, Harold L. and Kocherlakota, Narayana R.
- Subjects
- *
GAMES , *MATHEMATICAL optimization , *MATHEMATICAL analysis , *MATHEMATICS - Abstract
Abstract: In this paper, we consider a class of infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. We look at strongly symmetric perfect public equilibria with memory K: equilibria in which strategies are restricted to depend only on the last K observations of public signals. Define to be the set of payoffs of equilibria with memory K. We show that for some parameter settings, for sufficiently large K. However, for other parameter settings, we show that not only is , but that is a singleton. Moreover, this last result is essentially independent of the discount factor. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]
- Published
- 2005
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