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The article examines how the war in the Persian Gulf posed a major and untimely crisis for foreign policy questions of genuine Soviet national interests in the Third World. The blunt fact is that, ever since the collapse of its ideology, the Soviet Union has been in a state of confusion about what constitutes its national interests. Communism provided the U.S.S.R. with a global vision. Once glasnost and perestroika delivered the coup de grace to Marxism-Leninism as the guiding principle of foreign policy, the Soviet ship of state was left rudderless. Any major policy issue becomes grist for domestic infighting. Apart from the inherent national interests at stake for the Soviet Union, the debate coincided with a period of great flux in domestic politics. Apart from the substantive issues intrinsic to the gulf crisis, Mikhail Gorbacbev's increasing weakness compelled him to weave tactically to accommodate conflicting pressures. Perestroika basically committed him to seek common interests with the West. Soviet condemnation of Iraq was stunning and unprecedented. Gorbachev even stated that the Soviet Union bore special responsibility for the invasion, since Iraq employed weapons provided over many years by the U.S.S.R. for defensive purposes.

This article discusses the implication of glasnost and perestroika for the existence of antisemitism in the Soviet Union. Antisemitism draws on both traditional Russian sources as well as sentiments evoked by the current radical changes in Soviet society. The glasnost, or openness, unleashed by President Mikhail Gorbachev has permitted suppressed antisemitic instincts to appear on the public agenda, and perestroika, or economic restructuring, has opened entrepreneurial opportunities that many Soviet citizens view with distrust and identify with Jews. Perceptions of antisemitism are different in various parts of the country. 94 percent of Leningraders and 72 percent of Muscovites polled thought an upsurge of antisemitism was possible, only 21 percent of those from the Caucasus and 29 percent of those from central Asia thought the same. The strongest fears of antisemitism were expressed by those from the largest Jewish communities of the European U.S.S.R. In contemporary Soviet antisemitism there are four main themes: Jewish disloyalty to the Soviet Union, and specifically to Russia; Jewish domination of elite positions; Jewish privilege, as exemplified by a special right to emigrate, with emigration in turn proving Jews' disloyalty and ingratitude; finally, Jews as the root of all of society's evils.

The article examines political conditions and relevant problems in the Soviet Union. Political developments revealed various reforms which virtually rejected the Leninist-Stalinist legacy that dominated the country for many years. These reforms were carried out in 1985 and was further established by the implementation of Perestroika by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. These reforms also revealed a political crisis driven by a vertical conflict within the Communist Party between conservative and democratic elements and a horizontal conflict between the central government and the governments of the union's 15 constituent republics.

A list of books related to international relations is presented. They include "Sri Lanka: A Country Study," edited by Russell R. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Implications for Developing Countries," edited by Ian Goldin and Odin Knudsen, and "Perestroika: The End Game," by George H. Selden Jr.

The article comments on the Czechoslovak Revolution of 1989. There were a number of factors that merged to create this velvet revolution. It was Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev who started it. Gorbachev's perestroika created the condition for the Czechoslovaks to rid themselves of communist rule. However, it was the intellectuals gathered first under the umbrella of Charter 77, later giving way to Civic Forum, who gave the velvet revolution its spiritual character. These intellectuals made is possible for a smooth transition toward a free society.

This article addresses how the U.S. might better position itself to deal with and promote peaceful change in Eastern Europe as the era of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev unfolds. The style and policies of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev are certain to have a powerful, perhaps dramatic, impact in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's calls for glasnost, perestroika and democratization are shaking the foundations of the Communist old regimes. The Soviet leader's words and promises to the Soviet people become threats and blandishments to the ruling elite in Eastern Europe. The fact that there is so, little American understanding of Eastern Europe is shocking, but explainable. Shocking because the two alliances that border the iron curtain comprise the most heavily armed, militarily alert region of the world. More destructive weapons, tanks and armed forces are positioned in this area than in any region at any time in history. The U.S. policy toward Moscow's satellites since 1956 can be called minimalist. The approach of the U.S. to issue of satellites is as close to bipartisan and consistent as any aspect of U.S. policy in the past except for its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance. As Gorbachev's policies begin to have an impact, the U.S. needs to be more attentive to the region.

This article analyzes the impact of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika on Eastern Europe. While most people in Eastern Europe welcome the changes made and the changes promised in the Soviet Union, and hope for similar changes in their region as well, most leaders worry about the likely repercussions. In the past, while reforms in the Soviet Union proved to be manageable or even reversible, the pressure for change in Eastern Europe proved to be uncontrollable. With East European officials showing signs of aversion to starting Gorbachev-style reforms or accelerating existing ones, most of the region is out to step with the Soviet Union. While in Moscow criticism and self-criticism are in vogue, in East Berlin the party leadership reaffirms its own correct course. With the exception of Romania, all East European members of the Warsaw Pact have nonetheless endorse the party line emanating from Moscow. In descending order of sincerity, the leaders of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and even East Germany have spoken in favor of what the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is doing. Polish Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski has been especially full of praise for Gorbachev, stating that the Soviet leader's energy, courage, and farsightedness deserves respect and sympathy.