Search

How do our bodies influence who we are? Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has examined consciousness associated with the self and related multisensory processing of bodily signals, the so-called bodily self-consciousness. A parallel line of research has highlighted the concept of the autobiographical self and the associated autonoetic consciousness, which enables us to mentally travel in time. The subjective re-experiencing of past episodes is described as re-living them from within or outside one’s body. In this brief perspective, I aim to explore the underlying characteristics of self-consciousness and its relation to bodily signals and episodic memory. I will outline some recent behavioral and neuroimaging evidence indicating that bodily cues play a fundamental role in autobiographical memory. Finally, I will discuss these emerging concepts regarding the current understanding of bodily-self, autobiographical-self, their links to self-consciousness, and suggest directions for future research.

How do our bodies influence who we are? Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has examined consciousness associated with the self and related multisensory processing of bodily signals, the so-called bodily self-consciousness. A parallel line of research has highlighted the concept of the autobiographical self and the associated autonoetic consciousness, which enables us to mentally travel in time. The subjective re-experiencing of past episodes is described as re-living them from within or outside one's body. In this brief perspective, I aim to explore the underlying characteristics of self-consciousness and its relation to bodily signals and episodic memory. I will outline some recent behavioral and neuroimaging evidence indicating that bodily cues play a fundamental role in autobiographical memory. Finally, I will discuss these emerging concepts regarding the current understanding of bodily-self, autobiographical-self, their links to self-consciousness, and suggest directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to provide a psychologically informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favor of the view that the phenomenology of remembering— autonoetic consciousness , as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness , as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time is a fundamental dimension of our perception and mental construction of reality. It enables resolving changes in our environment without a direct sensory representation of elapsed time. Therefore, the concept of time is inferential by nature, but the units of subjective time that provide meaningful segmentation of the influx of sensory input remain to be determined. In this review, we posit that events are the construal instances of time perception as they provide a reproducible and consistent segmentation of the content. In that light, we discuss the implications of this proposal by looking at "events" and their role in subjective time experience from cultural anthropological and ontogenetic perspectives, as well as their relevance for episodic memory. Furthermore, we discuss the significance of "events" for the two critical aspects of subjective time--duration and order. Because segmentation involves parsing event streams according to causal sequences, we also consider the role of causality in developing the concept of directionality of mental timelines. We offer a fresh perspective on representing past and future events before age 5 by an egocentric bi-directional timeline model before acquiring the allocentric concept of absolute time. Finally, we illustrate how the relationship between events and durations can resolve contradictory experimental results. Although "time" warrants a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach, we focus this review on "time perception", the experience of time, without attempting to provide an all encompassing overview of the rich philosophical, physical, psychological, cognitive, linguistic, and neurophysiological context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flowinducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the ubiquity and importance of narratives for human adaptation is widely recognized, there is no integrative framework for understanding the roles of narrative in human adaptation. Research has identified several cognitive and social functions of narratives that are conducive to well-being and adaptation as well as to coordinated social practices and enculturation. In this paper, we characterize the cognitive and social functions of narratives in terms of active inference, to support the claim that one of the main adaptive functions of narrative is to generate more useful (i.e., accurate, parsimonious) predictions for the individual, as well as to coordinate group action (over multiple timescales) through shared predictions about collective behavior. Active inference is a theory that depicts the fundamental tendency of living organisms to adapt by proactively inferring the causes of their sensations (including their own actions). We review narrative research on identity, event segmentation, episodic memory, future projections, storytelling practices, enculturation, and master narratives. We show how this research dovetails with the active inference framework and propose an account of the cognitive and social functions of narrative that emphasizes that narratives are for the future--even when they are focused on recollecting or recounting the past. Understanding narratives as cognitive and cultural tools for mutual prediction in social contexts can guide research on narrative in adaptive behavior and psychopathology, based on a parsimonious mechanistic model of some of the basic adaptive functions of narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Distinctive encoding usually increases correct recognition while also producing a reduction in false recognition. In the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) illusion this phenomenon, called the mirror effect, occurs when participants focus on unique features of each of the words in the study list. In previous studies, the pleasantness rating task, used to foster distinctive encoding, generated different patterns of results. The main aim of our research is to examine under what circumstances this task can produce the mirror effect in the DRM paradigm, based on evidence from recognition accuracy and subjective retrieval experience. In Experiment 1, a standard version (word pleasantness rating on a 5-point Likert-type scale) was used for comparison with two other encoding conditions: shallow processing (vowel identification) and a readonly control. The standard task, compared to the other conditions, increased correct recognition, but did not reduce false recognition, and this result may be affected by the number of lists presented for study. Therefore, in experiment 2, to minimize the possible effect of the so-called retention size, the number of studied lists was reduced. In addition, the standard version was compared with a supposedly more item-specific version (participants rated the pleasantness of words while thinking of a single reason for this), also including the read-only control condition. In both versions of the pleasantness rating task, more correct recognition is achieved compared to the control condition, with no differences between the two versions. In the false recognition observed here, only the specific pleasantness rating task achieved a reduction relative to the control condition. On the other hand, the subjective retrieval experience accompanied correct and false recognition in the various study conditions. Although the standard pleasantness rating task has been considered to perform item-specific processing, our results challenge that claim. Furthermore, we propose a possible boundary condition of the standard task for the reduction of false recognition in the DRM paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Despite the ecological nature of episodic memory (EM) and the importance of consolidation in its functioning, studies tackling both subjects are still scarce. Therefore, the present study aims at establishing predictions of the future of newly encoded information in EM in an ecological paradigm. Methods: Participants recorded two personal events per day with a SenseCam portable camera, for 10 days, and characterized the events with different subjective scales (emotional valence and intensity, self-concept and selfrelevance, perspective and anticipated details at a month, mental images...). They then performed a surprise free recall at 5 days and 1 month after encoding. Machine learning algorithms were used to predict the future of events (episodic or forgotten) in memory at 1 month. Results: The best algorithm showed an accuracy of 78%, suggesting that such a prediction is reliably possible. Variables that best differentiated between episodic and forgotten memories at 1 month were mental imagery, self-reference, and prospection (anticipated details) at encoding and the first free recall. Discussion: These results may establish the basis for the development of episodic autobiographical memory during daily experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation--engendered by attentional activity--of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent's own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the twentieth century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While in previous work I have addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory, the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The recent COVID-19 pandemic has compelled various governments to trace all contacts of a confirmed case, as well as to identify the locations visited by infected individuals. This task, that requires the activation of our autobiographical memories, can make a difference in the spread of the contagion and was based primarily on telephone interviews with infected people. In this study, we examined whether participants were able to provide contact tracing information and whether their memories were influenced by salient events occurring during the initial phases of the pandemic. Methods: Participants were asked to fill in an online standardized form in which they recounted every day of the 2 weeks before, reporting as much information as possible. The time period selected included, among other things, the day on which the Italian government issued the decree initiating the COVID-19 lockdown. The task was completed twice, the first time relying solely on their memory, and the second time using external aids (diaries, mobile phones etc.). Reports were then coded using a scheme that segmented accounts into informational details, divided into two broad categories, internal and external. Results: Our findings showed that (i) the use of external aids was effective only when participants had to recall the day furthest away or if to-be-recalled events have low distinctiveness, and (ii) memories of internal details were recalled better than memories of external details. Participants were overall accurate and reported a large amount of information about people and places. However, because of the connection with key pandemic-related events, the effect was somewhat stronger on specific days (e.g., the day in which the lockdown was announced). Discussion: The results of this work could provide a useful tool for improving the design of contact tracing procedures in the event of an unwanted future public health crisis caused by a highly infectious agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces a process-oriented approach for improving present moment conceptualization in psychotherapy that is in alignment with neuroscience: the Temporospatial movements of mind (TSMM) model. We elaborate on seven temporal movements that describe the moment-to-moment morphogenesis of emotional feelings and thoughts from inception to maturity. Temporal refers to the passage of time through which feelings and thoughts develop, and electromagnetic activity, that among other responsibilities, bind information across time. Spatial dynamics extend from an undifferentiated to three dimensional experiences of emotional and cognitive processes. Neurophysiologically, spatial refers to structures within the brain and their varying interactions with one another. This article culminates in the development of an atheoretical temporospatial grid that may help clinicians conceptualize where patients are in their cognitive and emotional development to further guide technique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rather than occurring abstractly (autonomously), ethical growth occurs in interpersonal relationships (IRs). It requires optimally functioning cognitive processes [attention, working memory (WM), episodic/autobiographical memory (AM), inhibition, flexibility, among others], emotional processes (physical contact, motivation, and empathy), processes surrounding ethical, intimacy, and identity issues, and other psychological processes (self-knowledge, integration, and the capacity for agency). Without intending to be reductionist, we believe that these aspects are essential for optimally engaging in IRs and for the personal constitution. While they are all integrated into our daily life, in research and academic work, it is hard to see how they are integrated. Thus, we need better theoretical frameworks for studying them. That study and integration thereof are undertaken differently depending on different views of what it means to live as a human being. We rely on neuroscientific data to support the chosen theory to offer knowledge to understand human beings and interpersonal relational growth. We should of course note that to describe what makes up the uniqueness of being, acting, and growing as a human person involves something much more profound which requires too, a methodology that opens the way for a theory of the person that responds to the concerns of philosophy and philosophical anthropology from many disciplines and methods (Orón Semper, 2015; Polo, 2015), but this is outside the scope of this study. With these in mind, this article aims to introduce a new explanatory framework, called the Interprocessual-self (IPS), for the neuroscientific findings that allow for a holistic consideration of the previously mentioned processes. Contributing to the knowledge of personal growth and avoiding a reductionist view, we first offer a general description of the research that supports the interrelation between personal virtue in IRs and relevant cognitive, emotional, and ethic-moral processes. This reveals how relationships allow people to relate ethically and grow as persons. We include conceptualizations and descriptions of their neural bases. Secondly, with the IPS model, we explore neuroscientific findings regarding self-knowledge, integration, and agency, all psychological processes that stimulate inner exploration of the self concerning the other. We find that these fundamental conditions can be understood from IPS theory. Finally, we explore situations that involve the integration of two levels, namely the interpersonal one and the social contexts of relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alzheimer's disease is an insidious onset neurodegenerative syndrome without effective treatment or cure. It is rapidly becoming a global health crisis that is overwhelming healthcare, society, and individuals. The clinical nature of neurocognitive decline creates significant challenges in bidirectional communication between caregivers and persons with Alzheimer's disease (AD) that can negatively impact quality-of-life. This paper sought to understand how and to what extent would awareness training about the levels of consciousness in AD influence the quality-of-life interactions in the caregiver-patient dyad. A literature review of multiple databases was conducted utilizing a transdisciplinary approach. The sum of findings indicates a positive relationship between enhanced caregiver awareness and training, positive interactions, and improved QOL measures among patients and caregivers. A multidirectional relationship was found among healthcare policies, training and education resources, caregivers, and persons with AD. Specifically, the current lack of policy and inadequate training and educational resources has various detrimental effects on patients and caregivers, while improvements in training and education of caregivers yields positive outcomes in communication and QOL. Furthermore, evidence of preserved consciousness in persons with AD was demonstrated from multiple disciplines, including neurobiological, psychological, and biopsychosocial models. The literature further revealed several methods to access the preserved consciousness in persons with AD and related dementias, including sensory, emotional, and cognitive stimulations. The evidence from the literature suggests a reframed approach to our understanding and treatment of persons with AD is not only warranted, but crucial to address the needs of those affected by AD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The subjective experience associated to memory processing is the core of the definition of episodic autobiographical memory (EAM). However, while it is widely known that amnesia affects the content of memories, few studies focused on the consequences of an impairment of EAM on the subjective self, also called the I-self. In the present study, we explored the I-self in two puzzling disorders that affect EAM: functional amnesia , which has an impact on autobiographical memory, and transient global amnesia (TGA), which only affects episodic memory. I-self was assessed through an original measure of self-integration in autobiographical narratives, namely the use of general or personal pronouns. Results showed that patients with functional amnesia tended to use general pronouns, whereas patients with TGA preferentially used the first person. The link between I-self and depersonalization-derealisation tendencies was also explored, showing dissociative tendencies in patients with functional amnesia but not in patients with TGA. We discuss these results from a combined neuropsychological and psychopathological perspective, with a view to proposing an explanatory model of the links between self-awareness and the episodic component of autobiographical memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is principally concerned with reappraising some of the major disagreements that separated the Viennese and the London Kleinians during the British Psychoanalytical Society's Controversial Discussions. Of particular focus are questions pertaining to the genesis of ego development, the beginnings of object-relating, and the role of unconscious phantasy in respect of these phenomena. The aim of the investigation is to inquire into the light that may be shed on the once intractable conflicts surrounding these questions by bringing to bear more recent developments from psychoanalysis and the neurosciences. First, various key issues from the Controversial Discussions are outlined, before the paper turns to work by Jaak Panksepp and Mark Solms that bears on these older arguments and the Freudian theories that underpinned them. With these conceptual foundations established, three questions are posed and discussed with a view to understanding the implications of recent neuropsychoanalytic thinking for some of the entrenched conflicts that divided the British Society. These questions include: (1) what does it mean for the ego if the id is conscious? (2) What does recent neuroscientific knowledge tell us about whether the ego should be thought of as present from birth? (3) How can we understand and locate unconscious phantasy if the main part of the mind that Freud thought of as unconscious is not so? Research from the arena of infant development—particularly the material and analysis of infant observation—is drawn on to illustrate various conclusions. The paper ultimately concludes that taking such an interdisciplinary approach can reveal renewed justification for aspects of the Kleinian metapsychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the theory of reconsolidation, the contents of an original memory can be updated after reactivation with subsequent new learnings. However, there seems to be a lack of an appropriate behavioral paradigm to study the reconsolidation of explicit self-related memory, which is of great significance to further explore its cognitive neural mechanism in the future. In two separate experiments, we adapted a trial-by-trial interfering paradigm with a self-episodic simulation process and investigated (1) whether it is possible to reconsolidate negative memories under the new behavioral paradigm and (2) how the emotional valence of post-retrieval interference material affects the reconsolidation of negative memories. The results showed that the negative memories under trial-by-trial self-simulation can be degraded and updated via post-retrieval interference processes. Individuals whose original memories were reactivated by initial background cues and who were then presented with new interference situations were less able to recall original scenes and showed more memory intrusions on these scenes than those who had experienced new learning without reactivation or only reactivation without interference. Furthermore, the extent and manner of memory change/updating were greatly influenced by the characteristics of interference information. For memories with negative valences, new learning materials with the same valence produced superior interference effects in the form of lower correct recalls and more integrated false; whereas the neutral interference materials can cause more memory intrusion. Post-retrieval memory distortions of negative self-memory may underlie different functional mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies imply causal links between linguistic competencies and Theory of Mind (ToM). But despite Dyslexia being a prime example of linguistic deficits, studies on whether it is related to ToM have been relatively unforthcoming. In the first of 2 studies (N = 89), independently-diagnosed dyslexic adults and non-dyslexic adults were presented with false-belief vignettes via computer, answering 4 types of question (Factual, Inference, 1st-order ToM & 2nd-order ToM). Dyslexia related to lower false-belief scores. Study 2 (N = 93) replicated this result with a non-computer-based variant on the false-belief task. We considered the possibility that the apparent-issue with ToM is caused by processing demands more associated to domains of cognition such as language, than to ToM itself. Addressing this possibility, study 2 additionally utilised the ToM30Q questionnaire, designed largely to circumvent issues related to language and memory. Principal-Components analysis extracted 4 factors, 2 capturing perceptual/representational ToM, and the other 2 capturing affective components related to ToM. The ToM30Q was validated via its associations to a published measure of empathy, replication of the female gender advantage over males, and for one factor from the ToM30Q there was a correlation with an existing published index of ToM. However, when we considered the performance of dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants using the ToM30Q, we found absolutely no difference between them. The contrasting findings from our 2 studies here, arguably offer the first experimental evidence with adults, that there is in fact no ToM deficit in dyslexia. Additionally, this finding raises the possibility that some other groups considered in some sense atypical, failed ToM tasks, not because they actually have a ToM deficit at all, but rather because they are asked to reveal their ToM competence through cognitive domains, such as language and memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by atypical perception, including processing that is biased toward local details rather than global configurations. This bias may impact on memory. The present study examined the effect of this perception on both implicit (Experiment 1) and explicit (Experiment 2) memory in conditions that promote either local or global processing. The first experiment consisted of an object identification priming task using two distinct encoding conditions: one favoring local processing (Local condition) and the other favoring global processing (Global condition) of drawings. The second experiment focused on episodic (explicit) memory with two different cartoon recognition tasks that favored either local (i.e., processing specific details) or a global processing (i.e., processing each cartoon as a whole). In addition, all the participants underwent a general clinical cognitive assessment aimed at documenting their cognitive profile and enabling correlational analyses with experimental memory tasks. Seventeen participants with ASD and 17 typically developing (TD) controls aged from 10 to 16 years participated to the first experiment and 13 ASD matched with 13 TD participants were included for the second experiment. Experiment 1 confirmed the preservation of priming effects in ASD but, unlike the Comparison group, the ASD group did not increase his performance as controls after a globally oriented processing. Experiment 2 revealed that local processing led to difficulties in discriminating lures from targets in a recognition task when both lures and targets shared common details. The correlation analysis revealed that these difficulties were associated with processing speed and inhibition. These preliminary results suggest that natural perceptual processes oriented toward local information in ASD may impact upon their implicit memory by preventing globally oriented processing in time-limited conditions and induce confusion between explicit memories that share common details. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autobiographical memory (AM) is closely linked to the self-concept, and fulfills directive, identity, social, and adaptive functions. Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are now known to have atypical AM, which may be closely associated with social communication difficulties. This may result in qualitatively different autobiographical narratives, notably regarding social identity. In the present study, we sought to investigate this concept and develop a cognitive intervention targeting individuals with ASD. First, 13 adolescents with ASD and 13 typically developing adolescents underwent an AM interview featuring an original coding system designed to analyze the social self. We observed that the narratives produced by the ASD group focused more on the family than on extended social spheres, compared with those of the comparison group. Moreover, participants with ASD did not include themselves in the social groups they mentioned, and produced more references to others, compared with typically developing participants. Second, we designed a cognitive intervention program consisting of individual and group sessions that targeted AM. We conducted a pilot study among three adolescents with ASD aged 12, 16, and 17 years. Preliminary results showed that the program increased extra-family narrative references by the two youngest adolescents, who produced more social integration markers. Our study of autobiographical narratives yielded interesting findings about social positioning in ASD and showed how AM can be targeted in rehabilitation programs as a vector of social interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent advances in the neuroscience of episodic memory provide a framework to integrate object relations theory, a psychoanalytic model of mind development, with potential neural mechanisms. Object relations are primordial cognitive-affective units of the mind derived from survival- and safety-level experiences with caretakers during phase-sensitive periods of infancy and toddlerhood. Because these are learning experiences, their neural substrate likely involves memory, here affect-enhanced episodic memory. Inaugural object relations are encoded by the hippocampus-amygdala synaptic plasticity, and systems-consolidated by medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Self- and object-mental representations, extracted from these early experiences, are at first dichotomized by contradictory affects evoked by frustrating and rewarding interactions ("partial object relations"). Such affective dichotomization appears to be genetically hardwired the amygdala. Intrinsic propensity of mPFC to form schematic frameworks for episodic memories may pilot non-conscious integration of dichotomized mental representations in neonates and infants. With the emergence of working memory in toddlers, an activated self- and object-representation of a particular valence can be juxtaposed with its memorized opposites creating a balanced cognitive-affective frame (conscious "integration of object relations"). Specific events of object relations are forgotten but nevertheless profoundly influence the mental future of the individual, acting (i) as implicit schema-affect templates that regulate attentional priorities, relevance, and preferential assimilation of new information based on past experience, and (ii) as basic units of experience that are, under normal circumstances, integrated as attractors or "focal points" for interactive self-organization of functional brain networks that underlie the mind. A failure to achieve integrated object relations is predictive of poor adult emotional and social outcomes, including personality disorder. Cognitive, cellular-, and systems-neuroscience of episodic memory appear to support key postulates of object relations theory and help elucidate neural mechanisms of psychodynamic psychotherapy. Derived through the dual prism of psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the gained insights may offer new directions to enhance mental health and improve treatment of multiple forms of psychopathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to provide a psychologically informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favor of the view that the phenomenology of remembering—autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here—is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides.

In two independent yet complementary studies, the current research explored the developmental changes of young children's conceptualization of learning, focusing the role of knowledge change and learning intention, and its association with their developing theory of mind (ToM) ability. In study 1, 75 children between 48 and 86 months of age (M = 65.45, SD = 11.45, 36 girls) judged whether a character with or without a genuine knowledge change had learned. The results showed that younger children randomly attributed learning between genuine knowledge change and accidental coincidence that did not involve knowledge change. Children's learning judgments in familiar contexts improved with age and correlated with their ToM understanding. However, the correlation was no longer significant once age was held constant. Another sample of 72 children aged between 40 and 90 months (M = 66.87, SD = 11.83, 31 girls) participated in study 2, where children were asked to judge whether the story protagonists intended to learn and whether they eventually learned. The results suggested that children over-attributed learning intention to discovery and implicit learning. Stories with conflict between the learning intention and outcome appeared to be most challenging for children. Children's intention judgment was correlated with their ToM understanding, and ToM marginally predicted intention judgment when the effect of age was accounted for. The implication of the findings for school readiness was discussed. Training studies and longitudinal designs in the future are warranted to better understand the relation between ToM development and children's learning understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Silence is an important aspect of various meditation practices, but little work has focused specifically on the underlying neurophysiology of silence-related meditative practice, and on how it relates to the self-reported experiences of practitioners. To expand current knowledge regarding the neurophenomenology of silence in meditation, we directly investigated first-person reports of silence-related experiences during the practice of Quadrato Motor Training (QMT) and their association with changes in fractional anisotropy (FA). Participants recorded their cognitive, emotional, and physical experiences upon beginning QMT and again after 6 weeks of QMT practice. These reports were evaluated qualitatively and quantitatively. Findings showed that change between the two time points in self-reported silence-related experiences was negatively correlated with change in attentional effort, and positively correlated with changes in the left uncinate fasciculus. These results expand current knowledge regarding the neuroanatomical correlates of silence-related experiences during meditation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relation between episodic memory and episodic (or experiential) imagination? According to the causal theory of memory, memory differs from imagination because remembering entails the existence of a continuous causal connection between one's original experience of an event and one's subsequent memory, a connection that is maintained by a memory trace. The simulation theory rejects this conception of memory, arguing against the necessity of a memory trace for successful remembering. I show that the simulation theory faces two serious problems, which are better explained by appealing to a causal connection maintained by a memory trace. Remembering the personal past is not the same as imagining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recalling memories for which one is nostalgic provides a host of psychological benefits, including promoting positive affect. The present research (N = 409) examined how memory recall perspective impacts this affective consequence of waxing nostalgic. Memory recall perspective research indicates that people show stronger affective engagement with memories recalled from a first person perspective (seeing the event through one's own eyes, as one experienced it) rather than a third person perspective (seeing the event as an outside observer may have). Results indicated that when participants recalled memories from a first person perspective, those who recalled an event for which they felt nostalgic reported higher positive affect compared to their counterparts who recalled an ordinary past event. However, when participants recalled memories from a third person perspective, those who recalled an event for which they felt nostalgic reported levels of positive affect that did not differ from participants who recalled an ordinary past event. This finding suggests that, when comparing nostalgic reverie to recalling an ordinary past event, the extent to which nostalgia serves as a well-spring of positive affect is partially impacted by memory recall perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We review evidence for Macphail's (1982, 1985, 1987) Null Hypothesis , that nonhumans animals do not differ either qualitatively or quantitatively in their cognitive capacities. Our review supports the Null Hypothesis in so much as there are no qualitative differences among nonhuman vertebrate animals, and any observed differences along the qualitative dimension can be attributed to failures to account for contextual variables. We argue species do differ quantitatively, however, and that the main difference in "intelligence" among animals lies in the degree to which one must account for contextual variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Supraspan verbal list-learning tests, such as the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT), are classic neuropsychological tests for assessing verbal memory. In this study, we investigated the impact of the meaning of the words to be learned on three memory stages [short-term recall (STR), learning, and delayed recall (DR)] in a cohort of 447 healthy adults. First, we compared scores obtained from the RAVLT (word condition) to those of an alternative version of this test using phonologically similar but meaningless items (pseudoword condition) and observed how each score varied as a function of age and sex. Then, we collected the participants' self-reported strategies to retain the word and pseudoword lists and examined if these strategies mediated the age and sex effects on memory scores. The word condition resulted in higher memory scores than pseudoword condition at each memory stage and even canceled out, for the learning stage, the detrimental effect of age that was observed for the short-term and DR. When taking sex into account, the word advantage was observed only in women for STR. The self-reported strategies, which were similar for words and pseudowords, were based on the position of the item on the list (word: 53%, pseudoword: 37%) or the meaning of the item (word: 64%, pseudoword: 58%) and were used alone or in combination. The best memory performance was associated with the meaning strategy in the word condition and with the combination of the meaning and position strategies in the pseudoword condition. Finally, we found that the word advantage observed in women for STR was mediated by the use of the meaning strategy. The RAVLT scores were thus highly dependent on word meaning, notably because it allowed efficient semantic knowledge-based strategies. Within the framework of Tulving's declarative memory model, these results are at odds with the depiction of the RAVLT as a verbal episodic memory test as it is increasingly referred to in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study was to adapt the Listening Span Task (Gaulin and Campbell, 1994; Pickering and Gathercole, 2001) into Turkish (LST-T), to administer it to children in order to measure how children of different ages perform on the task and to measure its psychometric properties by providing correlations with other cognitive measures: the Word Span Test that measures phonological WM capacity, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test that measures both categorization ability and executive WM functions, and the Categorical Free Recall Test that examines both the development of the release from proactive interference pattern and the categorization ability during childhood. The results indicate that the LST-T scores increased in a significant stepwise manner without any gender difference between boys and girls. Measures of convergent validity showed significant correlations with a working memory test: the Word Span Test, and. The results demonstrate that the LST-T is an adequate tool to be used by developmentalists for a variety of purposes, ranging from developmental research to educational and clinical practice to investigate cognitive development of Turkish-speaking children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals with autistic traits are those who present in the normal population with characteristics of social, communication, personality, and cognitive impairments but do not meet the clinical threshold for autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Most studies have focused on the abnormalities in ASD patients rather than on individuals with autistic traits. In this study, we focused on the behaviors of a large sample (N = 401) of Chinese individuals with different levels of autistic traits, measured using the Autism Spectrum Quotient, and applied voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to determine their association to differences in brain structure. The results mainly showed that the correlation between gray matter volume (GMV) and gray matter density of the brain and the Autism Spectrum Quotient was significant in these regions: the right middle frontal gyrus, which are involved in social processing and social reasoning; the left parahippocampal gyrus, which is involved in socioemotional behaviors and unconscious relational memory encoding; and the right superior parietal lobule, which are involved in cognitive control and the ability to show attention to detail. These findings reveal that people with autistic traits in the normal population have atypical development in GMV and gray matter density, which may affect their social functioning and communication ability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both a method of therapy and an exploration of psychic reality, free association is a fundamental element of psychoanalytical practices that refers to the way a patient is asked to describe what comes spontaneously to mind in the therapeutic setting. This paper examines the role of free association from the point of view of psychoanalysis and neuroscience in order to improve our understanding of therapeutic effects induced by psychoanalytic therapies and psychoanalysis. In this regard, we first propose a global overview of the historical origins of the concept of free association in psychoanalysis and examine how Freud established its principles. Then, from Freud's distinction between primary and secondary processes, we proceed to compare the psychoanalytic model with research originating from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. The notions of entropy and free energy appear particularly relevant at the intersection of these different domains. Finally, we propose the notion of symbolizing transmodality to describe certain specificities of symbolization processes within free association and we summarize the main functions of free association in psychoanalytic practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is statistical, abstract and difficult to comprehend directly. Imagining a specific, personal episode where you experience consequences of climate change in the future (episodic future thinking) may bring climate change closer, thus increasing the perceived risk of climate-related risk events. We conducted an experiment to test whether episodic future thinking increased the perceived risk of climate-related risk events and climate change in general, as compared to thinking about the future in a general, abstract manner (semantic future thinking). We also tested whether this effect is moderated by how easy it is to imagine the specific climate-related risk event initially. Participants were randomly assigned to an episodic future thinking-condition or a semantic future thinking-condition, and two of the risk events in each condition were related to flooding (difficult to imagine) and two were related to extreme temperature (easy to imagine). The results show no main effect of episodic future thinking on perceived risk, and no interaction effect with imaginability. Contrary to expectations and earlier research, this suggests that episodic future thinking may not influence risk perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorism is a salient risk source in 21st century life and may deter tourists from visiting certain destinations. How people perceive the risk of a future terror attack abroad, and thus their traveling decisions, may be influenced by whether they think about the future in specific and personal terms (episodic future thinking) or in more general, abstract terms (semantic future thinking). In a pre-registered experiment (N = 277) we explored the potential impact of episodic future thinking on the perceived risk of terror attacks abroad. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) An episodic future thinking-condition, where participants were asked to imagine a specific, terror-related personal episode that might occur in the future while traveling abroad; (2) a semantic future thinking-condition, where participants were asked to think more abstractly about terror events that might occur in the future; (3) an episodic counterfactual thinking-condition, where participants were asked to imagine a specific, terror-related personal episode that might have occurred in the past while traveling abroad and (4) a passive control condition. Participants indicated their perceived risk of six different future terror attacks occurring abroad. The manipulation checks suggest that the experimental manipulations functioned as intended. Contrary to the central hypothesis of the study, there were no differences in the perceived risk of terror attacks between the conditions. These results run counter to previous research and do not support the idea that how people think about the future influences their perceived risk of future dramatic events. Potential limitations and implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive studies generally report impaired autobiographical memory in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), but mostly using verbal paradigms. In the present study, we therefore investigated the properties of both past and future autobiographical productions using visual cues in 16 boys with ASD and 16 typically developing (TD) participants aged between 10 and 18 years. We focused on sensory properties, emotional properties, and recollection, probing past and future productions for both near and distant time periods. Results showed that the ASD group performed more poorly than controls on free recall for recent periods, but performed like them when provided with visual cues. In addition, the ASD group reported fewer sensory details than controls and exhibited difficulties in the experience of recollection for the most remote events. These data suggest a combination of consolidation and binding deficits. Finally, our findings reveal the relevance of using visual cues to probe autobiographical memory, with possible perspectives for memory rehabilitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience being the protagonist in the memory scene. This is the "phenomenal presence of self." To explore this special sense of self in memory, this paper focuses on the issue of how one identifies oneself in episodic simulation at the retrieval of memory and draws attention to the field and observer perspectives in episodic memory. Metzinger (2013a,b, 2017) recently introduced the concept of the phenomenal unit of identification (UI) to characterize the phenomenal property that gives rise to the conscious experience of "I am this." This paper shows how observer-perspective remembering provides an interesting opportunity for studying the sense of self. It is argued that observer-perspective remembering is a stable state of consciousness that is distinct from autoscopic phenomena with respect to the dimensions of minimal phenomenal self (MPS). Together, the notion of UI and the particular style of remembering offer a way of understanding the phenomenal presence of self, and three possible ways in which phenomenal properties constitute UI in memory are raised. The study of perspectives in episodic simulation may prompt new empirical and conceptual issues concerning both the sense of identity and the relationship between MPS and extended self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The questions of whether episodic memory is a propositional attitude, and of whether it has propositional content, are central to discussions about how memory represents the world, what mental states should count as memories, and what kind of beings are capable of remembering. Despite its importance to such topics, these questions have not been addressed explicitly in the recent literature in philosophy of memory. In one of the very few pieces dealing with the topic, Fernández ( 2006 ) provides a positive answer to the initial questions by arguing that the propositional attitude view of memory, as I will call it, provides a simple account of how memory possesses truth-conditions. A similar suggestion is made by Byrne ( 2010 ) when he proposes that perception and episodic memory have the same kind of content, differing only in degree. Against the propositional attitude view, I will argue that episodic memory does not have propositional content, and therefore, that it is not a propositional attitude. My project here is, therefore, mainly critical. I will show that, if empirical work is to inform our philosophical theories of memory in any way, we have good reasons to deny, or at least to be skeptical, of the prospects of the propositional attitude view of episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzed the relation between mental time travel (MTT) and the ability to produce a storytelling focusing on global coherence, which is one of the most notable characteristics of narrative discourse. As global coherence is strictly tied to the temporal sequence of the events narrated in a story, we hypothesized that the construction of coherent narratives would rely on the ability to mentally navigate in time. To test such a hypothesis, we investigated the relation between one component of MTT—namely, episodic future thinking (EFT)—and narrative production skills by comparing the narratives uttered by 66 children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD) with those produced by 66 children with typical development. EFT was assessed by administering a task with minimal narrative demands, whereas storytelling production skills were assessed by administering two narrative production tasks that required children to generate future or past episodes with respect to the target stimuli. The results showed that EFT skills were impaired only in a subgroup of children with ASD and that such subgroup performed significantly worse on the narrative production task than ASD participants with high EFT skills and participants with typical development. The practical and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diachronic unity is the belief that, despite changes, we are the same person across the lifespan. We propose that diachronic unity is supported by the experience of remembering the self over time during episodic recall (i.e., phenomenological continuity). However, we also predict that diachronic unity is also possible when episodic memory is impaired, as long as the ability to construct life narratives from semantic memory (i.e., semantic continuity) is intact. To examine this prediction, we investigated diachronic unity in Alzheimer's Disease (AD) and amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI), two conditions characterised by disrupted phenomenological continuity. If semantic continuity is also altered in these conditions, there should be an associated deterioration in diachronic unity. Participants with AD, aMCI, and healthy controls (HC) completed a self-persistence interview measuring diachronic unity (beliefs about self-persistence, explanations for stability/change). Semantic continuity was assessed with a life-story interview measuring autobiographical reasoning (self-event connections), and coherence (temporal/thematic/causal) of narratives. Our results highlight a complex relationship between semantic continuity and diachronic unity and revealed a divergence between two aspects of diachronic unity: AD/aMCI groups did not differ from HC in continuity beliefs, but AD explanations for self-persistence were less sophisticated. Semantic continuity was most impaired in AD: their narratives had fewer self-event connections (vs. HCs) and lower temporal/thematic coherence (vs. HC/aMCI), while both AD/aMCI groups had lower causal coherence. Paradoxically AD participants who scored higher on measures of beliefs in the persistence of the core self, provided less sophisticated explanations for their self-persistence and were less able to explore persistence in their life narratives. These findings support the importance of semantic continuity to diachronic unity, but suggest a more nuanced and multifaceted relationship than originally proposed in our model. In AD, diminished life narratives that retain features of cultural life scripts are sufficient for strong subjective beliefs of self-persistence, but not for sophisticated explanations about persistence. Better semantic continuity, with the ability to weave high-quality life narratives, may scaffold the capacity to understand and explain one's diachronic unity, but this produces less surety about self-persistence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some scholars have noted that an impressive number of self-related terms have been gradually introduced in the scientific literature. Several of these terms are either ill-defined or synonymous, creating confusion, and redundancy. In an effort to minimize this problem, I present a novel and systematic way of looking at possible relations between several key self-terms. I also propose a tentative classification scheme of self-terms as follows: (1) basic terms related to the overall process of self-perception (e.g., self-awareness), (2) non self-terms that are importantly associated to some other self-terms (e.g., consciousness and Theory of Mind), (3) processes related to the executive self and involving agency, volition, and self-control (e.g., self-regulation), and (4) self-views, that is, the content and feelings about the self (e.g., self-esteem). Three additional categories not discussed in this paper are self-biases, reactions to the self, and interpersonal style. Arguably unambiguous definitions for some of the most important and frequently used self-terms are suggested. These are presented in tables meant for the reader to search for definitions as well as related terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strategic or deliberate adoption of a cognitively distanced, third-person perspective is proposed to adaptively regulate emotions. However, studies of psychological disorders suggest spontaneous adoption of a third-person perspective reflects counter-productive avoidance. Here, we review studies that investigate the deliberate adoption of a third- or first-person vantage perspective and its impact on affect in healthy people, "sub-clinical" populations and those with psychological disorders. A systematic search was conducted across four databases. After exclusion criteria were applied, 38 studies were identified that investigated the impact of both imagery and verbal instructions designed to encourage adoption of a third-person perspective on self-reported affect. The identified studies examined a variety of outcomes related to recalling memories, imagining scenarios andmood induction. These were associated with specific negative emotions or mood states (dysphoria/sadness, anxiety, anger), mixed or neutral affect autobiographical memories, and self-conscious affect (e.g., guilt). Engaging a third-person perspective was generally associated with a reduction in the intensity of positive and negative affect. Studies that included measures of semantic change, suggested that this is a key mediator in reduction of affect following perspective change. Strategically adopting a "distanced," third-person perspective is linked to a reduction in affect intensity across valence, but in addition has the potential to introduce new information that regulates emotion via semantic change. Such reappraisal distinguishes deliberate adoption of a distanced perspective from the habitual and/or spontaneous shift in perspective that occurs in psychopathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Flying phobia is a highly prevalent anxiety disorder, which causes sufferers significant distress and life interference. The processes which maintain flying phobia remain poorly understood. A systematic search of the literature was performed to identify what research has been conducted into the processes which may be involved in the fear of flying and whether processes which are believed to maintain other anxiety disorder diagnoses have been investigated in flying phobia. The results of the literature review are presented and related to existing cognitive behavioral theory and research. The results indicate that little research has been conducted into a number of areas considered important in the wider cognitive behavioral literature on anxiety disorders: namely attention, mental imagery, memory, worry, and safety-seeking behaviors. The review proposes a hypothetical model, derived from cognitive behavioral theory, for the processes which may be involved in maintaining flying phobia, and considers a number of areas for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Occupational work as personal and social identification can be conceptualized as one of the life goals that we strive for and find meaning in. A basic categorization of the phenomenon of work-related identity is suggested, based on psychological theories of identity, memory and relational schema. It distinguishes between organizational, workgroup and professional identity. The two former relate to the concepts of social identity and collective self and the latter to the concepts of personal identity and individual self. These are assumed to form functionally independent cognitive structures, leading to separate motivations and influences on work-related satisfaction. Given this, empirical research on the impact of work-related identity on employee satisfaction, in general terms, is reviewed. The article concludes with some prospective directions for future research by sketching a general model of work-related self. It is hypothesized to evolve by a causal progression from employment across time via emotional and cognitive components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals who have Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM) are able to recall, with considerable accuracy, details of daily experiences that occurred over many previous decades. The present study parametrically investigates the quantity and quality of details of autobiographical memories acquired 1-week, 1-month, 1-year, and 10-years prior in HSAMs and controls. In addition, we tested the consistency of details provided at the 1-week delay by testing the subjects 1 month later with a surprise assessment. At the 1-week delay, HSAMs and controls recalled an equivalent number of events. In contrast, HSAM recall performance was superior at more remote delays, with remarkable consistency following a 1-month delay. Further, we revealed a relationship between the consistency of recall and HSAMs' obsessive- compulsive tendencies. These data suggest that HSAMs experience normal encoding, yet enhanced consolidation and later recall of autobiographical events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals who have Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM) are able to recall, with considerable accuracy, details of daily experiences that occurred over many previous decades. The present study parametrically investigates the quantity and quality of details of autobiographical memories acquired one-week, one-month, one-year, and ten-years prior in HSAMs and controls. In addition, we tested the consistency of details provided at the one-week delay by testing the subjects one month later with a surprise assessment. At the one-week delay, HSAMs and controls recalled an equivalent number of events. In contrast, HSAM recall performance was superior at more remote delays, with remarkable consistency following a one-month delay. Further, we revealed a relationship between the consistency of recall and HSAMs' obsessive-compulsive tendencies. These data suggest that HSAMs experience normal encoding, yet enhanced consolidation and later recall of autobiographical events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prospective bias is a salient feature of mind wandering in healthy adults, yet little is known about the temporal focus of children's mind wandering. In the present study, (I) we developed the temporal focus of mind wandering questionnaire for school-age children (TFMWQ-C), a 12-item scale with good test--retest reliability and construct validity. (II) The criterion validity was tested by thought sampling in both choice reaction time task and working memory task. A positive correlation was found between the temporal focus measured by the questionnaire and the one adopted during task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs) by thought sampling probes, especially in the trait level of future-oriented mind wandering. At the same time, children who experienced more TUTs tended to show worse behavioral performance during tasks. (III) The children in both tasks experienced more future oriented TUTs than past-oriented ones, which was congruent with the results observed in adults; however, in contrast with previous research on adults, the prospective bias was not influenced by task demands. Together these results indicate that the prospective bias of mind wandering has emerged since the school-age (9~13 years old), and that the relationship between mental time travel (MTT) during mind wandering and the use of cognitive resources differs between children and adults. Our study provides new insights into how this interesting feature of mind wandering may adaptively contribute to the development of children's MTT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]