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In Vietnam, the PFES program of payment for forest environmental services involves more than 100,000 forest right holders. Little is known about the impact of the program on the actual forest management activities by these actors. We used an open-ended self-reporting method in 21 villages in three provinces to characterize changes in forest management due to PFES, to assess levels of change (positive, no change, or negative), and to explore underlying motivations. The major changes identified occurred in the forest patrol groups, trespass and fire prevention, and the effectiveness of forest protection rules. Basically, all respondents reported a positive change in at least one of these features, and no negative change was reported. Respondents also highlighted that the payments and the clarification of boundaries were the main factors underlying this substantial impact. It must be borne in mind however that this success builds on effective forest law enforcement.

The distribution of monetary benefits is a central element in PES schemes and arouses ‘distributional risk’ if felt as unjust by the beneficiaries. The paper defines the concept of distributional risk, proposes a framework surrounding the phenomenon and explores their utility in an analysis of distributional decisions in eight Vietnamese communities that participate in a national forest PES program. This program shares a distributional principle with many PES schemes worldwide, paying out on a per hectare basis, implying that the biggest forest owners get most. Up till now, the communities successfully counterbalance this consequence by asserting the village level as the de facto distributor, able to apply their own principles of justice and partially reframing the disbursements as remuneration for work done for the forest rather than forest ownership. We recommend to legally institutionalize this practice, reaping other advantages as well, such as reduced transaction cost.