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Abstract: In this paper, we study average monotonic fuzzy games—a subclass of monotonic cooperative fuzzy games, and prove that for a continuous average monotonic cooperative fuzzy game which has a crisp maximal coalition of maximum excess at every imputation, its Aubin core coincides with its fuzzy bargaining set. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Recently, the concept of classical bargaining set given by Aumann and Maschler in 1964 has been extended to fuzzy bargaining set. In this paper, we give a modification to correct some weakness of this extension. We also extend the concept of the Mas-Colell''s bargaining set (the other major type of bargaining sets) to its corresponding fuzzy bargaining set. Our main effort is to prove existence theorems for these two types of fuzzy bargaining sets. We will also give necessary and sufficient conditions for these bargaining sets to coincide with the Aubin Core in a continuous superadditive cooperative fuzzy game which has a crisp maximal coalition of maximum excess at each payoff vector. We show that both Aumann–Maschler and Mas-Colell fuzzy bargaining sets of a continuous convex cooperative fuzzy game coincide with its Aubin core. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]