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A quantification of process's security by differential privacy is defined and studied in the framework of probabilistic process algebras. The resulting (quantitative) security properties are investigated and compared with other (qualitative and quantitative) security notions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Opacity testing is formalized and studied. We specify opacity testers as well as tested systems by (timed) process algebras. We model various testers according to how sophisticated observations of tested system they can make and which kind of conclusions they can obtain. We use this technique to define several realistic security properties. The properties are studied and compared with other security concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Process testing as a way to obtain information on confidential data is investigated. Our working formalism is based on an appropriate (probabilistic) process algebra and (probabilistic) testing. We define testing noninterference as well as sets of private actions which execution is guaranteed by a given test and sets of actions which execution could be excluded by a given test. Moreover, we relate obtained information to a size of the test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Formalisms for analysis of systems of various nature specified by process algebras are proposed. They allow us to formalize security properties based on an absence of information flow and properties on system's integrity. Resulting properties are compared and discussed. We present also quantification of these properties by means of information theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different techniques for expressing an amount of information on secrete data which can be obtained by a process observation are presented. They are based on information theory and they express certainty about sets of private actions which execution is guaranteed by a given observation and sets of actions which execution is excluded by a given observation. Moreover, the case when an intruder has same preliminary belief on secrete data is discussed. It is shown how the presented technique could be applied for such case. As regards working formalism, probabilistic process algebra is used for description of systems as well as attacker's belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Formalisms for description how much information on private actions can be obtained by observing public ones are presented. Two sets of private actions are considered. The set of actions which execution is guaranteed according to observations and the set of actions which execution is excluded according to observations. Since information flows could be realized also by means of different covert channels as time, termination and divergence this possibility is considered as well. Both qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the flow are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A general framework for defining security properties is presented. It allows us to model many traditional security properties as well as to define new ones. The framework is based on process algebras contexts and processes relations. By appropriate choice of both of them we can model also probabilistic and quantified security properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A quantification of process's security by quantification of an amount of information flow is defined and studied in the framework of timed process algebras. The resulting quantified security is compared with other (qualitative) security notions. Unprecise and limited observations are defined and discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A formal model for description of probabilistic timing attacks is presented and studied. It is based on a probabilistic timed process algebra, on observations (mappings which make visible only a part of system behavior) and on an information flow. The resulting security properties are studied and compared with other security concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A formal model for description of passive and active timing attacks is presented, studied and compared with other security concepts. It is based on a timed process algebra and on a concept of observations which make only a part of system behaviour visible. From this partial information which contains also timing of actions an intruder tries to deduce some private system activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A formal model for an analysis of an information flow in interconnection networks is presented. It is based on timed process algebra which can express also network properties. The information flow is based on a concept of deducibility on composition. Robustness of systems against network timing attacks is defined. A variety of different security properties which reflect different security requirements are defined and investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns a new approach to intelligent data analysis based on information flow distribution study in a flow graph. Branches of a flow graph are interpreted as decision rules, whereas a flow graph is supposed to describe a decision algorithm. We propose to model decision processes as flow graphs and analyze decisions in terms of flow spreading in a graph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]