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The essay aims to analyze the concept and the paradigm of harmony in the metaphysical system of the Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhang Zai. It argues that Zhang Zai's concept of Great Harmony not only inherits the traditional centrality of this idea within the Confucian tradition, but actually presents the most advanced idea of harmony up to his time. In Zhang Zai's philosophy, harmony becomes the Way itself, which includes the realm of principles and the outward and functional manifestations of reality. This essay will deal with harmony in two ways: first with Zhang Zai's direct use of the concept in the Zhengmeng and second, applying the paradigm of harmony to other of Zhang Zai's key concepts such as qi, void (xu ) and natural dispositions (xing ). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the integration of Confucian philosophy into contemporary discussions on technology, with contributors exploring topics such as Confucian notions of human dignity in modern contexts, the application of Confucian imaginative practices in engineering ethics education, and a Confucian response to the Anthropocene.

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi 's complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as "rightness," or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since China's reform and opening up in 1978, the study of Chinese philosophy has proceeded together with the times, not only making tremendous academic progress, but also serving as an important part of research on Chinese culture that undertakes the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and Chinese culture. This essay gives a brief review of the study of Chinese philosophy over the last forty years with particular attention to five aspects, namely the new horizons in the study of Chinese philosophy, the characteristics of Chinese philosophy, the comparison between Chinese and Western philosophy that also involves the "legitimacy" of the former, the relevance of Chinese philosophy for contemporary times, and the basic methodologies of Chinese philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Learning to be human is a highly important concern in Confucian philosophy. This paper is intended to provide a special perspective on this theme through an attempt to reinterpret Mengzi’s views on the heart-mind (xin 心) as “learning to be human” and to reconstruct these views into a multi-staged process of moral development. Through an intentional interpretation of various arguments advanced by Mengzi, we seek to justify that his views on the heart-mind and moral virtues can be seen as a learning process and that he subjects the inborn beginnings of goodness to a delicate development before they can actually qualify a person as fully human. Having examined the three dimensions of Mengzi’s learning, the intellectual, the practical and the spiritual, we will come to the conclusion that whether innate or a posteriori, initial good senses and knowledge require a moral and spiritual process of learning to develop which is, to Mengzi, crucial for one to become a genuine human being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“Learning to be Human” is the theme of the 24th World Congress of Philosophy, to be held in Beijing in 2018, and also an important topic in traditional Chinese Confucian philosophy. Different interpretations of this theme, however, directly determine how to understand the study of Chinese philosophy in the context of world philosophy today. Changes in contemporary philosophy urge us to reconsider philosophical research in today’s China. Reflecting on the status quo of research on Chinese philosophy and finding a method for solving certain existing difficulties will ultimately enhance the study of Chinese philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks whether “Confucian Management” may be seen as the dominant influence in contemporary China. The philosophical legacy of Confucius on modern management theory and practice has received a good deal of attention in recent times, and here I attempt to assess its possible continuity. In order to carry out this task, I apply a bibliometric analysis called the “Culturomics” approach, looking at the literature on “Chinese Management” published in Mandarin in the last century, from 1900 onwards. After the presentation of the empirical data, the discussion section is set out, followed by the article’s conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responding to three articles in a symposium dedicated to my research in somaesthetics, this paper explores a variety of themes connecting my theories with classical Chinese philosophy. The symposium topics discussed here range from the ontology of body-mind and world to the ethics of somaesthetic self-cultivation, and then to the somaesthetic meanings of our practices of erotics and of eating. The paper shows how the pragmatist orientation of somaesthetics reconciles values of unity with those of difference and how key ideas of somaesthetics intersect, in different ways, with both Confucian and Daoist thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In keeping with a view that is explicitly formulated by Aristotle in his Motion of Animals, general kinetic principles must be specified according to the different types of movable entities existing in the universe. At issue, essentially, are the motions of the stars and the motions of animals. Whereas the cosmological immovable mover is the object of two complementary analyses (in Bk. VIII of Physics and in Chs. 6 and 7 of Bk. XII of Metaphysics), information on the immovability of the first mover responsible for animal motion is to be found in the psychological and psycho-physiological treatises (On the Soul, in Bk. I, Chs. 3 and 4, and in Bk. III, Ch. 10 and in Ch. 6 of the Motion of Animals). But it is also found in Ch. 7, Bk. XII of the Metaphysics, in the very context of the argument concerning the absolutely first immovable mover of the world. This suggests that the two types of motion, that of the stars and that of animals, however distinct the arguments about them are, rest on a single scheme, and maybe even on a common principle. This is liable to surprise us, as much as stars and animals appear to us to belong to heterogeneous orders of reality. But the situation is different for Aristotle, who, as attentive as he is to differences, tends nonetheless to conceive the stars as living things of a particular kind. This fact is the source of a series of difficulties that Aristotle generously left for his many commentators to solve. Aim of this text, which was initially directed to a larger audience, is to set some of these complex issues in both simple and up to date terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early China, views concerning human nature underwent significant development, with philosophers moving from seeing it as desire or instinct to seeing it as virtue or essence. Before Confucius's time, human beings' xing, or nature, was construed as desire and instinct, i.e., as a physical nature. The key problem faced by theorists of human nature at that time was how to manage nature with virtue, i.e., how to use virtue to both control and enrich nature. A later, wide-reaching development was the use of qi to explain human nature. Laozi began, taking de or virtue to be the internal essence of the human being; Confucius took de or virtue to be xing or nature. Following this development, the main current of the theory of human nature in the pre-Qin period divided into two branches. One, created by the later Confucius, inherited in part by Zisi, and developed by Mencius, took virtue as nature and insisted on the a priority of internal morality. The other branch, inherited in part by Zisi and developed by the author of Xing Zi Ming Chu and Xunzi, featured the development of the old tradition which took yu, or desire, as nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, inspired by the somatic turn in philosophy initiated by Richard Shusterman, I want to invoke the language of classical Confucian philosophy to think through the best efforts of William James and John Dewey to escape the mind-body and nature-nurture dualisms--that is, to offer an alternative vocabulary that might lend further clarity to the revolutionary insights of James and Dewey by appealing to the processual categories of Chinese cosmology. What I will try to do first is to refocus the pragmatist's explanation of the relationship between mind and body through the lens of a process Confucian cosmology. And then, to make the case for James and Dewey, I will return to the radical, imagistic language they invoke to try and make the argument that this processual, holistic understanding of "vital bodyminding" is in fact what they were trying to say all along. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fung Yu-lan has suggested that Chinese philosophers have been unreceptive to modern science. This suggestion, however, has not been substantiated. This essay is an attempt to provide a justification of Fung's assertion through an existential analysis of the Chinese concepts of nature. The essay will examine Chinese existential concerns prevailing in Daoism and Confucianism, and these systems' distaste for the type of scientific study which has become prevalent in the modern world. I also intend to defend the claim that the ultimate concern of the Zhuangzi and the Zhongyong is completely contrary to the one that sustains modern science. A brief comparative discussion between Xu Guangqi and Galileo Galilei will be used to support this claim. My discussion will raise the contention that, to have a better understanding of the development of modern science in China, we have to understand the attitude toward religion that has underpinned modern science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century has often been related to some sort of cultural or other particularism or some sort of philosophical universalism. By and large, these still seem to be the terms along which academic debates are carried out. The tension is particularly manifest in notions such as "Chinese philosophy," "Daoist cosmology," "Neo-Confucian idealism," or "Chinese metaphysics." For some, "Chinese metaphysics" may be a blatant contradictio in adiecto, while others may find it a most ordinary topic to be discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this article, I set out to examine two major discourses in which talk about "metaphysics" is frequent and popular and to which talk of "Chinese metaphysics" may wish to contribute: the history of philosophy and analytic philosophy. My contention is that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting "Chinese metaphysics" on the academic agenda and to what precise purpose this is done. What my discussion seeks to highlight is the as yet often largely unarticulated dimension of the politics of comparative philosophy--of which talk about "Chinese metaphysics" may but need not be an example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional Confucian political culture (including its concepts, systems, practices and folk customs) has a legacy that deserves careful reconsideration today. Its theories, institutions, and practices address the source, legitimacy, division and balance, and restriction of political power. Confucian politics is a type of "moral politics" which sticks to what ought to be and what is justifiable, and holds that political power comes from Heaven, mandate of Heaven or Dao of Heaven, which implies that justification and standards rest with the people referring to scholars peasants, workers and merchants. This type of justification is rooted in the public space and the autonomous strength of the people, and it finds guidance in the involvement, supervision, and criticism of the class of scholar-bureaucrats (shi ...). In this article, Western political philosophy will be taken as a frame of reference for evaluating Confucian conception of justice as well as Confucian ideas of distribution, fairness of opportunity, caring kindness for "the least advantaged," and institutional construction. It will argue that the leading characteristic of Confucian political theory is that of "substantive justice." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among scholars of classical philosophy in the West, it is not uncommon to hesitate about the existence of metaphysics in non-Western philosophical traditions. At times, the dilemma seems due to culture-specific ideas or standards about what metaphysics is or how it should be done. Other times the problem seems to lie in a general lack of awareness about the methods and approaches of divergent philosophical traditions. This article explores an often ignored Aristotelian notion of metaphysics: That it is wisdom. If we acknowledge wisdom to be a common value or ideal found in different cultures, then characterizing metaphysics as wisdom promises to be more inclusive than prevalent ideas about it, being broad enough to allow for the appreciation of metaphysical insights and achievements in non-Western schools. I first examine Aristotle's account of what wisdom consists of. I shall then test the inclusivity of this conception of metaphysics by showing how its characteristic features are manifest in the Neo-Confucian ideal of sagely learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mencius takes humaneness as the primary moral idea, and makes new annotations to some classical Confucian moral ideas, such as lightness, courtesy and intelligence. The main traditional topic of virtue has, in Mencius, been transformed gradually form virtuous conduct to virtue. The four minds-four virtues theory of Mencius marks the formation of virtue ethics in classical Confucianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a relatively long period of time, it has been widely thought that Confucianism and constitutionalism are incompatible, even antithetic. This view is a prominent feature of Chinese thought from the New Cultural Movement of the early 20 century to the "Asian Values" debates of recent decades. Even today, it still holds some currency among many intellectuals, both within and outside China. However, in recent years some intellectuals are breaking with this dominant view by exploring the constitutional resources within Confucianism and challenging previous conceptual frameworks. As we shall see, we can identify three main approaches to the issue of Confucian Constitutionalism in contemporary academia, namely, the institutional approach, the ritualistic approach, and the religious approach. This article will seek to review the respective contents of each approach to Confucian constitutionalism and discuss their main problems as well as examine the prospects of establishing a traditional Confucian/Chinese constitutionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay attempts to compare Kant's better man and the Confucian junzi in the Zhongyong, and argues that Kant's idea of the better man, which expresses human self-improvement in ultimate freedom, is in fact a conception very similar to that of the Confucian junzi, which denotes an ideal human being in eheng. Kant attributes the lack of emphasis on self-improvement in Western culture to the Christian conception of grace, and demonstrates the possibility of self-improvement on the ground of ultimate freedom. We may call this treatment "the Confucian solution" in Kant's thought. My intention is to explicate the conceptual commonality between the better man and the junzi and demonstrate the Confucian element in Kant's religious thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A general account of the Confucian self as either collectivist or relational requires careful examination. This article begins with the major textual resources of the Confucian tradition and then compares this idea of moral expansion with Deweyan ideas of the self and community. By parsing key Confucian terms that comprise the meaning of "being together" and "mutual association," the author argues that Confucian selves and individuals are fundamentally contextually creative. By comparing the Confucian idea of family with the Deweyan notion of community, the author further supports his argument that the Confucian self is always co-creative with others. Despite the fact that Confucian ethics has long been considered either a kind of virtue ethics or a kind of role ethics, the author argues that Confucian ethics is better viewed as a kind of co-creative ethics, which stems from an ethical theory concerning the co-creative self and other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates Xunzi's ideas on self and community. According to Xunzi, the origin of Confucian rituals lies in the need to nourish human desires. However, this nourishment is more than the simple satisfaction of desire. Rather, in the development of rituals, desires are evaluated and directed according to the overall good of a person in order that the person can actively pursue fulfilment and self-realization. If human beings are controlled by momentary desires, they live like beasts and cannot act as autonomous agents. Confucian rituals constitute a normative framework for human life and desires. Following Xunzi, this normative framework is based on a cultural and collective interpretation of our own nature. Through Confucian rituals a person can not only satisfy desires properly, but can also enjoy human relationships within the community. Most importantly, it is through these Confucian rituals that a person realizes himself as an agent who can control and direct his own life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Zhong ... is a very important philosophical concept in early Confucianism. Both the received ancient Confucian classics and the newly discovered ancient bamboo manuscripts tell us that adhering to the principle of zhong was an important charge that had been transmitted and inherited by early ancient Chinese political leaders from generation to generation. Confucius and his followers adopted the concept of zhong and further developed it into a sophisticated doctrine, which is usually called zhongdao ... (the Way of zhong) or zhongyong .... Being a polysemous word, zhong has several different but philosophically related meanings. However, for a long time, people usually understood zhong in the sense of only one of its meanings, and zhongdao or zhongyong has been commonly interpreted as "the doctrine of the mean." My argument in this paper is that a synthetic interpretation, which includes all the semantic meanings of zhong is necessary in order to acquire a deep and well-rounded comprehension of the philosophical significance of the Way of zhong. The Way of zhong features a dialectal view of the relationship between heaven and human beings, mind and materials, subjective desire and the available objective conditions, self and others, centrality and diversity, and so on. The Way of zhong has become a widely applied philosophical methodology in Confucianism, as well as a political principle and a kind of personal moral merit in early Confucian doctrines. Today, it still has relevance in contemporary Chinese social and cultural contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By means of a theoretical analysis from the point of view of phenomenology of the body, this essay tries to explain the views of Taizhou School on the body so as to apprehend the essence of Confucian thought, which is a philosophy that seeks to “establish oneself” and “cultivate oneself” rather than a “philosophy of consciousness.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Frontiers of Philosophy in China is the property of Higher Education Press Limited Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Frontiers of Philosophy in China is the property of Higher Education Press Limited Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article underscores the philosophy of the arrival of things in ancient Chinese thought. It states that ancient Chinese line of thinking focused primarily into how the achievement of things is potential, rather than into what a thing as a thing is. It posited that man should take part in the achievement or generation of things in order to realize his self-achievement. Moreover, a thing is understood as an event and because all things and man are interconnected, it is potential for man to enter into things by feeling and tasting rather than by trusting on the sense of sight.

The article presents an interpretation of Lunyu as a text of philosophical hermeneutics. It mentions that communicating with Confucius based on people's hermeneutical context, and reading the Analects as a text of philosophical hermeneutics, it can be concluded that as an epochal thinker, the contribution of Confucius thought is that it initiated a humanistic moral ideal with cultural upbringing as its core. It declares that based on humanistic moral ideal, Confucius dealt positively with the human existential plight and social political problems that he faced during his own time. It suggests that modern beliefs about the inherent meaning of traditional Confucianism is an internal challenge which is related to individual life circumstances that people have to face.

The article presents a research which defines and compares private morality and public morality using ethics and public, and reviews weaknesses in the Confucian tradition. It declares that the weakness of public morality in Confucian society lies its ideas on ethics, where in social members stressed their familial relationships, and its ethical relationships. It notes that the Confucian way to realize self-identification and social identification through a network of ethical relationships encountered some obstacles which slowed the release of moral feelings and acts. It suggests that Confucianism overcame these obstacles, to a certain extent through its "quasi ethics," but it failed to eliminate the root of these obstacles and develop the necessary behavioral norms.

An essay is presented on Moral Confucianism. It declares that Moral Confucianism did not successfully develop the "new kingliness without" from its "sageliness within," respond to modernization marked by science and democracy, and provide moral impetus for the development of modern Chinese society. It suggests that the fundamental reason is that it was caught in a web of modern idealism, overemphasizing what ought to be without confronting what actually was.

The article presents a research which explains the Confucian philosophy of difference. It reports that difference is a category of relationship lying between identity and non-identity, and equality and equality. It declares that difference is the Confucian reflection of the real relationship between things in the world and the value of Confucianism. It suggests that the Confucian idea of difference, embodied in the view of human relationship, of world, and of nature, seeks to build a rational order based on difference, to reach a harmonious, united and ideal state. It concludes that in the past dynasties, Confucians continually interpreted difference and raised it to the level of ontology, thereby enriching the system of Confucianism.

The article presents a research concerning the Confucian philosophy and its possibility of it being communitarian. It reports that Confucian communitarianism advocates and thinks highly of community values and promotes individual values to be subordinate to community values. It mentions that communitarian ideas first appeared in the Pre-Qin Confucianism and by the Song Dynasty where in it had become a systematic theory embodied in the "four books," which includes two books called Lunyu and Menzi in which it is composed of two articles, Daxue and Xhongyong. It suggests that as a social and political theory, Confucian communitarianism contribute to Western liberalism and can be an intellectual resource for the development of democracy in East Asian countries and regions.

The article presents a study that explores the characteristics of lixue, the learning of the Neo-Confucian principles, of the Qing Dynasty in China. The study shows that lixue in Qing Dynasty follows the tradition of lixue in the Song Dynasty, Yuan Dynasty and Ming Dynasty, but had its own characteristics. It does not have primary direction, core train of ideas, and creativity. Its emphasis was made on ethics and it was influenced by the Western culture after the Opium War, partly resisting and partly integrating with it. Moreover, the dynamic dispute and integration between the hanxue and songxue Neo-Confucianism traditions, which was not seen in Ming Dynasty, were found to occur during the Qing Dynasty.